Cecil, famous Lion from Zimbabwe shot dead by Dentist from Minnesota for $55k

[Jeff Robinson]

But by explicitly choosing to save a herbivore rather than a carnivore, you seem to be making the assumption that a death through being eaten by a predator involves more suffering than other possible types of death, as well as ignoring that if you allow the lion to die rather than the cow, all the prey it would otherwise have eaten will go uneaten, with all the potential adverse effects on the ecosystem that might follow.

You could at least acknowledge that assumption and attempt to justify it.

My claim was not that "being eaten by a predator involves more suffering than other possible types of death". The harm of death isn't reducible to the suffering it causes, but also to the experiences it deprives its victims of. I take it that given the choice of dying peacefully in your sleep tonight or dying after a period of protracted illness in old age, you'd choose the latter. Even if prey animals die less painlessly from being killed by predators than they would from dying of disease later in life, that death can still be seen as a misfortune for them if it deprives them of years of their lives.

In regard to your second point, I concede that it provides a weighty counter-consideration to my argument for saving a herbivorous animal over a carnivorous animal in the wild. If it were the case that saving the carnivorous animal would result in less overall suffering and death then clearly one ought to do that.

But if we are talking about animals under human control, as in the examples I gave in my response to 8ball's post, then I think the considerations are different. Apparently lions in capacity are fed commercially reared meat like 'beef, sheep, chicken and horse' and 'carnivore-minded commercial foods'. Many of the animals they consume then are being bred for consumption, and most will live terrible lives prior to being prematurely slaughtered. As such, keeping a lion under human control is not contributing to eco-system health but is resulting in the suffering and death of other sentient creatures that would not otherwise have occurred. By contrast, one can keep a cow alive in a sanctuary without these adverse effects so if I had to choose between saving a life in those circumstances, I'd save the cow.

 

[PaoloSanchez]

Fucking hell

I had no idea a discussion was an “obligation”. You brought up the subject of whether one life was more valuable than another, I was simply trying to engage you on that subject to find out what motivated your beliefs. If that is a “waste of time” then yes, discussion is a waste of time.

A repeated pointed question isn't really a "discussion", so yes that is a waste of time especially after you started with the name calling. I'll repeat the answer I already gave in slightly different words that will hopefully register this time. I do not have an animal value ranking system or league table. Those that believe that Cecil's killing is more worthy of outrage and attention than a mere "farmyard cow" clearly do have some sort of ranking system, which begs the question what is it that makes Cecil worth more than Bessie. Teaboy at least had a decent go at addressing that point (an example of a discussion) whereas you kept on banging on about ants vs cows (waste of time).

 

[Magnus McGinty]

Apparently lions in capacity are fed commercially reared meat like 'beef, sheep, chicken and horse' and 'carnivore-minded commercial foods'. Many of the animals they consume then are being bred for consumption, and most will live terrible lives prior to being prematurely slaughtered. As such, keeping a lion under human control is not contributing to eco-system health but is resulting in the suffering and death of other sentient creatures that would not otherwise have occurred.

Much like lions bred for trophy hunters.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

Much like lions bred for trophy hunters.

Indeed. Trophy hunters are scum.

 

[8ball]

Those that believe that Cecil's killing is more worthy of outrage and attention than a mere "farmyard cow" clearly do have some sort of ranking system, which begs the question what is it that makes Cecil worth more than Bessie. Teaboy at least had a decent go at addressing that point (an example of a discussion) whereas you kept on banging on about ants vs cows (waste of time).

If you believe a lion is 'worth' the same as a cow (your own words were "as far as I'm concerned, a lion is not worth any more or any less than a cow"), then it is reasonable to ask whether this applies to all species or just, say, large sentient mammals.

It is you who has been wasting time.

 

[andysays]

My claim was not that "being eaten by a predator involves more suffering than other possible types of death". The harm of death isn't reducible to the suffering it causes, but also to the experiences it deprives its victims of. I take it that given the choice of dying peacefully in your sleep tonight or dying after a period of protracted illness in old age, you'd choose the latter. Even if prey animals die less painlessly from being killed by predators than they would from dying of disease later in life, that death can still be seen as a misfortune for them if it deprives them of years of their lives.

In regard to your second point, I concede that it provides a weighty counter-consideration to my argument for saving a herbivorous animal over a carnivorous animal in the wild. If it were the case that saving the carnivorous animal would result in less overall suffering and death then clearly one ought to do that.

But if we are talking about animals under human control, as in the examples I gave in my response to 8ball's post, then I think the considerations are different. Apparently lions in capacity are fed commercially reared meat like 'beef, sheep, chicken and horse' and 'carnivore-minded commercial foods'. Many of the animals they consume then are being bred for consumption, and most will live terrible lives prior to being prematurely slaughtered. As such, keeping a lion under human control is not contributing to eco-system health but is resulting in the suffering and death of other sentient creatures that would not otherwise have occurred. By contrast, one can keep a cow alive in a sanctuary without these adverse effects so if I had to choose between saving a life in those circumstances, I'd save the cow.

Thanks for your considered and detailed response. I will try to return to this later when I'm not at work and not posting on my phone.

 

[andysays]

...I take it that given the choice of dying peacefully in your sleep tonight or dying after a period of protracted illness in old age, you'd choose the latter. Even if prey animals die less painlessly from being killed by predators than they would from dying of disease later in life, that death can still be seen as a misfortune for them if it deprives them of years of their lives...

OK, I think I've found where the fundamental disagreement lies between us.

I don't think it's true that, given the choice of dying peacefully in their sleep tonight or dying after a period of protracted illness in old age, everyone would choose the latter.

But even if this were the case for humans, I also don't think it's possible to extrapolate this to the case of predator/prey relationships and argue that the assumed misfortune of even all the prey animals eaten by a lion over the course of its life necessarily outweighs the misfortune to the lion of being somehow prevented from following its natural instincts as a predator and carnivore.

I appreciate you giving some sort of explanation as to why eating meat might be wrong though, and at this point I suspect we'll just have to agree to disagree.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

But if we are talking about animals under human control, as in the examples I gave in my response to 8ball's post, then I think the considerations are different. Apparently lions in capacity are fed commercially reared meat like 'beef, sheep, chicken and horse' and 'carnivore-minded commercial foods'. Many of the animals they consume then are being bred for consumption, and most will live terrible lives prior to being prematurely slaughtered. As such, keeping a lion under human control is not contributing to eco-system health but is resulting in the suffering and death of other sentient creatures that would not otherwise have occurred. By contrast, one can keep a cow alive in a sanctuary without these adverse effects so if I had to choose between saving a life in those circumstances, I'd save the cow.

I won't argue with the suffering bit, but I will with the death bit. If an animal reared for meat has not suffered during its life, its death isn't obviously an adverse effect. It was brought into the world in the first place in order to be killed for meat.

I put this question on another thread, but it belongs better here:

You have a field that can sustain ten cows. Is it better to keep ten cows in that field for 14 years each or 70 cows for two years each? It's 140 cow-years in each case, but in the latter case, you've also got 60 more carcasses to feed to, say, a lion.

 

[kabbes]

This thread shows the knots you can get into when you think it is necessary to justify the emotional with the logical.

There is nothing wrong with simply saying you value a lion more than a cow just because you like lions more than cows. There is no neutral space from which we can judge your preference. Neither lions nor cows intrinsically have value and yet also neither is intrinsically worthless. As creatures, they simply are. They don't even have a cognitive awareness with which that they might value themselves, and nor does their loss necessarily create emotional trauma for others. They both just have the value we invest them with, and that value derives from whatever basis the valuer sees fit, whether that be enumarable or ineffible, systemizable or ill-defined. It is the personal value that we create as creatures that are capable of understanding value which in turn creates the trauma of their loss.

To challenge others to come up with a basis for valuation that you can then challenge is how you end up in the ridiculous situation of refusing to say if you choose to discriminate between a cow and an ant. And whilst the attempts to create reasons for preferring cows or lions has been admirable in its own way to watch, I am left wondering what on earth it is supposed to prove.

I prefer lions not to be shot, but I don't care if cows are eaten. There, it is done. Who can challenge this as a preference?

 

[Jeff Robinson]

This thread shows the knots you can get into when you think it is necessary to justify the emotional with the logical.

There is nothing wrong with simply saying you value a lion more than a cow just because you like lions more than cows. There is no neutral space from which we can judge your preference. Neither lions nor cows intrinsically have value and yet also neither is intrinsically worthless. As creatures, they simply are. They don't even have a cognitive awareness with which that they might value themselves, and nor does their loss necessarily create emotional trauma for others. They both just have the value we invest them with, and that value derives from whatever basis the valuer sees fit, whether that be enumarable or ineffible, systemizable or ill-defined. It is the personal value that we create as creatures that are capable of understanding value which in turn creates the trauma of their loss.

To challenge others to come up with a basis for valuation that you can then challenge is how you end up in the ridiculous situation of refusing to say if you choose to discriminate between a cow and an ant. And whilst the attempts to create reasons for preferring cows or lions has been admirable in its own way to watch, I am left wondering what on earth it is supposed to prove.

I prefer lions not to be shot, but I don't care if cows are eaten. There, it is done. Who can challenge this as a preference?

I don't think talk about "preferences" really captures the nature of how people feel about this issue. People might prefer apples over oranges or sunny over rainy weather but people aren't saying merely that their preferences have been thwarted by Walter Palmer shooting Cecil in the way that a rainy day would, they are also saying that what he did was wrong (if in any doubt, look at the first couple of pages of this thread). To think that Palmer did something wrong is to have a belief and beliefs require justification (or else they are arbitrary). If people believe that it's wrongful for trophy hunters to kill lions but it's not wrongful to kill cows for food then they should be able to present reasons as to why this is the case. I am not suggesting people cannot give reasons but they are required if they want to hold non-arbitrary beliefs.

If the reason is the one that you give - that they "like lions more than cows" then that's a bad reason. I like my dad more than my next door neighbour but I don't think my dad has more value than my neighbour, and I certainly don't think its fine for my neighbour to be killed merely because I like him less! And the reason for this is because I recognise that my dad and my neighbour have various shared capacities and interests that grounds their equal moral worth, independently of my personal preferences.

If I hear a racist or a sexist making arguments that women or ethnic minorities matter less than white people or men, my response is not that "There is no neutral space from which we can judge your preference", I'm going to challenge and oppose their beliefs and point out that they are groundless and damaging. Speciesist beliefs are equally arbitrary. When people think it's wrong that Koreans or Chinese people eat dogs, but see nothing wrong with eating pigs they are exhibiting arbitrary discriminatory attitudes as are people who simply assert, with no argument, that lions matter more - or have more value than - than cows. If you think that simply stating that you like lions more than cows is enough to justify your position then you've effectively disarmed yourself of any response to racists or sexists who justify their supremacist beliefs on the grounds that they prefer "their own kind". I seriously doubt you would accept these arguments in the human context but you are creating a double standard by making a structurally identical argument in the non-human context.

Perhaps you think the human and the non-human contexts are disanalogous, rendering my previous paragraph moot. You say that lions and cows "don't even have a cognitive awareness with which that they might value themselves". By contrast, you might argue, because humans do have the capacity to value themselves, this grounds their value independently of the attitudes of others. But it seems to me that trying to ground human value on the capacity for self-value is problematic. Where does this leave infants or the profoundly cognitively impaired? What about victims of abuse and neglect who develop a sense of self-hatred and do not value their own lives? Do all these humans have mere relative value, the value that others choose to bestow on them? Is it entirely arbitrary whether or not other's choose to value such humans?

What this points to, it seems to me, is the need to ground our perspectives about the moral value - of both humans and non-humans - on objective, rationally-defensible criteria. The strong subjectivism and relativism you seem to be suggesting opens pandora's box to all sorts of nastiness and, in effect, the impossibility of any moral discourse at all.

 

[8ball]

What this points to, it seems to me, is the need to ground our perspectives about the moral value - of both humans and non-humans - on objective, rationally-defensible criteria. The strong subjectivism and relativism you seem to be suggesting opens pandora's box to all sorts of nastiness and, in effect, the impossibility of any moral discourse at all.

The idea that an ant's life has the same moral value as a cow (or a human), would do the same.
Not that it was you that said it, I expect your ideas are more considered.

 

[kabbes]

I don't think talk about "preferences" really captures the nature of how people feel about this issue. People might prefer apples over oranges or sunny over rainy weather but people aren't saying merely that their preferences have been thwarted by Walter Palmer shooting Cecil in the way that a rainy day would, they are also saying that what he did was wrong (if in any doubt, look at the first couple of pages of this thread). To think that Palmer did something wrong is to have a belief and beliefs require justification (or else they are arbitrary). If people believe that it's wrongful for trophy hunters to kill lions but it's not wrongful to kill cows for food then they should be able to present reasons as to why this is the case. I am not suggesting people cannot give reasons but they are required if they want to hold non-arbitrary beliefs.

If the reason is the one that you give - that they "like lions more than cows" then that's a bad reason. I like my dad more than my next door neighbour but I don't think my dad has more value than my neighbour, and I certainly don't think its fine for my neighbour to be killed merely because I like him less! And the reason for this is because I recognise that my dad and my neighbour have various shared capacities and interests that grounds their equal moral worth, independently of my personal preferences.

If I hear a racist or a sexist making arguments that women or ethnic minorities matter less than white people or men, my response is not that "There is no neutral space from which we can judge your preference", I'm going to challenge and oppose their beliefs and point out that they are groundless and damaging. Speciesist beliefs are equally arbitrary. When people think it's wrong that Koreans or Chinese people eat dogs, but see nothing wrong with eating pigs they are exhibiting arbitrary discriminatory attitudes as are people who simply assert, with no argument, that lions matter more - or have more value than - than cows. If you think that simply stating that you like lions more than cows is enough to justify your position then you've effectively disarmed yourself of any response to racists or sexists who justify their supremacist beliefs on the grounds that they prefer "their own kind". I seriously doubt you would accept these arguments in the human context but you are creating a double standard by making a structurally identical argument in the non-human context.

Perhaps you think the human and the non-human contexts are disanalogous, rendering my previous paragraph moot. You say that lions and cows "don't even have a cognitive awareness with which that they might value themselves". By contrast, you might argue, because humans do have the capacity to value themselves, this grounds their value independently of the attitudes of others. But it seems to me that trying to ground human value on the capacity for self-value is problematic. Where does this leave infants or the profoundly cognitively impaired? What about victims of abuse and neglect who develop a sense of self-hatred and do not value their own lives? Do all these humans have mere relative value, the value that others choose to bestow on them? Is it entirely arbitrary whether or not other's choose to value such humans?

What this points to, it seems to me, is the need to ground our perspectives about the moral value - of both humans and non-humans - on objective, rationally-defensible criteria. The strong subjectivism and relativism you seem to be suggesting opens pandora's box to all sorts of nastiness and, in effect, the impossibility of any moral discourse at all.

For the record, I think the human and non-human contexts are MASSIVELY disanalogous. And as we move into territory as to why different manifestations of human life should or should not be sacred, I think we move quite heavily away from the context of this thread. We can have that discussion, but not here. I may even contribute to it, although I might well not.

In terms of your other points: I would certainly agree heartily that there is no reason why we shouldn't examine logically the consequences of our moral systems and interrogate them to make sure we like their conclusions. But that's a long way from saying that the starting axioms have to in some way be provable. It's OK to simply care more for lions than cows, for example -- that does not require any further justification in and of itself and explains why somebody might be more moved by the death of a lion than a cow with no further explanation required. After all, the degree to which you are moved by an event is not in itself the kind of active behaviour you are whatabouting with here (such as what you choose to kill), and it is the degree to which people are moved by the event that is being challenged by those who prefer to consider all animal life equally sacred.

 

[andysays]

I've been thinking more about what Jeff Robinson said yesterday, and I'm still struggling to imagine a gazelle, for example, on its death bed saying
'Now that I'm old and looking back on my life, even though I'm in terrible pain and afraid of what will happen after I die, I'm really glad I got to live this long and experience all the stuff I did. And most of all, I'm glad that fucking lion didn't manage to catch and eat me when I was a young gazelle, because then I would have missed out on all those amazing experiences I've had since'.

 

[PaoloSanchez]

I don't think talk about "preferences" really captures the nature of how people feel about this issue. People might prefer apples over oranges or sunny over rainy weather but people aren't saying merely that their preferences have been thwarted by Walter Palmer shooting Cecil in the way that a rainy day would, they are also saying that what he did was wrong (if in any doubt, look at the first couple of pages of this thread). To think that Palmer did something wrong is to have a belief and beliefs require justification (or else they are arbitrary). If people believe that it's wrongful for trophy hunters to kill lions but it's not wrongful to kill cows for food then they should be able to present reasons as to why this is the case. I am not suggesting people cannot give reasons but they are required if they want to hold non-arbitrary beliefs.

If the reason is the one that you give - that they "like lions more than cows" then that's a bad reason. I like my dad more than my next door neighbour but I don't think my dad has more value than my neighbour, and I certainly don't think its fine for my neighbour to be killed merely because I like him less! And the reason for this is because I recognise that my dad and my neighbour have various shared capacities and interests that grounds their equal moral worth, independently of my personal preferences.

If I hear a racist or a sexist making arguments that women or ethnic minorities matter less than white people or men, my response is not that "There is no neutral space from which we can judge your preference", I'm going to challenge and oppose their beliefs and point out that they are groundless and damaging. Speciesist beliefs are equally arbitrary. When people think it's wrong that Koreans or Chinese people eat dogs, but see nothing wrong with eating pigs they are exhibiting arbitrary discriminatory attitudes as are people who simply assert, with no argument, that lions matter more - or have more value than - than cows. If you think that simply stating that you like lions more than cows is enough to justify your position then you've effectively disarmed yourself of any response to racists or sexists who justify their supremacist beliefs on the grounds that they prefer "their own kind". I seriously doubt you would accept these arguments in the human context but you are creating a double standard by making a structurally identical argument in the non-human context.

Perhaps you think the human and the non-human contexts are disanalogous, rendering my previous paragraph moot. You say that lions and cows "don't even have a cognitive awareness with which that they might value themselves". By contrast, you might argue, because humans do have the capacity to value themselves, this grounds their value independently of the attitudes of others. But it seems to me that trying to ground human value on the capacity for self-value is problematic. Where does this leave infants or the profoundly cognitively impaired? What about victims of abuse and neglect who develop a sense of self-hatred and do not value their own lives? Do all these humans have mere relative value, the value that others choose to bestow on them? Is it entirely arbitrary whether or not other's choose to value such humans?

What this points to, it seems to me, is the need to ground our perspectives about the moral value - of both humans and non-humans - on objective, rationally-defensible criteria. The strong subjectivism and relativism you seem to be suggesting opens pandora's box to all sorts of nastiness and, in effect, the impossibility of any moral discourse at all.

Very nicely put. I had already started to reply but you beat me to it and covered several of the points I was going to make. I'll return later when I have time with my take on this.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

If an animal reared for meat has not suffered during its life, its death isn't obviously an adverse effect.

Leaving aside the fact that that virtually never happens in practice, I think you've got this back to front. The better an animal's life is the more adverse the death is for that animal, because the death deprives them of something good (i.e. the good life that they have).

It was brought into the world in the first place in order to be killed for meat.

It seems to me that the fact that the animal's life is dependent on their premature killing provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for their killing for you. It's not a necessary condition for you because you have told me in the past that you are not opposed to hunting wild animals to eat them or catching wild fish. These are not animals who we have bestowed with life, but you are not opposed to their killing, so I wonder whether this has any independent bearing on your position on the permissibility of killing animals, rather than your belief that we do not harm animals when we kill them, provided that the killing is painless.

Is bringing animals into existence for the specific purpose of prematurely killing them a sufficient reason for prematurely killing them for you? I don't think it is, because you have said previously that you think it's wrong to kill animals in some contexts. If lions were bred to be trophy hunted, I take it you'd think that is wrong and the fact that the lion would not exist were it not to be trophy hunted wouldn't cut it as a justification for you? Or breeding foxes to be turned into fur coats? I guess at this point you'd say meat consumption is a reason for premature death that you would support, but you wouldn't support others. I'm yet to hear a reason I find compelling as to why meat consumption grounds the premature killing of animals but other reasons do not. They all strike me as equally frivolous.

You have a field that can sustain ten cows. Is it better to keep ten cows in that field for 14 years each or 70 cows for two years each? It's 140 cow-years in each case, but in the latter case, you've also got 60 more carcasses to feed to, say, a lion.

It would be better for 10 cows to live for 14 years because those 10 cows would not be harmed by death (assuming it is at the end of their life span or before the quality of their life becomes negative) but the 70 cows would be. Thus in the 10 cow scenario nobody is harmed but in the 70 cow scenario all 70 are (see above). You might think the latter scenario is better because there is more total welfare but this involves subscribing to a view called 'total utilitarianism' which leads to some rather strange outcomes (see e.g. 'the repugnant conclusion').

 

[Jeff Robinson]

For the record, I think the human and non-human contexts are MASSIVELY disanalogous. And as we move into territory as to why different manifestations of human life should or should not be sacred, I think we move quite heavily away from the context of this thread. We can have that discussion, but not here. I may even contribute to it, although I might well not.

In terms of your other points: I would certainly agree heartily that there is no reason why we shouldn't examine logically the consequences of our moral systems and interrogate them to make sure we like their conclusions. But that's a long way from saying that the starting axioms have to in some way be provable. It's OK to simply care more for lions than cows, for example -- that does not require any further justification in and of itself and explains why somebody might be more moved by the death of a lion than a cow with no further explanation required. After all, the degree to which you are moved by an event is not in itself the kind of active behaviour you are whatabouting with here (such as what you choose to kill), and it is the degree to which people are moved by the event that is being challenged by those who prefer to consider all animal life equally sacred.

You haven't really addressed anything I said and have just restated your relativist and subjectivist position.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

I've been thinking more about what Jeff Robinson said yesterday, and I'm still struggling to imagine a gazelle, for example, on its death bed saying
'Now that I'm old and looking back on my life, even though I'm in terrible pain and afraid of what will happen after I die, I'm really glad I got to live this long and experience all the stuff I did. And most of all, I'm glad that fucking lion didn't manage to catch and eat me when I was a young gazelle, because then I would have missed out on all those amazing experiences I've had since'.

You misunderstood my point, I wasn't making any empirical claim about the harm of death for prey animals, I was making a conceptual point about how the *depriving* aspect of death is an independent harm from *suffering* aspect. Even if a gazelle cannot self-consciously reflect on their life, if they have positive experiences in their lives then those positive experiences are good for them (I cannot remember experiences I had as infant but I am sure I the good experiences were good for me). To the extent that death deprives them of those good experiences then death harms them (remember this is a conceptual not an empirical claim).

 

[kabbes]

You haven't really addressed anything I said and have just restated your relativist and subjectivist position.

I have addressed the elements of what you said that seem to me to have relevance to the subject in hand.

Which means yes, pretty much, on the latter point. You’re trying to make people feel bad for feeling sorry for Cecil despite being meat eaters. That’s nothing if not a relative, subjective preference.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

It would be better for 10 cows to live for 14 years because those 10 cows would not be harmed by death (assuming it is at the end of their life span or before the quality of their life becomes negative) but the 70 cows would be. Thus in the 10 cow scenario nobody is harmed but in the 70 cow scenario all 70 are (see above). You might think the latter scenario is better because there is more total welfare but this involves subscribing to a view called 'total utilitarianism' which leads to some rather strange outcomes (see e.g. 'the repugnant conclusion').

I find problems with all versions of utilitarianism tbh. I find that none of them, including your version, captures the way we make decisions or evaluate moral dilemmas.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

It seems to me that the fact that the animal's life is dependent on their premature killing provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for their killing for you. It's not a necessary condition for you because you have told me in the past that you are not opposed to hunting wild animals to eat them or catching wild fish. These are not animals who we have bestowed with life, but you are not opposed to their killing, so I wonder whether this has any independent bearing on your position on the permissibility of killing animals, rather than your belief that we do not harm animals when we kill them, provided that the killing is painless.
.

As for this bit, you're quite right that I am not opposed to the idea of hunting animals for meat, and so what I said here is not a necessary reason for their killing. That doesn't change the argument, though. It just means that there are other scenarios in addition to the one I described.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

I have addressed the elements of what you said that seem to me to have relevance to the subject in hand.

Which means yes, pretty much, on the latter point. You’re trying to make people feel bad for feeling sorry for Cecil despite being meat eaters. That’s nothing if not a relative, subjective preference.

It's pretty uncharitable for you to attribute a malign motive ("trying to make people feel bad") to me rather than address the substance of my critique of your moral relativism. Obviously you're free to ignore my points but its a shame that you had to include a sly dig in there.

 

[andysays]

You misunderstood my point, I wasn't making any empirical claim about the harm of death for prey animals, I was making a conceptual point about how the *depriving* aspect of death is an independent harm from *suffering* aspect. Even if a gazelle cannot self-consciously reflect on their life, if they have positive experiences in their lives then those positive experiences are good for them (I cannot remember experiences I had as infant but I am sure I the good experiences were good for me). To the extent that death deprives them of those good experiences then death harms them (remember this is a conceptual not an empirical claim).

I didn't think you were literally suggesting a herbivore looking back over its experiences from its deathbed and making an assessment as to which were positive etc.

But I was attempting to use irony to point out what I see as the inappropriateness of using human concepts which other animals aren't capable of using in a discussion on whether predator/prey interaction should or can be judged in terms of allowing or disallowing potentially positive future experiences.

I wouldn't expect a gazelle to understand this (which is kind of the point) but I had hoped that you might.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

I find problems with all versions of utilitarianism tbh. I find that none of them, including your version, captures the way we make decisions or evaluate moral dilemmas.

I wasn't advancing any version of utilitarianism. My answer would be the same if the number of cows living two years was doubled, quadrupled etc. If you are suggesting that between the two scenarios the one that maximises total welfare would be the best (I don't know if you are saying that) then you are adopting a total utilitarian position, whether or not you agree with the position more broadly.

As for this bit, you're quite right that I am not opposed to the idea of hunting animals for meat, and so what I said here is not a necessary reason for their killing. That doesn't change the argument, though. It just means that there are other scenarios in addition to the one I described.

That's true, but it was only half of my response to you. I also suggested that you don't believe bringing animals into existence is a sufficient reason to justify killing them either, giving the example of breeding lions to trophy hunt them. As far as I can see, your claim really just boils down to 'killing animals is justified if it's to eat them'. I repeat my question: why is 'meat' a justification but fur or trophy hunting, for example, aren't?

 

[Jeff Robinson]

I wouldn't expect a gazelle to understand this (which is kind of the point) but I had hoped that you might.

If you won't keep conversation civil then there's no point in continuing further.

 

[kabbes]

It's pretty uncharitable for you to attribute a malign motive ("trying to make people feel bad") to me rather than address the substance of my critique of your moral relativism. Obviously you're free to ignore my points but its a shame that you had to include a sly dig in there.

True. I didn’t really mean you personally, more that this is the direction the thread took. A thread that could quite easily instead have been about the socioeconomic pressures that allows big game hunting to thrive, just to pick one of many possibilities.

 

[weltweit]

The reason I posted the OP for this thread was because I was repulsed that the dentist and his guides had laid a trail to tempt a wild lion from its reserve onto other land where they thought they could legally kill it. And they didn't just kill it quickly and humanely, the dentist shot the lion with a crossbow and did not kill it, instead the injured lion had to be followed and eventually, hours later, put out of its misery.

That this lion was Cecil, an animal that was a favourite of tourists in the reserve, has a bearing also, the dentist knew nothing of this and seemingly didn't care. He just wanted the head of a lion for his wall.

I am interested in the slant this thread has taken and some of the arguments put for animal welfare and the like. I grew up in the country and worked often on farms including when slaughtering was taking place. I can remember helping when geese were being slaughtered, doing some of the manual plucking. At first I thought it was pretty awful but I quickly came to the realisation that they had only been farmed so that they could be turned into meat to be eaten.

And the geese were not shot with a crossbow, later to be finished off after hours of agony. They were walloped on the back of their heads, their throats cut and bled, and they were plucked very quickly without fuss with as much humane treatment as was possible.

If humans are going to eat meat, animals will be bred for that purpose and as long as their ends are as humane as possible, it remains an ethical option.

If a UK farmer had treated one of his beasts the way the dentist treated Cecil, they would be up in front of a court for cruelty and rightly.

 

[likesfish]

The scottish ghillie who had me deer cull would have strangled the dentist if you must hunt and we killed anything that could hunt deer centurys ago. You do it as quickly and cleanly as possible bows are not quick or clean that means a high powered rifle against big game.

 

[PaoloSanchez]

I don't think talk about "preferences" really captures the nature of how people feel about this issue. People might prefer apples over oranges or sunny over rainy weather but people aren't saying merely that their preferences have been thwarted by Walter Palmer shooting Cecil in the way that a rainy day would, they are also saying that what he did was wrong (if in any doubt, look at the first couple of pages of this thread). To think that Palmer did something wrong is to have a belief and beliefs require justification (or else they are arbitrary). If people believe that it's wrongful for trophy hunters to kill lions but it's not wrongful to kill cows for food then they should be able to present reasons as to why this is the case. I am not suggesting people cannot give reasons but they are required if they want to hold non-arbitrary beliefs.

I repeat my question: why is 'meat' a justification but fur or trophy hunting, for example, aren't?

Indeed. Describing them as mere "preferences" is rather dismissive of the plight of the victims of who end up prematurely dead. Not only that but Dr Palmer could also say that chasing down and shooting a lion is just a "preference" which he's prepared to pay a substantial amount of money to enjoy. Who can argue against that, eh? Not someone who is a contributor to the livestock (or even a "steakholder"), who's "preference" causes far more harm than a hunter does. Bad for the planet, bad for human health and bad for the animal...at least a triple-whammy. Not good at all. So when a hunter faces criticism from people who support the meat industry, they can quite rightly tell them to fuck right off with their hypocrisy.

 

[doodlelogic]

I've been thinking more about what Jeff Robinson said yesterday, and I'm still struggling to imagine a gazelle, for example, on its death bed saying
'Now that I'm old and looking back on my life, even though I'm in terrible pain and afraid of what will happen after I die, I'm really glad I got to live this long and experience all the stuff I did. And most of all, I'm glad that fucking lion didn't manage to catch and eat me when I was a young gazelle, because then I would have missed out on all those amazing experiences I've had since'.

on the other hand, I bet the gazelle that’s just got away from the lion feels great!

 

[existentialist]

Indeed. Describing them as mere "preferences" is rather dismissive of the plight of the victims of who end up prematurely dead. Not only that but Dr Palmer could also say that chasing down and shooting a lion is just a "preference" which he's prepared to pay a substantial amount of money to enjoy. Who can argue against that, eh? Not someone who is a contributor to the livestock (or even a "steakholder"), who's "preference" causes far more harm than a hunter does. Bad for the planet, bad for human health and bad for the animal...at least a triple-whammy. Not good at all. So when a hunter faces criticism from people who support the meat industry, they can quite rightly tell them to fuck right off with their hypocrisy.

I'm vegetarian, but your self-righteous fingerwagging makes me want to go and find some bacon to sniff.