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Global financial system implosion begins

Cars ain't remotely the same as the subprime crash, though it won't be pretty.

When you can't make the payments on a PCP or lease any more, the car - the asset - returns to the finance company, who in many but by no means all instances is the manufacturer. Better for them in some ways, but not others, that it's someone else, a bank. It continues to exist as a commodity but if this happens en masse then the oversupply devalues both used cars and, by opportunity, puts a brake on selling new ones. Not only that, but as well as the general appetite to either offer or take finance reducing, the GFV of finance arrangements declines too and so the financing requirement for a purchase increases. All in all, not just a financial hit, but also very hard to sell cars at a profit. If the manufacturer can't ride that pattern out - or indeed manipulate it by, say, destroying its returned cars - they'll go bust. There ends the tale.

There will be some outstanding personal consumer debt involved here - the negative equity on early termination - but it's strictly finite and comparatively small compared to mortgages. Most consumers won't lose their shirts.

Aside from the scale, unlike housing, there's no speculative or leveraged element to it, the assets are transferable commodities, a default isn't so simple, finance terms are fixed for the duration of the loan, the owner of the debt is probably generally better contained, the societal outcome isn't as disruptive, etc etc.

But if it does fail en masse, it will put a big dent in confidence, on which the economy depends, and therefore could be a trigger for other bigger failures.

punters demanding a brand new shiny thing rather than a couple of years old shiny thing could conversely come back and bite the auto manufacturers in the arse down the line.
 
Dalian Wanda deal: Why is China's 'Disney rival' being sold? - BBC News
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40554093
So, further to those financial investigations being carried out into major Chinese companies, Wanda have sold $9.6bn in assets, 76 hotels and several theme parks.

Incidentally, on the subway system in the city I live in, every single vending machine in every single station has been out of service for about 2 months. (which is really annoying because it often surpasses 40 degrees at this time of year and I sweat a lot) I don't know for sure, (actually, I might pop down to the nearest subway now to investigate) but I would wager that the vending machines are supplied and stocked by Gate Gourmet, which is owned by HNA, one of the five big companies under investigation. Perhaps they are in the process of finding another company to take on HNAs assets to help sort out its debt problem.

An interesting thing to note about Wanda is the choice of things that have been sold off. Wanda shopping malls and plazas are very visible in most major (and many not so major) cities in China, and if they went down it would be noticed by millions and taken as a very visible indicator that the economy is not good. Second thing to notice is that all the assets being sold off are within China, and none of the overseas assets are being sold. This seems to be a face saving decision and an attempt to maintain the perception of China's rising economic and political power, and to avoid putting off investors in China. So they have chosen to sell 79 hotels (which are not as noticeable as the Wanda owned commercial districts which have Wanda logos everywhere and are frequented by millions of people every day) and 12 amusement parks, of which only 3 have been completed and open to the public.

There are party committees within every company above a certain size in China, so they can be made to make decisions for political, rather than economic, reasons. So I wonder if Sunac, who purchased the nearly $10billion worth of assets, have been pushed into making the purchase?
 
the buyer -Sunac- are spunking loads of their ill gotten property profits in an effort to diversify from their core property development theme- they believe that the Chinese new property market will soon enter a death spiral phase and are looking for toe holds elsewhere. This mega deal has only gone ahead with the explicit approval of central command as chucking cash piles into external rather than domestic projects is increasingly being seen as a not wholly positive (patriotic) action. its a symbiotic arrangement if all goes well
 
the buyer -Sunac- are spunking loads of their ill gotten property profits in an effort to diversify from their core property development theme- they believe that the Chinese new property market will soon enter a death spiral phase and are looking for toe holds elsewhere. This mega deal has only gone ahead with the explicit approval of central command as chucking cash piles into external rather than domestic projects is increasingly being seen as a not wholly positive (patriotic) action. its a symbiotic arrangement if all goes well

Do you have a link? (and if so could you copy and paste, in case the site is blocked.)

Censorship of economy related bad news is tightening here, which is another reliable sign that things are fucked - searching just the keyword "sunac" on Bing does have plenty of results, but also the message that "some results are not displayed due to a notice of local law requirement." Wonder what that is - also searching "China financial crisis 2017" on Bing just brings up endless stories from China Daily and Xinhua about how a financial crisis would never happen in China and how prospects are bright, and it is hard to find anything else, have to go many pages deep to find any stories that aren't state media puff pieces. Wasn't like that only a few weeks back when I first posted about Anbang, so seems like the censors are working hard to control the narrative.

Only a little over 2 weeks left before my flight home, very much looking forward to getting google and youtube back... the tightening political controls, rising state directed nationalism and Han chauvinism, anti-western campaigns, and likelihood of imminent economic crisis make me feel very pleased I'm not here another year...
 
Sorry Rimbaud its a cobbled together post from shit I hear and read, so no succinct link as such.

WRT a Financial crisis-as ever, its not easy to find out what is going on but the supplemental little developments all add up of late - Anbang and its stable mates, restrictions of the level of capital flight have been massively tightened- and importantly , is being actively enforced -the go live of HK/PRC securities E-trading systems is dissapating some of the risk to counterparties yet still being under the control of central command. The Sunac/Wanda arrangement is a little strange in the sold off leisure brands remain Wanda and will be run by Wanda ( officially ) but they have been bailed out by Sunac. Not a buy out as convention would allow us to understand


Central command allows you to be able to execute these actions and temper the extremes that would possibly appear in a *free market* system. Don't think there will be a crash just yet but it is all hands to the pumps to keep things moving along - only a month ago , billions of USD were dumped from the coffers to support the RMB and the rate settling mechanism used by PBOC was tweaked to give a give more control ( and opacity ) over FX things
 
The sequel to the global financial crisis is here

High credit ratings have hidden a structural instability, writes Frank Partnoy

JULY 31, 2017 by: Frank Partnoy

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The financial scene is familiar, the stuff of films like Inside Job and The Big Short. Rocket-scientist financiers buy up billions of dollars of risky loans and repackage them into complex investments with multiple layers of debt. Credit rating agencies classify the top layers as triple A. Institutional investors, including pension funds and charitable organisations, flock to buy these apparently risk-free yet high-yielding investments. Tension builds.

But the year is not 2006 or 2007. It is today. While the US administration talks of repealing Dodd-Frank, the reality is that regulators have been flouting that law for years and now the shadow financial markets are frothing. Almost a decade after the global financial crisis, the sequel has arrived.

The central culprit this time is the collateralised loan obligation. Like its earlier esoteric cousins, a CLO bundles risky low-grade loans into attractive packages and high credit ratings. In May, there were two deals of more than $1bn each, and experts estimate that $75bn worth are coming this year. Antares Capital recently closed a $2.1bn CLO, the largest in the US since 2006 and the third-largest in history. Although most of the loans underlying these deals are of “junk” status, more than half the new debt is rated triple A. Sound familiar?

During the early 2000s, similar highly rated deals called collateralised debt obligations were popular. At first, they seemed harmless, or at least not so big that their collapse could cause financial contagion. But when regulators ignored their growth, they became more opaque and more profitable, with credit ratings disconnected from reality. Like cracks in a building’s foundation, the risks seemed minor at first. But high ratings hid the instability of the entire structure. Until it was too late.

Dodd-Frank was supposed to stop these credit-rating ploys. But the Securities and Exchange Commission has permitted the agencies to dodge that law. While Dodd-Frank imposed liability on the agencies for false ratings, the SEC exempted them. Likewise, Congress barred the agencies from getting inside information about issuers they rate, but the SEC permitted that, too. As CLOs grow, the cracks are spreading again.

Last Christmas Eve, the so-called risk-retention rule of Dodd-Frank took effect, requiring that arrangers of these complex deals keep a slice of the downside. But clever financiers arranged for third parties to take on this risk.

The credit rating agencies, particularly Moody’s Investors Service and S&P Global Ratings, are the central actors in this story, just as in the original. The computer programs they use to assign triple-A ratings remain flawed. Because loan defaults can come in waves, mathematical models should account for “correlation risk”, the chance that defaults might occur simultaneously. But the models for CLOs assume correlations are low. When defaults occur at the same time, these supposed triple-A investments will be wiped out. CLOs are just CDOs in new wrapping.

Some experts say this time it is different. Earlier this month, Ashish Shah, a managing director of Madison Capital Funding, a subsidiary of New York Life, told a roundtable of CLO experts they should not worry about defaults in 2017. “The appetite for assets is ferocious,” he said. Pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are demanding both safety and high returns. CLOs seem to offer both.

A new Office of Credit Ratings within the SEC is supposed to provide a check on this appetite. But when I sent a Freedom of Information Act request, seeking to identify which credit rating agencies have been found to violate SEC rules, the regulators refused to divulge names. Violators remain anonymous.

It is hard to police the financial markets. New business school graduates are inevitably one step ahead of their regulator counterparts, and many of the least creditworthy businesses find it easy to borrow, because their loans can be quickly repackaged and sold. During the debates about Dodd-Frank repeal, legislators should keep their eyes on these complex investments and the agencies that facilitate them.

Some might claim CLOs are different or smaller, or that regulators are better prepared today, or that business loans could not possibly default all at once, as home mortgage loans did. But similar arguments were made about risks during the early 2000s, before they spread to the major banks and AIG, and the markets spiralled out of control.

To avoid an even bigger crisis, regulators should heed warnings about financial dysfunction and hidden risks now, before the cracks spread.

The writer is a professor at the University of San Diego and author of ‘Fiasco: Blood in the Water on Wall Street’


...and in other news investors are now chowing down on debt issued by Argentina & Greece....what could go wrong
 
No self respecting bank is holding these instruments, just assisting in the design and production- the end users are invariably us , by proxy

Comments about the regulators are apt and critical-troublesome regulators are taken out of the process by offering them jobs with the banks for 3/4 x their salary. The FCA are left with a hard core of unimaginative drones whilst the truly smart ones are bought off to work around the regulations and undermine them. Working for the enemy covenants are either ignored or worked around.
 
No self respecting bank is holding these instruments, just assisting in the design and production- the end users are invariably us , by proxy

Comments about the regulators are apt and critical-troublesome regulators are taken out of the process by offering them jobs with the banks for 3/4 x their salary. The FCA are left with a hard core of unimaginative drones whilst the truly smart ones are bought off to work around the regulations and undermine them. Working for the enemy covenants are either ignored or worked around.
regulatory capture is what I've heard it called, and it goes on in more than just finance ennit
 
the drips always happened - same with the ratings agencies- but now it is almost like soviet snipers targeting the officers to demoralise the troops and waiting for the next one to pop up and take a head shot. I know of one who was graduate entry to FSA , went to one of the big consultants and thence into a yank bank - 10x his salary in as many years. He is a very dull man and not massively clever but knows his niche inside out. A moral free cunt.
 
Good piece by Aditya Chakrabortty

Ten years after the crash, there’s barely suppressed civil war in Britain
Guardian 15/08/17
Everyone knows history is written by the victors, but this is something else: bullshit recounted by the bullshitters. Even the banks are back to bragging how many billions they generously chip in to Her Majesty’s Exchequer, presumably hoping no one will point out that they took £1.3tn from taxpayers in just a few months in 2008.
 
There’s a Reason People Are Worried About Low Volatility

something that has reared its head on here a few times - the last was after Dwyer had read a book on it. The volatility index merely reflects sentiment really but like all economy-alchemy things, it can take on a life of its own and become a factor driving sentiment as well. A true Financial ouroboros. Overall it means nothing or is hugely significant. One or the other,. of maybe somewhere inbetween. Things are still fucked whatever.
 
1) Wanda have officially pulled their interest in the London 9 Elms project - central command says no more spunking money on speculative overseas projects
2) re the Credit card issue above- the BoE is shitting about CC being sued to cover shortfalls elsewhere ( see their stability report from June) a c. 10% growth of credit card useage would indicate that there is some tightness in many households
 
I think it is all down hill from here on - I am going to call another credit event by the end of the year . I will invariably be proved wrong, but fuck it.

Looks very much like it, doesn't it?

But not until after the Party Conference, so my money is on early to mid 2018. No matter how much more trouble it is storing up for later, they will keep pumping more debt into the economy to delay the inevitable until Xi has secured his position. Mutterings abound that he is planning to abolish effectively abolish term limits by restoring the role of Chairman.
 
isn't that "real wages" chart just another way of saying those countries have deflation ( eurozone & Japan esp. ) - which is invariably written up by economics correspondents as a massive problem aswell ? :confused: ( confused.com )
 
Capitalism Can’t Save The Planet – It Can Only Destroy It
Monbiot. 13 September 2017
The perpetual quest for growth drives our economics. That’s why our environment and financial system lurch from crisis to crisis.
The commons have been wrecked. Or in language of Capitalism negative externalities.

UK's high street banks are accident waiting to happen, says report
13 September 2017
Dowd argued that the scenarios were “hardly doomsday” and disputes the way banks’ capital strength is measured.

“The stress tests are about as useful as a cancer test that cannot detect cancer. They seek to demonstrate a financial resilience on the part of UK banks that simply isn’t there,” said Dowd in the report. “Our banking system is an accident waiting to happen.”
The Bank uses the value of assets as calculated by the banks rather than their value on the markets which, he argued, would give a more accurate assessment of their financial health.

The leverage of banks has fallen by about a third since 2006 on the first measure but, according to Dowd, has increased by a half on the second.

“It is disturbing that 10 years on from Northern Rock, the best measures of leverage – those based on market values – indicate that UK banks are even more leveraged than they were then,” said Dowd.
 
Have noticed Lloyd Bank are about to change their overdraft policy.. charging 1p per £7 borrowed, charged daily on a "pay as you borrow".. SO you if live in an overdraft, it basically works out at over 50% APR. Practically puts them in pay day loan territory. Looks like the first squeeze on unsecured debt to me.
 
back in the good old days, the basel group committee of central bankers reckoned that c. 18% was a reasonable benchmark for Tier 1 Bank capital adequacy cover - we are running at 13% at the minute and there is a raging argument going on as to the efficacy of the current stress tests and whether they are fit for purpose of measuring the real world impact of cobbles and potholes on the financial highway. The big boys was as low as cap ad as possible and the central banks have to temper caution and keep the banking sector happy.For fucks sake, even the Adam Smith institute think the current model for stress testing is gerrymandered self priced shit and not reflective of todays interconnected world.

One big issue is that they are self pricing some murky shit, which is bad enough, but there is an assumption that there is a final destination market for everything if it goes tits up - which is clearly not the case. Them corporate bonds you are holding with a couple of % haircut for valuation could drop to pennies in minutes or hours and the market will cease to exist. the black swan events of yore are no longer out of scope, they are tangible and closer than ever.

lolz
 
Aleksandar Kocic Presents: The Dark Side Of Liquidity

I am ahead of the curve- fuck knows that this heisenberg site is about - but it does taken on board the timely Kocic moot that boundary assumptions on liquidity should not be erm.. assumed. Its all about liquidity, and oddly, liquidity is not always a transparent factor. I am shouting at myself here I know, but mrs NBE has had enough and banished me to the guest room with some Diazipam to keep me medically coshed so she can get a good nights sleep.
 
Central bankers face a crisis of confidence as models fail
FT 11/10/17
The new masters of the universe are struggling to understand what makes a modern economy tick and their actions could prove harmful
Central bankers usurped the titans of Wall Street as the masters of the universe almost a decade ago. They rescued the global economy from the financial crisis, flooding the world with cheap money. They used their powers effectively to get banks lending again. Their actions raised asset prices, keeping business and consumer confidence up. Financial markets and populations hang on their words. But never have they been so vulnerable.

As they gather in Washington for the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund, there is a crisis of confidence in central banking. Their economic models are failing and there are doubts whether they understand the effects of interest rates and other monetary policies on the economy.

In short, the new masters of the universe might not understand what makes a modern economy tick and their well-intentioned actions could prove harmful.

While there have long been critics of the power of central bankers on the left and the right, such profound doubts have never been so present within their narrow world. In the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffett, they risk being the next ones to be found swimming naked when the tide goes out.
The ability of central banks to resolve these questions does not just affect growth rates, but is fundamental to the health of the democracies of advanced economies, many of which have been assailed by populist uprisings.

“If we can’t get inflation back up [trouble lies ahead]. We can’t have political stability without wage growth,” says Adam Posen, head of the Peterson Institute and formerly a central banker at the Bank of England.

The root of the current insecurity around monetary policy is that in advanced economies — from Japan to the US — inflation is not behaving in the way economic models predicted.

Deflation failed to materialise in the depths of the great recession of 2008-09 and now that the global economy is enjoying its broadest and strongest upswing since 2010, inflationary pressures are largely absent. Even as the unemployment rate across advanced economies has fallen from almost 9 per cent in 2009 to less than 6 per cent today, IMF figures this week show wage growth has been stuck hovering around annual increases of 2 per cent. The normal relationships in the labour market have broken down.
Amid this forecasting nightmare, some frank talk is breaking out. Janet Yellen, chair of the US Federal Reserve and the world’s most important central banker, has been the most direct. “Our framework for understanding inflation dynamics could be mis-specified in some fundamental way,” she said last month. Her sentiments are spreading.

For Mark Carney, governor of the BoE, global considerations “have made it more difficult for central banks to set policy in order to achieve their objectives”. Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, is keeping the faith for now, but observes, “the ongoing economic expansion . . . has yet to translate sufficiently into stronger inflation dynamics”.

Claudio Borio, chief economist of the Bank for International Settlements, which provides banking services to the world’s central banks, says: “If one is completely honest, it is hard to avoid the question: how much do we really know about the inflation process?”
 
The details of macroeconomic models are fiendishly complicated, but at their heart is a relationship — called the Phillips curve — between the economic cycle and inflation. The cycle can be measured by unemployment, the rate of growth or other variables, and the model predicts that if the economy is running hot — if unemployment falls below a long-run sustainable level or if growth is persistently faster than its speed limit — inflation will rise.

The models are augmented by a concept of inflation expectations, which keep inflation closer to a central bank’s target — usually 2 per cent — if the public trusts that central bankers will do whatever it takes to return inflation to that level after any temporary deviation. The holy grail for central bankers is to claim credibly that they have “anchored inflation expectations” at the target level.

In the model, the most important factors that explain price movements are therefore the degree to which the economy has room to grow without inflation, termed “slack” or “the output gap”, and the public’s inflation expectations.
The role of central banks in the model is to set the short-term interest rate. If a central bank sets its official interest rates low, people and companies will be encouraged to borrow more to spend and invest and discouraged from saving, boosting the economy in the short term. Higher interest rates cool demand.

The first fundamental problem with the model is, as Mr Borio says, “the link between measures of domestic slack and inflation has proved rather weak and elusive for at least a couple of decades”.

While Japan’s unemployment rate is now back down to the levels of the 1970s and 1980s boom, leaving little slack, inflation is barely above zero. In Britain, unemployment has almost halved since 2010, but wage growth has stuck resolutely at 2 per cent a year.

But many economists and central bankers are wedded to the underlying theory, which is about 30 years old, and seek to tweak it to explain recent events rather than ditch it in favour of less orthodox ideas. Such nips and tucks are occurring all over the world, although the explanations differ.
Ms Yellen has highlighted measurement issues in inflation and “idiosyncratic shifts in the prices of some items, such as the large decline in telecommunication service prices seen earlier in the year”. Similarly, the ECB is fond of a new definition — “super core inflation”, which strips out more items from the index and shows the bank performing better against its target than the headline measure. But few central bankers are happy with meeting targets only once they have moved the goalposts.

A second explanation is that the level of unemployment that is consistent with stable inflation has fallen. In 2013, the BoE thought the UK economy could not withstand unemployment falling below 7 per cent before wages and inflation would pick up. It now thinks that rate is 4.5 per cent. On this reasoning, inflation has been low because there was more slack in the economy than they had thought.

The problem with such explanations, as Daniel Tarullo, a Fed governor for eight years until April, notes, is that if central bankers keep changing their notion of sustainable unemployment levels “sound estimation and judgment are sometimes hard to differentiate from guesswork in attempting to see through transitory developments”.

A third explanation is that central bankers have been so successful in anchoring inflation expectations, companies do not seek to raise prices any faster and workers do not ask for wage rises even when jobs are plentiful.
Mr Draghi recently urged union pay bargainers to stop looking backward at inflation rates of the past when they negotiate wages, in a move that used to be unthinkable for a central banker. The problem with this explanation is both the self-serving reasoning and the fact that inflation expectations cannot be measured.

“Over my time at the Fed, I came to worry that inflation expectations are bearing an awful lot of weight in monetary policy these days, considering the range and depth of unanswered questions about them,” says Mr Tarullo.

The Bank of Japan, meanwhile, frets that companies are cutting employees’ hours and raising productivity rather than paying more, which is hampering its ability to push up inflation despite extremely low unemployment.
If it was not bad enough that the link between the economic cycle and inflation has broken down, the second fundamental problem in central banking is that estimates of the neutral rate of interest — seen as the long-term rate of interest that balances people’s desire to save and invest with their desire to borrow and spend — appear to have fallen persistently across the world.

The Fed’s central estimates of the real neutral interest rate has declined by nearly two-thirds in five years, from 2 per cent to 0.75 per cent. But the figures are again little more than guesswork. As Ms Yellen said, “[the neutral rate’s] value at any point in time cannot be estimated or projected with much precision”.

Whether it is because ageing populations want to save more or because of a global “savings glut”, as former Fed chair Ben Bernanke said, low rates no longer have the same impact, limiting the effectiveness of the medicine central banks want to administer.

Regardless of the terminology, the two problems combined suggest central bankers cannot easily determine whether their economies need stimulus or cooling and do not know whether their monetary tools are helping them do their job. And there is increasing concern, even expressed by Ms Yellen, that the underlying theoretical model might simply be rotten to the core and attempts to tweak it are futile.

“Essentially you are setting policy on things you don’t know and can’t measure and then reasoning after the fact,” says Mr Tarullo. His core argument is that central banks maintain an absolute faith in the model with absolutely no evidence to support it.

At a conference last month to celebrate the BoE’s 20 years of independence, Christina Romer, professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, urged central bankers to have a more open mind.

New research is needed to question whether current thinking is deficient, she said, “and if such research suggests our ideas explaining how the economy works are wrong or need to change, then central bankers need to embrace those ideas”.
The most aggressive critic of the consensus is Mr Borio of the BIS. He accuses central bankers of misunderstanding the drivers of inflation and their effects on the economy. His argument is that global forces of trade integration and technology are more convincing than concepts of domestic slack in explaining the absence of pricing power among companies and employees.

He asks: “Is it reasonable to believe that the inflation process should have remained immune to the entry into the global economy of the former Soviet bloc and China and to the opening up of other emerging market economies?”

His concern is that by keeping interest rates low, central bankers have no effect on inflation or the economy other than to increase the level of debt. The result is that it will be harder “to raise interest rates without causing economic damage, owing to the large debts and distortions in the real economy that the financial cycle creates”.
It is not a popular view, but it is no longer dismissed out of hand. Ms Yellen justified her stance on continuing to raise interest rates gradually in the face of persistently low inflation by appealing to concerns about debt.

“Persistently easy monetary policy might also eventually lead to increased leverage and other developments, with adverse implications for financial stability,” she said.

With central bankers credited for keeping the economic show on the road over the past decade, it will come as a shock to many to hear how little confidence they have in their models, their policies and their tools.

One question posed by Richard Barwell, a senior economist at BNP Paribas, is whether they should let on about how little they know. “It’s rather like Daddy is driving the car down a hill, turning round to the family and saying, ‘I’m not sure the brakes work, but trust me anyway’,” he says.

For now, the public still trust the women and men who work in the marbled halls of central banks around the world. But that confidence is fragile. Central bankers might have been the masters of the universe of the past decade, but they know well what happened to the previous holders of that title.
 
Beautiful. Utterly beautiful.

I recall raising the issue ( not here) of long term flat rates in late 07 /early 08 IIRC but it was not something willing to be discussed- the mindset at the time was firefighting.- which was completely understandable.

Now we seem to be in a Dr Strangelove scenario-unable to stop the machine now it has been triggered.
 
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Beautiful. Utterly beautiful.

I recall raising the issue ( not here) of long term flat rates in late 07 /early 08 IIRC but it was not something willing to be discussed- the mindset at the time was firefighting.- which was completely understandable.

Now we seem to be in a Dr Strangelove scenario-unable to stop the machine now it has been triggered.
Isn't it! Bubble everything.
 
Global financial system implosion begins

And yet now, nine years after this thread began, the system has NOT imploded.

The capitalist system has corrected itself and many share markets are at all time highs.

Bank loans received from the US government have been repaid, with interest.

Time has proved that the fear mongering by the usual leftist groups was utter nonsense.
 
Global financial system implosion begins

And yet now, nine years after this thread began, the system has NOT imploded.

The capitalist system has corrected itself and many share markets are at all time highs.

Bank loans received from the US government have been repaid, with interest.

Time has proved that the fear mongering by the usual leftist groups was utter nonsense.

Meanwhile, in terms of shit that actually means something to ordinary workers:

'Real value' of wages in the UK plummets by 14% since 2008 | This is Money
 
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