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Germany: Hegemony in Europe

pocketscience

Well-Known Member
Thought I'd start this thread to open a discussion on Germany's current hegemony in Europe: how it came about, where it's going, what if anything should or could be done about it, and to track any political/ economical developments related to it.

Initially triggered by a question* from bimble (albeit tongue in cheek I believe) on whether there's an "innate Teutonic Will To Power" * - which begs the question: why is (in an historical context) Germany's economic & political domination of Europe happening again?

butchersapron posted an excellent article yesterday by Costas Lapavitsas on what the left can do about Germany's hegemony; particularly focusing on how the Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) of the EU has been structured to serve german capital and its industrial exporters and not the continents workers.
I'm personally really interested in and follow german culture and current affairs closely, yet the articles boldness made me realise how rarely this topic is seen in discussions about Europe - an elephant in the room.
Maybe Lapavitsas is just a bitter Greek and his strategy is based on a false premise? - maybe we're all better off with a strong dominant german exporting industry?
I'd say it's a good reference/ starting point for discussion.

Any discussions on the ongoing german election/ coalition marathon should go in Idris2002 's Germany: Elections 2017 thread.



* unfortunately that discussion veered into a long discussion on racism; no thanks to me! Sharing my personal views that, although based on personal experience, admittedly were probably inappropriate as they conform to lazy stereotypes etc - so please avoid any references to national traits or stereotypes...
 
A.J.P. Taylor was a firm believer in the analytical utility of national stereotypes - "Bismarck - good man - knew how to handle Jerry" was the kind of thing he came up with. During the Cold War he used to argue that there wouldn't be a Third World War because for a world war you need a united Germany. . .

Well, we've had a united Germany for nearly thirty years now. And whatever else you can say about it, it's a country most of whose population have got the message about exactly what Grandad really did in the last war.

So the stereotypes don't necessarily apply there anymore. What might still apply is Taylor's point about how Germany is in the wrong place: it's too big to be just another Euro country, and it's too small to be a superpower in its own right.

To get to the latter status, "she must make herself master of Europe". A hundred years ago, the population were largely behind that project (until the wheels started to come off). Today, I don't think they have the stomach for that sort of thing, at least not the way it was attempted a century ago. So other methods will have to be found. . .
 
I like psychological explanations, so found the ideas in here interesting (from a google during the other thread) - painting Germany's dominance of the EU as a result of its ongoing need to reinvent itself as a unifier post-war.

Is Germany too powerful for Europe?

'But what are the Germans getting out of teaching allegedly slacker Europeans how to run their economies? For Beck, Germany's European dominance has given the nation a new sense of identity after decades of Nazi guilt, and provides liberation from what he calls the "never again syndrome" – never again a Holocaust, never again fascism, never again militarism. After the second world war and the Holocaust, he argues, Germany was in ruins morally and economically. Now, in both senses, it is back..'
 
Well, we've had a united Germany for nearly thirty years now. And whatever else you can say about it, it's a country most of whose population have got the message about exactly what Grandad really did in the last war.

Tbf most of their Grandads were doing the exact same thing our Grandads were doing.
 
I remember having a long and slowly more drunken talk with a bloke in a pub in Ireland some years ago whose hobby horse was the EU being the resurgence of the German empire. Like, they failed under the Kaiser, they failed under the Fuhrer - but they're succeeding now under the EU (needless to say he wished Eire had never joined)

No amount of appeals to Franco-German co-operation or preventing war or raising prosperity for the poorer nations (this was before the Greece situation) or other rational arguments made any headway. Stubborn old men and their opinions eh.
 
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No amount of appeals to Franco-German co-operation or preventing war or raising prosperity for the poorer nations (this was before the Greece situation)

I'm not sure that those are much less asinine explanations of the EU.

I thought Varafoukis was quite interesting when he quite clearly argues that the domination of the EU by Germany is not down to some peculiarly German characteristics. For years the French elite also saw the EEC/EU as a means of being dominant in Europe, and in particular the exchange rate mechanism and single currency were meant to keep a reunited Germany under control. It was a condition of reunification, some of the conservative French press declared that Maastricht was a new Treaty of Versailles. It just happens that they badly misjudged the leverage they would get.
 
I'm not sure that those are much less asinine explanations of the EU.

I thought Varafoukis was quite interesting when he quite clearly argues that the domination of the EU by Germany is not down to some peculiarly German characteristics. For years the French elite also saw the EEC/EU as a means of being dominant in Europe, and in particular the exchange rate mechanism and single currency were meant to keep a reunited Germany under control. It was a condition of reunification, some of the conservative French press declared that Maastricht was a new Treaty of Versailles. It just happens that they badly misjudged the leverage they would get.
What does he put this dominance down to then?
 
What does he put this dominance down to then?
From what I remember at least in the short term he claims that the failure of the ERM allowed for the Eurozone to be formulated on terms which were much more favourable to Germany. And that the idea that France could use the single currency to subdue Germany was always a delusion of French elites. Also that it was in the American economic interest that a post war West Germany remain industrialised with a strong currency. I don't know if he more generally talked about why Germany came to dominate Europe (I can't really look now), I don't think he was dismissing the geographical factors etc, just the idea that there was something peculiar to German culture that drove them to dominate, unlike other European countries.
 
Just noticed the thread from danny la rouge (initially posted by butchersapron) over in the theory, philosophy & history forum referencing a review of Wolfgang Streecks 'How will Capitalism End'.
Seeing as the ensuing Tooze/ Streeck ding-dong goes down a bit of a primacy of the nation/ Europe/ German hegemony rabbit hole, I thought it might be a good idea to cross reference it here for now.
It leads to the following closing statement from Streeck, which in all its bluntness is particularly relevant:
...Others with less grounded experience may find it hard to understand why so many in Europe perceive Habermas’s Europeanisation of Germany as a Germanisation of Europe. Universalism, however, can be imperialism; when I call for the preservation of a modicum of national sovereignty within whatever European construction will finally emerge, it is because I want Europeans to live in peace with one another, which to me requires, among other things, that countries be able to command a halfway effective capacity to defend themselves against competitive pressures and German rule, and in particular against the former imposed by the latter. High capitalism is a difficult enough fellow to fight...
 
A very EU coup: Martin Selmayr’s astonishing power grab | The Spectator

Martin Selmayr has always dreamed of being known beyond the Brussels bubble. His wish has now been granted, albeit in not quite the way he might have hoped. It has arrived in the form of a brilliantly executed coup that has handed this 47-year-old German bureaucrat near-total control of the EU machine.
The coup began at 9.39 a.m. on 21 February, when 1,000 journalists were sent an email summoning them to a 10.30 a.m. audience with Jean-Claude Juncker. The short notice suggested urgency — and for such a meeting to be happening at all was unusual in itself. Since becoming President of the European Commission, Juncker has held hardly any press conferences.

His news was the surprise promotion of Selmayr, his Chief of Staff, to the position of Secretary-General, in charge of the Commission’s 33,000 staff. The reaction from the journalists present was astonishment. No one had been aware of a vacancy. There was no sign that the 61-year-old Alexander Italianer had been thinking of retiring. But as Juncker announced other appointments, it quickly became clear what had happened. Selmayr had taken control, and anyone who resisted him had been unceremoniously fired. Juncker had handed the keys of the European house to his favourite Eurocrat.

Selmayr had served Juncker well — or was it the other way around? Rather than being a regular chief of staff, Selmayr acted like a de facto deputy president. Juncker, who looks increasingly tired and worn out, had been the perfect glove puppet for Selmayr. Juncker was happy to let his Chief of Staff do the work, and happy to thank him by giving him a job of even greater power.
In the first few days of his new job, Selmayr has left no doubt about how he intends to rule. Last week, all Commission staffers were sent a letter from their new Secretary-General — something that is, again, highly unusual, as such letters are sent only by the President. In hisUrbi et Orbi, Selmayr proclaimed that the EU civil service ‘must not be satisfied with being the machine to run our institution’, which is odd, given this is exactly what the Commission is supposed to be for.
But Selmayr declared that the civil service (or, rather, he himself) would act as ‘the heart and soul of the Commission’. With that sentence, Selmayr reduced the role of the 28 European Commissioners to mere extras.

One commissioner who was present at the meeting where Selmayr was promoted later explained to me what happened (he spoke on condition of anonymity, which is in itself telling as he is supposed to be a heavyweight). They were called to a 9.30 a.m. meeting where Juncker presented them with nominations. Selmayr was named not as the Secretary-General, but as the deputy — a post that was known to be vacant. Selmayr’s promotion was unexpected, but Juncker assured them that all was above board.
Then came the coup de grâce. Having appointed Selmayr as deputy, Juncker announced that the Secretary-General — ltalianer — had resigned. So Selmayr, having been deputy for just a few minutes, would take his place from 1 March. ‘It was totally stunning,’ the commissioner told me. ‘We had witnessed an impeccably prepared and audacious power-grab.’ Before anyone else could find out about this unprecedented double-promotion, an email was sent out summoning journalists to the press conference — where Selmayr was confirmed. A fait accompli.

Why are the European Commissioners not making more of a fuss? Perhaps because Selmayr is preparing to give them a special present. Retiring commissioners are entitled to a generous ‘transition allowance’ of up to two-thirds of their basic salary for roughly two years, up to about €13,500 a month. Selmayr now plans to extend this to three, or perhaps even five, years. On top of the extra cash, they’d enjoy a series of benefits in kind: an office in the Commission headquarters (previously a perk to which only former presidents were entitled), a company car with a driver and two assistants. So thanks to Selmayr, a departing European Commissioner might receive double, if not triple, what he or she currently receives. All tax free, let’s not forget.
Selmayr’s manoeuvre would not have been possible without the complicity of Irene Souka, the European Commission’s Director-General of Human Resources. She has been amply rewarded for her efforts: last month, her job was extended beyond compulsory retirement age (as was that of her husband, Dominique Ristori, who is Director-General for Energy).

Only one mystery remains: why did Selmayr move when he did? Why not wait? Juncker will be President until October 2019: why would Selmayr not stay as chief of staff (or de facto president) until then? Or why not at least spend six months in the Deputy Secretary-General job? One answer is that Selmayr had to move before anyone could work out what he was up to. France, in particular, had its eye on the Secretary-General job, as two of the four great European institutions (the Parliament and the Diplomatic Service) are managed by Germans. Now, thanks to the Selmayr ascendancy, it’s three out of four. Rather a lot.
But there’s an even bigger reason for him to have moved. Precisely because Juncker will be gone next year, Selmayr needs to act now to line up a replacement — someone just as docile. And he believes he has found just the man in Michel Barnier. It’s thanks to Selmayr’s patronage that Barnier ended up as the Brexit negotiator in the first place. Selmayr’s next mission is to put Barnier top of the list of the European People’s Party (a grouping of centre-right MEPs), which means he’ll be in pole position for the job under the Spitzenkandidat system that Selmayr did so much to set up. Barnier is the ideal candidate because he is (in Selmayr’s eyes), weak, malleable and Macron-compatible.

Selmayr is now accountable to no one. Indeed, he has lost no time further consolidating his power. He has moved his office close to the President’s. I understand he will continue to chair meetings in the President’s office and even plans to put the hitherto independent European legal service under his command. So all he needs now is a new president as docile as Juncker has been and he’ll have achieved his aim: before his 50th birthday, and without ever having stood for elected office Selmayr will become the alpha and omega of the European Commission.
 
See also:

Brussels’ Selmayr problem: Too many Germans in top jobs

Too many Germans and not enough transparency.

Those were the main complaints among EU diplomats and members of the European Parliament about the surprise appointment of Martin Selmayr, Jean-Claude Juncker’s chief of staff, as the Commission’s top civil servant. The move gives the already-powerful German lawyer even more influence in Brussels and ensures he will stay in the secretary-general post even after the current Commission departs in October next year.

The move means Germans will hold the secretary-general position in three EU institutions. Klaus Welle holds the post at the European Parliament while veteran diplomat Helga Schmid has the equivalent position at the European External Action Service.

...

Other German nationals who hold key positions in the EU include Werner Hoyer, the president of the European Investment Bank.
 
I'm not sure the cultural stereotypes help much do they? If you're going to generalise that much you could as well ask why Germanic language speakers share a liking for good beer, imperial hubris and committing the worst human rights violations since the Mongol hordes (slave trade, the holocaust). That's a bit of a glib joke, but honestly, doesn't a lot depend on where you set the limits of your generalisation?

I wonder if would be more helpful to talk about a particular capitalist-bureaucratic culture that has embedded itself at the top of Germany and a bunch of EU institutions. Then the question might be why that has that been so successful, who its real base is, what the shared goals are.
 
Which culturalist stereotypes? On this thread?

There are substantive political positions based on what you may like to see happen - and rather deeper than that, in fact - posted from #1 on this thread. If you want to respond to them then feel free.
 
If your argument is that German industry is largely behind their dominance, it would be valuable to examine how and why German industry is so strong. In past discussions on here a lot has been put at the doors of German Banks and their requirement to support middle sized local industry, something that happens to a much lesser extent in the UK and France I believe.
 
“how the Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) of the EU has been structured to serve german capital”.

This may be true, but as a statement, it’s “when did you stop beating your wife?”

I’d say rewind a bit. Aside from Germany being a big economy, how has the EU been structured specifically not just to favour any big economy (and that’s a different discussion), but how the EU is structured to favour Germany specifically.

Is it? How does the EU do this specifically for Germany?
 
“how the Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) of the EU has been structured to serve german capital”.

This may be true, but as a statement, it’s “when did you stop beating your wife?”

I’d say rewind a bit. Aside from Germany being a big economy, how has the EU been structured specifically not just to favour any big economy (and that’s a different discussion), but how the EU is structured to favour Germany specifically.

Is it? How does the EU do this specifically for Germany?

Something something the euro something.
 
There's an exhibition in Berlin about the thriftiness of Germans, with a short mention on what maybe slightly here relevant:
“In Germany everyone takes it for granted that they should save, both privately and on a state level,” said Robert Muschalla, an economic historian and the main curator [...]
Muschalla, together with the director of the museum, Raphael Gross, say the exhibition - believed to be the first ever on the subject anywhere – was largely a response to the international exasperation felt towards Germany during the the eurozone crisis. Germany was accused of traumatising southern Europeans, particularly the Greeks, with its insistence that they bring their unmanageable deficits into line by imposing German-style austerity measures [...]
Later, from around the 1850s, saving developed into something of a national movement. Schools were encouraged to teach their pupils to save with the introduction of a schools savings bank. Simultaneously, there was an exponential rise in the number of savings accounts. Far from just being a means to fight poverty, people started to save for the national good. By 1875, at least a quarter of the German population had savings accounts. Local savings banks, or sparkassen, were used by municipal authorities to help fund the new Germany’s infrastructure.
Although teuchter would probably claim this to be racist, it may go a small way to explaining the question that bimble posed as to whether there is such a thing as "a will to power" in Germany. I really cant think of any other people who would consider their personal savings to be directly related to supporting the state.
The wider economic impacts - particularly Germany's trade to current account surplus - are getting a lot bad press.
Germany’s current-account surplus is a problem
Why Germany’s current-account surplus is bad for the world economy
There’s no need to envy Germany’s trade surplus

yet (unsurprisingly) German economists themselves seem to see the prudence as the right policy.
Germany fiercely defends its trade surplus, says it would be ‘futile’ to spend more
 
There's an exhibition in Berlin about the thriftiness of Germans, with a short mention on what maybe slightly here relevant:

Although teuchter would probably claim this to be racist, it may go a small way to explaining the question that bimble posed as to whether there is such a thing as "a will to power" in Germany. I really cant think of any other people who would consider their personal savings to be directly related to supporting the state.
The wider economic impacts - particularly Germany's trade to current account surplus - are getting a lot bad press.
Germany’s current-account surplus is a problem
Why Germany’s current-account surplus is bad for the world economy
There’s no need to envy Germany’s trade surplus

yet (unsurprisingly) German economists themselves seem to see the prudence as the right policy.
Germany fiercely defends its trade surplus, says it would be ‘futile’ to spend more

As it happens I've just spent the best part of a week with several Germans. I failed to detect the "unsavoury characteristics" you consider to be a trait of the majority of Germans. Maybe I just struck lucky (again)?

But what's this argument you are making now - that Germans' personal savings habits demonstrate a "will to power"? It seems to go like this:

(1) the curators of an exhibition say that staying out of debt is important to most Germans
(2) you interpret the motivation behind this as a desire to support the state (not, say a desire to be financially secure in retirement)
(3) you interpret it that way because...what? Is it because of an epithet written on a savings box from the Nazi era, which is mentioned in a guardian article? Or based on some other more solid and contemporary evidence?
(4) having argued that this is the motivation for the habit of saving - the interests of the state - you then assume that that means an interest in the state expressing power over other countries. Rather than anything else, like, say, a strong economy that can provide secure employment and welfare.

This kind of argument seems as bonkers as your sweeping generalisations about German character traits.

I note you back it up with various articles from authors strongly supportive of the ideology of free trade. These are the people providing the "bad press" for Germany's current account surplus.
 
This kind of argument seems as bonkers as your sweeping generalisations about German character traits.
One thing at a time.
(1) the curators of an exhibition say that staying out of debt is important to most Germans
The curator actually said
Curator said:
“In Germany everyone takes it for granted that they should save, both privately and on a state level,”
I was just concerned you'd consider the curators generalisation of all germans as being racist. You didn't pick up on it. I feel vindicated. Thanks. :)
 
(3) you interpret it that way because...what? Is it because of an epithet written on a savings box from the Nazi era, which is mentioned in a guardian article? Or based on some other more solid and contemporary evidence?
I quoted the relevant part:
Later, from around the 1850s, saving developed into something of a national movement. Schools were encouraged to teach their pupils to save with the introduction of a schools savings bank. Simultaneously, there was an exponential rise in the number of savings accounts. Far from just being a means to fight poverty, people started to save for the national good.
Just for a moment, try not to make a subjective interpretation of whether such an initiative should be judged as good or bad (unsavory).
Don't you think such an initiative, pushed on school children could later have an effect on the national psyche/ traits/ culture?

As it happens I've just spent the best part of a week with several Germans. I failed to detect the "unsavoury characteristics" you consider to be a trait of the majority of Germans. Maybe I just struck lucky (again)?
Hope you wasn't in Baden Wüttemburg. Bastards for getting a round in down the kneipe ;):p
 
I quoted the relevant part:

Just for a moment, try not to make a subjective interpretation of whether such an initiative should be judged as good or bad (unsavory).
Don't you think such an initiative, pushed on school children could later have an effect on the national psyche/ traits/ culture?

It's possible that an educational initiatives in the 19th century might continue to have some effect nowadays. It's also possible that behaviour nowadays is more significantly affected by other things. This could be said of any country. But what's your point? What's the relevance of this to the "will to power" that you seem to argue exists?
 
Hope you wasn't in Baden Wüttemburg. Bastards for getting a round in down the kneipe ;):p

Of course (as I'm sure you're aware), buying rounds simply isn't the custom in Germany, and the many Brits who think the failure to buy a round indicates stinginess aren't aware that the problem is their own cultural ignorance.

Personally I wish we didn't have the rounds system here - it's a nightmare for anyone on a budget, or who doesn't drink alcohol, and forces people to drink more than they want.
 
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