Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

The Islamic state

On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 239 Jun 12 2017
...
Farther west along the Syrian border the Guardian went to Baaj, which was recently freed by the Hashd. The town was empty of people as the Hashd have told those residents and all the other towns they seized in west Ninewa to evacuate because they were not safe. This has caused a huge displacement confirmed by the United Nations that recorded around 12,000 people from Baaj and Tal Afar arriving in camps south of Mosul from June 8-10. That raises a big question of whether the Hashd just want to clear out explosives and hunt down insurgents in these areas and then will allow the residents to return or whether they plan on keeping them out. Due to west Ninewa being a traditional route for foreign fighters to enter Iraq, pro-Tehran Hashd wanting to create a land route between Iran and Syria, and the Hashd wanting to protect the Shiite Turkmen in Tal Afar this section of the province may become a security zone bereft of people.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force commander General Qasim Suleimani was again seen along the Iraq-Syrian border. When the Hashd originally reached the area earlier this month General Suleimani was pictured with them on social media. Now the Iranian news agency Tasnim posted pictures of the general posing with Afghan Shiite militiamen on the Syrian side of the border. Iran has mobilized Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese and others to help support the Assad government in the Syrian civil war. It raises more questions that the pro-Iran Hashd want to hold western Ninewa so that it can cooperate with Tehran in Syria.
...
Click to expand...
sul3.jpg

Looks like Hazara a long way from home.
 
teqniq said:
Ok try the Torygraph instead, but I think you will find that the SDF is a multi-ethnic force including Kurds.
Click to expand...

Yeah, I know what the SDF is and it's exactly that, a multi-ethic force, basic journalism would tell you that, so calling it Kurdish is shit, as is calling the YPG its military wing.

And I'm not doubting WP is being used, just skeptical of the importance of the attention being drawn to it, especially when it comes from an IS news agency as a source.

And what's with the 'supposedly fighting IS' quip from them then?
 
LynnDoyleCooper said:
So many mistakes in that paragraph... 'supposedly fighting ISIS' ? :hmm:, white phosphorous isn't illegal, it's not being dropped, the SDF aren't Kurdish, nor is the YPG the military wing of the SDF. Quality journalism.
Click to expand...
I think it depends if it's being used as an anti-personal incendiary against or to provide a smoke screen. The latter is absolutely legal the former very dubious especially if civ pop are in the target zone. Unfortunately pushing the envelope here is quite common as making a case stick would be tricky thanks to the ambiguity. White phosphorous has been used in Mosul recently. The Russians make lavish use of incendiary weapons against civilians. It's a perhaps a bit legalistic to focus on white phosphorous as it's not like conventional bombs produce humane results on the battlefield.

The article makes a fair point that there's a certain lack of sympathy with civ pop on IS held turf like Raqqa. Even civ pop supportive of IS should be respected and most in Raqqa probably are not IS fans. Coalition conduct in the environs of Raqqa was criticised AirWars. The rate of civilian deaths is not what you'd expect in village fighting. Now HRW is raising concerns. It looks very iffy to me.

An embattled PM Abadi went for Mosul early. The Iraqi's could not evacuate it due to lack of resources but at least did make some humanitarian provision. They had a very large force assembled with some very capable units. Mosul's a bloodbath but that was anticipated. IS behaviour on their home turf in Iraq is even worse than in Syria. Constant mass casualty attacks on civ pop and the place is littered with mass graves filled with those that opposed them. They've been actively massacring Mosul's civ pop and that justifies some haste. Mosul is also the financial heart of the Caliphate. It's vital to shut that down. This is the 2nd round with IS in Iraq. It's what comes after the city's fall that's crucial. That doesn't look great in Iraq but Phase IV in Syria looks even less promising.

I don't get what the hurry is with Raqqa. It's a significant prize but IS will not be ended by the fall of Raqqa. They'll fall back to Deir and then the wild country and plot the next round. Taking Raqqa with more civilian casualties than necessary won't make it easier to hold. Least that's the thinking expressed in US COIN doctrine.

I'm not going to blame Trump. He just lets the Pentagon do what they want. CENTCOM may be trying to make up for inadequate ground forces in Syria by using lots of air. Trump's probably set a stretch deadline they're trying to hit. The Pentagon probably want to get back to being chums with Turkey. Unfortunately prudence is not a quality that gets you promoted in the US military but tactical victories against the odds does. That's been a problem in these wars.
 
Might be wrong but my understanding it that the WP is being used in a limited way by USMC 155mm artillery to provide smoke cover for SDF troop movements.
 
LynnDoyleCooper said:
Might be wrong but my understanding it that the WP is being used in a limited way by USMC 155mm artillery to provide smoke cover for SDF troop movements.
Click to expand...
Not unlikely.

It's the reliance on air strikes that worries me. That happened when the CTS took Ramadi with insufficient backup from the ISF but Ramadi was empty. 75% of Ramadi was badly damaged. It's estimated about $20 billion will be needed to repair it. Not much cheaper than Trump's wall. It'll be a disaster if they attack a populated Raqqa like that.

I'm afraid even the Raqqa Is Silently Being Slaughtered folk were anticipating a blood bath if the SDF took Raqqa. The mistakes that guy was making are interesting. They do reflect views in Raqqa I've read in research on tribal attitudes there. There is IS support there. There's even more antipathy to the SDF. There's also residual regime support amongst tribal leaders as well as general hostility to the regime and a perception that the PKK are regime allies. Some local tribes seem to favour the Turkish backed rebels. This is all bad. They should be very, very careful taking Raqqa and make every effort not to harm civilians even if it means taking more losses in the process. Then they need to pour in aid and lavish blood money on families that have lost kin. It's a partly Kurdish town but the Arab locals will too easily read their relatives getting killed and maimed as "Kurdish" revenge for Kobani. It's more complicated with alliances across ethnic lines and divisions within the Kurds but I would note the US planners of the Mosul siege would not even let the Pesh enter the city this time after the ill will that caused in 08.
 
On ISW ISIS’s Global Campaign Remains Intact
...
ISIS is globalizing its external attack capability in order to endure even a total loss of its terrain in Iraq and Syria, which even today extends beyond Mosul and Raqqa, respectively. ISIS is deliberately “[fostering] interconnectedness among its scattered branches, networks, and supporters, seeking to build a global organization,” according to an assessment released by the anti-ISIS coalition in March 2017. The US has increased the tempo of operations against high-value ISIS operatives, but has not disabled the external operations cell. ISIS has shifted to mobilizing prospective fighters in place rather than bringing them to Syria, Iraq, or Libya as foreign fighters. ISIS’s expansion in farther flung areas like Afghanistan and Southeast Asia also generates alternative basing options for command-and-control elements and potential fighting forces.

President Donald Trump’s supposed “acceleration” of the anti-ISIS campaign he inherited from his predecessor has minimally increased the speed of tactical gains in Raqqa and Mosul while doing little to ensure that the U.S. achieves its strategic objectives The liberation of Mosul and Raqqa in 2014 might have defeated the organization, but it no longer suffices. ISIS’s global attack network is now more robust, dispersed, and resilient than ever. ISIS will remain dedicated to its global objectives after Mosul and Raqqa fall and will continue to wage a calculated global campaign. ISIS’s global success generates a momentum for jihadism that will endure even if the US manages to defeat the organization, moreover. Al Qaeda is waiting to pick up the mantle of the global war against the West, and could be even more successful than ISIS. The threat the US faces from jihadism vastly overmatches its current hyper-tactical campaign in Iraq and Syria. The first step in placing the US and its allies back on a path to victory is to recognize that the existing strategy of tactics will not suffice.
Click to expand...
And I guess after that correct assessment there will follow an ISW plan that looks strangely like an attempt to thwart Iran.

This is a bit silly. A much smaller IS survived strategic defeat while there were 150K troops in Iraq. Rolling up IS's territory leaves its thousands foreign fighters few options but to go elsewhere. Some will join AQ in Idlib. Some will go home. Some will carry out attacks. IS has looted a great deal of wealth. Even a big spectacular attack like the AQ related one on Madrid cost maybe $50K. Many attacks are by inspired fighters emulating IS who've had little or no face to face contact. These only require a tiny social media presence. Suppressed in its home territory it was always likely IS would attack abroad. Most analysts expect IS to persist in Iraq. Diyala has been a Badr Brigade ruled fiefdom for a couple of years yet IS persist in the wild places there occasionally carrying out attacks. IS has a lot of supporters. Even more people are sensibly intimidated by the organisation. IS deliberately goaded the US into attacking them by beheading US captives in the hope of a full on US invasion. The way this is ending they constantly prepared for in their rhetoric. The core survives to fight again until the last great battle with Rom itself.

IS have been mostly a great plague on Iraq and to lesser extent Syria that's ending. The main good is they are repressed there. It's effete to focus on a fairly small domestic terrorism problem. They'll probably recur in Iraq and Syria. The thing is to leave it in a state that doesn't actually facilitate that. Doing nothing isn't an option but we've a problem with doing too much in the Greater Middle East and making things worse.
 
On Political Violence @ A Glance The (Overblown) Concerns Linking Foreign Fighters, Civil Wars, and Terrorist Campaigns
...
We employ a variety of regression-based statistical techniques to analyze data on foreign fighters and civil conflict outcomes between 1946 and 2013. We show that when foreign fighters participate alongside rebel groups, governments are significantly less likely to achieve an outright victory. More specifically, foreign fighters that travel from greater distances (beyond the immediate neighborhood) to join rebels, help those rebels to achieve a negotiated settlement or to otherwise continue their struggle against the government. This advantageous effect does not, however, help rebel groups to achieve outright victory. In other words, foreign fighters appear to boost the resource base of the rebels that they join without necessarily helping them to defeat their governments. Therefore, the concerns about foreign fighters radicalizing and leading groups to victory seem to be overstated.

Terrorist attacks in Brussels (May 2014), Paris (January and November 2015), and Manchester (May 2017) highlight the potential threat related to the arrival of foreign fighters and trained militants from conflict zones elsewhere. In our second paper, we argue that the greatest risk comes from scenarios in which rebel groups with foreign fighter participation achieve victory. Under such circumstances, we suggest, any remaining foreign fighters are most likely to rejoin the global stock of militants. From there, they represent a resource for militant campaigns around the globe, increasing the odds of terrorist violence globally. By contrast, when rebel groups are defeated, this restricts the flow of foreign fighters on the global market, reducing risks of terrorism. Our analysis of terrorist campaigns globally between 1970 and 2006 supports these expectations. Specifically, we demonstrate that the flow of foreign fighters is associated with the creation of new terrorism campaigns rather than the exacerbation of existing campaigns. It appears, therefore, that concerns about foreign fighters leaving conflicts and engaging in terror elsewhere are overblown and likely to be observed only in rare circumstances.
...
Click to expand...
Well consider Muhj War in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Both perceived by Salafi-Jihadis as victories if in reality their role was small and sometimes comical. Veteran Arab Afghans did turn up in Kosovo. That victory left many fighters at a loose end and suffering from enemy deficit. The group that became AQI and then IS was founded by Arab Afghans and moved to the KRG.

Points out those that went to Chechnya actually reduced local rebel support. Same has happened in Syria with the much debated international call to Jihad being a bit of a disaster for the rebellion. It's not that there's great support for Assad. There's a lot of fear of what the revolt might become and in some cases became. Interventions in civil wars tend to prolong them and that's the same when the Beards do it.

The two Sunni Arab risings IS has participated in in Iraq have both been a disaster for their people. The second is perhaps the most successful Salafi-Jihadi campaign in history but it's ending in strategic defeat again.

Salafi-Jihadi victories may be worse but defeats don't end the problem. Though often also shifting fighters elsewhere as was the case with Chechnya. Russian authorities chose to export their Jihadi problem as is a common choice by MENA governments. Salafi-Jihadis often become tactical assets in other peoples wars. In both Syria and Libya there was a pretence they were not there until it was too late.

Ultimately these people thrive in chaos that's often only partly of their making. Carrion creatures that multiply on carnage.
 
On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's blogiJourneys to Mosul
...
In general, residents of east Mosul affirmed that life now was better than the days of the Islamic State. "Who likes them?" asked rhetorically a member of the Al Fariq restaurant staff in the al-Nour neighborhood of east Mosul city.[35] There is of course an analytical caveat before proceeding into further detail: That is, the most obvious problem is that openly expressing support for the Islamic State or the days of its rule in east Mosul understandably risks exposing oneself to arrest. There may be overstatement of popular dislike for the Islamic State in interaction with those perceived to be outside observers in order to uphold the reputation of the people of Mosul and portray them as entirely passive victims. Similar points apply to internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Mosul in the refugee camps outside of the city.

That said, the specific observations raised in interviews with residents as well as IDPs did provide some genuine insights. While the overall assessment of life under the Islamic State was resoundingly negative, some interviewees conceded in the early days that there was joy over the government's loss of Mosul, with romantic notions of "tribal revolutionaries" as checkpoints were removed from various places. In part these perceptions were bolstered by a limited and auxiliary role for other Iraqi insurgent groups like the Ba'athist-Sufi group called the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order (JRTN). Though outside observers often supposed a crucial "alliance of convenience" between these groups and IS, the reality is that they were quickly stamped out.[36]
...
Click to expand...
Long piece based on actual visits to Mosul. Goes through Hashd lines and onto the East of the city. Not as devastated as the West and returning to normal life.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 241 Jun 14 2017
...
The Islamic State launched a surprise attack upon the Iraqi forces in two neighborhoods in southern west Mosul. Starting at 3 am around 100 Islamic State fighters attacked the Danadan neighborhood coming out of the Old City district. The fighters moved along the Tigris River and opened with 7 car bombs from the front and 25 suicide bombers that hit the Federal Police from the rear. One police commander told the press there might have been up to 50 suicide bombers, but that figure might have just come from the heat of the battle with so many explosions going off. The Federal Police claimed that IS sleeper cells were responsible for the attacks from behind. The insurgents set fire to buildings to create smoke to try to prevent air strikes, took over a mosque to announce their presence, and executed 6 people. They were able to expand the attack into Dawasa and Nabi Sheet as well. The police were temporarily forced back to the Mosul airport outside of the city. By the afternoon, the Iraqi forces (ISF) and a spokesman for the U.S. led Coalition claimed that all the lost territory was re-captured. That was contradicted by a man who talked with the Washington Post who said there were still IS fighters on his block, and a Federal Police officer who told Reuters clashes continued. Throughout the Mosul battle the insurgents have been able to occasionally launch these large attacks and throw the ISF back on their heels.
...
Click to expand...
 
This could go a number of places, but I thought here was as good as any:

https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/06/16/the-perils-of-sectarianism/

Review by Louis Proyect of an interesting looking book:

"Throughout the Middle East, sectarianism is a problem that has existed for decades but more recently has reached catastrophic dimensions with ISIS declaring just about ever religious rival as a takfiri. This has led to stoning, beheadings, the rape of Yazidi women and an iron enforcement of sharia law that makes every person living under its sway worried about becoming the next victim of its religious enforcers."

"For both Syria and the other case studies in Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, you always find men and women like Aziz and Saleh who despite their small numbers speak for the broader interests of society. As the futility of sectarianism grows ever more obvious, the people of the Middle East will be open to alternative political strategies that place an emphasis on their common class interests. For the emerging vanguard of a new Middle East, Hashemi and Postel’s book should be required reading since it puts a spotlight on the damage that has been done by a “divide and conquer” strategy used by their native ruling classes. One hopes that the book will be the opening salvo in a new struggle to put the region on new and much more humane basis."
 
danny la rouge said:
This could go a number of places, but I thought here was as good as any:

https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/06/16/the-perils-of-sectarianism/

Review by Louis Proyect of an interesting looking book:

"Throughout the Middle East, sectarianism is a problem that has existed for decades but more recently has reached catastrophic dimensions with ISIS declaring just about ever religious rival as a takfiri. This has led to stoning, beheadings, the rape of Yazidi women and an iron enforcement of sharia law that makes every person living under its sway worried about becoming the next victim of its religious enforcers."

"For both Syria and the other case studies in Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, you always find men and women like Aziz and Saleh who despite their small numbers speak for the broader interests of society. As the futility of sectarianism grows ever more obvious, the people of the Middle East will be open to alternative political strategies that place an emphasis on their common class interests. For the emerging vanguard of a new Middle East, Hashemi and Postel’s book should be required reading since it puts a spotlight on the damage that has been done by a “divide and conquer” strategy used by their native ruling classes. One hopes that the book will be the opening salvo in a new struggle to put the region on new and much more humane basis."
Click to expand...
This paper and Fanar Haddad's work in general is worth reading on that topic:
...
Summary
  • In Iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the social, political, and technological changes of the 21st century are giving birth to a new sectarian landscape.
  • The three most consequential drivers behind the change in sectarian relations have been the political change in Iraq of 2003; the near simultaneous spread of new media and social networking in the Arab world; and – perhaps as a consequence of the first two – the ongoing search for alternatives to familiar but moribund forms of authoritarianism, as demonstrated most dramatically by the“Arab Spring.”
  • 2003 highlighted the uncomfortable fact that there were multiple, indeed contradictory, visions of what it meant to be an Iraqi and by extension what it meant to be a part of the Arab world.
  • New media,social networking, user-generated websites, and private satellite channels helped to make Iraq’s accelerated sectarianization contagious.
  • The mainstreaming of sectarian polemics has increased the relevance of religious, doctrinal, and dogmatic differences in views regarding the sectarian“other,”a particularly dangerous development.
...
Click to expand...
 
On TIMEP Iran in the Islamic State’s Crosshairs
...
Why Iran

Thus, there are three aims for the Tehran attacks. First, the group seeks to “refute” frequent accusations of collaboration with the Iranians. In the video shot before the twin operation, the speaker stressed that the group was not an agent to Iran or Saudi Arabia, after threatening further attacks against the two countries. “We are agents for no one,” he said. “We are fighting for this religion, not for Iran or the Arabian Peninsula.”

He was addressing common critique from fellow jihadists, ordinary people, and even politicians that the lack of attacks against Iran since the group’s establishment, despite the proximity, was an indication of collaboration. Also, mentioning Saudi Arabia was also an attempt to defend the group against accusations in Iran of being a Saudi proxy.

The second aim is rivalry with al-Qaeda. Since the establishment of the caliphate in 2014, the Islamic State has sought to replace al-Qaeda and present itself as the leader of global jihad. Al-Adnani’s speech, the release in March, and the attack this month are framed as a repudiation of al-Qaeda’s credibility in the jihadist worldview.

Related to the second reason is the continuing aim of tapping into the niche market of sectarianism in the Middle East. The Islamic State, unlike al-Qaeda, has no qualms in targeting Shi’a mosques and ordinary Shi’a civilians. One of the militants in the Tehran attacks reiterated a frequent theme in the Islamic State’s propaganda: “We will not hesitate to apostatize the Shia, specifically and as a whole, and kill them.”

Yet, the fact that it took three years since the Adnani statement for the Islamic State to carry out the two strikes in Tehran, in addition to the paucity of Iranian militants fighting with the group, indicate the organization has so far failed to build the infrastructure for sustained attacks inside the Islamic Republic, both because Sunni Iranians make up less than 10 percent of the population and because the group has struggled to carve out a significant support base in stable countries in the region. Even in predominantly Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, the Islamic State has failed to recruit large numbers capable of conducting a sustained insurrection, especially considering the heavy investment it has made in terms of ideological and political messaging. The group’s poor record in these countries means that the delay in carrying out attacks in Iran is hardly surprising.
...
Click to expand...
Hassan Hassan points out these attacks play on anti-Iranian feeling amongst Sunni Arabs in a game of rivalry with AQ.
 


Article paywalled unfortunately.

That final question is a very good one. Badr effectively govern Diyala on behalf of the IRGC. They have made a pigs ear of COIN there. IS has sometimes staged provocative attacks on Shia that cause Badr to attack Sunni Arabs. That in turn grows IS's support base. This has been going on for a couple of years. I think it's about playing to an anti-Iranian constituency as HH suggests above. But it's also just basic war of the flea stuff. It's a regrouping strategy to rebuild a base for the next round. What Diyala is the model for their future not just in that provence but elsewhere.

Sowell is also right about what sort of setback Mosul is for IS. It's something they've planned for. It's a bit optimistic to think of the upcoming fall of Mosul as like being 08. They're still probably an order of magnitude larger than AQI was in 08.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 243 Jun 16 2017
...
The final battle for Mosul is taking far longer than originally admitted to by the ISF. Ninewa Operations Command’s General Najm al-Jabouri predicted that the city wouldn’t be liberated until July. The head of the Federal Police General Raed Shakir Jawadat said they had underestimated the number of IS fighters they were facing. Originally, they believed there were just 150-300 left, but they had killed 1,800 since the start of June. Iraqi propaganda claimed that this last campaign would be over in just days. That was because IS was supposed to be a defeated force with most of their men dead. This has been repeated for months now however. Again, this is the positive messaging Baghdad has been promoting for years now, and does nothing to explain what is actually going on.
...
Click to expand...
 
On Musings On Iraq Sinjar Dispute Between The Hashd and Kurdistan Democratic Party Interview With Journalist Wladimir van Wilgenburg
...
2. What kind of problems was the KDP having with the district before the Hashd arrived?

According to the KDP, there was an agreement between Baghdad and Erbil to do a joint operation with the Iraqi army in South Sinjar after Mosul or before Mosul was finished. Also U.S. officials confirmed to me that that was the deal to have a joint Iraqi-Kurdish force to take south Sinjar, so the move was not perceived as a land grab in south Sinjar. Now the KDP fears that the PMU could try to undermine the Peshmerga presence in Sinar, and that could result in fighters over the disputed territories in the future. Especially when the Kurdish independence referendum is getting closer. Furthermore, the KDP feared that the PMU would link up with the YBS, which would give the YBS-YPG a link to Syria through Mosul to the Syrian border, which would make the YPG-led self-administrations in northern Syria less dependent on the KDP. The YPG-PYD in the past before 2014 used the border crossing at Rabia to avoid the KDP-held border crossing in Fish Khabur, but now the Peshmerga control this area. Despite this fears, it seems that the relation between the YPG and the PMU is not so good, and the PMU denies any connection with the PKK, YBS, YPG or PYD. Although in the past, the YBS was funded for some time by Baghdad. This support of Baghdad for the YBS has stopped, and the PMU media officer got upset when I asked about this and denied any links. So far, it seems the PMU could be a challenge both for the Peshmerga and the YBS, and the Sinjar region will now be de-factor divided between three rival factions.
...
Click to expand...
 
On ISW The Campaign for Mosul: May 12-June 21, 2017
...
ISIS seeks to undermine ISF morale and devastate Mosul’s infrastructure, thereby diminishing the value of the city’s liberation and prospects for post-ISIS governance and security. The 15th Iraqi Army Division cleared areas west of Mosul near Mount Badush in its advance toward ISIS-held Tel Afar. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) meanwhile began surrounding Qayrawan on May 13, and had reached the Syrian border by June 2. The operation included seizing Baaj, Baghdadi's former safe haven, on June 4. ISIS countered these gains by launching ground attacks on Hatra, south and west of Shirqat, Mount Badush, and near the Iraq-Syria border. Iran played a prominent role in the operations; senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Shaaban Nassiri died in clashes near Baaj on May 27 and Lebanese Hezbollah commander Abd al-Hamid Mahmoud Shari died near Qayrawan on June 2. Iran seeks to hinder U.S. freedom of maneuver along the Iraq-Syria border by maintaining a border presence and shaping post-Mosul security in Iraq. It may also hope to position its proxies to lead Hawijah’s recapture rather than U.S.-backed forces.
...
Click to expand...
Hassan Hassan pointed out it was an odd decision for IS to blow up that Mosque in Mosul. Not likely to make them popular in Iraq. If they'd tried to hold it the Coalition might well have destroyed it.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 252 Jun 25 2017
...
The Iraqi forces (ISF) predicted that they would have all of Mosul liberated by June 25 the start of Eid. Without having achieved that it made a series of exaggerated propaganda releases. First, a lieutenant colonel from the Golden Division claimed that 65-70% of the Old City was under government control. Then the Joint Operations Command announced that the Islamic State only held 1% of the district. That might have been a mistranslation meaning only 1% of west Mosul, but you can never tell with Iraqi statements. None of these claims were supported by the latest map released by the government, which shows little progress over the last few days.
...
Click to expand...
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 253 Jun 26 2017
...
Mosul was still recovering from the surprise attack by Islamic State sleeper cells in three liberated areas of west Mosul. On June 25 IS elements attacked Tanak, Yarmouk and Rajam al-Hadeed in the western section of west Mosul. There were only a few fighters, maybe 20 or more, but they were able to sow a huge amount of chaos. They set fire to cars and buildings, and led to hundreds of people to flee. The Golden Division was called in to kill and capture the insurgents. Yarmouk was surrounded, a curfew imposed, some remaining IS members were holding hostages inside a house, and there might have been scattered clashes still going on as well. The Iraqi forces (ISF) were conducting mass arrestsin nearby Rashidiya in fears of more IS cells operating there. An investigation was launched by the ISF to discover what happened. Preliminary press reports found that Tanak was supposed to be held by a tribal Hashd unit, but actually had no security for the last twenty days.
...
Click to expand...
But some progress as well:
DDQqEGWXkAAhsL-.jpg
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Similar threads

tim
Bizarre acts of terrorism - statue of Lenin and Mao blown up in Texas.
Replies
3
Views
438
belboid
belboid
Bingoman
Turkish terror attack 23rd October 2024
Replies
4
Views
913
_Russ_
_Russ_
tim
State murder in Singapore.
Replies
21
Views
868
A380
A380
JimW
Indian state implicated in murder of Sikh activist in Canada
2
Replies
30
Views
2K
_Russ_
_Russ_
Pickman's model
fascist republican state legislators (usa)
Replies
0
Views
404
Pickman's model
Pickman's model
Back
Top Bottom