FruitandNut
New Member
They worked straight from Google!
I'd agree with you that the Koran is austere and can hardly be described as progressive. I'm also told it can only really be understood in the Arabic which I don't have. But both parts of the Bible are essentially reactionary and excepting the the superb King James translation are a very dreary read.FruitandNut said:There is a passive Jihad and a violent Jihad, I have read Qu'ranic texts, translations by Muslims...
I suspect, though I don't know, that the historical relationship is the other way round.butchersapron said:However, the concept of jahiliyya does logically lead to that of takfir - that is excommunication, which them allows (or even demands) war on those expelled...
You're right there, this is a vast subject and I base my reading of Islam more on the history of Islamic states than any deep knowledge of Islamic theology.FruitandNut said:Islam 'progressives' also cherry pick, indeed it is very difficult, nay impossible for any of us in the absence of complete knowledge and non-bais to entirely avoid doing it ourselves.
I'm reminded of this:I think you're right. There is a major discrepancy in our foreign policy in that we support many governments in the Muslim world that are dictatorships or police states, whether it's in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, and certainly that makes America look hypocritical. America was formed, and has had a history of destroying those types of countries. And I think there is a question that needs to be – there should be a question for Americans – about whether or not we should be supporting governments that are police states and dictatorships. It's always been hard for me to understand how we say people who supports Osama Bin Laden or someone else like him – who are willing to give their lives to destroy the dictatorship in Saudi Arabia – how we can describe those people as people who hated freedom. It seems to me that their definition of freedom might be different than ours, but to oppose a dictatorship, one must want freedom in some kind of way.
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Well I think we're clearly losing "the war on terror," if you will. I think it's probably misnamed. I think we're better off calling it a war against an Islamic insurgency rather than terror, and I argued in the book – and I maintain now – that we're losing it because we're not listening to what the enemy is saying. We continue to believe that somehow the Muslim world hates freedoms and liberties and equality in society, and that's clearly not the case. We're in this war because of the reaction in much of the Muslim world to U.S. foreign policies, and until we realize that we will not be able to take the measure of our enemy and fight this war...
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and Commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.
- Karl von Clausewitz
There are some rather strange assumptions in this post.1. Democracy is not a panacea for dealing with terrorism.
2. Extremists often fare quite well in emerging democracies by virtue of being the best-organized.
3. There is no silver bullet in dealing with the threat of Salafist terrorism and an in-depth plan is instead needed - Dr. Gunaratna provides one.
4. The US has little if any real support among the general populace of the Muslim world for reasons that well pre-date the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Our public diplomacy efforts for dealing with the general public rather than the governments of the Muslim world have been grossly ineffective and mostly non-existent.
5. This is a problem because al-Qaeda currently enjoys far more popular support than any earlier terrorist groups.
6. Setting up merely a democracy in the sense of voting and majority rule is pointless as far as preventing terrorism or political violence if the institutions needed for such a society to function or flourish do not exist or are not being respected.
7. The European Muslim population is attracted towards jihadi groups through a combination of the Middle Eastern political culture being imported to Europe and/or European governments being unwilling to deal with known Islamic radicals in their midst.
8. Democratization is effective with regard to dealing with state sponsors of terrorism since the issue there is one of state policy rather than popular support.
The future Iraq, even if democracy does take hold, is very likely to support Hezbollah and sympathise with the PLO and even Hamas rather than Israel.Finally, there is the issue of state sponsorship to consider. Here in my view is where the democratization argument makes the most sense, as an authoritarian state pursues terrorism as a matter of policy and then undergoes democratization is not likely to revive the practice. Iraq, for instance, is not going to reviving its support for the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, Hamas, or the Abu Nidal Organization at any point in the near future as a matter of state policy.
He senses the Yanks are getting ready to tuck tail and urgently urges revolutionary preparation to move into the vacum.The Muslim masses-for many reasons, and this is not the place to discuss it-do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American.
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This, in my limited opinion, is the reason for the popular support that the mujahedeen enjoy in Iraq, by the grace of God.
As for the sectarian and chauvinistic factor, it is secondary in importance to outside aggression, and is much weaker than it. In my opinion-which is limited and which is what I see far from the scene-the awakening of the Sunni people in Iraq against the Shia would not have had such strength and toughness were it not for the treason of the Shia and their collusion with the Americans, and their agreement with them to permit the Americans to occupy Iraq in exchange for the Shia assuming power.
This is sage advice the great weakness of the rebellion is the lack of a coherrent political scheme. The Salafi Jihad in Iraq has a narrow base but is disciplined and the political field amongst the Sunni looks ripe for revolution. I'm reminded of the Bolsheviks in 1915....it doesn't appear that the Mujahedeen, much less the al-Qaida in the Land of Two Rivers, will lay claim to governance without the Iraqi people. Not to mention that that would be in contravention of the Shura methodology. That is not practical in my opinion.
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My answer is, firstly: Things may develop faster than we imagine. The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam-and how they ran and left their agents-is noteworthy. Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them. We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli upon our enemies, instead of the enemy imposing one on us, wherein our lot would be to merely resist their schemes.
Second: This is the most vital part. This authority, or the Sharia amirate that is necessary, requires fieldwork starting now, alongside the combat and war. It would be a political endeavor in which the mujahedeen would be a nucleus around which would gather the tribes and their elders, and the people in positions, and scientists, and merchants, and people of opinion, and all the distinguished ones who were not sullied by appeasing the occupation and those who defended Islam. We don't want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban, who restricted participation in governance to the students and the people of Qandahar alone.
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Therefore, I stress again to you and to all your brothers the need to direct the political action equally with the military action, by the alliance, cooperation and gathering of all leaders of opinion and influence in the Iraqi arena.
The man's from Cairo and still thinks like an Egyptian familiar with his cities shrine of Hasan and toleration of Shi'a. I think he's missed the revolutionary opportunities presented by sectarian war in Iraq.(C) People of discernment and knowledge among Muslims know the extent of danger to Islam of the Twelve'er school of Shiism. It is a religious school based on excess and falsehood whose function is to accuse the companions of Muhammad { of heresy in a campaign against Islam, in order to free the way for a group of those who call for a dialogue in the name of the hidden mahdi who is in control of existence and infallible in what he does. Their prior history in cooperating with the enemies of Islam is consistent with their current reality of connivance with the Crusaders.
(D) The collision between any state based on the model of prophecy with the Shia is a matter that will happen sooner or later. This is the judgment of history, and these are the fruits to be expected from the rejectionist Shia sect and their opinion of the Sunnis. These are clear, well-known matters to anyone with a knowledge of history, the ideologies, and the politics of states. (E) We must repeat what we mentioned previously, that the majority of Muslims don't comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia.
One things apparent from this the 2nd man in AQ knows very little about what's going on in Iraq. He doesn't even know if Al Jaz broadcast all of his speech. I think what we have here is not command and control but yesterdays man perhaps abandoned by Bin Laden offering his services to al-Zarqawi. Trotsky asking Stalin for a job. If I was al-Zarqaw I'd invite the clever old bugger over and then posion his couscous.Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable - also- are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God.
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However, despite all of this, I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us. And we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts. We don't need this.
Well there's been plenty of Christian sect aligned terrorist groups in the 20th century and it's easy to imagine hate attacks on mosques but I doubt if a coherrent movement will occur.kyser_soze said:Maybe I'm being a controversialist saying this, but for my money at some point Xtian terrorism will become a reality, if for no other reason than a reaction to the Islamic variant - and it's not as if there isn't a sizeable pool of condidates is there?
I see no evidence that al-Zarqawi is subject to command and control by al-Zawahiri. Al-Zarqawi only adopted the AQ brand 2 years or so ago probably to increase his attractiveness to new recruits. This letter and the previously intercepted correspondence suggests a loose alliance of convenience between respectful former rivals within the Salafi Jihad (which has never been a coherrent movement) who have always had deep strategic differences.Reading the Zawahiri letter, you sense that the field of battle is shifting. Al Qaeda is waging a political war for Muslim hearts and minds as it seeks to build a global caliphate. America shouldn't make the same mistake for which Zawahiri is upbraiding his Iraq commander -- fighting in the Iraq theater in ways that make it harder to win the larger war.
I have read the letter in English and looked at the Arabic on a "sampling" basis and my conclusion would be that it was writen by someone who was not a native speaker of Arabic but who had been well educated in the language. I would guess that an Iranian, A Pakistani or the odd Westerner with such a capability would be likely possibilities.