This is about face: why didn't the army defend the protestors killed by Brotherhood police
over the past year? Why did the army intervene to stop Islamists attacking and ransacking Shiite homes (killing four eventually) in Abu Mussalam?
What does state elements mean? What's the suggestion here? That the Brotherhood President was forced out of office by people who don't like beards - that these people have some kind of conspiracy power to control Egyptian society to make the first bearded president look bad?
We are not privy to the precise twists and turns in the relationship between the MB and the army. So it is hard to iron out all contradictions and offer simple explanations.
But we could probably hazard a guess that Morsi did not deliver results to the satisfaction of either those on the street or the military. There are some theories about specific things Morsi might have done quite recently that upset the military, but I am ill equipped to judge the validity of these theories.
No it's not always able to protect locations, there's been an unprecented wave of popular gatherings and events over the period since 25 Jan 2011 which sometimes develop too quickly leaving police or riot police unable to cope.
The police were often useless but on occasions it was a deliberate decision to withdraw. And the military never had trouble protecting key state institutions, e.g. back when there was anger against state TV the state TV building was protected easily. When the military wanted to clear Tahrir square, they did so, etc.
What does this mean? Morsi taking a real measure instead of repeating he was legitimate/political legitimacy 74 (seventy four) times in his speech last night could have achieved something, but he didn't.
Other than resigning there was no measure he could have taken at that stage that the opposition would have welcomed. Earlier on there is much he could have done to avoid his demise, but his error with the constitution towards the end of last year was probably a point of no return as far as much of the opposition were concerned.
El Baradei himself is a spineless liberal against the military, as Morsi was until about 3 days ago and the ultimatum. Two hypocrite sides unable to unite against the military pole.
The MB were weak-willed against the state and the military at all stages of the uprising against Mubarak, and many of the young MB members who joined protests initially did so against the will of the organisation. Some here were so suspicious of the MB at that stage that they expected the MB to be used by the state at any moment to crush the true revolution. But it didn't exactly pan out like that at the time.
As for El-Baradei, or el-blah-blah as we disparagingly referred to him for a time when his weak attempts to be a figurehead for the revolution came to little, his rhetoric against the military after Mubarak was deposed, and refusal to be co-opted into the process was probably stronger than we might have expected. But now it is quite possible that he will revert to type and end up fulfilling the sort of 'moderate, liberal, acceptable to the global community' role that we might have expected from him during the first transition before it became clear that it wasn't going to be that simple a stage-managed show. This time it might be.