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Titanic tourist sub missing

i had a conversation with an ex submariner this very morning about this . (Doesn't endow me with any expertise at all btw). i asked him if he had experienced any scary moments in his career. He revealed that once, whilst on board a polaris vessel, they had been tasked to (slowly) traverse a deep bottom of sea trench. Apparently it struck the wall of the trench with some force, causing many to shit themselves. Action stations were sounded, but no penetration damage was found to the hull. They (and we) got away with it. When i asked him what chances the passengers had in this mini sub he was emphatic - "absolutely nae chance". No coms, no possibility of getting out at that depth - "fucked"..
 

Hmmmm
Interesting that he had little time for safety regulations as they hampered innovation. I’m sure these conversations can be covered with his passengers until their dying breaths.
 
how long does the oxygen last in these mini subs?
I have been wondering this too, but can't find any info, not in news reports nor on Oceangate's materials. So let's speculate in the true U75 tradition.

Firstly, it's not oxygen; they will be breathing normal air (80% Nitrogen, 20% Oxygen) at normal atmospheric pressure of 1 bar. Pure oxygen at 1 bar is amazingly dangerous (see: Apollo 1 fire). When breathing in a confined space, the main problem is CO2 build up, and then to a much lesser extent, oxygen depletion.

Bearing in mind the small budget and limited engineering skills of Oceangate, I am going to assume that they must use off-the-shelf technology, in the shape of repurposed diving "rebreathers", used by commercial and advanced recreational divers. These units contain a canister of Lithium Oxide, which absorbs CO2, and turns into Lithium Carbonate, a one-way process. The used canisters are sent back to the manufacturer to be refurbished. Rebreathers also contain small tanks of oxygen and diluent gases. A lump of complicated electronics monitors the air composition, and releases O2 and diluents as required to maintain a healthy gas mix. So I would buy a bunch of rebreathers, dismantle them, reassemble them on some sort of rack or framework, and install it under the internal floor of the vessel.

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X-CCR | Expedition grade mixed gas rebreather
 
It’s interesting that other articles mentioned problems with fatigue life calculations, and here they mention acoustic detection of structural problems in the carbon fibre…that type of fracture analysis is s bit of a black art..it’s hard enough with steel structures where we have a lot of test data..if they find it, I suspect there won’t be much left to recover other than the titanium bits
 
I have been wondering this too, but can't find any info, not in news reports nor on Oceangate's materials. So let's speculate in the true U75 tradition.

Firstly, it's not oxygen; they will be breathing normal air (80% Nitrogen, 20% Oxygen) at normal atmospheric pressure of 1 bar. Pure oxygen at 1 bar is amazingly dangerous (see: Apollo 1 fire). When breathing in a confined space, the main problem is CO2 build up, and then to a much lesser extent, oxygen depletion.

Bearing in mind the small budget and limited engineering skills of Oceangate, I am going to assume that they must use off-the-shelf technology, in the shape of repurposed diving "rebreathers", used by commercial and advanced recreational divers. These units contain a canister of Lithium Oxide, which absorbs CO2, and turns into Lithium Carbonate, a one-way process. The used canisters are sent back to the manufacturer to be refurbished. Rebreathers also contain small tanks of oxygen and diluent gases. A lump of complicated electronics monitors the air composition, and releases O2 and diluents as required to maintain a healthy gas mix. So I would buy a bunch of rebreathers, dismantle them, reassemble them on some sort of rack or framework, and install it under the internal floor of the vessel.

undefined
X-CCR | Expedition grade mixed gas rebreather
The problem will be less acute in the sub as the air quality issues are exacerbated by pressure as much as concentration and exposure time (I seem to recall the “footsworth” being the unit of measure).
 
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It’s interesting that other articles mentioned problems with fatigue life calculations, and here they mention acoustic detection of structural problems in the carbon fibre…that type of fracture analysis is s bit of a black art..it’s hard enough with steel structures where we have a lot of test data..if they find it, I suspect there won’t be much left to recover other than the titanium bits

I wouldn't be surprised if they just didn't spend the money for proper NDT testing. I have a friend who does NDT for nuclear power plants and power generation. He considered getting marine NDT certifications because marine NDT techs make a shit-ton of money.
 
I have been wondering this too, but can't find any info, not in news reports


What? It's been all over the news since the start "96 hours" to now "40 hours".

 
What? It's been all over the news since the start "96 hours" to now "40 hours".

I mean no description of how breathing gas system is designed or works.
 

I wouldn't be surprised if they just didn't spend the money for proper NDT testing. I have a friend who does NDT for nuclear power plants and power generation. He considered getting marine NDT certifications because marine NDT techs make a shit-ton of money.
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The problem with carbon fibre is there’s not much NDT you can do…ultrasonics and X-ray don't really show the cracks as the fibres come away from the matrix…hence trying acoustics to try to hear to the bonds breaking
 
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The cold. If they're at any depth and the power is out (I mean probably even if they have power) it'll be fucking freezing.

Take your pick of; hypothermia, suffocation, or crushed to death.
Yes, the ambient temperature is 4C at depth.

other ways to die: fire, smoke inhalation, caused by electrical failure. Business Insider reports on a court case involving the sacking of an employee named Lochridge, who complained about the lack of hull integrity testing and the use of hazardous flammable materials inside the hull.
 
I know next to nothing about deep water engineering (or engineering in general, for that matter), but the more I read about the design of this submarine, the more I'm convinced that it was a deathtrap from the start. The design reflects the appalling attitudes towards safety exhibited by OceanGate at the highest levels of the organisation. Did they even test this thing?
 
It’s interesting that other articles mentioned problems with fatigue life calculations, and here they mention acoustic detection of structural problems in the carbon fibre…that type of fracture analysis is s bit of a black art..it’s hard enough with steel structures where we have a lot of test data..if they find it, I suspect there won’t be much left to recover other than the titanium bits

At those depths, the pressure/salinity conditions mean that even Titanium rots. We had to change our lander frames and release mechanisms on a regular/rotating basis. I can't remember anything over two years old (typically 4/5 cruises) going down and the release mechs were replaced annually.

The grade of titanium we had to use for deep sea work was exceptional - one year, we found ourselves in a bidding war with Lockheed and Honda Racing for virtually the entire annual production of that particular grade - we won!
 
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I know next to nothing about deep water engineering (or engineering in general, for that matter), but the more I read about the design of this submarine, the more I'm convinced that it was a deathtrap from the start. The design reflects the appalling attitudes towards safety exhibited by OceanGate at the highest levels of the organisation. Did they even test this thing?
the technology has been around for ages...LR5 was built in the 70s and I think it was fibreglass
 
the technology has been around for ages...LR5 was built in the 70s and I think it was fibreglass

I mean, just because the material is proven, doesn't mean that the particular design using that material is proven. The Vasa was built out of a proven material, in this case wood, but that didn't prevent her from meeting an ignominious fate less than two kilometres into her maiden voyage.
 
And in more it'll be fine news... (And there's a separate issue of client journalism not just being a British political problem...)


top tweet from that thread

For the next version of the submarine they will definitely increase the tour prices because in the future they will visit the wreck of the Titanic AND the wreck of their first submarine.
 
I know next to nothing about deep water engineering (or engineering in general, for that matter), but the more I read about the design of this submarine, the more I'm convinced that it was a deathtrap from the start. The design reflects the appalling attitudes towards safety exhibited by OceanGate at the highest levels of the organisation. Did they even test this thing?
Some stills of early tests have emerged:
IMG_1298.jpeg
 
he problem with carbon fibre is there’s not much NDT you can do…ultrasonics and X-ray don't really show the cracks as the fibres come away from the matrix…hence trying acoustics to try to hear to the bonds breaking

For that reason, our engineers tended to use acetate and PVC for the synthetic parts - They were much more consistent strength-wise and we could gather test data in our own pressure tank.

The only fibre-based components we used were floats.
 
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