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Matthew Goodwin.....

Te chart is the evidence.

The chart *is* evidence offering a static, 'snapshot' sample of geographically comparative data about attitudes. Goodwin appears to want to offer this as a counterpoint to his contestable notion that 'we on the left' "argue that Brexit Britain is awash with racism." So, as a social scientist, he's employing indirect spatial static data to counter a (claimed) dynamic, temporal phenomena. Not only dodgy ideologically, but certainly methodologically.

Of course, if he were interested in offering context ( & I don't think he is) he could have gone to the basic Government data on reported race related hate crime and shown that those 'on the left' and anywhere else on his spectrum might well be concerned with the increases over the last 6 years or so.

I'm reminded of Will Davies' review of the Revelli book:
“Marco Revelli weaves political theory with sociological analysis to provide the first definitive analysis of post-2008 populism. The New Populism demonstrates that, with the right critical and empirical mindset, it is possible to understand these movements, without either deploring or embracing them.”

upload_2019-7-31_21-25-41.png
 
Te chart is the evidence.
It’s evidence of something very narrow; that people answer one very particular question in a way that suggests a moderately high level of comparative tolerance of that one particular issue. There are loads of problems with that; the level of ‘approval is still in many ways surprisingly low- regardless of whether it’s higher than anywhere else. But also does it even mean that those respondents are not racist? You can be ok with relationships but still hold some really dodgy racist views for example; you can not be ok with relationships and know it’s not really ok to not be ok and so misreport when asked a direct question.... etc etc.

If you wanted to prove the country wasn’t awash with racism that might be the ‘and another thing’ that you added on page four of evidence and argument- on its own I think it’s pretty meaningless
 
The chart *is* evidence offering a static, 'snapshot' sample of geographically comparative data about attitudes. Goodwin appears to want to offer this as a counterpoint to his contestable notion that 'we on the left' "argue that Brexit Britain is awash with racism." So, as a social scientist, he's employing indirect spatial static data to counter a (claimed) dynamic, temporal phenomena. Not only dodgy ideologically, but certainly methodologically.

Of course, if he were interested in offering context ( & I don't think he is) he could have gone to the basic Government data on reported race related hate crime and shown that those 'on the left' and anywhere else on his spectrum might well be concerned with the increases over the last 6 years or so.

I'm reminded of Will Davies' review of the Revelli book:
“Marco Revelli weaves political theory with sociological analysis to provide the first definitive analysis of post-2008 populism. The New Populism demonstrates that, with the right critical and empirical mindset, it is possible to understand these movements, without either deploring or embracing them.”

View attachment 179369
Which this is not doing. What it is doing is phrenology for the middle class again.
 
Which this is not doing. What it is doing is phrenology for the middle class again.
I can appreciate why a right wing populist politician might seek to play down concerns about the impact of their othering of the 'out group' inherent in the 'triadic' nature of their offer. I fail to see why an academic would feel the need to attempt that.
 
Just in case anyone can't access the above article

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Britain is getting used to political gamblers. David Cameron held a referendum and Theresa May hoped Brexit would allow her to steal Labour territory and win a huge majority. They both failed, and join Margaret Thatcher and John Major as the four Conservative prime ministers brought down by Europe.

Boris Johnson could be the fifth. With a majority of just one, after the resurgent Liberal Democrats triumphed at the Brecon and Radnorshire by-election last week, the word in Westminster is that either a vote of confidence will be called early next month or Johnson will push for a snap election after delivering Brexit. Either way, if he is to triumph over Europe then he, too, will need to place a bet — that he can go to the country and win big. But how?

Our politics has never been as volatile, our loyalty to the two big parties never weaker, and our willingness to switch votes never greater. A once-stable two-party system has imploded. Trying to calculate what will happen in marginal seats is virtually impossible. One irony of Brexit is that our politics is now more European: fragmented, populist, chaotic and unpredictable.

Yet it is still possible to chart some pathways. One is for Johnson to pursue a “strategy of consolidation” — to bring leavers under one roof. It is a strategy not dissimilar to Nicola Sturgeon’s in Scotland, where independence voters rallied under one flag while unionists stayed divided. Crucially, Dominic Cummings, Johnson’s new adviser and Vote Leave mastermind, knows who and where these leavers are. This involves a two-pronged mission; to cannibalise the Brexit Party vote and to target the nearly 160 pro-Brexit seats in Labour hands, including in Wales, where polls last week put the Tories first and Labour on what would be their lowest number of seats since 1918.

Johnson is already promising to “turbocharge” the north of England. “I want to be the prime minister who does with Northern Powerhouse Rail what we did with Crossrail in London,” he said.

It appears to be working. In the polls last week a “Boris bounce” went hand-in-hand with a “Farage flop”. Support for the Tories is up five points; the Brexit Party is down by the same amount.

But to unify leavers Johnson will need to recruit specific groups. The first is “Mansfield Man”. Seats such as Mansfield, a pro-Brexit Labour seat won by the Tories in 2017, are filled with blue-collar, aspirational and patriotic leavers. Boris will need to reach deep into this territory to win over mechanics, plumbers and small business owners — today’s equivalent of Thatcher’s Essex Man or Blair’s Mondeo Man.

Mansfield Man leans a little left on the economy, believing it is rigged against him, and a little right on culture, believing we should leave the EU, control immigration and get tough on crime. He wants more apprenticeships in a society that is obsessed with degree-holders and, while he is open to Labour, as Blair showed, he loathes Corbyn. Today, he quite likes Farage.

To win them over, Johnson will need to work harder than May. In 2017, the Tories enjoyed their strongest result among the working class since Thatcher came to power but they still captured only six pro-Brexit Labour seats.

Another smaller group is “Lost Leavers”, left behind and deeply disillusioned Brits who do not usually engage in politics but backed Brexit in 2016. These instinctive conservatives failed to show up for May in 2017. Boris needs to find them and get them to vote.

Then come the older, lifelong pro-Brexit “true blue” Tories in southern England and coastal communities, who worried at the last election that a Tory government might take their homes if they got dementia. Boris needs to repair this relationship and ensure they turn out en masse. If Johnson does all this and mobilises a leave alliance, he could defend his “blue wall” in southwest England, which was central to Cameron’s majority in 2015, against the resurgent Lib Dems and help his party advance in Brexit-backing Labour seats.

But the problem with this strategy is that it depends heavily on something that is out of the control of Johnson and Cummings: a divided opposition. The problem for Corbyn is that even if Boris wins only half of what remains of Farage’s vote then, alongside tribal Tories, he is climbing back towards 40% of the vote, close to what May achieved in 2017. Meanwhile, the electorate Corbyn put together two years ago has imploded. Only half have stayed loyal since 2017; one third has left for the Lib Dems or Greens, while another rump has gone to Farage or Johnson. Corbyn’s ratings have crashed. Johnson could ruthlessly exploit these divisions and capture a wave of seats where Lib Dems take more votes from Labour, allowing a consolidated “leave” vote to cross the line with a majority of 70-80.

But what if the opposition does not stay divided? It is not hard to see how all of this could backfire, leaving Johnson humiliated like May in 2017. Corbyn and Labour turn up the volume on climate change, support for remain and populist attacks against the distant wealthy elite embodied in Britain’s 20th Etonian prime minister. If Labour frames the new government as secretly wanting to privatise the NHS, put crony capitalism on steroids and turn Britain into a “Singapore-on-Thames”, it could put its fractured coalition back together — remainers, Greens and liberals who tactically conclude that, while Labour is divided, it is still the best bet against the sequel to Vote Leave.
 
pt 2

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Other problems could arise. What if the remaining Brexit Party voters are not ready to trust Johnson, a man who, as Farage reminds them, voted for May’s withdrawal agreement? The Brexit Party’s 10% in the by-election last week cost Boris an early victory. What if Boris is forced to hold an election before he can deliver Brexit, or delivers a revised version of May’s deal considered too soft by most leavers? What if he wins Brexit Party votes only in safe Tory seats in the south of England, where he does not need them, rather than in Labour heartlands, where he needs them to offset losses in Remainia?

Such questions point to a possible nightmare scenario. Like May, Johnson overestimates his appeal in Labour Land and underestimates Labour tribalism. Meanwhile, the Lib Dems attack on another flank, including in the 28 seats where they are second to the Tories. This is why Johnson will also need to carve out a message to other key groups that are rapidly abandoning his party.

Fifty years ago, one academic famously remarked that social class is the basis of British party politics and that “all else is embellishment and detail”. This is no longer true. Age is the new dividing line. And today the Tories are getting smashed among younger voters.

At the last election Labour was nearly 50 points ahead among 18- and 19-year olds. I often meet these post-millennials on my university campus in Canterbury, which at the last election went Labour for the first time in history. They have no memory of 9/11, barely remember Blair or even the start of the financial crisis. Most are convinced they have been dealt a rotten hand: tuition fees, property prices, climate change and a sluggish economy. As one student said to me: “All we have known is austerity.”

But the post-millennials are not as important as another group. Last week, James Johnson, Theresa May’s pollster, explained where he thought the Tories had gone wrong. While lots of rock-solid leavers are out there, he said, they tended to live in ultra-safe Labour seats. He urged his party to focus instead on voters who do not trust the Tories on public services but are winnable. Cummings voiced similar views in 2017: “People think, and . . . I think most people are right: “The Tory party is run by people who basically don’t care about people like me.” Both are right. Most voters remain deeply pessimistic about the direction of the economy and, for the first time since 2002, a clear majority want taxes to rise to spend more on public services. Labour still holds a clear lead when voters are asked whom they trust to run the NHS.

Enter the “Things can only get better generation”: those born in the late 1970s or 1980s who came of age under New Labour and all that went with it. Massive investment in public services. Childcare. Cool Britannia. Social liberalism. Competent government.

Today, that generation have children of their own, but are struggling. They worry about the cost of childcare, never mind putting their offspring through university. They worry about their ageing baby-boomer parents and the cost of social care. They might be lucky enough to have bought their own house, but if they did they probably owe the Bank of Mum and Dad. They are instinctively liberal and agree with Corbyn that the game is rigged. Some backed Brexit; most did not. All are convinced it has been handled terribly.

This group is critical because it swung the hardest against the Tories in 2017. May had little if anything to say to them. The only 35- to 54-year-olds who stayed with the Tories were the most affluent AB group. Everybody else in this age group swung behind Labour.

The Tories are also incredibly weak among young women, and ethnic minorities. Two years ago, they lagged 34 points behind Labour among women aged 25-34 and 55 points behind among women aged 18-24. Johnson is already struggling here. It’s not hard to figure out why. And he might have the most ethnically diverse cabinet in British history, but at the last election Labour’s lead among non-white voters increased to 54 points, up six points on 2015.

All of this points to an awkward reality for the new prime minister. One legacy of Brexit and May’s premiership is that Johnson has inherited a party that is growing among non-graduates and the working-class but losing ground among ascendant middle-class professionals, the young middle-aged, women and minorities. A leave alliance and a strategy of consolidation might allow him to win big at an election this year, provided his opposition remains divided. But step back and you quickly see how the Conservative Party is going backwards among other groups that are only going to become more important to shaping the future of modern Britain.
 
pt 2

---

Other problems could arise. What if the remaining Brexit Party voters are not ready to trust Johnson, a man who, as Farage reminds them, voted for May’s withdrawal agreement? The Brexit Party’s 10% in the by-election last week cost Boris an early victory. What if Boris is forced to hold an election before he can deliver Brexit, or delivers a revised version of May’s deal considered too soft by most leavers? What if he wins Brexit Party votes only in safe Tory seats in the south of England, where he does not need them, rather than in Labour heartlands, where he needs them to offset losses in Remainia?

Such questions point to a possible nightmare scenario. Like May, Johnson overestimates his appeal in Labour Land and underestimates Labour tribalism. Meanwhile, the Lib Dems attack on another flank, including in the 28 seats where they are second to the Tories. This is why Johnson will also need to carve out a message to other key groups that are rapidly abandoning his party.

Fifty years ago, one academic famously remarked that social class is the basis of British party politics and that “all else is embellishment and detail”. This is no longer true. Age is the new dividing line. And today the Tories are getting smashed among younger voters.

At the last election Labour was nearly 50 points ahead among 18- and 19-year olds. I often meet these post-millennials on my university campus in Canterbury, which at the last election went Labour for the first time in history. They have no memory of 9/11, barely remember Blair or even the start of the financial crisis. Most are convinced they have been dealt a rotten hand: tuition fees, property prices, climate change and a sluggish economy. As one student said to me: “All we have known is austerity.”

But the post-millennials are not as important as another group. Last week, James Johnson, Theresa May’s pollster, explained where he thought the Tories had gone wrong. While lots of rock-solid leavers are out there, he said, they tended to live in ultra-safe Labour seats. He urged his party to focus instead on voters who do not trust the Tories on public services but are winnable. Cummings voiced similar views in 2017: “People think, and . . . I think most people are right: “The Tory party is run by people who basically don’t care about people like me.” Both are right. Most voters remain deeply pessimistic about the direction of the economy and, for the first time since 2002, a clear majority want taxes to rise to spend more on public services. Labour still holds a clear lead when voters are asked whom they trust to run the NHS.

Enter the “Things can only get better generation”: those born in the late 1970s or 1980s who came of age under New Labour and all that went with it. Massive investment in public services. Childcare. Cool Britannia. Social liberalism. Competent government.

Today, that generation have children of their own, but are struggling. They worry about the cost of childcare, never mind putting their offspring through university. They worry about their ageing baby-boomer parents and the cost of social care. They might be lucky enough to have bought their own house, but if they did they probably owe the Bank of Mum and Dad. They are instinctively liberal and agree with Corbyn that the game is rigged. Some backed Brexit; most did not. All are convinced it has been handled terribly.

This group is critical because it swung the hardest against the Tories in 2017. May had little if anything to say to them. The only 35- to 54-year-olds who stayed with the Tories were the most affluent AB group. Everybody else in this age group swung behind Labour.

The Tories are also incredibly weak among young women, and ethnic minorities. Two years ago, they lagged 34 points behind Labour among women aged 25-34 and 55 points behind among women aged 18-24. Johnson is already struggling here. It’s not hard to figure out why. And he might have the most ethnically diverse cabinet in British history, but at the last election Labour’s lead among non-white voters increased to 54 points, up six points on 2015.

All of this points to an awkward reality for the new prime minister. One legacy of Brexit and May’s premiership is that Johnson has inherited a party that is growing among non-graduates and the working-class but losing ground among ascendant middle-class professionals, the young middle-aged, women and minorities. A leave alliance and a strategy of consolidation might allow him to win big at an election this year, provided his opposition remains divided. But step back and you quickly see how the Conservative Party is going backwards among other groups that are only going to become more important to shaping the future of modern Britain.
:thumbs: ta
 
Thanks redsquirrel for posting.

I think Goodwin is broadly correct. However, his characterisation of the ‘lost leavers’ is wide of the mark. The numbers he ascribes to the group are too small and the reason this group didn’t vote for May, and won’t vote for Johnson, are the same (and why they won’t vote for Corbyn either) - their sense of betrayal and abandonment, and their disdain for the establishment parties, makes it impossible.

I voted in the referendum and then took my dad to vote. He pointed out, as we waited in the long queue, loads of people who he knew and who hadn’t voted since the eighties. Their vote in the referendum was a one off and they won’t vote again in an election for either Tory or Labour. Too much betrayal
 
Interesting article by Goodwin - in the form of a MOS article ‘advising Johnson how to reconnect with the periphery, the deindustriaised towns and coastal town of Britain.

A ‘Marshall Plan’ of investment, infrastructure and economic rebalancing to reconnect these areas and rebalance politics:

 
Without pointing to any specific source polling, Goodwin claims that "Few actual Leavers or Remianers have changed their minds." Then, seemingly without irony warns his followers to treat "confident claims with extreme caution". Clown.

He also chooses not to consider the impact of the estimated near 2 million voters that have attained majority/franchise since June 2016 on that "slight shift", merely claiming that it is down to "those who did not vote".

upload_2019-8-24_9-6-22.png
 
I mean... treating confident assertions with caution doesn't mean discounting them: it means checking if the facts support them. Which - in this case - they do.
 
Wouldn't those who didn't vote include "the estimated near 2 million voters that have attained majority/franchise since June 2016"?
It would, but it would be psephologically clearer to distinguish between significant sample cohorts that did not & could not vote in 2016.
 
He's right to be confident in that assertion though. Its supported by every post-referendum poll I've seen.
Is it?

Based on the Britain Elects tracker poll of polling, it looks as though there have been significant (beyond MoE) changes of expressed sentiment with remainian majorities over much of the last year. Granted the margin appears to have closed over the last 3 months back into MoE territory.

upload_2019-8-24_12-48-53.png
 
That doesn't contradict Goodwin's point though, he admits there has been a slight shift to remain (though worth remembering that is for a vote that is at this stage still hypothetical) but the point is that vote is based on 2016 non-voters going to Remain rather than those that voted Leave in 2016 voting differently.

Year old but here's a study that backs up Goddwin's claim
The reason why most polls now have Remain narrowly ahead is not because more voters have switched from Leave to Remain than have made the journey in the opposite direction.
 
More recent piece here. Not read this in full yet, the plot they are showing as voting intention 6 months prior to Mar 2016 looks far too flat and doesn't agree with the Britain elects one so something a bit suss there and frankly I'd take issue with lots of the politics (e.g. use of 'only' in statement I quote below), but relevant part is
But how about all the other voters getting older? Some indeed have switched their allegiance: only 88 per cent of Remainers would vote the same again. But even more Leave voters would switch, only 82 per cent saying they would repeat their vote.

EDIT: Forgot to attach link
 
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More recent piece here. Not read this in full yet, the plot they are showing as voting intention 6 months prior to Mar 2016 looks far too flat and doesn't agree with the Britain elects one so something a bit suss there and frankly I'd take issue with lots of the politics (e.g. use of 'only' in statement I quote below), but relevant part is
There was a useful John Curtice piece published just before the (then) impending March Brexit deadline date that looked specifically at the question of the degree to which there had been any significant 'churn' between the referendum positions:

Has there been a shift in support for Brexit? - UK in a changing Europe

Amongst quite a full account that, in part, supports Goodwin's general claims, he did make this observation:

It looks then as though the modest but perceptible increase in the lead of Remain over Leave in the last nine months has been occasioned by a small rise in the proportion of Leave voters who now have doubts or, in some cases, second thoughts about their original choice.

A not dissimilar pattern is found in the responses to YouGov’s ‘In hindsight’ question.

Though we have to bear in mind that this is 6 months old now.
 
Definitely something a little weird with that University of Warwick piece. Taking the results of all polls in the 6 month run up to the EU elections I get below, which is considerably different to the flat lines they are getting
plot.png

(Moving averages are done over five data points)
 
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