Ethiopian Airlines 737 crashes on way to Kenya 157 onboard.

[HAL9000]

I couldn't see a post about the, international panel review of FAA’s Boeing 737 MAX flight control system certification process. In the Seatletimes

An international panel of air-safety regulators convened by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released a damning report Friday that criticizes both Boeing and the FAA for how they assessed and approved the design of the 737 MAX automated flight-control system implicated in two fatal airliner crashes.

More broadly, the panel also questioned how systems on the the MAX were certified as derivative of a now-50-year-old aircraft design.

And it further recommended that airplane-safety systems address the new reality of increased cockpit automation by reducing the reliance on pilots to respond to emergencies, and instead designing protections as part of the systems.

Pilots unable to cope
The panel also questions the assumption in FAA regulations that pilots will recognize something wrong within 1 second when flying the plane manually and will take corrective action within 3 seconds. The report indicates that the 737’s crew-alerting systems that tell pilots when something goes wrong may not be adequate for such an assumption.

The JATR noted that a system fault can result in cascading failures, and asked the FAA to assess the adequacy of both the certification process and of pilot training to address “the impact of multiple alarms, along with possible startle effect, on the ability of pilots to respond appropriately.”

Regulators need to ensure there’s adequate training so pilots can “respond effectively to failures that they may never have encountered before,” the report states.

International regulator report slams Boeing, FAA over 737 MAX design and approval

I thought the comment about "increased cockpit automation" was interesting.

new reality of increased cockpit automation by reducing the reliance on pilots

At the moment if the something goes wrong and the computer doesn't know what to do with the problem, its left to the pilots to sort the issue. A good example is the Air France flight 447, one or more air speed sensors stopped working, computer didn't know what to do and passed the problem to the pilots, pilot flying respond incorrectly and the plane crashed

Air France Flight 447 - Wikipedia​

There is a produre to follow to keep a plane at a safe air speed, by flying the plane at a certain pitch for a particular power level.

Unreliable Airspeed Indications - SKYbrary Aviation Safety​

In the coming years it will be interesting to see how aviation control systems change, perhaps when a system or sensor fails, the plane keeps flying until the pilots can take over.

Link to the offical report can be found here...

International panel releases review of FAA's Boeing 737 MAX flight control system certification process - ASN News

 

[bluescreen]

There is something inherently troubling about a system that's been managing fine for hours and suddenly says to a human being (who was doing what until then? Watching the instruments in a kind of mesmeric daze? Playing chess? Snoozing?) - Whoops, over to you! Now! And the human being is supposed to spring into instant alertness, maximum awareness of all circs, and maximum capability.

 

[Saul Goodman]

There is something inherently troubling about a system that's been managing fine for hours and suddenly says to a human being (who was doing what until then? Watching the instruments in a kind of mesmeric daze? Playing chess? Snoozing?) - Whoops, over to you! Now! And the human being is supposed to spring into instant alertness, maximum awareness of all circs, and maximum capability.

Why? That's the pilot's job. They're not supposed to be playing chess.

 

[bluescreen]

Why? That's the pilot's job. They're not supposed to be playing chess.

My hyperbole, sorry. I mean that if the pilot's job is de-skilled to this extent and their skills are only called on in an emergency it's inherently dangerous. What problem is autopilot solving if it's the pilot's job to fly the plane?

 

[Saul Goodman]

My hyperbole, sorry. I mean that if the pilot's job is de-skilled to this extent and their skills are only called on in an emergency it's inherently dangerous. What problem is autopilot solving if it's the pilot's job to fly the plane?

It's taking the monotony out of the job, and leaving the pilot's skills for when they're needed.

 

[bluescreen]

It's taking the monotony out of the job, and leaving the pilot's skills for when they're needed.

Yes. I understand that. I'm questioning whether it's reasonable to expect a human being to go straight from being relaxed into an urgent highly complex situation.

 

[bluescreen]

... when part of the complexity is due to the induced relaxation

 

[T & P]

Why? That's the pilot's job. They're not supposed to be playing chess.

Thing is, pilots hadn’t even been told let alone trained to handle the MACS system that turned their plane into kamikaze mode. When a plane starts to forcibly point to ground with alarms sounding all around you, expecting them to solve the matter is absurd.

Boeing and its PR army have tried to pin the blame on pilot error: lack of training to cover up the fact that their plane was rushed into service without proper checks and with obvious design faults, and hid vital flight control new systems from them to avoid the cost of extra training, as they were marketing the MAX as a seamless progression from the 737 NG with minimal training costs.

This letter by Captain Sully to the NYT debunking the smears toward the pilots in a recent article that blamed them is worth a read if you still think pilots fucked up

My Letter to the Editor of New York Times Magazine – Sully Sullenberger

 

[Saul Goodman]

Thing is, pilots hadn’t even been told let alone trained to handle the MACS system that turned their plane into kamikaze mode. When a plane starts to forcibly point to ground with alarms sounding all around you, expecting them to solve the matter is absurd.

Boeing and its PR army have tried to pin the blame on pilot error: lack of training to cover up the fact that their plane was rushed into service without proper checks and with obvious design faults, and hid vital flight control new systems from them to avoid the cost of extra training, as they were marketing the MAX as a seamless progression from the 737 NG with minimal training costs.

This letter by Captain Sully to the NYT debunking the smears toward the pilots in a recent article that blamed them is worth a read if you still think pilots fucked up

My Letter to the Editor of New York Times Magazine – Sully Sullenberger

I didn't say pilots fucked up.

 

[DownwardDog]

Thing is, pilots hadn’t even been told let alone trained to handle the MACS system that turned their plane into kamikaze mode.

They were (supposed to be) trained in how to recognise and react to runaway pitch trim though. It was covered in some detail on the 3rd or 4th sim session in 747 training and almost certainly has equal prominence in 737 training. Boeing issued a service bulletin about the MCAS issue in November 2018 (after Lion Air) but the before Ethopian Airlines directing airlines to update their ops manuals.

There is no doubt the MCAS was poorly implemented and certified but runaway pitch trim shouldn't kill everyone on the aircraft with a competent crew.

 

[HAL9000]

They were (supposed to be) trained in how to recognise and react to runaway pitch trim though. It was covered in some detail on the 3rd or 4th sim session in 747 training and almost certainly has equal prominence in 737 training. Boeing issued a service bulletin about the MCAS issue in November 2018 (after Lion Air) but the before Ethopian Airlines directing airlines to update their ops manuals.

There is no doubt the MCAS was poorly implemented and certified but runaway pitch trim shouldn't kill everyone on the aircraft with a competent crew.

There seems to be some debate about whether the training was sufficient to over come trim wheel forces...

This analysis suggests the stabilizer trim wheel at the Ethiopian captain’s right hand could have been difficult to budge.

Why Boeing’s emergency directions may have failed to save 737 MAX

Summary of the article, should pilots have been taught the "roller coaster" manouvre, which is in the 1982 check list but is missing from the current 737 check list? It will be interesting to see the final report, even if the pilots reacted correctly did they have a enough time to fix the problem? International review of FAA’s Boeing 737 MAX flight control system stated..

The panel also questions the assumption in FAA regulations that pilots will recognize something wrong within 1 second when flying the plane manually and will take corrective action within 3 seconds. The report indicates that the 737’s crew-alerting systems that tell pilots when something goes wrong may not be adequate for such an assumption.

The link below highlights differences in 737 check lists for runaway stabilizer procedure over time and describes the "roller coaster" manouvre

737 Runaway Stabilizer Procedure

 

[T & P]

New revelations today and they are trending massively on the news outlets. Seen as serious enough to cause a sizeable fall in Boeing shares’ value (though Americans are IMO far too obsessed with stocks)

Boeing staff texted about 737 Max issue in 2016

 

[MrSki]

A series of nine failures caused the Lion Air crash report finds.

A series of failures led to the crash of a Lion Air flight, which killed 189 people and led to the grounding of the Boeing 737 Max, a report has found.

Investigators said faults by Boeing, Lion Air and pilots caused the crash.

On Friday, air crash investigators in Indonesia released their final report, detailing the list of events that caused the Lion Air jet to plunge into the Java Sea.

"From what we know, there are nine things that contributed to this accident," Indonesian air accident investigator Nurcahyo Utomo told reporters at a news conference.

"If one of the nine hadn't occurred, maybe the accident wouldn't have occurred."

Series of failures behind Boeing Lion Air crash

 

[Don Troooomp]

Boeing might well use this as a partial get out.
Everything still says MCAS is the big problem, but whomever the repair shop turns out to be and Lion hold partial blame.

Indonesia recommends redesign, training after 737 MAX crash

The report also found that a critical sensor providing data to an anti-stall system had been miscalibrated by a repair shop in Florida and that there were strong indications that it was not tested during installation by Lion Air maintenance staff.

Lion Air should have grounded the plane following faults on earlier flights, the report said and added that 31 pages were missing from the airline's October maintenance logs.

 

[Saul Goodman]

Everything still says MCAS is the big problem

MCAS isn't the problem. It's a poor solution to the actual problem.
My nephew works for Boeing, and he's been cluing me up on the real problem. The problem is that they basically took a 50 year old plane and slapped a couple of massive engines onto it, and they had to move the engines forward and upward to get them to fit, and as a result the aerodynamics got completely messed up, and even worse under thrust. MACS was designed to compensate for the shit aerodynamics but if Boeing had designed a new plane from scratch, instead of jerry-rigging a couple of massive new engines onto a 50 year old design, there would have been no need for MCAS. I'm sure MCAS works fine, once you know how to use it and why and when you'll need to use it.

 

[HAL9000]

MCAS isn't the problem. It's a poor solution to the actual problem.
My nephew works for Boeing, and he's been cluing me up on the real problem. The problem is that they basically took a 50 year old plane and slapped a couple of massive engines onto it, and they had to move the engines forward and upward to get them to fit, and as a result the aerodynamics got completely messed up, and even worse under thrust. MACS was designed to compensate for the shit aerodynamics but if Boeing had designed a new plane from scratch, instead of jerry-rigging a couple of massive new engines onto a 50 year old design, there would have been no need for MCAS. I'm sure MCAS works fine, once you know how to use it and why and when you'll need to use it.

Safety Case is a structured argument, supported by evidence, intended to justify that a system is acceptably safe for a specific application in a specific operating environment.

That's a fair summary from the limited number of articles I've read. But there does appear to be lot's places where if boeing had spent more time making sure there safety case was water tight, then they wouldn't be in this mess.
US airforce KC-46 has MCAS...

The 737 MAX 8 uses an MCAS to deal with weight and balance issues driven by the narrow ground clearance of its engines. It will automatically direct a nose-down attitude to prevent the aircraft from stalling if the angle of attack is too high. The KC-46 uses a similar system because the weight and balance of the tanker shifts as it redistributes and offloads fuel. The KC-46 has a two-sensor MCAS system, which “compares the two readings,” the Air Force said.

Moreover, while the MAX 8 MCAS will reset and come back on automatically, the KC-46’s system is “disengaged if the pilot makes a stick input,” according to the Air Force. “The KC-46 has protections that ensure pilot manual inputs have override priority.”

USAF Reviewing Training After MAX 8 Crashes; KC-46 Uses Similar MCAS

• If they had designed the 737 MCAS to disengage if the pilot makes a stick input, that might have been enough to stop the plane crashing.
• If they had told the pilots about MCAS, and given more training for this feature, that might have been enough to stop the plane crashing.
  
• If they had fitted an "AOA disagree" light—a warning light that indicates when the aircraft's two AOA sensors provide different readings. This was an optional extra, I doubt this sensor in itself would have stopped the crashes, but it might have helped inconjuction with training.

This is just a small list, there are many more actions boeing could have made and the accident wouldn't happen. An accident is a chain of events, break the chain and the accident doesn't happen. Hopefully boeing and airbus will learn actions needed to prevent accidents and avoid complacency.

One other point, having a badly designed plane with engines in the wrong plance shouldn't make the plane dangerous. My guess is that there's a number of old planes still flying which have one or more design flaw built in, but a combination of training or some sort of safety feature allows the planes to be flown safely.

 

[Don Troooomp]

Training and an 'off' switch?

 

[DownwardDog]

Training and an 'off' switch?

There is already an auto stab trim cut out switch on the pedestal behind the throttles.

 

[Don Troooomp]

^

Does that kill MCAS?

 

[T & P]

^

Does that kill MCAS?

It does with the correct procedure. The problem as I understand it is that Boeing changed the set up from the previous set of switches that controlled the elevator on the 737 NG and, er, forgot to tell pilots about it. And when you have a system constantly trying to fly you into the ground with alarm bells sounding all over the cockpit, it is rather difficult to work out a solution before the situation becomes non-recoverable.

Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit, limiting ability to shut off MCAS

In the middle of Boeing 737 cockpits, sitting between the pilot seats, are two toggle switches that can immediately shut off power to the systems that control the angle of the plane’s horizontal tail.

Those switches are critical in the event a malfunction causes movements that the pilots don’t want. And Boeing sees the toggles as a vital backstop to a new safety system on the 737 MAX – the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) – which is suspected of repeatedly moving the horizontal tails on the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines flights that crashed and killed a total of 346 people.

But as Boeing was transitioning from its 737 NG model to the 737 MAX, the company altered the labeling and the purpose of those two switches. The functionality of the switches became more restrictive on the MAX than on previous models, closing out an option that could conceivably have helped the pilots in the Ethiopian Airlines flight regain control.

Boeing declined to detail the specific functionality of the two switches. But after obtaining and reviewing flight manual documents, The Seattle Times found that the left switch on the 737 NG model is capable of deactivating the buttons on the yoke that pilots regularly press with their thumb to control the horizontal stabilizer. The right switch on the 737 NG was labeled “AUTO PILOT” and is capable of deactivating just the automated controls of the stabilizer.

On the newer 737 MAX, according to documents reviewed by The Times, those two switches were changed to perform the same function – flipping either one of them would turn off all electric controls of the stabilizer. That means there is no longer an option to turn off automated functions – such as MCAS – without also turning off the thumb buttons the pilots would normally use to control the stabilizer.

 

[DownwardDog]

There seems to be some debate about whether the training was sufficient to over come trim wheel forces...

The reasons the crew flying the Ethopian MAX to their fiery doom couldn't move the trim wheel was because they were grossly overspeeding the airframe. They never throttled back from TO power, ignored the overspeed audible and flew it 25kts past its maximum operating speed.

 

[HAL9000]

The reasons the crew flying the Ethopian MAX to their fiery doom couldn't move the trim wheel was because they were grossly overspeeding the airframe. They never throttled back from TO power, ignored the overspeed audible and flew it 25kts past its maximum operating speed.

But there are number of cases where poor flying has led to the plane crashing, like Air France Flight 447. More training might help, but I suspect boeing/airbus systems will have to do more help, perhaps handling emergenices for longer period before passing control to the pilots.

 

[Don Troooomp]

Not 737, but damning for Boeing and suggestive of a 'don't give a shit' culture.

Boeing whistleblower raises doubts over 787 oxygen

 

[2hats]

Entire 737-NG range (737-{6,7,8,9}xx) now subject to an airworthiness directive mandating inspections for premature cracking in the pickle forks (where the wing root attaches to the fuselage). Ryanair has reportedly quietly grounded a few of their fleet due to this issue.

 

[editor]

Anyone watch the Channel 4 documentary tonight? Damning stuff. Boeing are pure evil.

 

[Bahnhof Strasse]

Anyone watch the Channel 4 documentary tonight? Damning stuff. Boeing are pure evil.

No, what's it called? Guess it will be on catch-up?

 

[editor]

No, what's it called? Guess it will be on catch-up?

Boeing's Killer Plane: What Went Wrong? 9:00pm, Channel 4
Channel 4 says its Boeing 737 MAX documentary "unravels the chain of events that led to two modern passenger jets falling out of the sky, and investigates why the story of the fastest-selling aircraft in Boeing's history ended in disaster and tragedy". Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea in October 2018 with the loss of all 189 people on board. In March 2019, an Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX flight crashed minutes after take-off en route from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia to Nairobi, Kenya. All 157 people on board were killed, among them Clare man Micheál Ryan.

And... Boeing gets 737 Max vote of confidence

 

[Bahnhof Strasse]

Ta

 

[editor]

Ta

It'll make you angry. Especially the bit where Boeing try to blame the pilots.

 

[Bahnhof Strasse]

It'll make you angry. Especially the bit where Boeing try to blame the pilots.

Every time I have read that they are doing that it makes my blood boil. Will not watch this with Frau Bahn, she hates flying as it is!