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The Islamic state

On Al Monitor Congress threatens to cut payments to Iraqi Kurds if they break with Baghdad
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“The KRG wasn’t expecting US support, but they would be happy if the US would not oppose,” Wahab told Al-Monitor. ”And this language is therefore bad news. It has the hallmarks of opposition.”

Wahab noted that the Trump administration appears to be on the same page as Congress with regard to the referendum. The State Department signaled its opposition in a June 8 statement from spokeswoman Heather Nauert.

“We have expressed our concerns to authorities in the Kurdistan Region that holding a referendum — even this nonbinding resolution — at this time will distract from more urgent priorities: the defeat of ISIS, stabilization and the return of the displaced, managing the [Kurdistan] Region’s economic crisis, and resolving the [Kurdistan] Region’s internal political disputes,” Nauert said at the time.

Even if the language remains in the final bill, Wahab believes that the Trump administration still has some latitude in how it provides Iraq and the KRG with military assistance for the campaign to counter IS. “It’s up to the executive branch … whether they actually cut funding or not,” he said.

Kirk Sowell, the head of the political intelligence firm Utica Risk Services, predicted that the referendum, should it go forward, will not affect relations with the United States.

“The referendum will have no impact at all, at least in terms of US policy,” Sowell told Al-Monitor. “It is not even certain to happen, but assuming it does, nothing will change afterward. The question is framed like an opinion poll, and there is no legal or institutional structure to turn a ‘yes’ vote into something real. The status quo will continue.”
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That's despite an awful lot of lobbying by the KDP in Washington for partition. Sowell's right Barzani's referendum is just political theatre. None of the neighbours want the KRG to secede. The KRG is skint, a vassal of Turkey and politically very divided. Post-IS it's more likely to break up than become independent. Barzani's already lost the Yazidi part of Sinjar. Irbil actually needs to get closer to Baghdad to ween itself off Ankara's tit. Someday KRG independence may happen but it seems much less likely now than in 2014.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 255 Jun 28 2017
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Shrinking.
 
From The CTC The Fight Goes On: The Islamic State’s Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities
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  • In the Iraqi cities in the dataset, the Islamic State predominately targets both Iraqi government forces and Shiite militias, with the peshmerga coming in at a distant third. In the Syrian cities, the Kurdish opposition is targeted in the large majority of Islamic State operations in liberated cities, with the Syrian regime a distant second.
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Note the contrast between Iraq and Syria. The bulk of the conventional battles against IS have happened in Iraq but IS's terrorist activity in liberated areas of Iraq is really much more intense than in Syria. IS is deeply rooted in Iraqi's Sunni Arab population and this is the sort of savage, sectarian terrorist war AQI fought. It's much less active in Kurdish dominated areas once it's been expelled from them. It strikes the Syrian regime very little though this may change as large chunks of the Caliphate are taken by loyalist forces that often include a preference target: Shia forces. Likewise IS terrorist operations in Arab dominated in Syria taken by the SDF may increase. I think IS simply isn't as invested in the Syrian territory it grabbed opportunistically in the chaos of the revolt. It's left behind intelligence networks are probably much weaker in Syria.
 
On IRIN News Disturbing civilian death trends in Iraq-Syria air war: A researcher’s view
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The spike in casualties we’ve seen in Raqqa, however, is even more troubling. To some extent, given how densely populated parts of Mosul city are, it was expected that civilian death tolls would be high. But the villages and towns that surround Raqqa governorate’s capital hold comparably fewer civilians – and yet numerous and large-scale casualty events have become the norm since March.

In Raqqa, there appears to be little correlation between what is being destroyed and civilian fatalities. In a recent study, I discovered that the number of targets bombed in Raqqa decreased by 39 percent from February to March. Consequently, we expected to see civilian deaths decrease – instead they rose more than fivefold to an all-time high of at least 275 civilians likely killed in the area.

In short, more civilians are dying in Raqqa even when fewer targets are hit – reinforcing what Airwars has believed for some time: that the high increase in deaths from coalition actions is most likely related to changes in the rules of engagement – or to offensive procedures on the battlefield – exposing civilians to greater risk.

For the last six months, Airwars has also tracked more civilian casualties tied to coalition raids in Iraq and Syria than those carried out by Moscow. In May, with Russian strikes heavily reduced across Syria, we saw upwards of 2.5 times more alleged coalition civilian casualty events than Russian. Given the international outcry over Russia’s notoriously brutal campaign in Syria, this puts the US-led coalition in an increasingly compromising position. Moreover, it damages its credibility.

The warnings from the UN and various NGOs are stark and clear: hundreds of thousands of civilians remain trapped between IS snipers and mines, plus coalition and allied air and artillery strikes. With the Mosul battle in its final terrible days, and the Raqqa campaign now moving into the city itself, it is imperative that the coalition and its ground allies exercise more restraint in their bombing – and urgently improve safeguards to reduce the very high death count.
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Fella from AirWars particularly concerned about civilians in Raqqa.
 
On Terrorism Analysts A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement
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This exploration of Ba’athist influence on the Islamic State movement reinforces Kazimi’s and Gerges’ insights, and demonstrates that the sentiment described by Reuter in his influential article on Haji Bakr–that ISIS is a non-religious power accumulator with little connection to the jihadist trend–is categorically false. That Reuter could make this statement based on genuine captured documents shows that despite the availability of credible information, it is still possible to make erroneous deductions based on limited glimpses into complex organizations. The Islamic State, like its rival al-Qaeda, deliberately recruited former regime members for their military experience early in their existence. Once in the organization, they almost exclusively served in military and command roles–a key function in an insurgency to be sure–but not the most important. In revolutionary war, it is the political and social aspects of the conflict that dominate the action and will determine the outcome. The technical requirements of modern warfare and weaponry absolutely demand an expertise in military operations.[105] But outside of war-fighting functions and internal security, the former regime members in the Islamic State were simply not to be found.[106] Time and time again, the various leaders of the Islamic State installed religious experts, who could reliably interpret and uphold the legitimacy of the so-called caliphate project, into its important governing structures and departments–such as its groundbreaking media department,[107] its religious education programs, its wealth management, etc. Certainly the FRE contributed in a significant manner to the hybrid military campaign that consolidated extensive terrain in Syria and Iraq between 2012 and 2014, and this recognition certainly deserves the attention it has received. The problem with this attention is the need for balance; in looking at it from the Islamic State perspective, their legends are presented as a broad mix of people: homegrown Salafis, FRE, and immigrants.[108]

Beyond the presence of some very prominent FRE in the senior ranks of the Islamic State, and probably scores scattered throughout the mid-level ranks, there is little evidence of any deep Ba’athist influence on the evolving structure or the enduring ideas of the organization.[109] Instead, early adopters of the Salafi-jihadist trend were the ones who shaped the organizational culture during the decade-long struggle to establish an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. As such, our efforts to understand the ability of the Islamic State to remain a coherent entity should focus on its ties to the global Salafi community, foreign fighter induction networks, and certainly its demonstrated ability to recruit among local tribes in Iraq and Syria[110]–and much less on a dying ideology from yesterday–in order to avoid a very tainted view of this organization on which to base strategic and operational decisions.[111]
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Has IS's cultural origins more in highly sectarian underground Iraqi Salafi networks leveraging some Baathist technocrats. Figures from the wider Salafi-Jihadi milieu are more crucial. Much of their skill set simply evolves.
 
In The NYRB Iraq: The Battle to Come
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One can see why Kurdish leaders would want to keep potentially hostile Arabs away from a strategic asset such as oil, especially since they tend to view Arabs as potential ISIS sympathizers. Yet a population has been forcibly removed from its lands. Can one expect them to relinquish their legitimate claims to their property, or not to seek revenge when political fortunes turn?

To prevent such a retributive cycle, a new Kurdish policy is needed. But this will require the leadership to understand the problem of Arab radicalism somewhat differently. Kurdish leaders’ analysis of ISIS contains a fundamental flaw. They correctly see the group as essentially Iraqi, contrary to much Western thinking, which gives outsize emphasis to the foreign fighters in its ranks. As Prime Minister Nechervan Barzani put it to me, “What is Daesh? Daesh is the result of wrong policies.” To him, Iraq offers an abject lesson of how losers can become dangerous if the victors fail to treat them with respect and dignity. “As a result,” he said, “Daesh was established in this country. It is an Iraqi organization.” But the Kurds fail to see how their own actions have also led some in the local Arab population to support ISIS.

A better approach would be for Kurdish leaders to relinquish areas outside the Kurdish region they have taken from ISIS and start negotiations with Baghdad, with the UN’s help, over the disputed territories on a district-by-district basis (an effort the UN tried to initiate nine years ago). The negotiations should include the all-important question of oil: who owns it, who obtains the revenues. These are complicated matters, but not unresolvable. The Kurds have the advantage, and they can use their allies in Washington and other western capitals to ensure that negotiations take place and produce a compromise that secures their core interests. Finally, President Masoud Barzani should postpone the independence referendum until these matters are settled, or at least until he has managed to resolve the Kurds’ own internal discord.
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Unfortunately Baghdad-Irbil relations and the Disputed Areas is more about which politician gets to pocket a large part of the profits from oil resources.
 
what will happen to the Iraqi army once the operation is finished? will a lot of them be sent home? this must be costing a shitload of money. i'd love to know how much the US has spent on equipping the Iraqi army. bet Iran has spent a fair bit too. billions and billions.
 
I would imagine that there's going to be a fair few with mental health issues after this what with all they've seen and some of them have done. I wonder if there'll be money for that if/when this is all over?
 
Flavour said:
what will happen to the Iraqi army once the operation is finished? will a lot of them be sent home? this must be costing a shitload of money. i'd love to know how much the US has spent on equipping the Iraqi army. bet Iran has spent a fair bit too. billions and billions.
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Baghdad has about 190K men under arms. The ISF which includes the army is a standing, volunteer force. It's half the size it was in 09. A third smaller than it was before the fall of Mosul and has retention and recruitment problems. It won't stand down as IS won't be going away and isn't the only terrorist group in Iraq.

The Hashd militias are also supported by state funds. Some are Iranian backed. Those fighting in Syria are mostly paid by the Iranians. Some are loyal to Najaf which raised a Fatwa for Iraqs to mobilise against IS when the ISF collapsed. The Fatwa may be withdrawn and the latter may stand down eventually.

The KRG's Pesh militias's are also paid for by it's government in Irbil, they're about 110K strong.

The US perhaps spent $20 billion on setting up the ISF after it disbanded the old army. So a bit less than cost of Trump's border wall. For some time the ISF has been mainly financed by the Iraqi government. The Iraqi's are spending 20% of their budget (~$85 billion) on defence that's about $17 billion. They are running a deficit of $27 billion. There is still aid from the US, $1.3 billion from 2014-17, $77 million of which was from the Pentagon. That dwarfs contributions from other nations but this is in total a drop in the bucket. Some of Iraq's Sunni cities are wrecks. Estimates of the costs of rebuilding just Anbar's capital Ramadi run to over $10 billion. Just for scale Egypt gets about $1.3 billion in military aid from the US PA. In 2016 the US pledged to give wealthy Israel $38 billion in military aid over the next ten years. It does make you wonder about US priorities and for that matter wealthy European nations in a tizzy about refugees a large tranche of which are Iraqi.
 
On TDB U.S. Commandos Running Out of ISIS Targets
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Trump’s changes to the campaign so far have been tactical—namely, giving the military more autonomy to strike, including special operators. But the effectiveness of the current Obama-era strategy of attacking ISIS via local forces together with allies calls into question whether there’s a need for more dramatic revision.

That’s presented a dilemma for those working on the Trump anti-ISIS strategy and slowed its public unveiling, U.S. officials tell The Daily Beast. The White House has asked defense officials to come up with new ideas to help brand the Trump campaign as different from its predecessor, according to two U.S. officials and one senior administration official. They spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive debates.

The senior administration official described Trump’s plan as “relying even more” on special operations working together with local partner forces. “But that’s nuanced, like most of the suggested changes” and doesn’t easily translate to a talking point, he said. That could help explain why Trump has twice missed his own deadline for unveiling the new anti-ISIS strategy.

The White House and the Pentagon declined to comment.
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Goes on to say how wonderful Obama's plan was. When I'd say it was really just short sighted, reactive, tactical stumbling with serious strategic flaws. This hasn't changed under Trump as the plan's the work of the same Pentagon planners and just unfolding with some added stunts and a more liberal use of resources. It's just become even more one dimensionally military and overly focused on rapid territorial gains against IS.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 263 Jul 6 2017
The fighting in west Mosul was down to the last five neighborhoods and areas. Bab al-Tob, which was declared freed yesterday, was now cut off and surrounded. It is one of the southern entrances to the Old City district. The other areas still under Islamic State control were all along the Tigris River. That included Qurnish, Shahwan, Najafi Street, and Maidan. There were a few reports that claimed the entire city was freed, but that seemed to be propaganda. Various military and political leaders said that July 6 was the day victory was to be declared in the campaign, but that appeared to be a date set by politics not the situation on the ground.
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CrabbedOne said:
Baghdad has about 190K men under arms. The ISF which includes the army is a standing, volunteer force. It's half the size it was in 09. A third smaller than it was before the fall of Mosul and has retention and recruitment problems. It won't stand down as IS won't be going away and isn't the only terrorist group in Iraq.

The Hashd militias are also supported by state funds. Some are Iranian backed. Those fighting in Syria are mostly paid by the Iranians. Some are loyal to Najaf which raised a Fatwa for Iraqs to mobilise against IS when the ISF collapsed. The Fatwa may be withdrawn and the latter may stand down eventually.

The KRG's Pesh militias's are also paid for by it's government in Irbil, they're about 110K strong.

The US perhaps spent $20 billion on setting up the ISF after it disbanded the old army. So a bit less than cost of Trump's border wall. For some time the ISF has been mainly financed by the Iraqi government. The Iraqi's are spending 20% of their budget (~$85 billion) on defence that's about $17 billion. They are running a deficit of $27 billion. There is still aid from the US, $1.3 billion from 2014-17, $77 million of which was from the Pentagon. That dwarfs contributions from other nations but this is in total a drop in the bucket. Some of Iraq's Sunni cities are wrecks. Estimates of the costs of rebuilding just Anbar's capital Ramadi run to over $10 billion. Just for scale Egypt gets about $1.3 billion in military aid from the US PA. In 2016 the US pledged to give wealthy Israel $38 billion in military aid over the next ten years. It does make you wonder about US priorities and for that matter wealthy European nations in a tizzy about refugees a large tranche of which are Iraqi.
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Meanwhile China is pumping a 100 billion into building new trade networks, but that's probably another thread.
 
On Al Monitor Planning minister: Iraq needs $100 billion for post-IS reconstruction
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Jumaili: It is too soon to talk accurately about the level of damage at this point, but the damage to the infrastructure and state institutions alone between 2004 and 2016 has been set at 42 trillion Iraqi dinars [$36 billion], 60% of it between 2014 and 2016. Regarding the scale of the damage to private property, it is very large, and there are committees charged with estimating it and working out its actual scale.

Different areas are damaged to different degrees depending on how much fighting took place there and because the military operations to liberate territories are ongoing. Some areas have still not been liberated, so figures on the scale of destruction will be lacking until those operations are finished.

Iraq needs $100 billion to rebuild the liberated areas, a figure that includes all areas that were damaged during the presence of Daesh [IS], either by direct occupation or due to terrorist acts, so the funds will be allocated according to the scale of the damage in each province.

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Speaking of $100 billion. He explains that's spread over a decade. I think the US spent about $20 billion on civil reconstruction after the invasion. Note the damage is greater from this round of the civil war than the first.
 
On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog After the Caliphate: Interview with Omar Fawaz
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Aymenn: Do you think that the idea of the Sunni region is an appropriate solution for the Sunnis in Iraq today?

Omar: Now the matter is very difficult.

Aymenn: Meaning there is no possibility of establishing a Sunni region in Iraq.

Omar: I don't think so.

Aymenn: Do you expect there is a future for the people in Mosul?

Omar: We hope for the best.

Aymenn: If the choice now is between living under the Dawla organization or living under the Iraqi government, whom do you choose?

Omar: I don't choose any of them, because currently I don't trust the two sides.

Aymenn: And if the choice now is between living under the Dawla organization or living under the Japanese government, whom do you choose?

Omar: I prefer any state that guarantees my freedom and protects my dignity.

Aymenn: Yes, I visited Japan and this matter is clear. The Japanese government guarantees the citizen's freedoms.

Omar: Any non-Arab state is a state that guarantees man's dignity in my personal view, only we Arabs are the ones who resolve our problems through hitting and torture and force.
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Dawla organization=IS. Interview with a former IS supporter who previously advocated for an autonomous Sunni region in Iraq. Interestingly he thinks IS's popularity in Mosul went into decline declined after salaries stopped being paid in 2015 but he obviously blames their oppressive techniques as well. Ended up being tortured on suspicion of espionage which would put you off a group.
 
On Defense One What the Largest Battle of the Decade Says About the Future of War
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But the bulk of the fighting has taken place on the ground, and under historically dangerous conditions, Uribe said. “When is the last time that any major army has fought in an environment like this? I would offer it’s probably been in World War II.” Others have suggested the 1990s battles for Grozny, Chechnya, and 1968's assault on Vietnam's Hue City—but with caveats.

Witty suggested the 1942 battle for Stalingrad as a possible parallel. But, he added, “The thing that really makes this different is that the Iraqis are really taking a lot of care to try to protect as many civilians as they can and as much infrastructure as they can. And, of course, those those weren’t concerns to the Germans and Russians in the battles that they fought. So that's what kind of makes this unique and I think that was really kind of a hallmark in the battle of the east Mosul.”
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Excellent piece on Mosul giving some idea of the scale of a battle that actually took longer than Stalingrad

The far bigger Siege of Basra in 8 January-26 February 1987 occurs to me as a comparison point. Now that was a real war: half a million men in the field, nearly 90K casualties, two million IDPs. I recall a piece at the start of the Mosul buildup about two veteran Iraqi tankies three decades later still driving an old T-series that they'd fought the Iranians in. It's really not so long ago.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 265 Jul 8 2017
The news of the day was whether Mosul was finally liberated or not. The Joint Operations Command got things underway by saying that the city was free, but then added that there were small pockets of resistance. That last caveat was missed by most leading the command to issue a clarification that there were still a few meters of the city under Islamic State control. It then added that a victory announcement was imminent and that fighting would be over in a few hours. Units of the Iraqi forces (ISF) were seen celebrating in the streets. In fact, at the start of the day there were still three contestedneighborhoods, Maidan, Qalahat and Shahwan that were under attack by the Golden Division and the army’s 9th Division. By nighttime the Islamic State was reduced to small pockets, but were holding a number of civilian captives. It was predicted that by July 9 those would be wrapped up. Prime Minister Haidar Abadi already flew into the Qayara base northeast of Mosul, and was expected to give a victory speech. The campaign took nine long months. It witnessed some of the toughest urban fighting seen in years. While the war against the Islamic State is far from over, this will be a huge symbolic and political victory for the Iraqi government. Three years ago, IS declared its caliphate in Mosul, and now the Iraqi forces are standing over the rubble of its state.
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Now comes the tricky bit.
 
On ISW ISIS Sanctuary: July 10, 2017
Increased security measures inhibited a cohesive ISIS offensive in Iraq and Syria during Ramadan. ISIS focused its global Ramadan campaign on polarizing communities in the West, attacking regional power centers, and extending its reach in Southeast Asia. ISIS lost significant terrain in Ninewa and Raqqa Provinces in Iraq and Syria, respectively. Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced the liberation of Mosul and visited the city on July 9, however fighting continues in several Old City sectors. U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces have isolated and begun operations to liberate Raqqa City. Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend estimated the Raqqa operation was 25-30% complete as of late June 2017. ISIS will attempt to exploit inadequate security and governance in Mosul and Raqqa after clearing operations conclude. ISIS will also continue to adapt to the new security environ by conducting geographically disparate attacks, exploiting seams between anti-ISIS forces, and setting conditions to resurge in alternative terrain. ISIS is allocating additional resources and fighters to Diyala and Salah al-Din Provinces, Iraq. ISIS is also attempting to defend its Euphrates River Valley safe haven in Syria by targeting the Syrian regime outpost in Deir ez-Zour and holding defensive lines against U.S. and Iran-backed force advances.
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With the usual spidery map.
 
On Musings On Iraq Reviewing The Battle Of Mosul, Interview With Ret Col David M Witty
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1. The Mosul campaign started as a joint operation between the Iraqi forces (ISF), the Hashd and Peshmerga all taking part. All of these forces operate under their own command, and there are even more between the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), army and police within the ISF. How did the forces cooperate?

It was a very difficult task for the overall Mosul commander, LTG Abd’ al-Amir Yarallah, to coordinate these diverse forces. There was the Peshmerga which reported to the Kurdish Regional Government. There was the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service which reported directly to the Prime Minister. There was the Hashd (Popular Mobilization Units), which in theory worked for the Prime Minister but had varying degrees of Iranian influences with Iranian advisors. There was the Iraqi Federal Police which reported to the Minister of the Interior through the commander of the Federal Police. There was the Emergency Reaction Division (ERD) which worked directly for the Minister of Interior. Then there were the Iraqi Army divisions, the 15th and 16th Infantry Divisions and the 9thArmor Division, which worked for the Minister of Defense. It is amazing it was able to work at all. There were reports that LTG Yarallah had to coax the various units into following his scheme of maneuver. I think this explains the disjointed efforts we saw in the first few months of the battle when CTS operated in East Mosul alone while other units lagged outside of the city. ISIS was able to focus all its power on CTS, which led to significant casualties for CTS. This happened again in the battle for West Mosul, when for months the only units attacking in the city were CTS, the Federal Police, and ERD. When Iraqi forces attacked on multiple axes with all forces involved, they were successful, but not otherwise. It was if the lessons from the East Mosul Battle had to be relearned for the West Mosul Battle.
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That's an important insight. CTS reports directly to the PMs office. It's by far the most capable force facing IS but Abadi was also in a hurry. Witty notes ERD and the Federal Police under the Interior Ministry tended to use artillery indiscriminately. The Interior Ministry has been the main bastion of Iranian influence since 08. It's forces often have a dark record.

I'd note chucking fire at enemy turf regardless of civilians is the regional way. The ISF gets accused of that, the SAA routinely does it, Turkish backed Syrian rebels using mortars without even securing the base plates was reported up by al Bab not so long ago. Barrel bombs get a lot of publicity but extensive use of indiscriminate artillery by both sides has killed an awful lot of people in Syria.
 
On Musings on Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 266 Jul 9 2017
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Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report on the latest confrontation between the Kurds, Hashd, and Yazidis in Sinjar. The Hashd recently freed the remaining towns in the district from the Islamic State. That was harshly criticized by the Kurds who claimed they had a deal with Baghdad to keep any non-Kurdish force out of the area. That set off a war of words between the two sides. HRW talked with four Yazidi families who claimed they were threatened, and then expelled from displacement camps because a relative joined the Hashd. There were reports that 15 other families had been kicked out as well, but HRW could not confirm their stories. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) considers Sinjar an area that should be under its control. That has fallen apart since it abandoned the Yazidis to the Islamic State back in 2014. Now they are facing all kinds of challenges to their hegemony, most recently the Hashd. Harassing families that have aligned themselves with the Hashd is just the latest tactic the KDP has employed to try to re-establish their authority. The situation is so diffuse in Sinjar currently, that the party is unlikely to be successful.
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The KDP have really screwed that up.
 
On Reuters Syrian Observatory says it has 'confirmed information' that Islamic State chief is dead
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"(We have) confirmed information from leaders, including one of the first rank who is Syrian, in the Islamic State in the eastern countryside of Deir al-Zor," said Rami Abdulrahman, the director of the British-based war monitoring group.

In Iraq, U.S. Army Colonel Ryan Dillon, spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State, said he could not confirm the news.

Abdulrahman said activists working with him in Deir al-Zor had been told by the Islamic State sources that Baghdadi had died, but not when or how. The sources said Baghdadi had been present in the eastern countryside of Syria's Deir al-Zor province in the past three months.

The Pentagon said it had no information to corroborate the reports. Kurdish and Iraqi officials also had no immediate confirmation.

Baghdadi's death has been announced many times before, but the Observatory has a record of credible reporting on the Syrian conflict. Islamic State-affiliated websites and social media feeds have so far said nothing.
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On Syria Comment Resolving Article 140: Settling the Issue of Iraq’s Disputed Territories Ahead of an Independence Referendum for Kurdistan
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Manipulating Patriotism

The phrasing of the referendum’s question is indicative of ethnic outbidding. By asking voters if they “want independence,” as opposed to inquiring, for example, as to whether voters approve of a parliamentary motion to declare independence, the KDP is playing a semantics game designed to force voters to deliver a “patriotic” or “unpatriotic” response, a tactic to rally broad nationalist support behind the KDP’s drive for political dominance while discrediting the domestic opposition by casting doubt on their supporters’ kurdayeti.

Beyond the realm of mere words, Kurdish authorities have already begun arrestingdissenters and shutting down media centers that publish literature that “uses inappropriate language in connection with the referendum,” as well as harassing and assaulting journalists and writers who have expressed opposition to the referendum.

To garner support for the vote, the Kurdish nationalist parties—and the KDP in particular—have been aggressively fueling Kurdish irredentist sentiments and issuing provocative statements, such as KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani’s affirmation that the “disputed territories are no longer disputed,” the acting president’s assertion that opposition to the referendum would be met with a “bloody war,” and a KDP MP’s callfor the legal prosecution and punishment of the political opposition to the vote. Moreover, the KDP has linked issue of Kurdish statehood with that of Masoud Barzani’s continued leadership and his defiance of Parliament’s attempts to limit presidential power. The alarming tone of this discourse rose to a crescendo this week when Barzani, before the European Parliament, accused opposition MPs of concocting an “attempted coupt d’etat” against him in Parliament prior to its dissolution by the KDP, and of being responsible for the deaths of children in the 2015 riots in the Sulaimaniyah Governorate.

Furthermore, the language of the referendum announcement itself does not acknowledge that disputed territories are “disputed,” instead referring to them as “Kurdish areas outside of the KRG’s administrative area.” This language does not recognize the presence of the very populations whose existence is the origin of the disputed territory dilemma: Arabs, Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, Turkoman, certain Yazidis who do not identify as Kurds, and others.

In addition to validating aggression against Kurdish domestic opposition, this kind of antagonistic, nationalist campaign will do nothing to assuage the fears and mistrust of minorities and non-Kurdish populations with competing claims to self-determination in the disputed areas. This could ultimately provoke violent reactions with armed sectarian and partisan militias, with their various regional sponsors poised to intervene.

Ahead of Referendum, Yazidis Targeted for Supporting Baghdad

In the last few years, observers have become increasingly familiar with how intimidation is employed to pressure minority populations of the disputed territories into political submission. Recent punitive measures against Yazidis who favor IFG rather than KRG administration for Shingal (Sinjar in Arabic) are a characteristic—and unsurprising—case in point.

A new Human Rights Watch report has this week exposed a tactic that the KDP asaish are using to deter Yazidis from aligning with Baghdad: expelling displaced Yazidi families from the IDP camps in Dohuk and evicting them from the KRI, if a family member joins the Baghdad-supported Hashd al-Sha’bi forces in Shingal. This tactic is unsurprising, as the KDP asaish already expelled (from the same camps in 2015-2016) displaced Yazidi families if a family member joined the PKK-affiliated YBŞ, a local Yazidi force in Shingal that challenges KDP hegemony.

The Yazidis of Shingal are a perfect example of the challenge of Iraq’s disputed territories. This population has long stymied KDP attempts to smoothly incorporate Shingal into the KRI. Yazidis are independently-minded, have repeatedly been victimized by external parties vying for control of their areas, and as a result are mixed as to whether they even identify as Kurds. Unlike Yazidis from villages inside the KRI, many Yazidis from Shingal resolutely identify only as “Yazidi,” maintaining that it is not only their religious affiliation but also their ethnic identity. The vast majority resent Kurdish politics and would prefer a quiet form of local governance. This hasn’t stopped the KDP from insisting that Shingal’s population wants to be included in the KRI, and they always have an array of token Yazidi mouthpieces ready to authenticate this claim.
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Mathew Barber on the Disputed Territories, a lingering problem from our invasion and a big post-IS issue. He think this needs UN mediation. lots of international support and even peacekeepers on the ground to stop a war breaking out. Admits this is unlikely given the Trump administrations aversion to multilateralism and reconstruction.

If more was invested in stability operations and diplomatic involvement like this by the US the Pentagon might find itself playing very expensive Whackamole with terrorists a little less often.
 
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From The Washington Institute The Caliphate Project in Iraq Post-Mosul
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WILAYAT AL-FURAT

Finally, on the Iraqi side of the Islamic State's Wilayat al-Furat, the group has been most active in the cities of al-Qaim and Rawa. There, members continue to go on fishing expeditions and sell their catch in markets, spray pesticides in agricultural fields, run enterprises that manufacture and sell ice cream, and harvest and sell fruits such as apricots. This suggests that much of the IS focus in this region is on ensuring residents have adequate access to food.

Although IS governance on the Iraqi side of Wilayat al-Furat has not reflected quite the acumen found in Wilayat Karkuk, the former province benefits from its lack of geographic isolation, in comparison to the other three provinces discussed here. Because the other half of Wilayat al-Furat is in Syria, IS has freedom of movement across the border, complicating potential military plans. Furthermore, the U.S.-led coalition working to retake Raqqa, in Syria, will likely not be able to advance far enough south to connect efforts on both sides of the border before Tal Afar falls in Iraq. This is why it would make most sense to focus on Wilayat al-Furat third among the three remaining IS locations within Iraq. The success of such a battle, meanwhile, would rely on further advances in the anti-IS campaign in Syria, accepting that the most effective approach would entail taking all of Wilayat al-Furat, on both its Iraqi and Syrian sides. If the coalition just focuses on one side, IS elements could cross the border, regrouping and neutralizing the desired effects of coalition actions.

CONCLUSIONS

Given this profile of holdout areas of Islamic State control, Iraqi and coalition forces should indeed laud their victory in Mosul -- but should likewise keep an eye on what's next, regarding not only where IS retains insurgent strength but also where it holds territorial control and administrative resilience. Destroying the remaining vestiges of the IS caliphate project will not eliminate the group, which will continue to pose an insurgent and terrorist threat, but it will remove any arguments the jihadists might be inclined to make about the viability of their state -- even if that state is a shell of its former self.
Click to expand...
Note the need for a joint Iraq-Syria operation for Wilayat al-Furat.
 
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