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Global financial system implosion begins

Browsing the internet and came across this fanatical piece
This might seem surprising considering the national economy — which experienced one of its worst downturns thanks to the coronavirus pandemic — is now objectively improving. The United States added 916,000 jobs in March, smashing Dow Jones expectations and the unemployment rate is now at its lowest level (6 percent) in over a year. And economic forecasters now predict annual GDP growth in 2021 will soar to levels the country hasn’t witnessed in nearly 40 years.
The lunacy of someone talking about objective economics while pouring scorn on the 'subjective' views of others is out there. And then there is the complete disconnect between 'the economy' and people's experiences.

Mad priests trying to reconcile the contradictions in their bibles.
 
Well, from the point of view of those whose aim is to consolidate power in the hands of the few, the system really is working, isn’t it? The fact that everyday people’s experience is increasingly dire isn’t a flaw, it’s part of the process. Ever more “efficient” companies that generate greater profits.
 
Piece by Doug Henwood. Not specifically about the stock market but more about the interaction of capital (big and medium) with the 'ruling class' (Henwood's term not mine).

It is very top down and a little disjointed at times. And some parts are a well know story
I’d say the ruling class consists of a politically engaged capitalist class, operating through lobbying groups, financial support for politicians, think tanks, and publicity, that meshes with a senior political class that directs the machinery of the state. (You could say something similar about regional, state, and local capitalists and the relevant machinery.) But we shouldn’t underestimate the importance of the political branch of the ruling class in shaping the thinking of the capitalists, who are too busy making money to think much on their own or even organize in their collective interest.
Enabling that demand for more was the major shift in the ownership of stocks. In the early 1950s, households (mostly rich ones, of course) owned over 90 percent of stock; now it’s under 40 percent. Large institutional holders like pension funds and mutual funds owned about 2 percent of all stock in the 1950s; now it’s around 30 percent. While the household owners of the mid-twentieth century had common interests in rising share prices and stable, generous dividends, they had no means of organizing to influence the corporations they owned. Today’s institutional owners have plenty of means. The diffuse, passive shareholders of the past have given way to the professional money managers of recent decades.
Over the last decade, law professors Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst report, 95 percent of all inflows into investment funds have gone to passively managed funds, like mutual funds. The lion’s share has gone into funds managed by the Big Three (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street), and that proportion has been rising. In 1998, those three firms held about 5 percent of the total capitalization of the S&P 500, an index made up of the stocks of the largest blue chip corporations. That share is now 21 percent, and it’s almost certain to keep growing.
But the divergence between large multinational capital and medium local capital is more interesting.
These enterprises yield a nice living for their owners, especially at the highest end. Firms owned by the top 0.1 percent (those with annual incomes of $1.6 million or more) have an average of seventy-four employees who yield a profit of $14,000 each for the boss — more than $10 million in total. Few of these owners have more than one business, which makes for some precarity, and few businesses survive their owners. Even at the high end, this is not “Big Capital,” though it’s fat personal income. But they make up much of the top 0.1 percent — 84 percent of it in all. That’s thirteen times the number who make their big incomes as officers of public corporations; in the aggregate, privateers make eight times as much as their corporate comrades.
It’s not just geographical, it’s also a sectoral angle to the class base for right-wing politics. The MyPillow guy, Mike Lindell, was the most charmingly visible of Trump’s marginal business supporters, but there are also characters like Marty Davis, whom the Washington Postdescribed as a “quartz-countertop mogul” based in suburban Minneapolis, at whose lakefront house Trump held an indoor fundraiser just before his COVID diagnosis. Minneapolis is far from a backwater, but Davis operates in an industry that would never qualify for inclusion in the commanding heights of capitalism. Still, the Davis family, which diversified into countertops after a successful run in the dairy business, was rich enough to have made a brief appearance on Forbes’s 2015 list of America’s richest families, with $1.7 billion in net worth.
Despite this power, the Right has never achieved political hegemony, nor have its business patrons achieved economic hegemony. The Koch network is rich, but its wealth pales next to the Fortune 500’s cash flow. One way to make this point is to poke about their think tanks, where money is made into policy. There’s a decided lack of big names.

The board of the Cato Institute, despite its ties to the Koch world, is heavy with second-tier and third-tier capitalists — the chair of something called TAMKO Building Products, a Missouri-based firm; a managing director with Susquehanna International Group, a money management firm based in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania; and the former owner of the Tennessee-based Young Radiator Company. Koch aside, it’s light on seriously elite connections.
[.....]
Contrast this with the centrist Brookings Institution, whose board includes ambassadors from Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, TD Bank, Duke Energy, and Young & Rubicam. Its top funders include the Gates Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, Comcast, Google, JPMorgan Chase, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Shell, Time Warner, Toyota, AIG, and the governments of Japan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — and even the libertarian would-be secessionist Peter Thiel, who, like any big investor, knows the importance of diversification. Or take the Clintonite Dems’ favorite think tank, the Center for American Progress, which has a “Business Alliance” — price of admission: $100,000 — that includes Comcast, Walmart, GM, GE, and Boeing.
Henwood is certainly right in that large capital is increasingly socially liberal, pro-ESG, anti-populist and technocratic, and thus a much better fit to what where once centre-left parties than the Republicans or populist parities
The two-party system has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past several decades. Once the party of New Dealers and Southern segregationists, the Democrats have evolved into a coalition of the softer side of the metropolitan establishment and a progressive wing the party leadership hates. And the GOP, once the party of the northeastern WASP elite, has evolved into a coalition of plutocrats and an enraged provincial petite bourgeoisie (often mistaken for the “white working class”).
Big capital is socially liberal — or it pretends to be. It has no interest in the Christian right’s moral agenda, nor is it nativist. Almost every Wall Street and Fortune 500 company has a diversity department, handling everything from anti-racist training sessions to the corporate float for the annual LGBT pride parade. Their worldview is little different from Hillary Clinton’s — but they’re not passionately engaged in politics. They write checks, but profits are high, and the tax rate they paid on those profits over the last few years was the lowest it’s been since the early 1930s.

They’re layabouts compared to the class fraction I’m describing, a gang made up of the owners of private companies as opposed to public ones, disproportionately in dirty industries. The financier wing comes largely out of “alternative investments,” hedge funds and private equity, not big Wall Street banks or Silicon Valley VC firms. Most alternative investment operations are run as partnerships with a small staff, often under the direction of a single figure. Collectively, they look like freebooters more than corporate personalities, and asset-strippers more than builders, be it natural assets in the case of the carbon moguls or corporate assets in the case of the PE titans. Trump himself ran a real estate firm with a small staff and no outside shareholders. Like a private equity guy, Trump loaded up his casinos with debt and pocketed much of the proceeds.
Within the GOP, the petit bourgeois mass base — the car dealers and accountants — is in conflict with its big business wing, and neither can gain political or ideological hegemony over the whole society. (That intraclass conflict became sharp and visible during Trump’s second impeachment hearing.) The Democrats, for that matter, look divided between the old centrist DLC faction — tied to parts of Wall Street and big capital, represented by Biden — and a younger, more leftish, and more energetic activist wing. It’s much easier to imagine (to take some names from the fuzzy past) Everett Dirksen and Lyndon Johnson coexisting in the same universe than to picture Marjorie Taylor Greene and Ro Khanna as colleagues in governance. Until the 1990s, the federal government never shut down for any length of time because of the inability to pass a proper budget; since 1995, the US government has shut down to a significant degree five times, for a cumulative total of eighty days, and political leaders openly suggested that a default on Treasury securities might be a salutary measure. There’s something fractured in a state that engages in periodic shutdowns.
 
It’s also true for the UK as it is for the US. But working for a big US firm, I very much recognise the statement that big US firms are very socially liberal these days. It’s a perfect philosophy for them, in fact. The reification of choice and the normalising judgement of inclusion culture attaching to a wider treatment of neoliberal values as taken-for-granted brings with it self-governance at the individual level, driving people not to just obey rules but obey principles, with those principles being “everybody should work really hard and pull together for the company”.
 
with those principles being “everybody should work really hard and pull together for the company”.
Indeed, this type of attitude keeps on cropping up when trying to organise workers - "we're all in it together", "we don't want to take action to just the company" (or in my case university)
 
I'm pretty sure that every company wants its employees to work hard and pull together. It's not just a huge neoliberal corporation thing.
 
I'm pretty sure that every company wants its employees to work hard and pull together. It's not just a huge neoliberal corporation thing.
Yes it is, though. Pre-70s, companies focused on rules. You met the rules and it didn’t cross your mind to go beyond them. Contemporary workplaces are completely different things. This didn’t happen in isolation, it was part of the transformation of contemporary culture.
 
Yes it is, though. Pre-70s, companies focused on rules. You met the rules and it didn’t cross your mind to go beyond them. Contemporary workplaces are completely different things. This didn’t happen in isolation, it was part of the transformation of contemporary culture.

I think that's got more to do with the fact that you can't make a rule up for every situation, otherwise you end up with a rulebook as big as a series of novels.
 
I think that's got more to do with the fact that you can't make a rule up for every situation, otherwise you end up with a rulebook as big as a series of novels.
This is an ahistorical understanding of how subjectivity functions in contemporary society, including the contemporary workplace. There was a seismic shift starting in the 1970s but really accelerating through the 1980s and 1990s regarding how people see themselves as "workers". Old securities regarding specific contractual duties and responsibilities based on static structures were replaced with an entrepeneurial culture that embraced change for change's sake, and workers that sought "value-add" (and other market-based concepts) based on what was needed, not what was written down for them to do. The very fact that you see contemporary subjectivity as something you take for granted should in itself be a warning flag that this has been culturally embedded into you, not something layered on top.

Don't take my word for it. There's a wealth of research on it.
 
Yes it is, though. Pre-70s, companies focused on rules. You met the rules and it didn’t cross your mind to go beyond them. Contemporary workplaces are completely different things. This didn’t happen in isolation, it was part of the transformation of contemporary culture.
You are saying that the workplace has become more cult like?
 
This is an ahistorical understanding of how subjectivity functions in contemporary society, including the contemporary workplace. There was a seismic shift starting in the 1970s but really accelerating through the 1980s and 1990s regarding how people see themselves as "workers". Old securities regarding specific contractual duties and responsibilities based on static structures were replaced with an entrepeneurial culture that embraced change for change's sake, and workers that sought "value-add" (and other market-based concepts) based on what was needed, not what was written down for them to do. The very fact that you see contemporary subjectivity as something you take for granted should in itself be a warning flag that this has been culturally embedded into you, not something layered on top.

Don't take my word for it. There's a wealth of research on it.

Every place I've ever worked at has given me a contract delineating my duties and responsibilities. Maybe this "entrepreneurial" shitwank flies in some swanky City job or godawful Silicon Valley start-up, but in the kind of jobs which a school drop-out like me has a chance of obtaining, behaving "entrepreneurial" will just get you ignored or laughed at. Despite the neolib "diversity and inclusivity" wank that gets piled on nowadays, management still aren't interested in our opinions.
 
Every place I've ever worked at has given me a contract delineating my duties and responsibilities. Maybe this "entrepreneurial" shitwank flies in some swanky City job or godawful Silicon Valley start-up, but in the kind of jobs which a school drop-out like me has a chance of obtaining, behaving "entrepreneurial" will just get you ignored or laughed at. Despite the neolib "diversity and inclusivity" wank that gets piled on nowadays, management still aren't interested in our opinions.
Do you have a policy that means what you do on social media can be a dismissable offence? Do you feel an expectation to work at your desk over lunch or not take breaks? If not these specific things, are there other cultural norms that you would feel weird or know there would be consequences for breaking, despite them not being codified?
 
Do you have a policy that means what you do on social media can be a dismissable offence? Do you feel an expectation to work at your desk over lunch or not take breaks? If not these specific things, are there other cultural norms that you would feel weird or know there would be consequences for breaking, despite them not being codified?

1. I vaguely remember something like a pamphlet being given to us about posting on social media, but I honestly can't recall if there are any specific rules. Regardless, I used to post a whole bunch of radical shit on Facebook under my real name (the only platform on which I've done this), none of which I could be bothered to delete before all but abandoning Facebook. So far not a single employer has even batted an eyelid at me being a dirty communist.

2. We're discouraged from eating lunch at our desks in the office. My immediate supervisor has actually been encouraging me to take breaks as of late. Not sure what to make of that to be honest.

Doesn't every workplace have its norms? I mean that's the real reason that workplaces have job interviews and probationary periods, isn't it? To see how well you fit in on a personal level? I've been in my current job now for over two years, which I understand makes me a bit more difficult to get rid of easily. I do suspect however that my decision to start keeping a lid on my tendency to grumble, mutter shit under my breath and generally act like a depressing little raincloud (at least while I'm at work) has had something to do with why I've managed to hang on here so long, unlike in previous jobs. Frankly, my attitude at work used to stink, and changing that has improved things for me.
 
Every place I've ever worked at has given me a contract delineating my duties and responsibilities. Maybe this "entrepreneurial" shitwank flies in some swanky City job or godawful Silicon Valley start-up, but in the kind of jobs which a school drop-out like me has a chance of obtaining, behaving "entrepreneurial" will just get you ignored or laughed at. Despite the neolib "diversity and inclusivity" wank that gets piled on nowadays, management still aren't interested in our opinions.

I think the shift is from "these are your duties, do them" to "I must do this, that, the other, I must ensure I am adding value to the company, and never ever stopping"

Like theres a bit of the first one sure but for the most part its now ever more ingrained in the workers mindset that good workers never stop and are always looking towards the next task.
 
Illustrative of where the debate for economists is now, what are the best ways to protect capitalism?. Unlike in 2008 (most of) capital and states are in favour of spending (in their own interests of course), the question being where this spending is to be done. I suspect little of it will go towards reducing inequality. but the fact that even the FT is worried about the issue does show where sections of capital are at.

The problem is that without strong labour directing/enforcing it what do measures to reduce inequality or increase social mobility look like?
 
G7/corporate tax: a hard but fragile bargain
June 06, 2021 Outline - Read & annotate without distractions
Unprecedented. Seismic. World-changing. The finance chiefs of G7 countries reached for superlatives as they hailed Saturday’s corporate tax deal. After nearly a decade of talks, it is a remarkably bold plan. But expectations of a massive tax windfall are misplaced.

The accord has two components. One aims to address the race to the bottom on tax rates by imposing a global minimum corporation tax on large companies. The second component would require the largest, most profitable companies to pay more tax in countries where they make their sales. A fifth of their global profits above a 10 per cent profit margin would be reallocated in this way.

Big companies should be braced for higher tax bills. But by how much? Some big numbers are doing the rounds. EU multinationals would have to pay about €50bn or 15 per cent more in taxes globally, according to the Paris-based EU Tax Observatory. Similarly, the UK would collect an extra £7.9bn, according to the IPPR think-tank.

Such estimates look overblown. Scaling up an earlier OECD estimate suggests extra revenues of less than 4 per cent or $84bn. The biggest share would be paid by tech giants and other US multinationals to the US. Weak anti-avoidance rules enabled them to move profits to tax havens more readily than companies based elsewhere.

The second component will cost companies less overall — at most $12bn or 0.5 per cent of global corporate tax revenues. Some high-profile companies such as Amazon, with a 7.5 per cent net profit margin, may be completely outside its scope. But the measure is significant even so, as it would allow for the taxing rights on $100bn of profits to be shuffled between countries.

The US would foot a large part of the bill for this. Its companies represent 72 per cent of the profits of the world’s 100 most profitable multinationals, according to the Tax Foundation. That will make it tricky to get this agreement through Congress.

The tax plan should be seen as a grand bargain. In exchange for allowing greater taxation of US multinationals by other countries, Washington would get a widely applied global minimum tax rate. That would allow the US to increase its corporate tax rate without fear of being undercut by other countries. It would also prompt the UK, Italy and others to drop their digital taxes. In return, the US would rescind its threat to impose tariffs.

The hype about this long-awaited deal would be justified if it averted a costly tax and trade war.
 
Capital for the people — an idea whose time has come
FT June 20, 2021 Outline - Read & annotate without distractions
If American states are, as former US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once put it, the “laboratories of democracy,” then it’s worth watching closely what’s happening in California right now.

The threat of rising taxes and a “soak the rich” political atmosphere has led some wealthy Golden State residents, including a number of technology entrepreneurs, to leave for cheaper pastures such as Austin or Miami. This has, in turn, prompted worries of a larger migration that would have an impact not only on the state’s tax base, but on the growth and innovation that have made California the world’s fifth-largest economy.

It is an exceptionally fraught situation. While nobody these days has much sympathy for wealthy individuals or companies (witness the recent justified fury about the ProPublica leaks showing how little tax the wealthiest Americans pay), or really believes in trickle-down economics, the threat of tax and regulatory arbitrage by other states is real.

The good news is that California is applying some typically creative thinking to the problem. What if there was another way to harness company and citizen wealth for the benefit of all?
"fraught"
 
He, along with some very rich Californians like former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt and Snap founder Evan Spiegel, have proposed that the concept be broadened into something called “universal basic capital”. The idea is that seed contributions of equity from companies or philanthropists could be invested into a fund that would then be used by individual Californians for things like retirement security, healthcare and so on.
Even at this politically polarised moment, it’s an idea whose time may have come. Pre-distribution is supported by such unlikely bedfellows as hedge funder Ray Dalio and leftwing economist Joseph Stiglitz. Perhaps that’s because while it doesn’t fundamentally alter the market system, it does broaden share ownership: a mix of capitalism and socialism that is right for our time.
Thanks for the spot yield. This is definitely where things are heading.
 
Thanks for the spot yield. This is definitely where things are heading.

In the short/medium-term in Europe I think the implementation of UBI will continue to sow divisions between the immigrant and citizenship-holding sections of the working class, as pretty much all the examples that I know of are conditional on citizenship, which is very hard to get in most Euro countries without marriage or family ties.

Cyprus and Italy for example have some form of UBI but only for citizens. Spain on the other hand have a more inclusive system that is extended to all legal residents -- which Vox are of course opposed to, for this reason.

There is a lot of media discussion now in Italy regarding the difficulty (for restaurateurs, hotel owners, and the like) in finding hospitality staff in this new economic reopening, and the blame is being squarely laid at the feet of UBI (which is around 600 euro a month, on average) by the media... though just as in the US, the real reason is of course a renewed class confidence among the precariat to reject shitty conditions. In the US the media blame it on the stimulus checks, but it's the same basic logic.
 
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