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The Islamic state


Just some stats on European attitudes. It strikes me anti-Muslim attitudes don't seem correlated with where Safali-Jihadi terrorist attacks have happened either. France in particular appears more Muslim friendly than I'd have expected given the rise of the far right there. Hungary and Greece appear to outliers in terms of bigotry. Greece of course has very bad economic conditions and has been flooded by refugees for a long time. Greek identity is also very tied up with Orthodox Christianity and Turko-phobia. Frightening levels of anti-semitism seeming to correlate with high levels of Christian devotion. The old beast appears to be out of its box.
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On Rudaw Despite long siege Shiite Hashd prefer locals to liberate Tal Afar
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“We do hope that the people of Tal Afar themselves will liberate the city and if they need help we will go ahead with it, but again we want them to do that if they can because if they sacrifice for the liberation of their city they will appreciate it more and it will never fall again to ISIS or any terrorist group.” Nuri said.

He also maintained that local police and security forces are also involved in the ongoing operations and that the final battle will be easy thanks to “cutting off all the roads,”

The Hashd commander who has been on the Tal Afar front from the start of the Mosul operations said that concern for civilian populations is the reason the liberation of the city has taken this long.

“It is not a traditional war between two armies, the presence of civilians makes it hard and we cannot use all our force and it slows us down,” he said. “It is not correct to hurry up.”

Nuri said that sooner or later Mosul and Tal Afar will be liberated and ISIS will be gone, but that the government must address their grievances in order to stop any resurgence of terrorism in the area.

“Unemployment helps terrorism, so I hope the government and the international community help Mosul and rebuild it,” he said, adding that many people have lost their jobs since the coming of ISIS to the area and that the government must address that too.
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Oddly sensible.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 142, Mar 9, 2017
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Several humanitarian groups published a survey of life in east Mosul. It questioned people in 19 neighborhoods. It found that food was the main priority for residents followed by electricity, both of which were in short supply. Other concerns were sewage, which was not available in one-third of the neighborhoods in the study, and drinkable water. The U.N. and aid groups were providing bottled water to just 2 of the areas in the survey. There was also no solid waste management either. Much has been recently made about schools re-opening. Almost all of those are primary level and are working two shifts to accommodate all the students. They are short of stationary and books however. On the other hand, over half of the 19 neighborhoods in the poll had no secondary schools. Those that were open were also not doing the double shifts like the other schools. Another thing often mentioned in stories about east Mosul is that markets and shops are back in business. What’s not mentioned is that many of those places lack basic supplies. More importantly there are few jobs and little money in the east to buy anything. 4/5 of the respondents said they had no cash savings. More than half the people said they were not working. Those that were employed were doing day labor. People were forced into selling their possession to try to make some cash. That meant many markets were selling on credit. Many of these issues are not going to be solved any time soon. Fallujah for example was liberated in June and is still relying upon generators and bottled water and there is no real economy. That’s because the government doesn’t have the funds for any real rebuilding due to low oil prices.
Not good.
 
On War Is Boring As Clashes With Kurdish Fighters Erupt, Yazidi Militiamen Recall Bitter Memories
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Ibrahim’s distrust for the Peshmerga is an uncomfortable fact for the U.S. government, which has pumped resources into Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government hoping it will restore stability to the chaotic region.

A recent meeting between KRG President Masoud Barzani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was seen by commentators as the spark that lit recent clashes between the Peshmerga — loyal to Barzani — and the PKK, a socialist militia which has fought a brutal insurgency against the Turkish state for decades.

In 2014, the PKK opened a corridor for Yazidis to evacuate Mount Sinjar where thousands had fled to escape the Islamic State. Locals, although skeptical of the PKK’s motivations, signed up en masse to join the YBS, a PKK-led militia charged with defending Sinjar from another I.S. attack.

The PKK’s presence is unmistakable in the region as images of the group’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, hang throughout Yazidi villages.
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Still the PKK's finest moment.
 
On MLI THE ENDURING FIGHT AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: CRAIG WHITESIDE AND RASHA AL-AQEEDI FOR INSIDE POLICY
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This leads to the important issue of detention in the post-caliphate period in Iraq. The Iraqi criminal detention system was not in good shape before 2014, and its failings contributed in no small manner to the rise of the Islamic State – due to its laxity and corruption, and the perception of Sunni mass incarceration. Today, these problems are of course magnified ten-fold under the current weight of tens of thousands of prisoners swept up in the effort to defeat the Islamic State. As the United States has learned from its Guantanamo problem, prosecuting prisoners collected on a polluted battlefield by untrained people, in criminal courts, is a difficult task. Nonetheless, if the Iraqi government is unable to come up with better solutions, a third return of the Islamic State is a distinct and likely possibility. In this case, sovereignty concerns should not preclude the active assistance and resources of the international community. If the Islamic State has proved in its actions in France and elsewhere, this is a collective problem now.

A recognition of these challenges is important for all the relevant actors to avoid the mistakes of 2009-2013, mistakes that have led to the loss of thousands of lives and the return of incredible violence and tension throughout not just Iraq and Syria, but to lesser degrees in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, as well as in western countries. The stakes in this game just keep getting higher, with the important set-piece plays still to come.
Runs through a series of post-IS problems. This last one was a big factor in their last revival. Iraq's prison system ended up being a source of recruitment and housing IS's strategic reserve.
 
On Oryx Blog Armour in the Islamic State, the DIY works of Wilayat al-Khayr
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On PBS Author delves into what motivates ISIS supporters
PHIL HIRSCHKORN: Americans since 9/11 have really grappled with this question: “Why do they hate us?” From your discussions with ISIS supporters around the world, was it A, that they don’t like our liberal social mores relative to theirs? Or B, they don’t like our foreign policy, our military deployments in some Muslim-dominated countries? Or would you say it was something else?

GRAEME WOOD:
I think when we look at the reasons that Osama Bin Laden gave for fighting against the United States, they were very clear. They were often very political. So Israel would be mentioned. Autocracies in the Middle East. When I spoke to people who were associated with ISIS, it was a very different type of hatred. They would emphasize this concept of loyalty and disavowal. Loyalty to all Muslims, disavowal and hatred of non-Muslims. So for them, it was an inherent obligation of their religion to hate me. And they would even say after the most friendly interactions, “Oh, by the way, we still hate you.”
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While IS is mostly in the business of killing Muslims.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 143, Mar 10, 2017
There was more movement into the middle of west Mosul, and in the Badush district. The Golden Division seized the Amil 1, Amil 2 and the Aghawat neighborhoods. The Federal Police and Rapid Reaction Division moving up the Tigris River freed Nabi Sheet, Okaidat, Bab Jadid, and attacked Bab al-Tob again. To the west of the city the Iraqi forces (ISF) took two more towns in the Badush area. The advance along multiple fronts is stretching the Islamic State’s defenses. General Maan al-Saadi from the Golden Division claimed that they had been broken, but that’s yet to be seen.
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On War Is Boring This Is Not Your Father’s Iraqi Army
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The Iraqi government has attempted to eliminate ghost soldiers and punish politicians for handing out corrupt contracts, but these steps have been halting and corruption remains an endemic problem, according to Iraq analyst Joel Wing who writes at the blog Musings on Iraq.

“The Iraqi government never tackles corruption because it is not only institutionalized, but is part of how the ruling parties run the country,” Wing told War Is Boring. “Dishing out crooked contracts, handing out jobs, creating ghost soldiers and the like are all part of the patronage networks the parties have to maintain followers and win votes.”

“Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi tried to get rid of some ghost soldiers on the payrolls,” Wing added. “The former Defense Minister Khalid Obeidi went after some politicians for corrupt contracts — but that was because he was being accused of the same and was dismissed by parliament.”

“Otherwise, there has been no real moves.”

It is Iraq’s nepotistic political structure that continues to drain the Iraqi Army and poses one of the biggest obstacles to a lasting peace. Today, the problem is corruption. During the Saddam era, the problem was a military structure which favored loyalty to the Ba’athist regime over ability.
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What's happening in that video?
Much as the Tweet says a IS Suicide Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device charges at a column of well spread out US supplied High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. One breaks away and he chases it at high speed. Then detonates behind two of them all with a stirring nasheed soundtrack. Looks like a pretty big truck bomb but he looks too short of them may have detonated prematurely.
 
On Niqash.org Proxy War? Complicated Allegiances In Sinjar Will Threaten Iraqi Kurdish Unity In Long Run
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In fact, this is not the first time that violence has erupted between allies of the KDP and the PKK. There were also clashes in 1992 and 1994.

In fact, these clashes can be traced one step further back, to long time international enmities.

“The forces that attacked the YBS were trained by the KDP and by Turkey,” Sarhad Warto, a spokesperson for the PKK, says. His implication is that the KDP, which has close links to Turkey, is acting on Turkish orders: The PKK have been fighting the Turkish for decades in Turkey and the Turkish government has repeatedly said it will not tolerate a “new Qandil”. By this, they mean the mountainous Qandil area, near the Iraq-Iran-Turkish border where PKK fighters hide out.

The PKK is also generally considered to be closer to the other major Iraqi Kurdish party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, thanks to both parties having stronger links to Iran, than Turkey.

This is just going to cause more problems for Iraqi Kurdistan, Watheq al-Hashimi, the director of the Iraqi Group for Strategic Studies based in Baghdad, told NIQASH. “There are basically two administrations in Iraqi Kurdistan – one in Erbil [the KDP] and one in Sulaymaniyah [the PUK]. The relationship Massoud al-Barzani [the head of the KDP] has with Turkey and the fighting between the KDP-sponsored forces and the PKK is just going to make that relationship worse.”

It’s not like the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is settled at the moment either. There is an economic crisis that has seen wages go unpaid and locals protesting, as well as the ongoing security crisis caused by the IS group, and an ongoing political problem, that has meant the Iraqi Kurdish parliament has been more or less shuttered for months.

And there are going to be more problems with a similar root cause once the IS group has been driven out, al-Hashimi warns. Control of Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil and means of delivery will be another reason for disputes and it is quite likely external influencers – like Iran, Turkey and the US – will have a lot to do with how these are handled.
And it's not IS have gone away in Sinjar yet.
 

The youthful Change party that split from the Iran aligned and Talabani led PUK. The PUK also tends to to be sympathetic with the PKK. All have bad blood with the KDP; the dominant (and domineering) Kurdish party in Turkey dependent Irbil under the Barzanis. This is all getting increasingly tense and could do with some close management by the Americans. It's Game Of Thrones in baggy trousers.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 147, March 14, 2017
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Researcher Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi uncovered an Islamic State document found in north Mosul about the future of the organization. The paper said IS acknowledged that it would lose not only Mosul but Raqqa as well, but said that setbacks did not mean the end of the caliphate. This would support remarks by Charlie Winter a Senior Research Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College that IS gave up on Mosul months if not a year ago. The writing has been on the wall for a long time that the insurgents were going to lose in Iraq, and it would only be natural for them to start planning for their next phase. One of the group’s main slogans has been “endure.” It has gone through defeats before, and still believes that it will live through this time as well. This is yet another reminder that seizing the Islamic State’s territory is only part of destroying the group, and other security, economic and political steps are necessary, which Baghdad should be planning for.
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Simpleton question, please help:
A group like the self-named Sinai Province who self define as a branch of ISIL but are active just in Sinai, mainly killing Egyptian police & army and the occasional tourist - What do they want can you explain? Is there a goal /endgame / strategy that can be explained in any sort of way that makes sense in traditional warfare / insurgency terms?
 
Simpleton question, please help:
A group like the self-named Sinai Province who self define as a branch of ISIL but are active just in Sinai, mainly killing Egyptian police & army and the occasional tourist - What do they want can you explain? Is there a goal /endgame / strategy that can be explained in any sort of way that makes sense in traditional warfare / insurgency terms?
There's been Takfiri in the Sinai for decades.

This lot swore allegiance to aL Baghdadi so I assume they broadly share IS goals. That's rather grandiose: mainly restoration of the Caliphate under their idea of Sharia. Eventual world domination and a pony. But the reality of Salafi-Jihadi groups is their motivations are diverse and often local. Staying in business is usually a top priority and IS affiliation has some recruitment and retention benefits.

Before becoming Wilayat Sinai Ansar Bait al-Maqdis was quite focused on Israel (on their shit list, not really not an IS priority but they've kept at it) and the gas pipeline to Jordan as well as Egyptian state forces.

On Al Monitor Islamic State's Sinai branch shifts its strategy

Had it shifting to softer civilian targets. Taking down a Russian airliner in October 2015 is their most famous action. You might see this as motivated by Russian intervention in Syria though at this time they had barely targeted IS being mostly focused on more direct threats to Assad and their own basing in Latakia.

On INSS The Ramifications of the Weakening of Wilayat Sinai
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In tandem, over the past year Wilayat Sinai has increased the intensity of its threats against Israel. In October 2015, January 2016, and most recently in August 2016, the organization's spokesmen have promised that they will act against Israel and that the organization retains its promise to work toward the liberation of al-Aqsa Mosque. In a video on August 2, 2016, the organization promised Israel that "we have a long-standing account with you, and you will soon pay the price." In the same video, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi promised not to forget Jerusalem and threatened the Jews that "your land will not be yours for long, it will be your graveyard." The implication is that Wilayat Sinai sees Israel as a partner in the Egyptian campaign against it, and hence its drive to take revenge against Israel. Wilayat Sinai's increased threats may reflect the goal to deter Israel from continuing to support the Egyptian operations. In addition, the organization also seems interested in proving to its patron, the Islamic State, the advantages of the partnership, in the hope of receiving active assistance. It also believes that attacking Israel could earn it the broad support of Muslims around the world who identify with the resistance to Israel, and lament the fact that Israel has not sustained losses inflicted by the Islamic State and its allies.

It is clear, however, that Wilayat Sinai's main efforts remain focused on the Egyptian army, security forces, and police in Sinai. It continues its efforts to carry out terrorist attacks in Egyptian cities, especially in the Cairo area, the Delta, and the Suez Canal. Despite the significant decrease in the effectiveness of its operations over the past few months, it is too early to state that Egypt is on the verge of defeating Wilayat Sinai and removing the danger it poses to the security of Sinai and Egypt as a whole. Egypt must continue to deal with the popular base of support for the organization, through massive investment in building an economic infrastructure in Sinai and in improving the welfare of the local civilian population that has been neglected for many years – in the hope that this too will aid in preventing terrorism.
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My bold, this is the same position as taken by the Egyptian head of AQ, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Jihad against the Jews as a mass mobiliser. As in his case originally their "Near Enemy" seems to be the Egyptian state with which Israel is rather complicit.

This Israeli article also suggests some not unlikely level of collaboration with an ideological enemy of IS Hamas in Gaza. Gaza has a number of Salafi-Jihadi outfits that might be more actively sympathetic.
 
Yes makes sense. Mistakenly did the Sinai Israel land crossing few days ago very tense indeed around the border. The only other foreigners were Ukrainians. Lots and lots of checkpoints and military. Maybe it's not about a goal so much as it is about something meaningful to do on a bleak windy rock hard to even graze a goat on.
 
Simpleton question, please help:
A group like the self-named Sinai Province who self define as a branch of ISIL but are active just in Sinai, mainly killing Egyptian police & army and the occasional tourist - What do they want can you explain? Is there a goal /endgame / strategy that can be explained in any sort of way that makes sense in traditional warfare / insurgency terms?
18 months old but this is probably still worth a listen.
Jihadology Podcast: Jihadism in the Land of the Pharaohs
 

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Other residents have similar stories of overwhelming firepower used against sometimes solitary IS fighters, which caused huge amounts of "collateral damage".

In a graveyard on the other side of Mosul's al-Mamoun district, a team of men and boys dig graves for civilians killed not only by air strikes, but by mortar fire and IEDs left by IS.

"Countless civilians have been killed by these air strikes and many, many bodies are still lying underneath their homes," says Ismail Dabus, 50, shaking his head.

"The aircraft see one Daesh guy on the roof and drops a bomb to get him but, in the basement below, a family of 10 people are sheltering and they get killed too."

He said several families often group together in homes that have large basements, so the destruction of even a single house could result in multiple civilian casualties.

"We keep asking why these air strikes are killing so many civilians," says Dabus.

"We know they are necessary, but they have to check to see whether there are civilians inside before they carry out these attacks."

His cousin Falah claims some of these air strikes fail to actually kill any IS militants.

"Daesh knocked holes through the walls of the houses so they could move around unseen from the sky," he says.

"The US aircraft sees a Daesh fighter and then drops a bomb on that house but half the time the Daesh fighter has already moved to another house."

Collateral damage - the awful war euphemism that smoothes over civilian deaths - is severe in the latest phase of the Mosul conflict.

In the chaotic aftermath of Iraqi army advances, accurate statistics for civilian deaths are not readily available.

Airwars however has estimated that as many as 369 civilians were killed in just one week by air strikes in this district of southwest Mosul, a figure that vastly exceeds modest estimates admitted by Operation Inherent Resolve - the US-led coalition supporting Iraq's battle against IS.
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Airwars again reported civilians killed in Coalition raids outpacing R+6 "collateral damage".
 
On MEE Iraq wants fewer US troops on territory after IS defeat in Mosul, says PM
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Abadi outlined other items on his US agenda, in particular an appeal for more US investment in the Iraqi economy.

The prime minister's advisers realise that the Trump administration's foreign policy is still being worked out as the State Department and National Security Council have yet to make all the top appointments to their various teams.

They are looking to a second meeting between Abadi and Trump later in the year, by which time Trump's Middle East policy will be clearer.

According to Sajad Jiyad, the director of the al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies think-tank, the Iraqi government is not willing to let Trump use its territory against Iran, but is willing to let the US use it against IS in Syria.

"US special forces already cross into Syria. Last week there was an Iraqi air strike inside Syria [against IS]," he said.

"The prime minister said he had spoken to the Syrian government and got permission to operate by land and air in Syria."

He hinted that the US would be allowed to expand its operations against IS in Syria without formally needing Syrian clearance if it was done through the Iraqis.

Jiyad acknowledged that Trump sounded more hostile towards Iran than Obama was, but Iraq would resist that.

"We want to press the US to push the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to be less aggressive towards Iran.

"The Saudis saw Trump win the election and they feel he wants Iraq to be on the side of their alliance rather than on the Iranian side.

"But Abadi is balanced. He doesn't want Iraq to be anti-Iran or anti-Saudi, the same as he is with Turkey, neither anti or pro."
Abadi walking a fine line as usual. Said he wants US training programs to continue in Iraq.
 
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