I was being polite. I could have used "minimise", or "dismiss", both of which I am sure you will deny, as you generally do.
"left liberals" - your agenda is showing. Again.
They don't get "abuse" for their scepticism. They get called out for the nefarious ways in which they - and that includes you - duck and weave to actually avoid standing up for their views. And, of course, get terribly offended when their blanket accusations - "warmongers" - are challenged.
Not particularly informed either. Could add that to the list.
I don't deny my indifference to the fate of most of Putin's opponents. After all, they would most definitely be indifferent to mine or yours.
Do you read the threads? The abuse goes almost entirely one way. Doesn't bother me, I merely highlight the fact occasionally.
You're the one who seems to need control over opinions you don't like.
0/10
Nothing like being damned with faint praise.
Tbf, doubt he has a "hidden" agenda.
Whether unfounded or not, they're never really unclear. And it's all subjective anyway.
The post you quote wasn't referring to you.
Well the weird ct level stuff was the other fella but no, he doesn't owe you anything, it's very very boring and it doesn't constitute constructive discussion on your part. Not that everything has to be constructive but it's not entertaining either.
Fair enough. No more questions or interactions with the thread.
Fair points-but you'll see that my replies to those who prefer to focus on me as a poster and not the issues are usually accompanied by some kind of appeal to get back to the topic.
Since you have been banned from threads for constantly demonstrating your shortcomings, I'm not sure you have that much of a leg to stand on when it comes to complaining about people pointing out those shortcomings.
And, no doubt, "cheers on war" covers a conveniently broad front in your mind...
"Carry on Coup-ing"
Yeah. The Russian economy, and Russian society can't produce social groups that are supportive of the Western style combo of free markets + liberal democracy - at least, they can't produce such groups in sufficient numbers to make the combo stick. That's nothing to do with some innate national character, but like the man said, to do with material conditions, and the pragmatic choices they force on individuals.
No significant Ukrainian strides soon, it seems...
The US representative Mike Quigley, an Illinois Democrat who recently returned from meetings in Europe with US commanders training Ukrainian armed forces, said:
"When people say "I'm a bit concerned", it mean's they're very concerned, and when they say "I'm very concerned", it means they're absolutely desperate" - Robert De Niro in the Irishman.
Also from thatThis pro-Ukraine article, the emphasis of which is on the perceived weakness of Putin after the so-called coup attempt, offers little comfort for those with a rosy view of Russia.
'The war has begun to change Russia, and profound internal shifts are likely underway—in Putin’s regime, in the elites’ perception of Putin, and in the public’s attitude toward the war. Indeed, the militarization of Russian life is empowering ultranationalist hard-liners in the elite, eclipsing an old guard of ideologues that the Russian public has begun to view as increasingly out of touch with the realities of the war. The perception of Putin’s weakening has further revealed the regime’s deep flaws: the habitual inclination of the authorities to underestimate domestic political risks, ignore long-term developments in favor of addressing immediate challenges, and refuse responsibility for the growing number of incidents on Russian territory linked to the war.
Prigozhin’s mutiny has pushed the situation to an extreme and may pave the way for the emergence of a more radicalized, hawkish, and ruthless state. Threats to the Kremlin, such as the Wagner rebellion, and the revelations of the government’s weakness, will not necessarily lead the public to turn against Putin and bring down the regime. Instead, these developments are transforming Russia into a far less cohesive entity, one rife with internal contradictions and conflicts, more volatile and lacking predictability. With so much pressure turning inward, the space for debate about the ongoing war in Ukraine may open somewhat, even if not for outright dissent. But at home, the order that Putin built will become more disorderly, and the world will have to contend with a more dangerous and unpredictable Russia.'
'Now, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russians hunger for geopolitical security. The people have delegated to Putin the right to deal with the West—which many Russians believe threatens their country’s very existence—even if that causes domestic turmoil owing to stringent sanctions and crackdowns on liberals. Polls show that since the war began, the percentage of Russians who overtly admire Putin has grown from eight to 19 percent, and 68 percent of Russians now say they want him to be reelected, a significant jump from 48 percent of Russians before the war. The war has also increased support for all official institutions: the cabinet, regional governors, parliament, and even the ruling party, United Russia.'
It appears, meanwhile, that popular discontent with the Russian elite is taking far from fluffy forms:
'Ordinary Russians were struck by Prigozhin’s brazen confrontation with the Defense Ministry and his complaints that his troops were desperately short of ammunition. The public perceived him as a crusader against corruption and someone who dared to challenge the spoiled elites. A local eyewitness to Wagner’s seizure of Rostov-on-Don described Prigozhin in a Facebook post as “a simple, ordinary man going to have it out with the fat cats of every stripe and color,” a sentiment that explains the warm welcome Rostov residents gave Wagner fighters. That disgruntlement with the powers that be—“the fat cats”— to some extent explains the ease with which Prigozhin took control of the city.'
'Reactions to the drone attacks and incursions by paramilitaries into the Belgorod region in the spring are instructive. According to Levada polling, these events only fueled support for the war among Russians, with people becoming more hostile toward ordinary Ukrainians and anxious about the fate of the “special military operation.” The attacks did not in any way increase public desire for peace talks or a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, a country that is perceived now more than ever as a threat to Russia’s existence. According to polling by Levada, Russians have started to conclude in recent months that the war will be long and drawn out. In May, 45 percent of respondents said they believed the war would last more than another year—the highest percentage since the conflict began (in May 2022, it was 21 percent). They are adapting to that reality and steeling themselves for tough times ahead; they are not seeking to halt the war, and antiwar sentiment remains at best subdued, at worst entirely suppressed.'
