EU Reading List

[CNT36]

That's such a recipe for success, I don't understand how they failed.

Me neither. They had the miracle worker who helped the Lib Dems keep 8 MPs.

 

[Patteran]

Have we had this? Difficult keeping up with all the threads. Stathis Kouvelakis again, this time in Jacobin, arguing for rigorous marxist analysis rather than wallowing in 'we're drowning in a tide of reaction!' woe.

From this angle, the worst thing the Left could do to confront the Right’s hegemony is to conform to the dominant narrative that Brexit’s success is a racist outburst from the depths of Britain’s psyche. Not only because this interpretation is analytically incorrect, but also because this discourse has an immanently performative dimension.

 

[chilango]

Verso have put out a free ebook on Brexit.

Ive ordered it but not read it yet...

 

[Louis MacNeice]

Here's John Gray's take on the brexit vote: point of view

This post is not an endorsement. Gray's is an attempt to argue against the EU on the same terms as many liberal proponents of remain.

Cheers - Louis MacNeice

 

[inva]

Verso have put out a free ebook on Brexit.

Ive ordered it but not read it yet...

it's mostly rubbish tbh, sometimes boringly repetitive, sometimes embarassing drivel. a couple of decent bits.

 

[chilango]

it's mostly rubbish tbh, sometimes boringly repetitive, sometimes embarassing drivel. a couple of decent bits.

Ah ok. Thanks. Might read the Streck bit though.

 

[butchersapron]

What's your thoughts on the Streeck book so far?

 

[inva]

Ah ok. Thanks. Might read the Streck bit though.

i filed that bit in boring.
odd obsession with national stereotypes

 

[inva]

Ah ok. Thanks. Might read the Streck bit though.

the piece by Kouvelakis is worth a read too though it has been linked on here before so you might already have seen it

 

[chilango]

What's your thoughts on the Streeck book so far?

Only a little way in tbf. His writing style is accessible enough for me but I've yet to get to any meaty arguments.

 

[brogdale]

I've started the Streeck book

Thinking about your reading of 'Buying Time'; something cropped up on the Radio 4 'Today' programme (2:42:26 onwards) yesterday that gave a rare MSM glimpse of the real power of financialised capital's usury. In a commentary regarding the appointment of Manny Roman as PIMCO's new CEO, the following was broadcast...

Not only can it [PIMCO] move markets, but I don't think it's too much of a stretch to say it can move governments as well....and if it says it doesn't like your policies you'd better sit up and take notice.

True dat.

 

[butchersapron]

The new streeck is a repetitive rush job filled with last minute minute book reviews to fill it out. It's a pamphlet. The end bits about sociology are in the wrong book.

Two chapters are great. The rest are shit

Buying time = perf

 

[butchersapron]

I've just ripped this brilliant Costas Lapavitsas article from the new edition of the Jacobin linked Catalyst Journal - really recommend a read. First half deals with what's happening, how it's happening and why it's happening. Then there's a few graphs and then moves onto why the reform the EU from within line is daydreaming utopian nonsense using the Syriza experience as a microcosmical (?) example:

More specifically, the emu has come to foster an international hierarchy of
economies in the eu that is associated with German dominance, both within the
core and between core and periphery. By virtue of its institutions, norms, and
functioning, the emu has enabled Germany to acquire tremendous competitive
preeminence and a towering current account surplus, as well as assuming the
position as European creditor par excellence. On these grounds Germany has
become the eu ’s dominant force and the hegemon of Europe.

In working out a strategy appropriate to the current state of Europe, it
is crucial for the Left to recognize that the destructive role of the emu is not
derived primarily from its overlay of neoliberal thinking and politics, which, if
torn away, would allow the euro to function in the interest of working people.
The emu is a rigid set of institutions that has become the backbone of the eu .
Its deepest failing has been its role in constructing and reproducing German
preeminence, thus also reshaping the eu in practice. That has been the primary
function of the euro in historical terms, even if it was not purposely intended
by those who created the monetary union in the 1990s.

Given this overriding reality, to hope that the outlook of the emu and the eu
could be altered through the simultaneous election of left-wing governments
in core countries, drawing upon common anticapitalist policies and supported
by grassroots workers’ movements, is to add fantasy to misunderstanding. The
political emptiness of this view has been made clear — in different ways —
by the failure of Syriza in Greece and the rise of the Labour Party in Britain
following Brexit.

 

[pocketscience]

killer b just linked a useful academic article: the political economy of brexit by Helen Thompson.
Well worth a read

 

[killer b]

I wondered if there was a more appropriate thread, but couldn't be arsed looking for it.

 

[butchersapron]

I've got a couple more from the new catalyst later this week - or maybe tmw depending on how busy i am.

 

[butchersapron]

I haven't got round to those catalyst pieces, forgot - will do later today. But for now:

Stathis Kouvelakis has a blisteringly angry piece in the latest New Left Review that takes an in-depth look with special attention on Greece and the role of it at both external border and internal border as a laboratory for the 'radicalised neo-liberalism' of the EU.

Borderland: Greece and the EU’s Southern Question

European integration since the 1980s has led to the construction and expansion of a specific institutional entity, the EU, which confiscates the name of ‘Europe’ to conceal at the symbolic level the operation of exclusion that lies at its core. The extent to which this hybrid construct, partly inter-governmental, partly supra-national, is based upon sheer coercion is, for the most part, barely visible to the populations living ‘inside’ it.

Greece stands at the intersection of at least three regions of broader significance: the Balkans, Southern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. All three share a common status of ‘in-betweenness’, sometimes considered as an advantage—as suggested by the metaphor of ‘the bridge’ or ‘the crossroads’—but more often as a predicament. [2] European, but not quite Western; Christian, but neither Catholic nor Protestant; the alleged original site of European culture, but also, for many centuries, part of an Islamic multi-ethnic empire; peripheral and ‘backward’, but economically inextricable from the Western core of the continent; dependent and dominated, but never part of the modern colonized world—Greece appears as a true embodiment of those tensions. Exploding after decades of seemingly successful European integration, the recent double ‘crisis’ of which it has been the epicentre—the debt crisis and the migrant crisis—confirmed its identity as Europe’s ‘Other within’. [3] Both marginal and central, its singularity thus revealed the cracks multiplying through the European edifice, as well as the latter’s role in the increasing instability and disruption affecting the broader region.

It was thus not by chance that the ‘refugee crisis’ exploded with spectacular violence in Greece, bringing it to the centre of public attention throughout Europe. I put the term in inverted commas to emphasize that there is nothing neutral about its adoption. Why was it that the arrival of around a million ‘refugees’ or ‘migrants’—again, the choice is significant—in a polity of 510 million, should have been, in and of itself, a ‘crisis’? In reality, its representation as such, above all by the EU authorities and member states, powerfully seconded by media commentary, was fully a part of the problem. The spectacle of humanitarian disaster—images from the summer of 2015 of a child’s body washed up on the beach, the mass arrivals on the Greek islands, the crowds at Budapest Station—briefly brought into the light of day a long-repressed reality. Its matrix lay in the lethal character of the liberal-capital ‘Fortress Europe’ regime which the EU has been building for decades, and its relation to the neighbouring zones of North Africa and the Middle East, where the EU powers have been major protagonists in the wave of wars and civil disruption that drove such numbers to flee.

Liz Fekete's new book Europe’s Fault Line: Racism and the Rise of the Right has an extremely detailed and in-depth chapter (Chapter 7 - The Market in Asylum and the Outsourcing of Force) that really demonstrates the EU's extension and militarisation (not to mention profit making) of borders. I really think there would be outrage on the well meaning liberal left if they ever really were told what the EU was up to - or made the effort to find out for themselves. Or at least there would have to be if they were to remain consistent in their oft declared principles

 

[Nigel]

Just Read This !
Well written and informed socialist and grass root political analysis how Greek Crisis with background Knowledge !
Written by well heeled ex Millie Intellectual !
Roger Silverman | Newham Bookshop

 

[pocketscience]

Been meaning to add this here since putting it on the Brexit thread.
Streeck - Europe under Merkel IV: Balance of impotence

 

[butchersapron]

Here's an excellent chapter i have took from the book Crisis, Movement, Strategy: The Greek Experience. It outlines in some detail what the growth of EU 'economic governance' rather than political governance by elected parliaments etc means - what in fact technocracy looks like. I understand it's rather a technical article but is well worth the time/effort. Anyone wanting to just skim would be well advised to look at the points connected to notes 9+35 together, 12, 28, 33, 59, 61 and 76-7. That means the points/context/argument/fact where those notes occur, not the notes themselves. Lots in there that EUtopiasts would - like the piece i linked to above - not have any idea of. This also connects with the piece on law-sterity/technocracy from the other week.

Below is the section of the book introduction that deals with the chapter, then a link to chapter and then the book.

__________

Yiorgos Vassalos in his own contribution deals with the many ways in which the European Union and its move towards forms of European economic governance is at the heart of the problems faced by European societies today, in particular countries that are under Troika supervision, such as Greece. For Vassalos, the implications of theTroika and economic governance reforms on the quality of democracy, the welfare state, and the social situation are huge.Human rights have been blatantly violated by the conditions the Troika imposed on governments subjected to the bail-outs. The economic governance agenda pushes for attacks on established social rights in core EU countries, such as national-level collective bargaining or protection against unjust dismissal.

This double path of reform in the EU (Troika/ESM mechanisms and economic governance) leads to important changes in the nature of the EU, as a unique transnational political construction. Vassalos analyses the mechanism of the Memorandums of Understanding and how European Institutions and the IMF have imposed on European countries policies that express the most aggressive demands of the corporate elites, suggesting that instead of the ‘shared sovereignty’ to which European treaties refer, we are rather dealing with a form of neo-colonialism. All Memoranda include measures that reduce pay in both the private and the public sectors, facilitate lay-offs of public sector employees, reduce the bargaining power of labour, and call for increases in retirement age along with cuts in pensions and public spending. He then proceeds to explain how these mechanisms go hand-in-hand with changes in European economic governance that impose budgetary discipline and neoliberal reforms under pressure from European business groups. Vassalos thinks that the European Union is becoming a dystopia for the vast majority of its citizens, eliminating social rights and gains and severely undermining democracy.

The third part of Vassalos’s contribution deals with political reactions to the European Union. He analyses the positions of the Far-right concerning European Integration in order to show that in reality this kind of far-right euroscepticism is not in opposition to the core of the dominant capitalist logic. Regarding left-wing parties such as SYRIZA and Podemos,Vassalos stresses the contradiction between their acceptance of European Institutions and their denunciation of austerity. He insists that the only way for countries to avoid austerity and social devastation and to stop the rise of the Far-right is to have a policy of ruptures with the European Union and of disobedience of its Treaties.

_____

Chapter: Consolidation of Authoritarian Rule in the EU: the Parallel Processes of the Troika’s Emergence and the Economic Governance Reforms

Book: Crisis, Movement, Strategy: The Greek Experience

 

[butchersapron]

Here is Streck's piece in the new NLR showing the historical growth/death of the idea of a EU social europe and why it's eutopian fantasy now - great stuff this. Defenders of the work directive who never asked how and why it appeared, this is for you:

Wolfgang Streeck Progressive Regression

A periodization of European social policy, from attempts to manage the militant labour upsurge of the late 1960s to a supra-national lever for neoliberal restructuring, by way of Maastricht’s Social Protocol. The upshot: a deleterious relocation of social-policy battles from the terrain of welfare-state building to the fields of fiscal policy and immigration.

 

[brogdale]

Here is Streck's piece in the new NLR showing the historical growth/death of the idea of a EU social europe and why it's eutopian fantasy now - great stuff this. Defenders of the work directive who never asked how and why it appeared, this is for you:

Wolfgang Streeck Progressive Regression

A periodization of European social policy, from attempts to manage the militant labour upsurge of the late 1960s to a supra-national lever for neoliberal restructuring, by way of Maastricht’s Social Protocol. The upshot: a deleterious relocation of social-policy battles from the terrain of welfare-state building to the fields of fiscal policy and immigration.

Excellent. Thanks for putting this up; as a lapsed subscriber I could only get a few paras in on my archive link.

 

[butchersapron]

Excellent. Thanks for putting this up; as a lapsed subscriber I could only get a few paras in on my archive link.

No worries, give i a shout if you need any others.

 

[brogdale]

No worries, give i a shout if you need any others.

Certainly something that iron fist fraternity should read, especially those that regurgitate the 'but what about workers' rights' tropes. But they won't.

Today, opposition to the eu-driven liberalization of national social-
policy regimes comes from a Europe-wide movement of ‘populists’, often
right-wing, and therefore vulnerable to moral condemnation by interna-
tionalist opinion, for which the democratic alternative to ‘xenophobia’
and ‘racism’ is the opening of national economies to external competi-
tion, regardless of the absence of a supranational European social policy
to compensate the losers of liberalization. Concepts like ‘social Europe’
and the ‘European social model’ have almost completely disappeared.

How would you like your neoliberalism served?

 

[butchersapron]

(can the person trying to access my eu google drive folder make themselves known please - it's not a problem just let me know who you are and it's yours)

 

[butchersapron]

Perry Anderson had two very long and detailed pieces in the last LRBs. Both brilliant examples of his olympian style and both well worth the time. The first piece outlines how the EU performed it's foundational coups through an examination of its current leading intellectual apologist (Luuk van Middelaar). The second looks at the how the institutional structures built on these coups have continued in the same vein. I suspect non-subscribers will only be able to see one of the pieces so i've uploaded the two here and here. I suspect a third on brexit itself and its waves will be in the next issue.

 

[cyril_smear]

Reflections on the revolution in Europe... don’t remember who wrote it.

 

[killer b]

Perry Anderson had two very long and detailed pieces in the last LRBs. Both brilliant examples of his olympian style and both well worth the time. The first piece outlines how the EU performed it's foundational coups through an examination of its current leading intellectual apologist (Luuk van Middelaar). The second looks at the how the institutional structures built on these coups have continued in the same vein. I suspect non-subscribers will only be able to see one of the pieces so i've uploaded the two here and here. I suspect a third on brexit itself and its waves will be in the next issue.

Just finished the first part now, great stuff. The series seems to be getting quite a bit of attention despite its quite intimidating length - starting part 2 tomorrow.

 

[The39thStep]

Euro Intelligence on the EU China negotiations

EuroIntelligence

www.eurointelligence.com

23 December 2020

The three-body problem

China’s rising influence was one of the biggest stories of 2020. China surpassed the US to become the EU’s top trading partner this year but, as the EU’s economic relationship with China has deepened, so too have security and human-rights concerns. Rising Sino-American tensions have simultaneously left Europe caught in the middle of a new cold war. A late-year push to finalise the long-awaited EU-China comprehensive agreement on investment looks increasingly incompatible with efforts to reset the transatlantic relationship. The EU doesn’t want to pick a side, but in 2021 it might have to.

Europe once welcomed Chinese investment, particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis and the eurozone crisis. However, concerns about China’s divide-and-conquer strategy have been rising since China's launch of the 16+1, now 17+1, format in 2012, since subsumed within the Belt-and-Road Initiative. But it wasn’t until the Covid-19 pandemic hit that the EU began to see China less as a valued investor, and more as a worrying rival. Highly-publicised Chinese donations of medical equipment deepened north-south EU divisions at the onset of the pandemic, and a gradual shift towards more aggressive wolf-warrior diplomacy enraged some member states.

Tensions boiled over during the late-summer European tour of Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, with EU leaders scolding China for its human rights record and for making threats against some member states. A subsequent EU-China videoconference summit held in mid-September ended with the EU calling on China to offer reciprocal market access. It appeared to be the final nail in the coffin for the EU-China investment agreement.

Wang’s visit was one of the few times the EU presented a united front. Divisions between member states have been particularly visible in 5G development. Only Sweden and the UK have definitively excluded Huawei from future 5G development. Huawei has already been instrumental in building many 4G networks in Europe. Decoupling from the company will be costly and time-consuming, and raises questions about whether European companies are capable of replacing it. Nokia, for example, still cannot manufacture its own 5G chipsets, and plans to sink most of its profits into R&D next year as it scrambles to catch up.

Replacing Huawei equipment is expected to cost billions in the US, which has taken a much stronger stance against China in recent years. The US position has undoubtedly impacted EU 5G development strategies, and American officials have repeatedly and aggressively lobbied European allies to drop Huawei from 5G development.

Sino-American relations deteriorated rapidly under President Donald Trump. So did transatlantic relations. We expect EU-US ties will continue to face challenges in 2021, particularly given the surprise announcement earlier this month that the EU is hoping to ratify the investment agreement with China by the end of the year.

The European Parliament was outraged. Will no one think of the Uighurs? But, as Angela Merkel made clear last week, forced labour in Xinjiang is a secondary concern.

The EP has vowed to block the investment agreement. A bigger concern for the European Commission might be that the US may try do the same. Views differ, but most observers agree that president-elect Joe Biden will maintain a tough line on China. This certainly appeared to be the case yesterday when Jake Sullivan, Biden’s incoming national security advisor, gently scolded the EU over the investment agreement. Sullivan tweeted that the Biden-Harris administration would welcome early consultations with European partners on common concerns about China’s economic practices.

So, while the agreement might be billed as a victory for Merkel as she exits the political stage, it will also pose a major challenge to any potential transatlantic reset.

Some in Europe have objected to the notion that the EU should have to call the US before signing an investment agreement. Strategic autonomy is a priority for Ursula von der Leyen’s geopolitical Commission, and an agreement with China should not require US approval. Others argue that the agreement has already stirred up trouble between the EP and the Commission, and that China has succeeded in driving a wedge between the EU and US before Biden even takes office. This means that, even if the deal is not ratified, it’s still a win for China.

This all raises the question: what does strategic autonomy really mean? The freedom to trade, the freedom to take a principled stance, or the freedom to avoid choosing sides? Josep Borrell, the EU's high representative, says it means not being dependent on other countries. If this is true, we do not expect the EU will make much progress on strategic autonomy next year. Germany’s large trade surplus with China has been the single largest obstacle for EU efforts to adopt a tougher stance on China. This might continue to be the case, depending on the outcome of next year's elections in Germany. Lacking its own tech giants and dependent on trade surpluses, the EU is at high risk of remaining hamstrung by its mercantilist foreign policy in 2021.

 

[butchersapron]

The third and final piece of Perry Anderson's series is now available here The Breakaway (and here for those who've used up their free articles). It's by far the weakest of the three, and the top-down view really starts to wear, but expecting anything else from PA at this point is to demand something from him that is impossible at best and counterfeit at worst. It does contain a brilliant few-line sum up (whilst summing up Richard Tuck's views) of where many remain voters (esp on the left) have gone wrong and the irredeemably nationalist grounds of their position vs the equally irreducible internationalist grounds of leave:

The old left was in irreversible decline in Europe, and neither Syriza nor Podemos could revive it, since the EU did not represent an attack on the old nation-states of Europe in the name of a new one, but an assault by capitalism on politics as such.

He also smuggles in a few of the old saws of the Nairn-Anderson theses and then looks like he's going to slip into his old militant charter 88ism days but manages to steady the ship by the conclusion.