Awesome. Though if the war in Ukraine has proven one thing for certain, CAS as a human-flown, fixed-wing aircraft is dead.
It's a derail, but...
Although I
kind if think that this is correct (I'm not actually a fan of the A-10, I take the view that in an age where pretty much every munition is guided it's benefits are tiny margins, and it's drawbacks are enormous...) I think we should be wary of taking a truth from the Ukraine war and transposing it onto every other.
In this case, both Ukraine and Russia are fielding battlefield interdiction aircraft (and others) that have limited sensors, and absolutely shit defensive systems like jamming gear, radar warning receivers, laser detectors, and chaff from the 1940's. In those circumstances, even the world's worst SAM's and radar guided guns are going to have a field day.
Those circumstances simply don't fit with western aircraft and systems, not least because our doctrine (and capability) would start with heavy SEAD, and using munitions like Brimstone to go for the gun tracks from well outside their range.
That's not to say that NATO CAS could swoop about like it did over the Helmand Valley, but that we should be wary of implementing lessons that apply to a much lesser extent to us.
Stockpiles matter, logistics matter, resilience matters, regeneration matters, the Deep Battle matters - these are lessons that the west has happily ignored since 1914 at every opportunity it got, and they've trumpeted themselves yet again in Ukraine - but for the air power lesson for me is that while NATO
could fight a CAS war, it would be much better off using every scrap of it's airpower in the Deep Battle, and leaving close support to the artillery.
Always fight your wars in other people's countries - because wars in your own create so much devastation that even if you win, you might as well have lost, and always ensure that if he does turn up in yours, half his kit is already in flames and he's got no diesel left.