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And next, Syria?


Do they mean Bashar experimenting with different moustache styles? Because that's all that's liable to change.
 
In SO Despite its Weakness, the Syrian Army Remains Central to the Regime’s Survival - Syrian Expert
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It was common for young Syrians to seek any means available to avoid the mandatory military service, including university exemptions, bribery, or even leaving the country entirely. When armed conflict broke out in 2011 and the Syrian Army responded by extending the term of mandatory military service indefinitely, its difficulty in recruiting became acute. Within the officer corps, recruitment had been slightly better before 2011. Even though the officer corps was majority Alawite, the army could still attract recruits from across the country. As the conflict polarised society along sectarian lines and local identities, and the army became a blatant tool for regime survival, new recruits to the officer colleges became almost exclusively Alawite, with small numbers of other minorities.

On the other hand, finding militia recruits has been much easier: they tend to come through informal community networks and family ties; joining a militia has usually meant a fighter can stay close to home, creating a sense of personal buy-in as the fighter feels he is defending his local community; militias pay better than the Syrian army and are also more flexible regarding joining and leaving.

The benefit of militias and paramilitary groups is that they are also much more agile fighting forces than a national army. With local commanders they can respond and take action swiftly, unencumbered by the bureaucratic machinery and centralised decision-making characteristic of an army – a key asset in the context of the irregular warfare characteristic of the Syria conflict.

The Syrian army’s decision to resort to lighter, locally recruited paramilitary groups may also have been inspired by its experience during the Lebanese civil war. In the 1980s, during its deployment there, the Syrian army became exhausted by the civil war and eventually opted to rely on local militias for frontline fighting, while maintaining strict control over their logistics support and organisational arrangements.
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I recall reading a piece by an IDF officer that assessed the SAA in Lebanon as a rather effective Counter Insurgent force. The ruthless brutality was commendable. It was not uncommon for truculent HA units to be lined up and shot. However the smartest aspect was that they got their local auxiliaries to do most of the fighting for them. Something the IDF were less successful at.

Piece has the SAA's mushily corrupt military weakness as key to regime survival. Not much at fighting but an effective institutional network that supported non-state forces.

It's not much remarked on but very little of the loyalist areas of Useful Syria has ever fallen to the rising. Only one of many SAA divisional HQs, isolated Raqqa fell. The revolt only really succeeded in provincial areas where state support was weak.

And the SAA is this way by design. A series of local rentier power brokers managing smaller ones for the House of Assad. This is what made catastrophic collapse of the regime that many analysts repeatedly anticipated very unlikely. The SAA was poor at reclaiming territory but often slow to lose urban ground. A wealthier more united army might pose a threat to the ruling family. It was fear of coups that led to the well defined divisional structure that made it difficult for a great warlord to emerge.

It's what made the Assad's so hard for powerful allies to control. Bashar may be weakened but remains his own man at the head of the family firm. Putin reportedly loathes him personally and the Russians are often frustrated by their Bolshie client. The Iranian's patience has visible limits as well. He might well have been retired now and replaced by a popular Syrian General to better serve as a puppet but no such powerful critter exists. And the SAA/NDF/LDF infestation presents a bottom up challenge to the Iranians as well. It's quite hard to subvert something so local and corrupt. They may create other substate actors as they have in Iraq but they will still need the Assads to hold Syria.
 
On War On The Rocks A COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO RUSSIA’S USE OF FORCE: MEASURE TWICE, INVADE ONCE
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In Ukraine, Moscow sent in regular units to beat the Ukrainian army in decisive battles, then withdrew many of those units. Rapid escalation, with an influx of battalion tactical groups, was followed by rapid de-escalation. Russia’s presence in Syria is similarly adjusted on a weekly basis and kept to a minimum, with surges as needed. The reason for this is straightforward. When deployed in regular formations, the Russian armed forces typically execute a not-so-sophisticated military doctrine for which they drill all year through numerous exercises and snap readiness checks. On the battlefield, the Russian military’s plan is simpler: Maneuver to contact and annihilate the enemy with face-melting firepower. Understanding this, the Kremlin prefers to use regular forces in burst mode, both to prevent combat losses and avoid uncontrolled escalation once they shift into the high gear. Leave any conventional force on the field long enough and you will find things becoming flatter, but Russia’s army in particular does this quickly.

The United States is not positioned to switch quickly from gradual escalation to decisive engagement because it’s military tends to play distant away games, while Moscow tends to fight just across the street, or at least in its general neighborhood. It is much easier to escalate, de-escalate, and adjust the amount of force applied in the conflict when you are fighting on, or near, your own borders. There are other dissimilarities that affect strategic flexibility, including leadership decision-making, the number of allied interests to consider, and domestic constraints imposed by the political system.

Russia retains absolute flexibility of decision-making at the national leadership level, with no accountability, but unlike many other countries, where this breeds incompetence, the Kremlin manages to retain good levels of technocratic competence in key areas, such as the military, financial administration, or the central bank. It is a remarkable amalgamation: a feudal economy, headed by what can best be described as a national security aristocracy, but the principal agencies required to manage government affairs (like the Ministry of Defense) tend to be run by competent administrators.
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Has Russian ways as almost the opposite of the old US Powell Doctrine of massive force or no force at all. Nicely phrased: Russian use of force as a "geopolitical mugging". Thinks the US might learn from it.

I'd consider this: Russia hasn't stuck it's nose in militarily much compared to the very grabby 21st century US which has multiple interventions in progress some of which are larger and much longer than what Russia is doing in Syria. None of those have been great in terms of regional stability. Russia only intervenes when clear national interests are in play in what it regards as its backyard. It then does it on the cheap with great brutality without much fear of failure as unlike in the US a Benghazi can be brushed aside.

Russia has not taken upon itself the task to pursue all terrorists internationally. Russia is just not that easily scared or on a endless global Crusade against a tactic. It's sometimes even helped it's own Chechen Jihadis go off abroad. It's rather happy to be working with some of the most effective Jihadi terrorists around: HA. It looks like it's quite prepared to cut a deal with Taliban like Salafi-Jihadis in Syria if they'll switch sides just as it did in Chechnya. The result may be less than perfectly stable but that'll do for Moscow. The Iranians are not so different from the Russians in this respect just poorer and strategically much more patient.

Russia is as the Israelis would say "mowing the lawn". Degrading threats to its interests in its near abroad whilst worry mostly about its largest enemies. The Syrian war for Russia is mostly about maintaining an old ally the Assad clan. It has only an incidental connection to terrorism. They'd still be bombing the shit out of rebels if they were a bunch of liberal-democrat hairdressers intent on making Syria into Denmark. If anything it's more an ideological Jihad for the revolutionary Iranians finding an almost perfect enemy in the Takfiri.

Maybe the US should have a similar level of caution and such modest goals. It's very easy to make things worse with grand Wilsonian schemes such as Iraq. Keep a huge amount of your military capacity in reserve as the Russian do for big trouble. Don't lose sight of the real threats chasing puny terrorist bands as we seem to have. And two of those are Russia and pipsqueak Iran getting by quite nicely with their parsimonious games while the mighty US squanders its own power.
 

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All the while, the Syrian army continued to ramp up military pressure, skirmishing with Failaq al-Rahman rebels in the Damascus suburb of Erbeen and massing against Islam Army and Ahrar al-Sham fighters in the Hazrama area further east. Artillery and air strikes targeted Douma, Erbeen, Zamalka, and other areas in the East Ghouta. The army also scuffled with rebels in Qaboun, a suburb near the enclave whose smuggling tunnels are used to bring in both food and weapons, and threatened to take it. The insurgents seem to have increased their own attacks, too, with shells dropping in eastern Damascus and hitting the Russian Embassy in early February.

Opposition leaders in the East Ghouta put on a brave face. “Praise be to God, the heroes of the Islam Army are preparing in a big way in Qaboun,” said Darwish, who said that the Islam Army has created a joint operations room with other factions in Qaboun and now stands ready to repel any attacks. “God willing, if the regime makes such a stupid move, it will come to greatly regret it,” he said.

Yet, despite the high-flying rhetoric, the odds are against the insurgents. Rebel towns continue to fall all around Damascus. After the regime’s late-January retaking of Wadi Barada, west of the city, units of the 105th Brigade of the Republican Guard reportedly shifted to Jobar on the western edge of the East Ghouta enclave.
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The short answer to that is yes.
 
On Reuters Anti-Assad states to meet on Syria amid concerns over U.S. policy
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A second European diplomat said it was unclear to what extent Tillerson represented the views of Trump himself.

"On the fight against Islamic State, we're comforted, but the question remains what will be the relationship with Russia? The Americans will gradually realize that everything is linked and that the fight against Islamic State and an alliance with Moscow also implies choices in the region and a long-term vision," the first source said.

"You can't just do a grand deal with Moscow and hope things will be resolved."

Turkey, which has been a major supporter of the rebellion against Assad, has, with Russia and Iran, brokered a shaky ceasefire.

"It's also urgent that we see where Turkey stands in light of the newfound proximity with Russia and Iran," the source said, adding that it would be vital to assess how Gulf Arab Sunni states Saudi Arabia and Qatar - opposed to Assad - saw the conflict after "pulling back a little".
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Trouble is Tillerson and Trump often say quite different things and Trump even contradicts himself.
 

Son of the legendary Imad. The old man was perhaps the most effective terrorist yet. Bit ironic really there were rumours Bashar touted Imad out to the Israelis as part of covert peace negotiations. They then assassinated him in 08. Now Imad's boy is revered by Pakistanis fighting to keep Bashar in power.
 
On Oryx Blog Replenishing the Stocks: Russian deliveries of T-62Ms and BMP-1s reach Syria
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The 5th Corps is a newly established unit of the Syrian Arab Army, and serves as a counterweight to the increasing strength of the various militias that have largely taken over the role of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) in the past years. While the partial dissolvement of the SyAA and the subsequent rise of militias was necessary for the survival of the Syrian regime, it ended up creating a whole host of major problems that could potentially spiral out of control in the future. The establishment of the 5th Corps aims to address at least a part of these problems.

Russia appears to be a key driver behind the de-facto re-establishment of the Syrian Arab Army by exerting pressure on the regime to bring back control of the many militias to the army instead of continuing as independent units under the control of the Syrian High Command. While Iran's goal of keeping Syria under its sphere of influence was enacted by the establishment of several militias, many of which foreign, Russia seeks to create a stable situation that allows for the survival of the current government by creating an unified army instead.

The lack of such an unified army has been made painfully clear during most of the regime's defeats over the past several years, the failed Tabqa offensive and losing Tadmur for a second time serving as recent examples. A project similar to that of the establishment of the 5th Corps was initiated shortly after the Russian intervention in Syria, which called for the merging of several militias, including parts of the NDF, into the 4th Corps. When the NDF largely replaced the Syrian Arab Army as the regime's primary forces, the NDF saw its tasks expanding from guarding neighbourhoods to undertaking offensives elsewhere and guarding towns, gasfields and other strategic installations throughout Syria. Thus, this initiative would have called for the return of these tasks to the SyAA, with the NDF remaining a force dedicated for local defense only. Thus far, this process appears to have been largely unsuccessful however.

In contrast to other units of the Syrian Arab Army, which consist almost exclusively of drafted personnel, the 5th Corps hopes to attract large numbers of men by offering salaries and benefits that were previously only found with militias such as Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons). To further strengthen its ranks, Syrian men that were previously exempted from the draft are likely to join the 5th Corps amidst sharpened rules for exclusion from mandatory service.
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My bold a key difference between Russian and Iranian ways. Top down statist command and control V something closer to revolutionary mobilisation. Most of the NDF/LDF does have intimate links to SAA units and IRGC/HA sometimes command SAA formations so it's rather more blurred than you might read from this article.

The main reason the militias won't go away is some are very profitable private sector ventures run by regime loyalists. The regime can no longer afford to buy these local power brokers off directly so they'll likely continue to pick over the carcass of Useful Syria.

Another thing to notice here is the 5th Corps is a volunteer outfit and a contrast to the traditionally miserable pay and abject conditions in most of the SAA. Imagine an army where it's normal for officers to pilfer their half starved mens' rations and sell them on on the blackmarket. Where officers sell TR-72 tanks to rebels they are meant to be fighting. Because the officers aren't paid well either and live in barrack slums. Is it a surprise that it fights so poorly? That despite lots of heavy kit like this it suffers higher rates of attrition than rebel groups?

Article has the Russians donating old Soviet kit from their vast stockpiles to a bankrupt Syria. Though as it explains its upgraded and pretty serviceable in this dusty theatre.
 

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The approach with the most likely success and the least cost to the United States would be to encourage the resumption of peace talks between Turkey and Kurdish representatives, to reduce conflict on front lines between U.S.-backed SDF forces and Arab- and Turkmen-majority Turkish-backed forces around al-Bab, and to expand air strikes against the HTS and al-Qaeda in Syria. This approach would reassure Turkey that the United States is committed to assisting in its war against the PKK, while contributing to a stabilizing political solution in Syria. It would give the United States leverage over Turkey and the PYD to shape outcomes. Although Ankara may object to this approach at first, the current U.S. strategy in Syria will further damage U.S.-Turkish relations in the coming years.

This policy is more advantageous than continuing with the status quo. The SDF-led approach has been militarily successful and, given the proper allocation of resources, would likely succeed in taking Raqqa from the Islamic State. Intense U.S. diplomacy would also likely prevent direct Turkish action against the SDF in Manbij or Tel Abyad in the coming months. However, absent a broader effort to address the drivers of the SDF-Turkish antagonisms, the United States could leave behind a Kurdishdominated enclave in Syria that exacerbatespolitical instability inside Turkey and risks aKurdish-Turkish conflict that could rupture relations between the United States and Turkey. It could also further destabilize the tenuous military balance in Syria and potentially create ethnic and religious fissures thatthe Islamic State could exploit to regain lost territory. Turkish-PYD tensions would also benefit to Russia, which has managed to deftly play both sides of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict in Syria. Moscow could leverage this subconflict for its geopolitical benefit—particularly if U.S.-Turkish tensions undermine NATO. Thus, the United States should address this aspect of the Syrian conflict, lest it undermines longer-term interests in a region of continued importance
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This would be the wise thing to focus US policy on in Syria. The Obama administration dropped the ball here and was too focused on tactical gains against IS rather than regional stability. There is a danger that, once again, a US intervention leads to more instability rather than less. I doubt the current President is patient enough for such an approach however.
 
From The Atlantic Council Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement: How a Once Moderate Group Joined Fateh al-Sham
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Hussam Atrash, a leader and legal official within the Zenki Movement, attributed the merger with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to “foreign intervention, which prevented moderate groups from uniting, and made them easy prey for the forces of the Syrian regime and its allies.”

“The movement started out open to working and uniting with groups in the Free Army,” Atrash said, explaining that armed opposition groups needed to merge to fight the regime. “There were many negotiations about uniting with groups in the Free Army in Aleppo and Idlib such as the Suqur al-Ghab Brigade, 13thDivision, Northern Division, and others, but the response was always that they weren’t able, because the MOM operations room and countries that supported them refused.” The MOM, or Musterek Operasyon Merkezi in Turkish, is the Turkey-based joint operations center that countries supporting the opposition use to channel supplies to opposition groups.
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All the foreign hands eagerly meddling in the Syrian revolt probably did unintentionally bugger it.

It might also be that our once favoured head choppers have grown a teensy bit more militant of course. Somebody should make a Syrian Islamist version of Breaking Bad.
 

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The administration should focus on the ultimate objective of defeating ISIS, recognize that the terrorists are being squeezed in a death spiral and demonstrate strategic patience. The boa constrictor is doing its job of strangling the Islamic State and if allowed to finish the job, ISIS will be ejected from Raqqa and Mosul, eventually losing the territory it holds elsewhere in the region. What the president must avoid at all costs is risking a major war with potent conventional opponents over something of no strategic value to the country.
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Ah but Trump wants a prize to brag about within 90 days.

And of course the other aspect is getting in Iran's face.
 

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MILITARY CHIEFS MEET

In a meeting on Friday at Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, a key hub for the U.S.-led coalition against the jihadists, Turkish military chief Hulusi Akar and his U.S. counterpart Joseph Dunford discussed the two Raqqa road maps, Hurriyet said, citing security sources.

Ankara's preferred plan of action envisages Turkish and U.S. special forces, backed by commandoes and Turkey-backed Syrian rebels entering Syria through the border town of Tel Abyad, currently held by Kurdish YPG militia, the newspaper said.

The forces would cut through YPG territory, before pushing on to Raqqa, about 100 kilometers (60 miles) south.

Such a plan would require the United States to convince the Kurdish militia to grant the Turkey-backed forces a 20-kilometre (12-mile)-wide strip through YPG territory, the paper said.
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Yes, I can see the PKK not noticing that that would chop one of their Syrian cantons in two.
 

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That’s another aspect of it, like the sexual relations between men and women. Not, like, actually fucking but, like, just the way that women are treated now, from what I hear, extremely different from before. Like, there were honour killings, people had several wives, and now, like, if people hear about, like, doing an honour killing, they’ll just come and kill you. And it’s illegal to marry more than one person now. But yeah. It’s different, really different from the West. In a lot of good ways and in some ways they’re confusing. … It’s pretty much illegal to jack off here
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My bold, sons of Onan take note.

Pretty harmful interview from a PR standpoint. Practically Turkish agitprop; if genuine it displays very sloppy external message discipline.

That relations are tense with embedded British/US SF is plausible. That's often the way in these things. They are partly there to keep and eye on allies. Soldiers often find auxiliaries ideologically repellent and it's a risky job. This isn't even the worst posting in that respect. US SF training obviously Salafi Syrian rebels have been reported as not exactly seeing them as brothers in arms. Around Mosul it's not just IS that are potential enemies for SF. In Afghanistan getting killed by local allies has not been uncommon.
 

Which makes sense. You look at the map and Turkey grabbing a border zone in Idlib policed by Ahar al Sham doesn't seem unlikely.
 
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In 2012, fighting against the YPG was invigorating to so many anti-regime forces in eastern and northern Syria. The rebels say the YPG "stabbed them in the back" by fighting them as they began to storm regime bases in that region.

Al Qaeda, which ISIL uprooted from eastern Syria in 2014, will undoubtedly use grievances against the Kurdish militias to mobilise locals and fill the vacuum after ISIL is expelled from its areas. Indeed, Al Qaeda’s plan to roll back into eastern Syria is already under way, according to senior jihadist sources inside the country.

A balanced approach in northern Syria, where the US has leverage, should consider all the fault lines in northern Syria and help turn that region, which constitutes around 50 per cent of Syria, into de facto safe areas that reduce the bloodshed and prevent the return of jihadists.

Reliance on the YPG is as wrong in Raqqa as the entry of Shia and Kurdish militias in Mosul that the US opposed.
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The difference in Mosul is the US has a very large, heavily equipped (mainly Shia) Iraqi army to draw on for Mosul as well as a practically a couple of Brigades of Western troops. In fact when the US previously fought in Mosul when the ISF was less mature the Pesh did as well. And yes the sticky fingered Kurdish militia men were often hated by the locals. Some ISF behaviour in the siege of Mosul has been less than exemplary anyway.

Raqqa was a fairly loyalist town but isolated. Some local tribes lost faith in the regime's ability to hold it and swapped sides. They supported the rebels and then IS. Several thousand locals are fighting for the SDF. Probably not enough to hold the place securely or legitimise a PKK led occupation but some are. A small Turkish force with a similar screen of Arabs and Turkmen from the NE isn't necessarily any more compatible than one that's predominantly Kurdish that has been trying to drum up support in the area for some time.

These are both flawed ideas especially now as the Turks threaten the PKK's rear in Syria promising to distract it and drain forces away from an attack on Raqqa. Raqqa may be a moment of opportunity for Turkey to carve hunks out of Rojava. A Rojava at war with Turkey is inherently unstable; that's the bigger problem. Trying to use rebels as an anti-IS force when their preoccupation is the regime they are losing a war against actually presents a similar dilemma. The PKK at least has a hudna with the regime. IS has thrived in Syria because it's enemies tended to fight each other.
 

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According to older Turkish sources, a total of ten Leopard 2A4 tanks, one M60T Sabra and four other vehicles were disabled or destroyed in the area around Al-Bab. One Leopard 2 had an issue with the tracks and the situation of one tank is unknown (supposedly this tank is among the ones captured by ISIS). Two tanks were damaged by IEDs, one of them heavily. A further tank was damaged by a mortar attack, while the other five Leopard 2A4 tanks were damaged by ATGMs - back then not a single tank was listed as destroyed by ATGMs. Earlier sources from about a week before the losses were leaked/published via Twitter claim that fifteen M60T Sabra tanks, three M60 tanks and three Leopard 2A4 were hit by ATGMs. One of the M60 tanks and three Sabras were total losses. Supposedly ten soldiers died in Turkish tanks at this time. The fact that no new tank wrecks appeared in the area from Al-Bab doesn't mean that Turkey hasn't lost more tanks since then - but it also doesn't directly confirm any losses at other places.

Turkish sources claim that between the 8th and 18th January 192 air raids and firing 2,196 rounds of artillery, tank and mortar ammunition resulted in the death of 1,362 enemies, a further 168 were wounded. As always these claims haver to be taken with a grain of salt, as there is no proof for any of these claims and kill figures of airstrikes and artillery are known to be exaggerated quite often. Still if true, one shouldn't pretend that the Turkish Army is so bad and the "Arabs are horrible at war" meme applies (not to mention that technically Turks aren't Arabs). Yes, the first Leopard 2 tanks were employed in a horrible way and thus destroyed. But maybe at least some common NATO training standards are met and result in some better performance after the initial shock.
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On War Is Boring Turkey Will Be Alone If It Attacks Syria’s Kurds in This City
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Russia might even act reluctantly to reel in Damascus were it to resist a Turkish attack on the SDF and YPG, as an attack would possibly jeopardize the campaign to free Raqqa. The Syrian regime was previously able to prevent Turkey from launching air strikes on Al Bab in November when it activated air defense systems and threatened to shoot down Turkish F-16s.

Only when Turkey consulted with Russian military officials was Moscow able to get Damascus to stand down. Turkey might not be so lucky if it unilaterally attacks Manbij and sparks a wider war with the SDF/YPG, the most effective on-the-ground force fighting the Islamic State at this time.

Syrian troops are currently undertaking an offensive to Al Bab’s south, recapturing swathes of territory from the Islamic State. The group’s fighters could have relocated from villages to beef up their defenses in Al Bab.

The regime’s focus on the dreaded group comes amid infighting among Islamist militias in the northwest province of Idlib. The Syrian army has also cut off the main road from the town of Deir Hafir to Al Bab, as well as capturing nine villages in the vicinity.

The SDF have vowed to fight off any Turkish-FSA attack on Manbij, which the Kurds captured in August 2016 with the help of U.S. warplanes. Turkey has targeted the Manbij region with intermittent artillery and air strikes, leading the SDF/YPG forces elsewhere in Syria to announce they will intervene and beef up the Manbij Military Council against a Turkish attack.

The SDF are more likely than not capable of fielding more fighters in Manbij than the Islamic State have massed in Al Bab — where the terror group is largely cut off from Raqqa on the other side of the Euphrates River. The latest Turkish attacks on the SDF in the Manbij region were on Feb. 10 and Jan. 17.
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My bold, interesting point about the Russians perhaps restraining a TSK attack on Manbij. Though I'd have to see that as just another chain to yank the Americans about with.

Al Bab also didn't look like the Russians were in control of their allies. It looked more like the regime making a point that the TSK couldn't expect to roll across Syria unopposed and the Russians having to deal with the consequences.
 
On War On The Rocks IN SYRIA, TURKEY FINDS ITSELF BOXED IN: WHAT’S NEXT?
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A Turkish-led attack on Manbij would slow the Raqqa operation, as YPG forces would likely move from Raqqa to defend the frontlines in Manbij. Turkish President Erdogan has sought to offer an alternative option for taking Raqqa that would involve Euphrates Shield forces, rather than the Kurdish YPG and Arab SDF. However, the Turkish military and its allied rebels have struggled to capture al-Bab, a city with a pre-war population of only 63,000. Raqqa is nearly four times larger and sits some 180 kilometers south of the current Turkish-held frontline. An offensive against it would require more troops and more complicated and exposed logistical chain, independent of the capabilities of the local partners.

Turkey has one other option: It could invade Tel Abyad, an SDF-held town. Turkey will retain this option indefinitely, but actually pursuing it would entangle Turkish military forces on third front in Syria’s multi-sided civil war. Moreover, taking territory from Kurdish forces in Tel Abyad would likely boomerang back into Turkey, resulting in cross-border YPG attacks against various Turkish targets along the border.
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My bold, well that's a merit really. Hard for the Americans to cling to their legalistic insistence that the YPG has nothing to do with Apoists in Turkey if they were staging cross border raids. Tel Abyad is right on the border making for simple logistics. The other thing about Tel Abyad is the Turks can insist all they are doing is driving towards Raqqa and in doing so "liberating" a mostly Arab town from the clutches of the PKK.

Article points out that the SAA are now in the way of a TSK advance between al Bab and Raqqa. Tel Rifaat also risks a clash with the R+6. It's also well fortified as now is Manbij.

On the other hand the Turks seem rather uncertain about this whole quagmire and don't seem willing to commit enough TSK forces. It's a big army over 300K strong and they've maybe got 8K trying to take al Bab.
 

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“A second marriage is one of the ways to deal with spinsterhood (or ‘unusah’ in Arabic; a term used in reference to an unmarried woman past the usual age for marriage)” said Judge Mahmud Maarawi.

A six-year civil war has seen hundreds of thousands of men die, thousands languishing in jail and millions flee the country in order to secure jobs abroad or avoid the military draft.

Syria’s population is now estimated at around 18 million, down from its pre-war population of 24 million — although no official figures have been released.

Woman now make up approximately 65 per cent of the population and millions of women are finding it increasingly difficult to find a husband.
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My bold, wow, that's a big imbalance. I'm reminded of the spinster wave after WWI.

By all the NGO figures young men are the main victims of the war. Mentions families who can't afford to feed their daughters are marrying them off earlier than they'd like to as well.

I do wonder what the PKK with their crackdown on polygamy make of this.
 

I suspect often Salafist rebels are much less ideologically motivated to fight IS than PKK fighters indoctrinated in Apoism. This was always visible when other Salafi-Jihadis who really hated IS clashed with IS. There was much talk of "fitna" and splits that led to the creation of outfits like Jun al Aqsa. The other factor is they must have "Why are we not fighting Assad?" running on a loop in their heads.
 

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Given this, an important question logically arises: How will Damascus take Moscow’s suggestion to decentralize power? As of now, the reaction is still unclear, as no one has publicly commented on the situation on the ground. However, the pro-government Syrian media tend to be quite skeptical about the performance of local councils. They stress that the councils fail to meet even the basic needs of the population, despite the assistance of nongovernmental organizations and funding provided by the West and the Persian Gulf states.

Meanwhile, the regime has long been playing its own game with local councils. Damascus maintains leverage in opposition-held areas, first and foremost, by demonstrating its sustained, indispensable role in providing essential public services — paying wages to teachers and money to pensioners who have not been reported as involved in opposition. At the same time, the regime has openly opposed any challenge to its monopolized areas such as providing public services and an alternative educational and health care system. Damascus launched deliberate airstrikes in the cities where local councils had been most successful and thereby had posed a substantial challenge to the regime. That was the case, for example, in Ma'arrat al-Numan, Douma and Darayya. However, in some areas, the administration has sought reconciliation with local councils for its own benefit — as it did, for instance, in Quneitra and Daraa provinces.
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The Baathist regime probably will be odds with the Russians over this. Giving much away formally to Rojava beyond Kurdish language rights for instance is unlikely. Russian proposals that they drop the "Arab" from Syrian Arab Republic do seem to be a non-starter.

However Bashar appears to be in no hurry and may accept a creeping restoration of absolute power while he picks at the oppositions weaknesses. Rojava is too strong militarily to challenge as yet and often is closer to a necessary regime ally. Rebel surrenders are negotiated on terms which are subsequently eroded until a satisfactory level of submission is achieved. Local Big Men who have emerged during the risings can be tolerated if they serve as instruments of control. The Baath always coopted local power brokers as they needed too.
 
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