Genetic determinism

[Jonti]

...
I don't believe non-locality has any relation to emergence. I don't believe exotic physics have much to do with living organisms. These are bullets you are just going to have to bite.

No disagrement with most of what you wrote, but ^^^this^^^ is bizarre.

Emergence is exactly "not being able to predict the nature of the thing just by considering the atomic interaction of the parts".

And that is just what non-locality implies. This is a bullet you are just going to have to bite.

 

[Jonti]

The kind of genetic determinism espoused by Dawkins and Dennett ('genes as algorithms') generally conflates the two concepts.

Dawkins is an eminent biologist. Ask him, does evolution create something new in the world? and he will say: 'Yes, it does ~ if we reran evolution from the same conditions, we would not necessarily (or even probably) end up with the same results.' Biology is not a determinist science!

I'm afraid you're attributing views to him, he does not in fact hold.

This is usually done to smuggle divinity into the discussion, to fill the gaps that a deterministic biology (if that existed) could not reach.

 

[Jonti]

By accepting the genes play any role in determining the development of an individual you are trapping yourself inside a political control paradigm.

If something is true, there's no choice but to accept it, and deal with its consequences according to choice.

A consequent of your dogmatic ideology is that we must accept the reduction of the individual to level of physical automata leading to a collective devaluation of worth at a social level. This allows the right to propagate the belief that humanity is naturally inclined to conflict helping them to maintain their capitalist values and vicariously maintain political support for their organisations.

It's dogmatic of you and others to deny the fact of biological inheritance. The fact one takes after one's parents does not make one into an automaton.

Down with the evil materialist, determinist, reductionist, essentialist, anglo-american, capitalist agenda!111

Your scientific epistemology is no match for my hermeneutic approach!!11

 

[Knotted]

Emergence is exactly "not being able to predict the nature of the thing just by considering the atomic interaction of the parts".

Take Bohmian mechanics. This is the most squarely non-local of the quantum mechanical interpretations, and yet it is based exactly on the interaction of the parts - ie. the particles and the pilot wave.

 

[Jonti]

The meaning of emergence is not a matter of Bohmian mechanics; and the ontology of BM itself raises difficult questions.

 

[Knotted]

Anyway, I think that we should start a new thread, preferably something that won't invite mumbojumbo replies (so Consciousness might be out). I'd certainly be up for pretty much anything in Philosophy of Science/ Philosophy of Mind/ Cognitive Science.

Will try to think of some concrete suggestions.

I wouldn't worry. The mumbojumbo types often start a threads, but they just don't have the endurance to maintain a debate. Consciousness is a favourite topic round here, but it's been done to death IMO. Same with determinism. I recon phenomenology might be an interesting subject one day - we just need a critical mass of posters with enough knowledge of the subject who have opinionated views on it.

 

[Knotted]

The meaning of emergence is not a matter of Bohmian mechanics; and the ontology of BM itself raises difficult questions.

I'm not thinking in terms of ontology but in terms of mathematics. The ontology of quantum physics is open to interpretation. The mathematics of the evolution of the wave function is no more emergent than the mathematics of the evolution of an ordinary wave.

Perhaps another way to think of QM is of relations between observations. Here your parts would be those observations.

I can't think of anyway to interpret QM as emergent unless QM is merely an approximation to a more fundamental theory.

 

[Knotted]

Perhaps many-worlds could be described as "emergent". You could argue that the part=the whole. But that's more like saying that the very question of emergence is meaningless.

 

[Jonti]

No, the point is just that the wave function of the whole world must be computed for any instatiation.

 

[Jonti]

the model of reality that we construct and call our minds

Now this puzzles me.

Why construct a model of something that's right there under our noses and that can be directly measured and manipulated?

 

[littlebabyjesus]

How else do we make sense of what's going on? We are able to act without reference to the model – indeed, since I touch-type, I'm partially doing so as I write this. But if we wish to consider something – anything – we have to be able to look at an image that has meaning for us. To do this, we necessarily run a model.

 

[Knotted]

How else do we make sense of what's going on? We are able to act without reference to the model – indeed, since I touch-type, I'm partially doing so as I write this. But if we wish to consider something – anything – we have to be able to look at an image that has meaning for us. To do this, we necessarily run a model.

Is it that our brains can be said to construct a model or is the model their in our consciousness?

 

[Caecilian]

Ok, I'm just going to take Dennett's argument. The problem with it, from what I can see, is that it assumes that you can know what this perfect knowledge is. I would say that you cannot, and that Dennett's conclusions are not valid. I agree, as it happens, that intentional states are not reducible to lower-level explanations, but I don't agree with his path to that conclusion. I don't think it is at all obvious, given the level of possible knowledge that we have, how to conceive properly of a perfect knowledge and say what that perfect knowledge could be.

So, to go back to Dennett's thought experiment, for it to work, the entity must have an existence that goes beyond our universe, an existence that we necessarily cannot imagine. And that invalidates any conclusion you might wish to draw – as we have no way of knowing what kind of understanding might be available to such a 'being'?

I suspect that we're going to have to agree to disagree on this one.

Dennett's thought experiment certainly works for me. The point, I think, is this: although, as you say, we can't know what a being with a complete knowledge of microphysics would be like, we can grasp the idea that such a complete knowledge wouldn't lead to an understanding of intentional states. In other words, although a Dennettian Martian is in its totality incomprehensible, the relevant features of such an entity are understandable.

To take another thought experiment, one that I'm sure you'll be familiar with:

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it; we call it a "beetle". No one can look in anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.-Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. -But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? -If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. -No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

Wiitgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, excerpt from sec. 293.

Can we really understand what it would be like for everyone to have a 'beetle' in a box? What effect it would have on society? What effect it would have on our language? I think not. And yet this thought experiment still works, because we don't have to understand the whole scenario. We only need to understand the particular features that Wittgenstein is interested in, and that we can do.

I feel that this is a particularly relevant example because the position that you're arguing from seems to me to be basically Wittgenstinian.

 

[Jonti]

I think its important to distinguish ontological reduction from epistemological reduction.

Ontologically, everything reduces to QM, and to whatever descriptions pertain to the level(s) below QM. I know that some people would argue with this, but IMO their views are either unscientific gobbledygook (idealism), incoherent (strong emergentism), or both (dualism).

Epistemological reduction is much trickier- a matter of whether in practice the phenomena on a given level of description can be reformulated in terms of a lower-level theory. Quantum chemistry is a very good example of successful epistemological reduction. However, IMO biological phenomena, including mental phenomena, are just too complex for epistemological reduction to work.

I'm uneasy at the notion that philosophical analysis hangs off particular scientific theories. So, for example, I'd want to discuss the natural philosophy of consciousness and other biological phenomena without being diverted into an arcane discussion about QM. Similarly, I wouldn't want to say ontology reduces to QM.

I think the problem with the epistemological reduction of biological phenomena to physics is more profound than one of sheer causal complexity. The question "Why did the police attack the demonstrators?" is not answered with talk about material processes and brain chemistry, it is answered by talking about the meaning of events as seen by the actors.

Somehow, as we shift our focus, causal chains segue into notions of meaning and information.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Is it that our brains can be said to construct a model or is the model their in our consciousness?

Our brains can be said to construct a model – and we can say many very definite things about the model. We can look at the ways it can go wrong and insert content that isn't justified by the information coming in via the senses, such as psychosis. We can look at how it runs on its own when we take various dissociative drugs. It runs on its own, or at least a partial version of it runs, when we are asleep and dream.

It must be a property of the whole brain, that is the pulling together of disparate pieces of information to construct a 'now' that immediately passes in varying parts into memory. It is the first layer of memory, if you like – our memories are made of the results of the model, which is why, when we are completely absorbed in an activity, so much so that we have no time to lay down memories as we're doing it, we can perform the activity without 'going through' our models before we take decisions, and we are left with only the sketchiest memories of what we did. It is also, necessarily, an after-the-fact construction.

 

[Knotted]

Wiitgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, excerpt from sec. 293.

Can we really understand what it would be like for everyone to have a 'beetle' in a box? What effect it would have on society? What effect it would have on our language? I think not. And yet this thought experiment still works, because we don't have to understand the whole scenario. We only need to understand the particular features that Wittgenstein is interested in, and that we can do.

I feel that this is a particularly relevant example because the position that you're arguing from seems to me to be basically Wittgenstinian.

I think Wittgenstein is more radical than that. Philosophy comes before natural science - we can make up nature as we go along if we fancy in philosophy.

If there is no coherent concept of God then all philosophy would be impossible. (Which is more or less the conclusion of Tractatus).

 

[Knotted]

Our brains can be said to construct a model – and we can say many very definite things about the model. We can look at the ways it can go wrong and insert content that isn't justified by the information coming in via the senses, such as psychosis. We can look at how it runs on its own when we take various dissociative drugs. It runs on its own, or at least a partial version of it runs, when we are asleep and dream.

But then the model only exists according to how we proscribe it. We may be able to look at the functioning of a brain and say it is constructing model A, but then look at it in another way and say it is constructing model B.

It must be a property of the whole brain, that is the pulling together of disparate pieces of information to construct a 'now' that immediately passes in varying parts into memory. It is the first layer of memory, if you like – our memories are made of the results of the model, which is why, when we are completely absorbed in an activity, so much so that we have no time to lay down memories as we're doing it, we can perform the activity without 'going through' our models before we take decisions, and we are left with only the sketchiest memories of what we did. It is also, necessarily, an after-the-fact construction.

I think you move too quickly from neuroscience to phenomenology and back again. What does information mean in this context? Is it meaningful information or is it abstract information?

 

[littlebabyjesus]

It is a while since I read Wittgenstein. I agree with him as to where it is necessary to be silent. I think he makes a fundamental error, however, by believing that it is only possible to reason with language. His language puzzles become much less interesting once you have rejected this idea.

 

[Knotted]

It is a while since I read Wittgenstein. I agree with him as to where it is necessary to be silent. I think he makes a fundamental error, however, by believing that it is only possible to reason with language. His language puzzles become much less interesting once you have rejected this idea.

I don't think he ever makes that assumption. Apart from anything that would be a statement of natural science rather than philosophy.

 

[Jonti]

You cannot reduce biology to quantum physics because the meanings in biology are not contained at the quantum level.

This.

Biology needs the notion of intent, and intentional behaviour. The fossilisation of ancient hominid footprints on the Olduvai strands is pure physics and chemistry; but why the hominids trod that particular path, this we cannot know without understanding their situation, how they saw themselves in that environment.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

But then the model only exists according to how we proscribe it. We may be able to look at the functioning of a brain and say it is constructing model A, but then look at it in another way and say it is constructing model B.

We have a point of view and that point of view is looking at the model. I think it is probably better to say that the point of view is the model and the apparent duality is not quite what we imagine it to be. Once the moment has gone, it can still be modified in our memories – we reinvent ourselves in this way all the time. And since the moment is itself an artificial construct, it is always contingent – it requires time to be constructed. The first level of memory requires memory to be made – the scariest point of advanced dementia, for me, comes not when you cannot remember the past, but when you can no longer construct a present.

I think you move too quickly from neuroscience to phenomenology and back again. What does information mean in this context? Is it meaningful information or is it abstract information?

Information becomes meaningful in us. All meaning is constructed in us. Different parts of us can assign meaning – our visual cortex, for instance, will give meanings to the 'raw' information it receives from the eyes, and we may react to the information based solely on this 'first' meaning, or we may require a more integrated look at it and wish to summon the image up into a 'full' model before we react, which of course takes more time. There is evidence that this information is first 'primed' at various points before it is sent to other parts of the brain to appear in a more integrated form of the model. At each point, it is meaning that is looked for and given.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I don't think he ever makes that assumption. Apart from anything that would be a statement of natural science rather than philosophy.

I'd have to dig it out, but I believe he does, quite explicitly, in Philosophical Investigations. But I don't know a huge amount about Wittgenstein.

 

[Knotted]

We have a point of view and that point of view is looking at the model. I think it is probably better to say that the point of view is the model and the apparent duality is not quite what we imagine it to be. Once the moment has gone, it can still be modified in our memories – we reinvent ourselves in this way all the time. And since the moment is itself an artificial construct, it is always contingent – it requires time to be constructed. The first level of memory requires memory to be made – the scariest point of advanced dementia, for me, comes not when you cannot remember the past, but when you can no longer construct a present.

I think the talk of models is metaphorical not literal. If it were literal then we wouldn't have a point of view as that would depend on arbitrary constructions of the neuroscientific model of the phenomenoligcal model.

Information becomes meaningful in us. All meaning is constructed in us. Different parts of us can assign meaning – our visual cortex, for instance, will give meanings to the 'raw' information it receives from the eyes, and we may react to the information based solely on this 'first' meaning, or we may require a more integrated look at it and wish to summon the image up into a 'full' model before we react, which of course takes more time. There is evidence that this information is first 'primed' at various points before it is sent to other parts of the brain to appear in a more integrated form of the model. At each point, it is meaning that is looked for and given.

Is the meaningful information dependent on the model or is the model dependent on the meaningful information?

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I think the talk of models is metaphorical not literal. If it were literal then we wouldn't have a point of view as that would depend on arbitrary constructions of the neuroscientific model of the phenomenoligcal model.

No, I mean it quite literally. I actually see the presence of a point of view as evidence that we should talk about a model literally. The fact that we can run it independently of any 'real' data – by taking data from our memories, essentially – says to me that it is useful to think of it as literally a model, and one with many very definite characteristics and rules. It exists simultaneously at different levels but that does not mean you cannot think of it as literally a model.

Is the meaningful information dependent on the model or is the model dependent on the meaningful information?

The model creates the meaning. It is this creation of meaning that we experience as our point of view. Our point of view is the meaning we both see in the model and use to create it. The two cannot be separated.

 

[Knotted]

I'd have to dig it out, but I believe he does, quite explicitly, in Philosophical Investigations. But I don't know a huge amount about Wittgenstein.

It's part (i) of PI2 that you want. I read him as insisting that linguistic reasoning is qualitatively different from pre-linguistic reasoning. We can use language to consider things which aren't proximate - like what will happen the day after tommorrow.

Having said that, pace W, animals can be hopeful. I find it perfectly reasonable to attribute "hope" to a dog.

 

[Knotted]

No, I mean it quite literally. I actually see the presence of a point of view as evidence that we should talk about a model literally. The fact that we can run it independently of any 'real' data – by taking data from our memories, essentially – says to me that it is useful to think of it as literally a model, and one with many very definite characteristics and rules. It exists simultaneously at different levels but that does not mean you cannot think of it as literally a model.

I think you're considering the image seperately from it's use. Our points of view and our memories exist as models which are then put to use - but does our point of view make any sense if it isn't put to use. Isn't a fearful image meaningful because it inspires fear in us (a physical reaction)?

I don't think it works input-model-storage-process-output. I doubt the model and the process-output are seperable.

 

[Jonti]

Some math of emergence here (pdf)

Emergence is ...

• What emerges from a spatially extended dynamical system is a “space-time phase”: probability distributions over space-time histories that arise from typical initial probabilities in the distant past.
• Amount of emergence is the “distance” of a space-time phase from the set of products for independent units.
• Strong emergence means non-unique space-time phase (but not due to decomposability).

 

[littlebabyjesus]

@ Knotted.

I'm not sure how much we're disagreeing here. The system is the model. It's hard to separate out any particular feature since they're all connected. I'm not keen on Dennett's explanation of consciousness, but his idea of 'multiple drafts' has merit here, I think – when you try to examine it too closely, the apparent unity disintegrates, but our everyday experience is that this unity is there. (Or at least that's true of us modern humans – Jaynes would have it, and I think he's right, that it has not always been so.)

Where I think it is useful to think in terms of a model is that it shows very clearly the nature of our experience. We do not experience reality. We experience our construction of 'reality'. It is this construction that I call the model, and it is, as I said originally, necessarily a simplification, an approximation, that shows the features (the meanings) we need to live.

And yes, a fearful image is meaningful because it inspires a physical emotional reaction, and the physical reaction itself informs the meaning. But that's the point. It is a model that is locked into our bodies. But you can disconnect it from various aspects of the body and it will still run. Those with locked-in syndrome have their models very largely cut off from physical reactions such as a fearful reaction, and this gives them a certain emotionless serenity, but their point of view is still there.

 

[Knotted]

Some math of emergence here (pdf)

Amount of emergence is the “distance” of a space-time phase from the set of products for independent units.

That will give quantum descriptions zero emergence. The independent units are the phase space.

There is nothing high level about QM. Don't confuse high level with non-atomistic. The independent units need not be particles and they certainly do not need to be classical particles.

 

[Jonti]

the pdf made no mention of QM that I saw