The Islamic state

[agricola]

Ended up having to pay the costs of being involuntarily sectioned. The ultimate win-win situation for privatised healthcare. Seriously fucked up nation.

Indeed. There is a bit more detail here:

A “master treatment plan” from Harlem Hospital backs up the Astoria Bank worker’s story.

“Objective: Patient will verbalize the importance of education for employment and will state that Obama is not following her on Twitter,” the document reads.

It also notes “patient’s weaknesses: inability to test reality, unemployment.”

Adding insult to insanity, the hospital hit Brock with a bill of $13,637.10, she charges in her suit seeking unspecified damages.

The bizarre experience began Sept. 12, when the NYPD seized her prized 2003 BMW 325Ci in Harlem because they suspected she was high on weed, her attorney, Michael Lamonsoff, said. Cops found no marijuana but confiscated her ride anyway, he said. The NYPD declined to comment.

The following day, Brock walked into the NYPD’s Public Service Area 6 stationhouse in Harlem to retrieve her car, her suit charges.

Brock — an eccentric 32-year-old born in Jamaica with dreams of making it big in the entertainment business — admitted in an interview she was “emotional,” but insisted she in no way is an “emotionally disturbed person.”

Nevertheless, cops cuffed her and put her in an ambulance bound for the hospital, her suit charges.

 

[DotCommunist]

I'm astonished to note the colour of the womans skin

 

[teqniq]

KekHamo: ISIS mother of the year. http://t.co/FYcjLZp4jx

 

[Geri]

*calls Social Services*

 

[Pickman's model]

*calls Social Services*

more like anti-social services from the pic of the boy

 

[frogwoman]

 

[Idris2002]

I'm astonished to note the colour of the womans skin

Your winnings, sir.

 

[TomUS]

Ended up having to pay the costs of being involuntarily sectioned. The ultimate win-win situation for privatised healthcare. Seriously fucked up nation.

Glad your nation isn't seriously fucked up.

 

[TomUS]

I'm astonished to note the colour of the womans skin

Glad to hear there are no racial problems where you are.

 

[butchersapron]

Don't start that offended patriotic shit for God's sake.

 

[TomUS]

Don't start that offended patriotic shit for God's sake.

You mean like what others on this thread have done by picking out an article unrelated to the topic and implying British superiority? That's patriotic shit for gods sake.

 

[butchersapron]

You mean like what others on this thread have done by picking out an article unrelated to the topic and implying British superiority? That's patriotic shit for gods sake.

Really? On a forum to discuss world politics you're going to argue a) that people cannot mention problems in states other than their own unless the state they live in is perfect and b) that making criticisms of other states constitutes a claim that the state you live in actually is perfect? Let's just shut the forum down in that case.

I'm not getting into this beyond that post btw.

 

[TomUS]

Really? On a forum to discuss world politics you're going to argue a) that people cannot mention problems in states other than their own unless the state they live in is perfect and b) that making criticisms of other states constitutes a claim that the state you live in actually is perfect? Let's just shut the forum down in that case.

I'm not getting into this beyond that post btw.

I didn't start the flag waving. I suggest you direct your indignation at those who did.

 

[frogwoman]

Meanwhile IS have taken control of regiment 28 outside baghdad.

 

[Teaboy]

I didn't start the flag waving. I suggest you direct your indignation at those who did.

Don't be silly, no one started any flag waiving.

 

[frogwoman]

Great piece here by ramzy baroud on how the idea of IS as a western phenomenon risks obscuring whats going on the ground in syria

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/islamic-state-western-phenomenon-reimagining-debate-1257069494

 

[butchersapron]

As an attempt to break out of the recent discussion's focus (understandable focus of course) on either military or sectarian issues/perspective etc here's a piece and some books looking at the wider economic background/context to the revolutions/counter-revolutions. Adam Hanieh is really important for this sort of stuff so i've added links and quick description of the books arguments (+the books of course) under the bit from the article. Apols for length but i want to get this done in one go before i go out.

Fundamental rifts: power, wealth and inequality in the Arab world

This polarisation of wealth and power is critical to unpacking the social roots of autocracy in the Middle East. As the handmaidens of neoliberal reform, autocratic rulers not only enriched themselves and allied elites but also moved to quash any domestic opposition to these policies. Simultaneously, they acted as dependable partners for Western policy in the region, receiving ample financial, political and military support in return. The problem is thus not simply "political"; that is, the existence of corrupt and nepotistic rulers. Rather, these forms of political rule reflect, protect and reinforce differences in socio-economic power. Politics and economics are fused.

These inequalities in power and wealth are essential to understanding the counter-revolutionary moment and have provided a fertile ground for the growth of sectarianism. Of course, the varied forms of foreign and regional intervention - political, economic and military - would always seek to block any fundamental challenge to the regional order. The predictable outcomes of the Western destruction of Iraq over the past two decades helped nurture the rise of sectarian groups and Islamist irredentism. In Syria, the bloody hand of the Assad regime fomented these processes deliberately, and appears to have won tacit support from the West.

However, throughout all of these events, Left and progressive voices have remained largely marginal and too easily swayed by a Manichean geopolitical worldview or illusions in their own "patriotic bourgeoisie". Without addressing questions of social and economic justice and presenting an alternative to the market-led policies of recent decades, there is little hope of building a progressive pole that is opposed to both existing elites and the disastrous course of sectarianism. This is not simply an economic question but is in essence profoundly political; one that must involve challenging the coterie of high-ranking political and military officials, wealthy businessmen and large corporations who continue to benefit from the status quo.

Lineages of Revolt : Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East

First, I try to unpack the frequent refrain that we heard in early 2011 from many mainstream analysts and government spokespeople, namely, that the uprisings were simply a matter of dictatorship and political authoritarianism, and that if capitalist markets were allowed to flourish then all would be fine. A striking example of this perspective was Obama’s comment in a major policy speech of May 2011, in which he stated that the region needed “a model in which protectionism gives way to openness, the reins of commerce pass from the few to the many, and the economy generates jobs for the young. America’s support for democracy will therefore be based on ensuring financial stability, promoting reform, and integrating competitive markets with each other and the global economy.”

In a related sense, a second key focus of the book is to grasp, in broad outlines, the main features of capitalism in the region. I approach this by tracing the historically structured processes of class and state formation and their interlinkages across different spaces and scales: rural and urban; national, regional, and global. One chapter discusses neoliberal policy in the Arab world and another focuses on agriculture and the rural sector in North Africa. These policies have produced highly polarized outcomes. A tiny layer of the population linked closely to international capital benefits from its control over key moments of accumulation and exists alongside a growing mass of poor, dispossessed populations across rural and urban areas. Networks of production and consumption are integrated into the world market to varying degrees, but have consistently produced high levels of dependence on imports and an exposure to the vicissitudes of the global economy. Authoritarian state structures—distinguished by a particular dialectic of centralization and decentralization that I discuss in the chapter on neoliberalism—have been the essential driver of this lopsided capitalist development.

A third major theme that runs through the book is the manner in which the Middle East has been inserted into the world market and remains a key zone of global rivalries

The final theme that runs through the book is the argument that we need to take seriously the development of the regional scale over the past period. What I mean by this is that we should critically re-assess the methodology of much academic writing on the region that divides the Middle East up into separate "ideal types"—such as authoritarian, republican, monarchical states—and then proceeds to delineate supposed similarities and differences on this basis. I criticize these approaches for their methodological nationalism, that is, their assumption of the nation-state as the natural and given vantage point from which to consider the political economy of the region as a whole

Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States

What if, asks Adam Hanieh in his new book,Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States, the economies of the Gulf Arab states should not be conceptualized as underdeveloped, semi-feudal economies that happen to sit on stupendous sources of wealth that they either squander or distribute to local constituencies in return for political loyalty? Hanieh’s groundbreaking book argues that we should not view the Gulf Arab states as anomalies in the worldwide economy. Instead, he claims, the story of twentieth-century capitalism could not be told without recounting their central role: the “global economy is part of the actual essence of the Gulf itself—the development of the global ‘appears’ through the development of the Gulf” (16).

The first theme of Hanieh’s book, advanced in chapters one, two, and four, is the “centrality of the Gulf to the structure of the global economy”

A second and quite remarkable contribution of the book is its documentation, in chapters five and six, of the rise and interconnectedness of “Khaliji” capital. According to Hanieh, Khaliji capital can be understood as a group of firms, partially or wholly owned by Gulf citizens through either family ownerships or partnerships, operating in three circuits of capital: production (petrochemicals, steel, industrial goods, and manufactured consumer durables); commodity (import and sale of retail, machinery, and consumer capital goods and durables; malls; media); and finance (banking and investment firms; real estate). Having surveyed over three hundred companies,

The crucial analytical contribution of the book lies in its Marxist analysis, advanced in chapters one and three, of capitalist class formation in the Gulf. Hanieh identifies two characteristics of this process: reliance by the Gulf countries on temporary migrant labor flows alongside a narrow definition of citizenship, and second, the redirection of oil revenues to merchant families. These two characteristics work in conjunction to (re)create and expand capital accumulation along the production, commodity, and finance sectors, as well as to segment and proscribe the (re)creation of a labor class capable of providing a systemic challenge to capital. This process evolved over time as Saudi Arabian and Arab labor became militant and thus troublesome, and was replaced systematically by South Asian workers. The jobs reserved for citizens were either managerial or high-level administration, and many were in fact plain sinecures. This mechanism allowed the ruling families to consolidate power through strengthening alliances with the emerging and privileged merchant families. It also means that workers do not have any permanent “right to space” or existence in those countries; instead, they constitute an “acute form of alienated labor,” whereby social ties are continuously dissolved and shifting (65). This alienation prohibited the emergence of a collective memory of struggle, particularly since workers are drawn from various spaces geographically, ethnically, and religiously.

 

[frogwoman]

Just a thought - what happens to Daesh now that Saudi is bombing Yemen? They appear to have held off the attack on tikrit for the time being. And they have taken control of an Iraqi regiment. This Saudi shit will allow them to regroup and build up even more support in Yemen through sectarian violence. Fucking horrible.

 

[quiquaquo]

Glad your nation isn't seriously fucked up.

A good ol' boy, how sweet.

 

[kebabking]

Just a thought - what happens to Daesh now that Saudi is bombing Yemen? They appear to have held off the attack on tikrit for the time being. And they have taken control of an Iraqi regiment. This Saudi shit will allow them to regroup and build up even more support in Yemen through sectarian violence. Fucking horrible.

it depends how far and for how long the two actions are concurrent - Saudi has lots of fast jets capable of doing strike roles, at it has very deep pockets to keep those jets in fuel, bombs and crews. there should be no problem with the Saudi's maintaining both missions, with the rest of GCC et al lobbing the odd bomb in for good measure. with the campaign against IS, its the US that is doing the heavy lifting - something like 85-90% of the strikes and sorties are US aircraft.

the problem in keeping the wheels on the cart will be how the Iranians react. we've already seen some pretty 'frank' comments from Iran over the action, if they decide to show how upset they are by playing games on the Saudi borders with their fast jets (think of the 300 interceptions by NATO fighters of Russian military aircraft in the Baltic alone in 2014), then the Saudi's may have problems maintaining what will be 3 seperate air operations at the same time.

that said, in top trumps terms, they are light years ahead of the Iranians in air power capability, for all the derision and piss-take given to the Saudi's about being lazy, inept, and unwilling to do anything that doesn't make them feel like a Formula One driver..

 

[Pickman's model]

yeh but if tbe iranians get really pissed off the straits of hormuz will close

 

[quiquaquo]

And then the US will send a carrier there and it will all end in tears.

US, KSA and Israel, the threesome made in Hell. Just like leopards the Great Satan doesn't change its spots.

 

[frogwoman]

Will other countries be so willing to assist iran against Daesh now though? If they're also being asked to fight a group that's allegedly linked to Iran? And I don't believe Saudi reallly has a serious interest in fighting Daesh and al-Qaeda tbh.

 

[elbows]

Iran is really quite desperate to get sanctions removed, and its a very delicate moment in the nuclear negotiations right now. I expect this to moderate their response for now, but things could change quickly if it goes sour on these other fronts.

 

[elbows]

Will other countries be so willing to assist iran against Daesh now though? If they're also being asked to fight a group that's allegedly linked to Iran? And I don't believe Saudi reallly has a serious interest in fighting Daesh and al-Qaeda tbh.

The sheer number of potentially duplicitous partners involved in that particular struggle makes it somewhat hard for me to draw conclusions.

 

[kebabking]

The sheer number of potentially duplicitous partners involved in that particular struggle makes it somewhat hard for me to draw conclusions.

indeed, imagine a sack full of vipers on crack, and go from there.

to answer frogwoman's entirely reasonable concern, a template (however flawed) may have emerged - the US was unwilling to support the now stalled/bogged-down Iraqi ground offensive on IS held Tikrit because the bulk of the Iraqi force was the less-than-ideal Shia militias, and the US had no intention of getting into bed, or being seen to get into bed, with them.

so, the Iraqi's appear to have got rid of the militias from the Tikrit job, and the USAF and USN (and our own polyester-clad heroes..) have weighed in on the beared loons, or at least on the bearded loons who aren't our bearded loons.

quite where the Shia militias have gone, and where the Iraqi's have got the sudden influx of trained (?) and equipped formations to replace the Shia militias is, of course, something to be drawn a veil over..

 

[frogwoman]

Yeah given the rehabilitation of al-qaeda as some sort of 'good' jihadis (israel have just admitted trauning al nusra ffs) and given our past track record i am not overly confident the ptb won't quietly 'forget' about Daesh and focus on the iranians/houthis and turn a blind eye to the house of saud's 'unique' take on the war against terrorism.

 

[butchersapron]

Armed US drones now oked to be deployed from İncirlik - maybe - according to a few sources. In october we were told that the US airforce were cleared to use it for whatever they want. They have been using a few unarmed drones from there up till now. A drone-ification is not going to be good for anyone.

 

[frogwoman]

indeed, imagine a sack full of vipers on crack, and go from there.

to answer frogwoman's entirely reasonable concern, a template (however flawed) may have emerged - the US was unwilling to support the now stalled/bogged-down Iraqi ground offensive on IS held Tikrit because the bulk of the Iraqi force was the less-than-ideal Shia militias, and the US had no intention of getting into bed, or being seen to get into bed, with them.

so, the Iraqi's appear to have got rid of the militias from the Tikrit job, and the USAF and USN (and our own polyester-clad heroes..) have weighed in on the beared loons, or at least on the bearded loons who aren't our bearded loons.

quite where the Shia militias have gone, and where the Iraqi's have got the sudden influx of trained (?) and equipped formations to replace the Shia militias is, of course, something to be drawn a veil over..

Thank you, i was worried i'd asked something really stupid as im not reallt up on the military aspects of it all.

 

[Patteran]

As an attempt to break out of the recent discussion's focus (understandable focus of course) on either military or sectarian issues/perspective etc here's a piece and some books looking at the wider economic background/context to the revolutions/counter-revolutions. Adam Hanieh is really important for this sort of stuff so i've added links and quick description of the books arguments (+the books of course) under the bit from the article. Apols for length but i want to get this done in one go before i go out.

I'd read the review in Jadaillya & was interested to read more. Not sure when I'll get the time, but thanks for the uploads.