It's irrelevant whether people believed he was religious, he established and funded networks and organisations that were based on islamist recruitment and principles and gave then to the keys to secret gladio-style arms dumps (but on much larger scale than gladio) which then formed the material and organisational backbone of the anti-US movement that morphed into wider islamist movements. Utterly crucial after the idiots shut down the army and fired all baathist members.
Yet it is difficult to escape the mirage-like quality of their own representations, which have the look and feel of Orientalist tourism literature. Indeed, considering that Daesh recruits are often at best religious novices (the well-known story of a Daesh recruit ordering Islam for Dummies does not appear to be an outlier), if not even cheerfully flouting the most basic of religious prohibitions (Hasna Aitboulahcen was reportedly far more into Whatsapp and booze than the Quran), it is tempting to regard the performative religiosity of Daesh recruits as a kind of self-Orientalising adventurism. Come to the sunny Wilaya of Raqqah, and experience survivalist nirvana
"it is tempting to regard the performative religiosity of Daesh recruits as a kind of self-Orientalising adventurism. Come to the sunny Wilaya of Raqqah, and experience survivalist nirvana"
What do you find so ridiculous about what he says there?
I thought it was quite funny.
I think some of them really believe it though. And what about the fact so many of them are from Chechnya etc? Not sure that's performance orientalism.
I think some of them really believe it though. And what about the fact so many of them are from Chechnya etc? Not sure that's performance orientalism.
ISIS
The twisted love child born of Menachim Begin and the Irgun Rapist/ Murder/Slaughter squads at Deir Yassin etc
Don't mate, it's so not worth it.Wot?
Genuine question: while I agree with most of what he says he alludes to the mass rape of Iraqi women by occupation forces and to 'millions' being killed. Is there any evidence of the former and is the latter not a significant exaggeration, even when you factor in the 100s of thousands killed by sanctions? Not that I'm trying to minimise the scale or horror of the more-or-less established estimates, nor trying to suggest that it was anything other than genocide and an heinous war crime, but millions?
“ISIS is a reality and we have to accept that we cannot eradicate a well-organized and popular establishment such as the Islamic State; therefore I urge my western colleagues to revise their mindset about Islamic political currents, put aside their cynical mentalité and thwart Vladimir Putin's plans to crush Syrian Islamist revolutionaries,”
The report of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War gave a figure of one million as a rough estimate for the number of deaths that ensued in Iraq following the 2003 invasion:Genuine question: while I agree with most of what he says he alludes to the mass rape of Iraqi women by occupation forces and to 'millions' being killed. Is there any evidence of the former and is the latter not a significant exaggeration, even when you factor in the 100s of thousands killed by sanctions? Not that I'm trying to minimise the scale or horror of the more-or-less established estimates, nor trying to suggest that it was anything other than genocide and an heinous war crime, but millions?
Isn't it weird how this story doesn't appear to have any sources other than this fake news awd news site? It's even worse than al masdar, at least he has some contacts in the regime army. This one just takes stories from salon, the mail etc and runs them. The sprinkles it with dodgy stuff like this, it's basically iranian propganda. I wonder why no other states or media sources thought to comment on something like Erdogan's key ally calling for recognition for ISIS and suggesting they have an embassy in Turkey. because it's made up bollocks for people like you to swallow and then circulate without question.
It's irrelevant whether people believed he was religious, he established and funded networks and organisations that were based on islamist recruitment and principles and gave then to the keys to secret gladio-style arms dumps (but on much larger scale than gladio) which then formed the material and organisational backbone of the anti-US movement that morphed into wider islamist movements. Utterly crucial after the idiots shut down the army and fired all baathist members.
This is the larger timeline problem. If you're asking, "How could Ba'athists become True Believers in a couple of months?" then the narrative of some kind of "Ba'athist coup" within IS is more believable. But Ba'athism had been dead for a decade by the time Saddam fell.
The internal Islamization of Saddam's regime happened in roughly three stages: there's a notable Islamization of official rhetoric between 1983 and 1989; there's the first steps toward Islamic rule between 1989 and 1993; and then there's the really intense, organized Islamization of the regime after the Faith Campaign is announced in 1993.
The most important moment in the turn to Islam is the meeting of the Pan-Arab Command, the Ba'ath's highest ideological institution, which has representatives ostensibly representing Syria and Sudan on it in preparation for the Ba'ath's pan-Arab revolution. At the PAC meeting—which Aflaq attends—Saddam announces that the regime will be forming an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, specifically in Syria, Sudan, and Egypt. Saddam had already trained and armed the Syrian Brothers during their rebellion against Hafez al-Assad, and sheltered them after the rebellion was crushed. But it was sub-rosa and could be passed off as tactical and unimportant. Now it was a full-scale reorientation of policy and everyone knew the implications. Indeed—it's quite funny—Tariq Aziz arrives late to the meeting so doesn't know that Saddam has spoken in favor of allying with the "religious trend," so Aziz speaks really forcefully against it, quoting Saddam's 1977 speeches. Saddam allows that "Comrade Tariq came late" and "we agree with all the concepts he mentioned as a general principle," and even adds that the Ba'ath will "launch a large scale attack on [the Islamists] if they are close to taking over power." Realizing what's happened Aziz says, "I may not have been able to express myself accurately," and "I agree with what our Comrade President said". There is no other dissent, and officially the decision is to stay secret.
But the Ba'athists don't fight them—not only when close to power but when in power. When the Sudanese Brothers take power in 1989, Saddam invites their leader, Hassan al-Turabi, to Baghdad after Saddam annexes Kuwait. The alliance with the Egyptian Brotherhood extends to an alliance with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, whose leader, Ayman az-Zawahiri, in exile in Afghanistan and increasingly part of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, comes to Baghdad three times we know about—in 1992 and 1998 as a personal guest of the regime, and in 1999 as part of a PIC. The al-Qaeda connections are obviously hyper-controversial but the evidence of repeated contacts through the 1990s, including at quite senior levels, is clear, and even clearer with the affiliates, especially in the Philippines. There's relations with the Taliban, too.
Punishments … included having one’s hands amputated for theft, being tossed off a tower for sodomy, being whipped a hundred times for sexual harassment, having one’s tongue cut out for lying, and being stoned for various other infractions. … [m]ilitary failure also became punishable as a criminal offense.”
The Fedayeen helped imbue ISIS with the spirit of fanaticism and cruelty from the beginning, and by now, with all of the former Iraqi insurgent groups—and their Fedayeen contingents—subordinated to ISIS, their role must be relatively enhanced. The Fedayeen were a key part of Saddam’s Islamization program, internally and externally, linking the regime with Islamist terrorists around the world, and in the aftermath provided connections with al-Qaeda and its offshoots for the Salafized regime remnants. The Fedayeen was a crucial glue that helped bind the disparate elements of the Iraqi insurgency together as it transformed into ISIS.