Ibn Khaldoun
the present is dead, long live the future . . .
Also, perhaps, nowhere hasn't been penetrated by transport and means of distribution.
Genetic determinism
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Johnny Canuck3
Well-Known Member
If you take the plane northeast from Vancouver, once you get past the first tier of mountains, you start passing over a mountainous area that can only be reached by airdrop. It continues for hundreds of miles.
Ibn Khaldoun
the present is dead, long live the future . . .
Ah yes. I should've remembered Canada - heard all about all the wild land there and forests.
Sounds awesome.
Johnny Canuck3
Well-Known Member
And it's not just Canada. There are places like that on every continent.
The point that I've been trying to make is that Genetic Determinism isn't necessarily the best scientific explanation. IMO Developmental Systems Theory gives a more plausible description of the relationship between genes, environment and ontogeny.
I'm still puzzled about who these genetic determinists are and what they are saying. Can you name a serious biologist who in your view is a genetic determinist (apart from Watson)?
Sure. Basically, I see the core issue as being that of the alleged genetic program. If you think that there is such a beast, then you're probably a genetic determinist in my book. Some prominent examples: Dawkins, Dennett, Monod, Maynard Smith.
The core issue for what? Development or evolution?
Dawkins is an interesting example. As the quote says, he doesn't identify genetic programs with DNA; his idea of 'selfish genes' corresponds much more to the rather abstract genes of Population Biology than to specific units of DNA. But a genetic program instantiated by abstract Population Biology genes is still a genetic program.
You're focusing on the details and ignoring the more elementary point - gene selectionism does not entail genetic determinism regardless of what genes are defined as. Indeed Williams/Dawkins theories require the rejection of preformationism because they require the rejection of neo-Lamarkism. It seems that on this issue everyone agrees including Laland, Turner and Jablonka who are mounting a developmental/epigenetic critique to gene selectionism. The arguments seem quite subtle to me and the differences seem small.
I've just read through this critique of John Maynard Smith by Paul Griffiths. It's interesting stuff and I don't know enough to be able assess it's validity. But I don't see it as earth shaking. I don't think Griffiths is saying that there is a problem with the idea of genetic programming and genetic information as such, just that it is equally valid to use the same language with regards to non-genetic developmental factors.
There is no hint that Griffiths regards Maynard Smith as a genetic determinist but admonishes him for using language that encourages genetic determinism. Note in particular that in Griffiths' view the only problem with the quote from the Economist at the start is the claim that behaviour is genetic thus implying that there is nothing wrong with the claim that genetic information is like a computer program.
There is no hint that Griffiths regards Maynard Smith as a genetic determinist but admonishes him for using language that encourages genetic determinism. Note in particular that in Griffiths' view the only problem with the quote from the Economist at the start is the claim that behaviour is genetic thus implying that there is nothing wrong with the claim that genetic information is like a computer program.
Hmmm...
Well, now you're talking about the role of genes in evolution, rather than the role of genes in ontogeny, which is what I thought we were talking about (it was, at least, what I was talking about). Its not the same issue, although I'd grant you the controversies are related.
Laland and (especially) Turner are more sympathetic to Dawkins' position than you seem to think. Turner's The Extended Organism is heavily influenced by The Extended Phenotype, as Turner himself acknowledges. The magesterial Niche Construction by Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman uses an algorithmic concept of genetic evolution which they call the 'Darwinian algorithm' (see especially pp. 180-192)- this is quite similar to the Dawkins/ Dennett position.
Jablonka and Lamb are quite a different matter. Their Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution is actually subtitled 'The Lamarckian Dimension', which gives you some idea of where they're coming from.
But Dawkins' use of genes is explicitly for evolutionary purposes. It seems odd that you mention Dawkins at all in this context.
As I said, the controversies are related. Dawkins position, especially The Extended Phenotype, has major implications for ontogeny. Mainly I cited him because he's well known.
Genes are seen as developmental resources, alongside epigenetic biological factors, and elements of the environment. They don't have the priveleged role of being blueprints/ programs/ recipes/ name your metaphor.
Ibn Khaldoun
the present is dead, long live the future . . .
Why is being a program/recipe a privelege? (I recognise that being a blueprint is a privelege - a blueprint contains all the information you need to know ie. it is preformationist.)
Because, as I've already said (post #60), the idea of the genetic program/ recipe/ whatever imputes a kind of causal agency to the genome, but not to other factors in development. Dennett, in the later chapters of The Intentional Stance, actually attributes a kind of intentionality to genes. (Admittedly an extreme position, even for Dennett).
In one of your earlier posts, you draw attention to Griffths' position- that its okay to talk about genetic information as long as you're willing to see other factors in the developmental process as having an informatic aspect. Personally, I'd agree with this- I think that it makes sense to see Biological Information as ubiquitous.
In one of your earlier posts, you draw attention to Griffths' position- that its okay to talk about genetic information as long as you're willing to see other factors in the developmental process as having an informatic aspect. Personally, I'd agree with this- I think that it makes sense to see Biological Information as ubiquitous.
This is exactly what I don't understand. Why does it impute a causal agency? I find this assertion baffling. It's perfectly coherent to say that genes are a recipe that minimally determine the development of the organism and that epigentic and environmental processes are far more significant.
The blueprint metaphor is radically different to the recipe and program metaphors.
Caecilian said:
I thought that was particularly excellent. I see Griffiths taking a similar position - except that he also includes non-genetic heritable systems as repositories for teleosemantic information. An even more radical position!
Caecilian said:
Strictly speaking that makes you a genetic determinist by your own definition.
The below is a product of typing when I'm half asleep:
I withdraw both of the above.
I thought that was particularly excellent. I see Griffiths taking a similar position - except that he also includes non-genetic heritable systems as repositories for teleosemantic information. An even more radical position!
Strictly speaking that makes you a genetic determinist by your own definition.
I withdraw both of the above.
It seems to me that the difference between a blueprint and a recipe or program is one of degree. That is: to what extent, or in what detail, does the program specify the organism?
By contrast, the difference between causal factors that are programmatic, and those that aren't, is one of principle.
I suppose that you could say that there is a genetic program, but that non-genetic factors are more important than genetic- as you point out the position isn't incoherent. But in practice I don't know of anyone who actually does say that. And in any case, you're still ascribing informational content to the genome alone, and therefore picking it out as 'special' as compared to other factors.
As I've said repeatedly, IMO the best solution is to dispense with the whole program metaphor altogether. I don't really see that it serves a useful purpose.
Fair enough
I'm half asleep myself. Had to edit last post twice due to fucking up format. Time for bed, I think.
eoin_k
Lawyer's fees, beetroot and music
First off, can I say thanks for a thread. I have found it stimulating, if willfully obscure at times. I haven't studied biology since school and it is interesting to encounter debates that weren't included in the syllabus.
I have the, perhps incorrect, impression that your radical critique of mainstream evolutionary biology seems to be mainly based on (continental) philosophical/socio-political concerns rather than scientific ones.
Could a Pluralist Darwinist like Stephen Jay Gould, rather than the fundamentalists you refer to, not readily accomodate the phenomena you describe within a broadly Darwinian framework?
Do exceptions like the ones described in relation to immunology really form the basis of a paradigm shift in biology?
I'm not sure if the following quote of Gould supports this point or not. It is from a New York review of Books article on Dawkins et al.:
I have the, perhps incorrect, impression that your radical critique of mainstream evolutionary biology seems to be mainly based on (continental) philosophical/socio-political concerns rather than scientific ones.
Could a Pluralist Darwinist like Stephen Jay Gould, rather than the fundamentalists you refer to, not readily accomodate the phenomena you describe within a broadly Darwinian framework?
Do exceptions like the ones described in relation to immunology really form the basis of a paradigm shift in biology?
I'm not sure if the following quote of Gould supports this point or not. It is from a New York review of Books article on Dawkins et al.:
Glad that you've enjoyed reading the trhread.
I've enjoyed taking part in it.The critique of mainstream biology that I've been proposing is, in fact, based on science. My own philosophical background and interests are almost exclusively analytical/ Anglo-American rather than Continental (I do have a fondness for Foucault, but thats another story...). The writers that I've cited are all Biologists and/or Philosophers of Science in the analytical tradition.
OTOH, as I said in one of my previous posts, there are good political reasons for viewing this particular scientific controversy as being important. So while my critique is based on scientific and analytical-philosiphical criteria, the reasons for my bothering to argue about the issue in the first place have more to do with politics.
I don't find Gould's argument about contingency very convincing. Were I to argue against the standard (gene-centric) view of Evolution, I doubt if I would mention it. However, thats a whole big discussion in itself, which for the time being at least I'd rather not get into.
If you reverse it you see the difference is very sharp. To what extent does the organism specify the program needed to build it?
If the program is a recipe, then you cannot recover the program from the design of the organism. In the same way you cannot recover the recipe for a cake from the cake.
However if the program is a blueprint then you can recover the program from the design of the organism because that's what a blueprint simply is - the details of the design.
Caecilian said:
But you can describe any causal factor in informatic terms. Surely the central motive for introducing information is not that informatic descriptions are inherently superior but rather there is a need for an account of how the organism develops into a functioning, living creature. Surely if you look at ontogeny purely as processes and systems then it looks miraculous that anything sensible comes out of it. Isn't there a question of where good design comes from? Hence the talk about information as in meaningful information.
My feeling is that this subject is still in its infancy and that, as Griffiths says, theorists are only interested in proximate causes rather than ultimate causes and so informatic talk is put on the backburner. But I don't see why informatic descriptions should be in competition with process descriptions - surely the two types of description serve different but complementary purposes?
What you say about blueprints/ recipes is certainly very interesting, but I don't see that it impinges on my argument.
As for describing any causal factor in informatic terms, lets do it. As I said in my post #111, I'm all in favour of a concept of Biological Information. What I object to is it being restricted to genes, which are then said to constitute some kind of program.
Informational concepts are indeed very useful, and perhaps even essential, when it comes to an accurate description of ontogeny. And not just ontogeny- other biological processes too. For example, I've recently been looking at the account of physiological adaptation given by the theory of Autopoiesis (this is very obscure stuff). My conclusion is that the account is basically incoherent because it tries to do without any informatic concepts at all.
