Oh look!
And a copper dangling from every lamppost of the a1 from aylmer parade to wherever it is the a1 finishes and then along the a5 from marble arch to the end of that road too. Other a roads might be similarly adorned and the rope industry's profits will go some way towards lifting the country out of its current economic doldrumsI am inclined to agree. It seems the only thing we can rely on the police to do regarding things of this nature is the square root of fuck all, They are hopelessly compromised.
It is indeed reasonable to point out that many countries actually tried to follow the 'minimise infections' approach from a much earlier point than the UK.More on Hancock at the enquiry:
Thread by @danielgoyal on Thread Reader App
@danielgoyal: So, Hancock's first appearance at the Covid Inquiry did not disappoint. I will share the critical moments below. But first, it is clear that his entire justification for the admitted calamitous respons...…threadreaderapp.com
And in that context, we are starting to hear some bizarre autarkic rhetoric, when barriers are going up, and when there is a risk that new diseases such as coronavirus will trigger a panic and a desire for market segregation that go beyond what is medically rational to the point of doing real and unnecessary economic damage, then at that moment humanity needs some government somewhere that is willing at least to make the case powerfully for freedom of exchange, some country ready to take off its Clark Kent spectacles and leap into the phone booth and emerge with its cloak flowing as the supercharged champion, of the right of the populations of the earth to buy and sell freely among each other.
And here in Greenwich in the first week of February 2020, I can tell you in all humility that the UK is ready for that role.
The cressida dick defenceIt would seem, predictably to be everyone else's fault except for the government's and by extension, himself:
Hancock blames everybody but the government at Covid inquiry
The former health secretary criticised local councils, civil servants and the World Health Organisation over UK failureswww.opendemocracy.net
Yeah. They already mentioned a bunch of Vallance diary entries that repeatedly underline that point. Between his evidence and Cummings stuff they've already got Johnsons number, although there will be plenty more to come from other sources too.Johnson very much coming across as being the same blundering, bullshitting oaf in private as he is in public rather than some sort of Machiavelli.
I don't quite get what's actually being said in that article. Civil servants & science advisors knew, but it wasn't discussed at the Sage meetings? Or it was discussed at the Sage meetings but not recorded in the minutes?
Q: Now, we may hear from those, for example, in Number 10 that this prospect of the NHS being overwhelmed wasn't something that at the very least they adverted to until a couple of weeks later than the end of February, in mid-March.
But are we to take it from this that -- not the possibility but the certainty of NHS capacity being overwhelmed was something that was clear to you and to SPI-M-O during February?
A: So the extent of the epidemic became very clear during February and so I think at that point we were, you know, the -- we'd essentially established the infection fatality rates, so that's the proportion of people who are -- die following infection, at about 1%, big variation with -- especially with age, but -- and if 80% of the population becomes infected in a single wave, then you can calculate the numbers of people who would die.
The question, then, of hospitalisation is slightly more complicated, because of course it depends on who goes to hospital under those kind of circumstances. So it needed a meeting with the NHS and with clinical colleagues for them to say what symptoms would justify admission into hospital, because that is a variable, it's a clinical variable that if somebody goes to hospital then they might not be admitted, and that -- those kind of clinical questions determine the extent to which the epidemic results in hospitalisations, for example.
Q: Well, Professor, just looking at this statement, and maybe you want to qualify or change it, looking at the statement, what you say is it became increasingly clear that capacity would be overwhelmed, and all you were doing with the NHS was talking about the extent of the overwhelm?
A: I think that's right. I mean, throughout -- I mean, yes, I stand by the statement, throughout February. What I mean is that, in terms of being able to make a clear statement, it was absolutely clear the expected deaths. Hospitalisations are slightly, you know, more uncertain because it requires more clinical input.
Q: Then this: "NHS needs must be considered in any decisions to alter the epidemic curve."
Is that consistent with a view that you'd reached that NHS overwhelm was at that stage inevitable?
A: I think so, yes. Remember these documents are written by civil servants for civil servants --
Q: Well, just pausing there, Professor, we may hear that SAGE minutes are written for policymakers.
A: Who are civil servants.
Q: Well, they are politicians, Professor.
A: Well, I always think of them as decision-makers.
Q: I'm not going to quibble with you about language, Professor, but I want to press you on the rather more important point, which is whether the sentence "NHS needs must be considered in any decisions to alter the epidemic curve", does that really mean, does that sentence signal a conclusion that it is inevitable that the NHS will be overwhelmed in the approaching epidemic?
A: It certainly indicates that the NHS is a major factor.
Q: Well, that's not the same thing, Professor, is it?
A: "UK academic modelling groups ... and NHS planners to organise a working group in the week starting 2 March [so the next week] to analyse key clinical variables for reasonable worst-case scenario planning for the NHS, for review by SPI-M and then discussion at SAGE."
So on the one hand, Professor, we have your statement which says that during February it became clear that the NHS would be overwhelmed, and then we have these two sets of minutes at the end of February, neither of which refer to an overwhelming of the NHS. Here what is referred to is reasonable worst-case planning. So, as we've already discussed, it's a scenario, it's not a prediction. How can we reconcile those two things, Professor?
A: So at the beginning of February it wasn't clear at all. By the end of February SAGE was asking for quantitative details. So that meeting happened on 1 March, I think.
It was asked for in SAGE, so by 1 March we had the --a good understanding of what the impact would likely be on the NHS. So that's, you know, that's throughout February.
Q: Professor, from a lay perspective, and of course with hindsight, but if you and your colleagues had already realised during February that the NHS was going to be overwhelmed by the pandemic that was developing, why didn't you just say so?
A: Well, we -- I mean, we -- the secretariat that we were talking to completely understood. The SAGE secretariat were taking the minutes. I didn't write these documents, the documents were written by somebody else for somebody else, they're not written for my benefit, and it's really the writers and the readers that you need to question. I was -- at the end -- by the end of February it was clear, I think, that the NHS would be overwhelmed, and I don't think that was being kept a secret.
Q: So the situation you're describing is a meeting, a SAGE meeting, where everyone round the table is discussing the fact that the NHS is going to be overwhelmed --
A: Yes.
Q: -- but the minutes record simply that there needs to be some reasonable worst-case planning for the NHS?
A: Yes.
Q: I see, thank you.
In a discussion about introducing regional circuit breakers, Mr Case writes: "Am not sure I can cope with today. Might just go home."
Lee Cain - Mr Johnson's head of communications - asks what "are we talking about".
"Whatever Carrie cares about, I guess," replies Mr Case.
He later adds: "I was always told that Dom [Cummings] was the secret PM. How wrong they are. I look forward to telling select [committee] tomorrow... don't worry about Dom, the real person in charge is Carrie."
"So true," Mr Cummings replies along with a laughing emoji.
Mr Cain agrees and adds that "she doesn't know [what] she is talking about either".
Mr Case goes on to say: "This government doesn't have the credibility needed to be imposing stuff within only days of deciding not too [sic]. We look like a terrible, tragic joke.
"If we were going hard, that decision was needed weeks ago. I cannot cope with this."
Mr Johnson also describes Mark Sedwill, the head of the civil service until September 2020, as "miles off pace".
Mr Cummings replies that "the problem is CabOff [the Cabinet Office] and DHSC [the health department] haven't listened and absorbed what the models truly mean."
Separately, in an email sent to Mr Johnson in July 2020, Mr Cummings writes: "Current CABOFF [Cabinet Office] doesn't work for anyone - it is high friction, low trust, and obv many good parts but overall low performance."
Mr Keith suggested that: "In the early part of the pandemic, the early months, the dysfunctionality... was reflective of the system, the structures, that were in place.
"Latterly the dysfunctionality lay more in the personalities and their working relationships and indeed the people who were in government."