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UK Inquiry Module 1: Resilience and preparedness

Another area of importance covered yesterday. Pages 54-57 of yesterdays transcript (linked to in previous post):

Q: I'd like to ask you now some questions about the level of preparedness of Asian countries for Covid-19, those who had experience of SARS and MERS in their recent history.
What effect do you think having a serious outbreak of those two previous coronaviruses had on countries such as Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong?

A: I believe they had a profound effect on those countries. In fact I visited some of those countries during the period after SARS and before the current pandemic, and some of those countries had actually established isolation wards with hundreds of beds in their hospitals, ready for when there should be an outbreak such as this. So they were developing surge capacity in those countries at the same time as they were training their health workers in procedures such as contact tracing. So they appeared to be much better prepared, because of what they had learned from the SARS outbreaks back in 2003.

Q: So you have mentioned two things there, surge capacity within hospitals, training of health workers in contact tracing. Why was that second element so important?

A: That element was important because early in the outbreak countries such as Japan, for example, did not only contact tracing looking forward to see who was in contact with a person who was sick, but also looked backwards to try to find the source of infection, and when they found that, they then did what they called a precision lockdown: they locked down where the source of infection was. That's good basic epidemiology and outbreak control. They did this in countries such as Singapore, in South Korea, in Japan, in Taiwan and other places as well.

Q: That was effective in controlling the spread?

A: It certainly appears it was effective, yes. In fact, they were able to stop outbreaks that -- there were major outbreaks in South Korea, there was a major outbreak around a church event, as there was in Singapore, and those outbreaks were completely contained and stopped, which permitted those countries to let the virus enter at a much lower rate because there were fewer people infected to infect community members.

Q: But to be effective, a precision lockdown has to take place very quickly after knowledge has been gained that the virus is spreading?

A: That's correct, yes.

Q: Before it gets out any further?

A: That's correct.

Q: All right. Those countries who had the ability, because of the training of their healthcare workers, to undergo contact tracing and then to set up a precision lockdown, were more successful in continuing(sic) the early spread of Covid-19?

A: It's my view that they were, and if you look at the results of that today, you will see that their mortality rates are much, much lower than mortality rates -- reported mortality rates in most European countries.

Q: All right. Let's take a look, please, at paragraphs 113 and 114 of your report.
(Pause)
113 and 114, please. Next page. Thank you. If we could highlight those two paragraphs, please.
So just to confirm what you have told us, Professor:

"113. Early in the Covid-19 pandemic, studies in Japan traced contacts of persons with Covid-19 forward for isolation and monitoring, and backward to the source of infection. They then shut down those areas where transmission was shown to be occurring, many times in nightclubs, gyms and other public spaces, until preventative measures could be reinforced at those sites.

"114. Such precision and short-term lockdowns demonstrated that unlike influenza, initial Covid-19 outbreaks could be contained and transmission interrupted. The same was true in Singapore and South Korea in early outbreaks that occurred in religious institutions and nightclubs [which is what you've just told us]. Many Asian countries continued to keep transmission at low levels before vaccines became available by outbreak investigation and precision lockdowns at the source, similar to those used in Japan. [So] As of 19 February 2023 Asian countries had reported fewer Covid-19 deaths per million in the population ..."

And you there give the figures:

"... (Japan 566, South Korea 680, Singapore 294; [which are to be] compared to Italy 3,150, USA 3,344 and the UK 3,038) [thereby] attesting to the effectiveness of their containment strategies, though other factors including the level of comorbidities and obesity may have also played a role."

Thank you very much.

So those figures speak for themselves, really, do they not?

A: Yes.
 
Skimming through yesterdays live updates page from the BBC, it is clear that they picked up the same themes as I did, plus other bits such as:

Professor David Alexander says he was at a Red Cross symposium in 2008 and an infectious diseases expert gave a lecture beginning. "My job is to tell you something you don't want to know and ask you to spend money you haven’t got on something you don’t think will happen."

The expert, he said, then went on to describe a viral pandemic and in considerable detail.

Alexander then said "it was quite clear this was going to happen and large elements of it were entirely predictable".

In the decade before Covid struck, the World Health Organization (WHO) described the UK as "amongst the leaders worldwide in preparing for a pandemic".

Asked about that assessment, Prof Alexander describe that glowing assessment as "simply wrong".

"It didn't match up to the results that came out in terms of comparing the British response to that of other countries," he said.

Another candid statement from Professor David Alexander, expert on risk and disaster reduction.

Addressing the issue of whether the British government does keep the public safe within the limits of its competency, he said “not sufficiently”.

Asked whether this referred to the current structures he said yes and added that the government could do more and better in providing safety for its population.

He said one weakness of the British system, though not referring to devolved administrations, was the lack of an intermediate layer between central and local government.

In their joint report, both witnesses said planning for a possible no-deal Brexit from 2016 onwards had the "inevitable" consequence of taking up time and energy which could have been used for pandemic planning.

"Let me be clear, this is not a political but an administration point," said Bruce Mann.

Quote Message: Yes of course it was absolutely important to prepare for our exit from the EU. The point we are making is there should also have been the capacity for preparedness planning in other fields." from Bruce Mann Former civil servant at Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office
Yes of course it was absolutely important to prepare for our exit from the EU. The point we are making is there should also have been the capacity for preparedness planning in other fields."
Bruce Mann
Former civil servant at Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office
He said he also recognised there were some benefits in planning for a no-deal exit from the EU – especially on supply chains and the capacity to manage a crisis.

From https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-65906046
 
Yeah, the same Drakeford who either helped produce, or at the very least gave the nod to, the 'Back to school' 50 page document that gave less than one line to air conditioning 'open a window'. put mask wearing at the bottom of the list of priorities 'there's no evidence they work and staff arriving in masks must remove them before entering school grounds', but gave 3 pages to what was the correct mark to put into the register for kids who didn't come in because of Covid.
Lockdown Wales by Will Hayward is about as close as we'll get to a proper inquiry here. I have my criticisms of Hayward but he's a rare actual investigative journalist interested in the Welsh public sphere in 2023.
 
This afternoons witness was the first one that was still a part of the weak and ineffective systems of government at the time. Which causes them to be grilled, to be defensive and mealy mouthed, and generally unimpressive when giving evidence. I believe a similar impression of this witness may also have been possible at the Grenfell inquiry. Katharine Hammond, former DIrector of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. This session therefore offered the first hints of what the lead counsel may be like when sharpening their tongue in this inquiry.

Operation Yellowhammer (hard brexit planning) has come up a number of times, often being used to explain why important work and development of plans ceased.

Much of what has been gone over in this session involves weaknesses that were highlighted in a report by a previous witness. Including a lack of formal assurance systems when it came to various central government departments testing their own shit to make sure it was fit for purpose.
 
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A BBC article on the evidence about inequalities that was heard this morning and that I did not have time to cover properly myself:


Its an OK sukmmary but doesnt really do justice to how disturbed the experts were by the decline in life expectancy and other metrics seen from 2010 onwards, not least because they were used to continual improvements in such figures throughout the entire 20th century (apart from during world wars) and up until 2010.
 
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An example of the sort of grilling Katharine Hammond got on Friday afternoon, covering some vital areas in terms of what measures were actually planned for long in advance of any pandemic arriving, eg a very large PPE stockpile that could last for ages, lockdowns. This line of questioning resulted in suitably damning answers, once wiggle room attempts were thwarted:

Q: So of the many impacts to which you referred to yourself in paragraph 4.2, the two which you can recall are that the assessment process correctly identified a real problem with workforce absence rates, and obviously, and terribly, the appalling number of excess deaths?

A: Those are two good examples, I think, yes.

Q:What other areas -- you used the words "many of the impacts were correctly identified". What other impacts did you identify?

A:I think I would need to go and look, refresh my memory of the impacts set out in the risk assessment in order to give you a fully answer, but I'm very happy to do that.

Q: Ms Hammond, you have long known and it is as wide(?) as in your own statement, that this would form a central part of examination today in this Inquiry. The impacts anticipated from the reasonable worst-case scenario risk assessment process lie at the very heart of your own acceptance that what transpired was a very long way from what was planned for, is it not?

A: I think there are some really -- there are obviously some really key differences between pandemic flu and coronavirus, and they lie in the characteristics of the disease, particularly in the ability to treat it. So
there are treatments for flu. That was not the case for coronavirus. There is a fairly rapid accepted built route to a vaccine for novel flu. That wasn't the case for coronavirus and, as you've already referred to, there is a substantial amount of asymptomatic transmission for coronavirus, which doesn't exist at the same level for flu. Those are characteristics. They give rise to a set of policy decisions which themselves had impacts that were not identified for that reason. I think that's the explanation I'm trying to give you. What I'm not attempting to say is that this risk assessment reflected exactly the reality that occurred in 2020.

Q: Ms Hammond, you make the positive assertion that this risk assessment process generated many of the impacts, so perhaps I may be permitted to put some suggestions to you.

A: By all means.

Q: Correctly identified was a certain amount, a stockpile, of personal protective equipment and associated equipment. Did that stockpile -- was that stockpile correctly envisaged to be inadequate in terms of the amount of time it would last for?

A: Erm --

Q: Did the NRPA correctly identify the need for protective equipment over such a long period and in such vast quantities?

A: No, I don't think so.

Q: A stockpile of antibiotics was available and planned for to deal with secondary bacterial infections, often associated with respiratory infections. But the fact that there was no antiviral for coronavirus was not anticipated or planned for, was it?

A: No, that's correct.

Q: The fact that there was no vaccine was not anticipated or planned for?

A: No, for flu there is a fairly established vaccination production route.

Q: Because the government had a stockpile of Tamiflu, antiviral for flu, it had a National Pandemic Flu Service, and there were vaccines which could be modified with some ease in order to cater for a new moderated flu virus?

A: I think those are the key differences between the different risks.

Q: They are not inconsequential differences, are they?

A: No, I am not suggesting they are.

Q: They are massive. Therefore to say that therefore many of the impacts seen in the Covid pandemic were correctly identified doesn't really pass muster, does it?

A: I think they're not impacts, is what I would say. So I probably used a term of art in a way that's been unhelpful in this statement.

Q: Mass contact tracing was not anticipated or planned for?

A: Again, in the way I'm using the word, that wouldn't be an impact, that is a tool for managing --

Q: A countermeasure. Was it anticipated and planned for?

A: No.

Q: Were lockdowns anticipated or planned for?

A: Not on the scale envisaged. There's certainly discussion of some social distancing measures, school closure, but not what you would call a lockdown.

Q: Ms Hammond, you know very well that in Pandemic Flu Preparedness Board documentation, to which you were party, there was discussion now and then of the possibility of social restrictions. Was there any consideration of full national lockdowns?

A: No, there wasn't, because --

Q: Right.

A: -- the pandemic flu scenario didn't make that an effective tool.

Q: Was there any discussion of schools being closed on a national basis?

A: Yes, there was, and for that reason a draft school closure power was included in the pandemic flu Bill which became the Covid-19 -- the coronavirus Bill -- Coronavirus Act, forgive me.

Q: For such a length of time that consideration would have to be given to whether or not children and pupils could sit national exams?

A: I don't think the planning was that well developed. No. But the potential for ministers wanting to take that decision had been identified.

Q: What was envisaged or planned for or foreseen was a temporary closure of schools, was it not?

A: Yes, driven in part by potential for absence rates in the teaching and support staff of schools, which might lead to the need to close them for safety.

Q: There was debate and consideration and planning for workforce absence rates, which is the only example that you provide in that paragraph. Was there any consideration, foresight or planning for total economic collapse, furlough scheme, for national support financially, and for the closing of businesses and, in effect, the economy?

A: All of things flow from the planning for a lockdown, so the answer follows no.

Q: Clinically, what debate was there about whether or not either of the next two possible pandemics, whether it was pandemic influenza or a new and emerging disease, would be symptomatic or asymptomatic, and therefore having a massive impact on transmissibility and spread?

A: I think you would need to direct that question to the clinical experts, including the Chief Medical Officer.

Thats from pages 161 to 166 of Fridays transcript: https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/w...54/C-19-Inquiry-16-June-23-Module-1-Day-4.pdf
 
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Some examples of coverage of that session:



 
The BBCs written coverage of Fridays session seemed to go badly wrong for reasons that are unclear to me, perhaps they had no staff to cover it that day. For example their live updates page for Friday only contains the opening entry.

I am keeping an eye on what their coverage does and does not adequately capture via this page:

 
The lead counsel didnt ask Cameron questions because they know each other.

Camerons evidence involved defending austerity and its impacts, disagreeing with reports that blamed austerity for terrible effects on public health, and going on and on about asymptomatic transmission and failing to plan for a broader range of possible pandemics. This is unsurprising and was always likely to be the main excuse. When it came to asymptomatic spread, this excuse has been used since quite early on in the pandemic, forming a major pillar of the 'only with the benefit of hindsight' excuse at the time.
 
Moving on to evidence from Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary of the Department for Heath and Social Care, Hunt didnt attend some board meeting where departmental planning and preparedness for serious pandemics were being deeply dived into. Here is the BBC coverage of this point from their live updates page.

Keith turned his attention to departmental board meetings which often discussed key issues such as pandemic planning.

In one record of minutes from 2016, there was no ministerial attendance. It says that board members agree ministerial engagement adds to the effectiveness of the board.

It also says members "were concerned by the secretary of state's [Jeremy Hunt] continuing lack of engagement with the Board."

Keith asks Wormald what steps he took to ensure that the Secretary of State, Jeremy Hunt, attended future meetings, however Wormald says he doesn't recall having a conversation about this.

"I remember having conversations with the secretary of state in general" which he thought was the best way to deal with the issue.

Thats the 13:36 entry from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-65930692
 
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Wormold was made to wriggle a lot. They messed up the timetabling for evidence today, things are now running late. Not sure why they thought they'd get the Wormold stuff done this morning, especially as they had troubnle getting short answers out of him. Right now they are on a break, thery still havent finished with him and another witness was still due to be called this afternoon.

A chunk of the wriggling covers the same themes as covered when questioning Katharine Hammond, but there was much else too.

One area is that in the national risk register there is planning for a severe flu pandemic with million of infections and up to 750,000 deaths. And another risk in the register is from high consequence emerging diseases, which was given a much less serious consequences rating than the pandemic, and involved assumptions of just a few thousand casualties. In todays evidence it was described that the emerging diseases one actually involves attempts at containment (unlike the flu pandemic plans), and that in the event of a failure of that containment they assumed they would switch to the flu pandemic plan. A lesson learnt by the department was that they should have a version of a containment plan that actually envisages entertaining a far larger scale version of containment within such emerging disease plans, rather than that stuff only being considered for small outbreaks at early stages, with a huge gulf in between that scale of outbreak and a pandemic.

Wormold acknowledged that the orthodox approach involved the thinking ‘ready for flu, ready for anything’, and that this aspect of the orthodoxy is now dead.

He wriggled over PPE, I might quote from the transcript on that later.

Another theme is the failings that exercise Cygnus uncovered in 2016, the recommendations that it came up with as a result, and how many of the responses to those recommendations were paused when no-deal Brexit planning was given priority. A list was published, which I shall probably put here later.

Exercise Alice came up again too, and the fact that its recommendation that we actually look properly at what some Asian countries leant was not followed up on properly at all.
 
They are now back on schedule because the questioning of todays final witness, Clara Swinson, did not last very long.

I dont think anything came up during that questioning that I wish to go on about now.
 
An example of the sort of wriggling from Wormold yesterday, from pages 133-134 of yesterdays transcript: https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/w...08/C-19-Inquiry-19-June-23-Module-1-Day-5.pdf

LADY HALLETT: Can I just interrupt there? I think a lot of medics would be surprised at your comment "we never nationally ran out of PPE".

A: Yes, and I chose my words very carefully, and it's a debate we have had before. There were huge pressures on PPE and we had, as I said, significant challenges getting PPE to the right place. So the department has never said, and it would not be true to say, that in individual places there were shortages of PPE and people having to use not the right PPE. That's different from it having run out nationally. So, in terms of all the reports people make of the struggles with PPE and the right PPE in an individual place not being available, that was clearly true.

MR KEITH: Sir Christopher, the stockpile which existed on 1 January 2020 ran out. Obviously further PPE had to be procured --

A: Yes.

Q: -- but the stockpile for an influenza pandemic was not sufficient, was it?

A: Well, the --

Q: Was that stockpile sufficient, Sir Christopher?

A:The stockpile was never intended to cover the whole of a pandemic, it was supposed to create a buffer while you ramp up production --

Q: But you're the one who said the capabilities developed for influenza are transferable for use?

A: Yeah, and the stockpile was transferred. Now, I did not, and this was a very deliberate answer to your question, I did not put PPE on my list of things that we transferred. While the stockpile we had was useful, and prevented us from running out of PPE at various points, there was a clear difference between the PPE we needed for this type of pandemic and the one we had built up, which is why I didn't put it on my list of transferables.

On the fragmented nature of the NHS, from page 95:

LADY HALLETT: You are accepting it was fragmented? I got the feeling that maybe you weren't accepting, Sir Christopher, it was fragmented.

A: I don't think there is any dispute that it was fragmented, and indeed the whole point of the 2012 Act was to reduce the level of central control over particularly the NHS and to run the system much more as a -- and I apologise for using the jargon -- as a quasi-market. So the idea of that Act was to have operational freedom within the NHS, and for the system to be based around a series of commissioners and providers, as opposed to a top-down system of direct control as had existed prior to 2012. Now, whether you believe fragmented to be a good or a bad thing, I don't think there's any dispute that that was the purpose of that set of reforms.
 
It also came up yesterday that approximately 70 Department of Health and Social Care staff were reallocated to the Yellowhammer brexit planning.

There was also a letter to Whitty saying that pandemic and high consequence infectious disease planning responsibility had been temporarily transferred to Whitty as a result of that, and this list of pandemic-related work that was paused or continued when the focus shifted to Yellowhammer.

Screenshot 2023-06-19 at 15.26.32.jpg
 
Osborne is tedious and predictable today so I hope to avoid covering his evidence in any depth.

Like the other tory defenders of austerity, his line is that by doing such things put the UK in a good overall financial position that would then allow them the flexibility to throw large amounts of money at a pandemic.

When it comes to the failure to plan for lockdowns, they resort to general observations about the orthodox approach here and across the west, that never considered lockdowns prior to this pandemic. This involves an area where the inquiry itself could ultimately draw the wrong conclusions. Because there is a repeated theme, a lasting orthodox opinion, that we wouldnt need lockdowns for a flu pandemic and so it was the failure to consider other sorts of pandemic that led to this failure to ever think about lockdowns when doing pandemic planning. Factors such as asymptomatic transmission vs symptomatic, incubation periods etc are used to explain why lockdowns were useful for covid as opposed to flu. I would counter this tidy view by suggesting that actually if we had a influenza pandemic that was so severe that it looked like it would totally overwhelm health systems by virtue of a certain high rate of hospital admissions over a period of time, authorities could very well have been forced to consider lockdowns then too. I'm not sure any witness will bring that possibility to the inquiries attention though. They are looking at the idea that groupthink led to some of the failings to prepare, but I suspect the inquiry itself will still be limited by groupthink on this front, by the aspects of orthodox opinion that were not totally crushed by the covid pandemic.
 
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The previous Chief Medical Officers evidence is rather quotable, not sure where to start on that really, I'll have to restrain myself a bit once I have the transcript to quote from. Unlike Whitty her area of expertise is not epidemiology, but she still had plenty of thoughts on matters.
 
Key lessons identified from Exercise Cygnus which looked at our capabilities during a flu pandemic, and decided we wouldnt cope very well:


Following on from my point about whether we might also have ended up with lockdowns etc in a very bad flu pandemic, we have heard from multiple witnesses that no attention was given to this area. A number of somewhat related things do come up in documents like the one above however:

KL 3. The public reaction to a reasonable worst case pandemic influenza scenario needs to be better understood.

LI 5: Further work is required to inform consideration of the issues related to the possible use of population based triage during a reasonable worst case influenza pandemic

In particular, some extreme forms of triage are one of the tools authorities may use and misuse to cope with situations where demand on health services is too great. There were a few weeks during the first wave where our media latched on to some of the dodgy ways this might be attempted, though interest in this subject soon faded. I hope the inquiry look at it properly, so far when its come up during questioning its been treated in a pretty benign way and not followed up on with further questions.
 
Key lessons identified by Exercise Alice, which looked at a scenario involving MERS:


A number of these would have been applicable to the Covid pandemic. If they had actually followed through with plans based on the learnings from this exercise then some of the things we ended up doing in this pandemic would have been better planned for and resourced, rather than considered unthinkable until rather late on when we ended up having to do them.

For example:

Produce a briefing paper on the South Korea outbreak with details on the cases and response and consider the direct application to the UK including ort of entry screening

To explore the capability for contact tracing and quarantining of possible MERS-CoV cases
Produce an options plan using extant evidence and cost benefits for quarantine versus self-isolation for a range of contact types including symptomatic, asymptomatic and high risk groups
Develop a plan for the process of community sampling in a MERS-CoV outbreak
Develop a live tool or system to collect data from MERS-CoV contacts
 
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Part of a witness statement submitted to the inquiry says:

In the event, our go-to response to Covid-19 became lockdown (implemented on multiple occasions in the nations of the UK). Of itself, that highlights a striking deficiency in the UK's pandemic preparedness: we had no plans to implement lockdown at all. On the contrary, the UK's 2011 pandemic influenza strategy document (provided as Exhibit {MW/353 - INQ000149105}) states: "During a pandemic, the Government will encourage those who are well to carry on with their normal daily lives for as long and as far as that is possible, whilst taking basic precautions to protect themselves from infection and lessen the risk of spreading influenza to others. The UK Government does not plan to close borders, stop mass gatherings or impose controls on public transport during any pandemic." Lockdown was an ad hoc public health intervention contrived in real time in the face of a fast-moving public health emergency.
From https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/19184740/INQ000182616_3.pdf

The bit that I have put in bolt type is probably sufficient to explain why the BBCs Nick Triggle came out with something that I was fond of repeatedly drawing attention to. Shit that was veryu much designed to support the orthodox plan, although in this case he said it on arguably the very last day that this approach was still being clung to fully, Friday March 13th 2020. Even the BBC deleted it later that day, which is one of the reasons I keep bringing it up.

That period of time wont be covered in thos module, it will be part of module 2, and I'm far from confident that theinquiry will make use of this particular example of 'keep calm and carry on' propaganda when the time comes. But since some relevant stuff is still coming up in evidence for this first module, I'm not going to miss the opportunity to mention it now.

Friday13thMarch2020.png
 
The previous Chief Medical Officers evidence is rather quotable, not sure where to start on that really, I'll have to restrain myself a bit once I have the transcript to quote from. Unlike Whitty her area of expertise is not epidemiology, but she still had plenty of thoughts on matters.
If it's all too upsetting take a break from watching all this. I'm jealous you have the time to follow this and write it all up, and do read it but do look after your sanity too.
The last few years have been depressing enough in all sorts of ways to endure more.
 
Cheers. Its all sorts of different kinds of upsetting at different times, but that doesnt really put me off, not now and not at any point in the past. The sheer amount of time required is daunting sometimes and I cannot say whether I will manage to follow the entire 6 weeks worth of evidence of this module.

I know I dont have a very large audience here for this level of detail these days so I have to cherrypick what I highlight each day, but as we've already seen that still results in lots of posts.
 
Cheers. Its all sorts of different kinds of upsetting at different times, but that doesnt really put me off, not now and not at any point in the past. The sheer amount of time required is daunting sometimes and I cannot say whether I will manage to follow the entire 6 weeks worth of evidence of this module.

I know I dont have a very large audience here for this level of detail these days so I have to cherrypick what I highlight each day, but as we've already seen that still results in lots of posts.
Remember too, it's not just this module and this will go on for years, and the there may be no real meaningful conclusion anyway and lots of people will feel unsatisfied with the outcome.
 
Remember too, it's not just this module and this will go on for years, and the there may be no real meaningful conclusion anyway and lots of people will feel unsatisfied with the outcome.
Sadly thay seems to be the result of every enquiry I've managed to notice. The updates are great tho I've no time to follow this.
 
What's the point of this? Will there then be an enquiry into the enquiry? And on and on, money for civil servants, lawyers whoever else.
 
The detail matters. The inquiry will not please everyone. All the same, various lessons will be learnt as a result of this pandemic. Some of them will even be acted upon in a way that leaves us better prepared in some areas.

And where stuff is not acted upon, the next generation of smart arses like me will still be able to use that information to understand in advance where we will fuck up next time, and be in a position to explain various things to people and warn people when the shit starts hitting the fan next time.

Much of the evidence in recent days has revealed the very picture some of you are going on about, that all manner of exercises and investigations came up with useful recommendations that were then not acted upon.

If you arent interested in that level of detail then fine, you can still be a positive influence in broader ways such as heckling the shit priorities of governments. But others need to operate with detail and these inquiries are still useful for that.
 
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