Hey Papa G what is the modern KKE take on what happened at Yalta. Uncle Joe seems to have really sold Ellas down the river.
Historiographic attempts to present the Conference of Yalta as the origin of the "partition of Europe" in "spheres of influence" are widespread. This approach, shared by bourgeois and "left-wing" historians alike, has been used as an ideological weapon against communists and the Soviet Union, attempting to equate the USSR with the imperialist countries.
It is in this vein that there exists a persistent myth that the Conference of Yalta had a decisive impact on developments in Greece, that the "treasonous actions" of the Soviet Union in Yalta led to the defeat of the popular movement during the civil war. There are some points that should be made:
1. The Conference of Yalta recognized the correlation of forces that had been established in each individual country as of February 1945. In Greece
there had already occured (in December 1944) an armed confrontation of the National Liberation Front Army (ELAS) with the British forces and their local collaborators. The defeat of the popular forces in December came about as a result of the fact that, although a revolutionary situation had developed in Greece during 1944, particularly after the withdrawal of the German forces in the autumn, KKE did not have the readiness to lead the class struggle to its logical end, the conquest of power.
2. All of the historians that point to Yalta as the decisive point fail to mention Roosevelt's and Churchill's meeting in Quebec in the summer of 1943, where it was decided that British forces would invade Greece after the withdrawal of the Germans. This is amply documented in Churchill's memoirs and in 1943 telegrams to his Foreign Minister Eden.
3. The major piece of "evidence" that is often given as proof of the "partition of Europe" is the infamous "small piece of paper" on which Churchill supposedly scribled perecentages of influence of the superpowers in the Balkans during his meeting with Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. Of course, the only reference for the existence of such a note can be found in the memoirs of Churchill himself.
No such reference or evidence has been found in the published archives of Great Britain or the USSR. Moreover, the subjects discussed in Moscow were clearly defined: the opening of the new fronts in Western Europe, the recognition of the governments in Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (that had already been liberated). Greece was NOT on the agenda of the meeting - the issues relating to Greece had already been discussed in the Teheran Conference (where there is also no discussion about partition).
4. The "argument" is often made that the Red Army could have entered Greece in 1944 and put its weight behind the ELAS forces. This is really a non-argument. The Red Army had no reason to enter Greece, since, during the allied war efforts, Greece had been assigned to the responsibilities of the English command when it came to the pursuance of military operations agianst the Germans and in 1944 the war was still ongoing. If the USSR had entered Greece, it could have jeopardized the war effort and the speedier ending of the war, something that would have been detrimental to the popular movement worldwide.
The myths concerning the "treachery" of the USSR and Stalin towards the Greek popular movement and KKE are not limited to the war period, but extend into the 1946-1949 period and the heroic struggle of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) against the Anglo-Americans and their local stooges. There is, however, extensive evidence to support the fact that the Soviet Union (and Stalin personally), not only had agreed to the decisions of the KKE leadership regarding the onset of the new phase of the armed struggle, but provided significant material support to that struggle. Of course, that support had to be clandestine, due to the very volatile post-war climate. In any case, the USSR could not substitute the Greek popular forces, could not win the war for them.