The Islamic state
- Thread starter brogdale
- Start date
teqniq
DisMembered
J Ed
Follow Back Pro Expropriation
DotCommunist
So many particulars. So many questions.
topical angle to flog his book.
coley
Well-Known Member
That's the PBI not the LRS
teqniq
DisMembered
J Ed
Follow Back Pro Expropriation
J Ed
Follow Back Pro Expropriation
LDC
On est tous des pangolins
Just reading this, well worth a read for those that missed this being posted. Discussion to follow hopefully...
DrRingDing
'anti-human wanker'
......and for the wider implications beyond ISIS.
Pickman's model
Starry Wisdom
Casually Red
tomorrow belongs to me
There's no talking to these types of death cults . Powell, a British intelligence agent, has a geo political objective . Namely the physical dismemberment and partitioning of Syria . Islamic insurgents have been used as proxies to that effect by Britain and others . When Powell says talks what he means is implementing a process that will result in Syrias partition . The regularisation of a Sunni Islamist agenda and state within Syrian borders .
Yet again the elephant in the room is Saudi Arabia .
Casually Red
tomorrow belongs to me
taffboy gwyrdd
Embrace the confusion!
Most suitable prominent international thread I can find for this very good post about Saudi Arabia from the linked thread. Somewhat more sympathetic than I have been, and too well informed to ignore.
http://justthetalk.com/…/cameron__39_s_allies_sentence_p…/35
Q: How would you characterise their <Saudi Arabia's> current mood and focus?
A: As I understand it, they believe they are currently involved in a life-or-death struggle with Iran for the future of the Middle East. Their analysis of the region is that Iran is bent on regional hegemony by using sectarian faultlines to create proxy non-state forces and weaken Arab states. They look at Lebanon, Iraq, war-time Syria and Yemen as evidence of this. And they fear it in Bahrain. They see the rise of non-state jihadist organisations - ISIS, al Qaeda etc - as being a direct symptom of all this and, therefore, they hold Iran and its regional proxies ultimately responsible for all of those problems too.
At the same time, they wrongly but sincerely discount the notion that Wahhabism is connected to jihadist ideology. Although all forms of Salafism, including its jihadist manifestations, are ultimately descended from the Wahhabi school, the Saudis see them all as being very different and emphasise the Muslim Brotherhood contributions to militant thought. It's a bit reminiscent of the bitter feuding between various iterations of Communism during the Cold War. They have purged their clergy of preachers who openly praise jihadists and have used state clerics to issue one fatwa after another against ISIS/al Qaeda etc. But they utterly fail to see that the sectarian and anti-infidel ideology they promote via Wahhabism feeds into the problem.
At the same time, the Saudis believe the West is cravenly capitulating to Tehran, and that in facing up to this pivotal struggle with Iran, they themselves must now adopt a far more aggressive policy that no longer depends on the US flying in to fight its battles. They saw the nuclear deal, which lifted sanctions on Tehran, thereby potentially giving it more money to continue the fight in Syria etc, as evidence for this, alongside what they regard as the West's refusal to seriously engage against Assad.
Since Salman took power in January, we've started to see all these elements filtered through a far more hawkish view of Saudi strategy. The war in Yemen, launched to stop a rebel group that the Saudis (mostly incorrectly) believe to be an Iranian proxy bent on undermining the kingdom's own southern border, was the first element of this. The renewed Saudi cooperation with Qatar and Turkey to back Syrian rebel groups fighting alongside al Qaeda (but not ISIS) was the second part of that.
But this strategy hasn't really worked. In Yemen they weren't able to get Pakistan or Egypt - their two largest non-Western military partners - to agree to put troops on the ground. And the continuation of their war has shown them how far they continue to rely on the West for any sustained military activity.
At the same time, the oil price slump over the past 18 months has raised a whole bunch of other questions about their ability to sustain a role as regional Sunni leader and about their own internal long-term stability. Both of those things, naturally, play into their complicated internal relationship between the Al Saud and the Wahhabi clergy/hardline conservatives. Although when push comes to shove they can usually get the clergy to support their policies, they remain genuinely scared of a conservative religious revolt so they try not to provoke that.
They know they need to reduce their dependence on oil long term by modernising the economy and moving to a point where most Saudis have private sector jobs. That means removing obstacles towards women working, making the education system less religious and more technical, making the Sharia justice system more predictable and business friendly, softening the stifling moral public code and embarking on a host of other reforms that will piss off conservatives. So they pick their battles. And they placate conservatives by allowing rebarbative judicial attacks on liberals and Shi'ites and by not letting women drive.
So - in brief, and apologies for such a long-winded answer - their current mood is deeply paranoid, their current focus is Iran and their longer concern is modernising their economy without provoking an internal jihadist revolt.
http://justthetalk.com/…/cameron__39_s_allies_sentence_p…/35
Q: How would you characterise their <Saudi Arabia's> current mood and focus?
A: As I understand it, they believe they are currently involved in a life-or-death struggle with Iran for the future of the Middle East. Their analysis of the region is that Iran is bent on regional hegemony by using sectarian faultlines to create proxy non-state forces and weaken Arab states. They look at Lebanon, Iraq, war-time Syria and Yemen as evidence of this. And they fear it in Bahrain. They see the rise of non-state jihadist organisations - ISIS, al Qaeda etc - as being a direct symptom of all this and, therefore, they hold Iran and its regional proxies ultimately responsible for all of those problems too.
At the same time, they wrongly but sincerely discount the notion that Wahhabism is connected to jihadist ideology. Although all forms of Salafism, including its jihadist manifestations, are ultimately descended from the Wahhabi school, the Saudis see them all as being very different and emphasise the Muslim Brotherhood contributions to militant thought. It's a bit reminiscent of the bitter feuding between various iterations of Communism during the Cold War. They have purged their clergy of preachers who openly praise jihadists and have used state clerics to issue one fatwa after another against ISIS/al Qaeda etc. But they utterly fail to see that the sectarian and anti-infidel ideology they promote via Wahhabism feeds into the problem.
At the same time, the Saudis believe the West is cravenly capitulating to Tehran, and that in facing up to this pivotal struggle with Iran, they themselves must now adopt a far more aggressive policy that no longer depends on the US flying in to fight its battles. They saw the nuclear deal, which lifted sanctions on Tehran, thereby potentially giving it more money to continue the fight in Syria etc, as evidence for this, alongside what they regard as the West's refusal to seriously engage against Assad.
Since Salman took power in January, we've started to see all these elements filtered through a far more hawkish view of Saudi strategy. The war in Yemen, launched to stop a rebel group that the Saudis (mostly incorrectly) believe to be an Iranian proxy bent on undermining the kingdom's own southern border, was the first element of this. The renewed Saudi cooperation with Qatar and Turkey to back Syrian rebel groups fighting alongside al Qaeda (but not ISIS) was the second part of that.
But this strategy hasn't really worked. In Yemen they weren't able to get Pakistan or Egypt - their two largest non-Western military partners - to agree to put troops on the ground. And the continuation of their war has shown them how far they continue to rely on the West for any sustained military activity.
At the same time, the oil price slump over the past 18 months has raised a whole bunch of other questions about their ability to sustain a role as regional Sunni leader and about their own internal long-term stability. Both of those things, naturally, play into their complicated internal relationship between the Al Saud and the Wahhabi clergy/hardline conservatives. Although when push comes to shove they can usually get the clergy to support their policies, they remain genuinely scared of a conservative religious revolt so they try not to provoke that.
They know they need to reduce their dependence on oil long term by modernising the economy and moving to a point where most Saudis have private sector jobs. That means removing obstacles towards women working, making the education system less religious and more technical, making the Sharia justice system more predictable and business friendly, softening the stifling moral public code and embarking on a host of other reforms that will piss off conservatives. So they pick their battles. And they placate conservatives by allowing rebarbative judicial attacks on liberals and Shi'ites and by not letting women drive.
So - in brief, and apologies for such a long-winded answer - their current mood is deeply paranoid, their current focus is Iran and their longer concern is modernising their economy without provoking an internal jihadist revolt.
Humberto
Godspede
Cba reading all that. Try and make a few comments you lazy fucker.
Possibly not the best thread for this but seeing a lot of articles like this one lately ISIL’s terrorism is not a reaction to Western foreign policy
It attacks some people who deserve to be attacked but they all seem to use the word "reaction" whether they are talking about western foreign policy/imperialism or some other synonym and side step another question: Are they a result of western foreign policy? The answer isn't a simple yes obviously and there are other factors. The reaction angle allows articles to say that it is down to the Saudi's throwing their money around without looking at the relationship with the west, arms sales and oil. In the article above Sunny is able to talk about ISIS's sectarianism without considering how the aftermath of the 2003 invasion increased sectarian tensions and led to the Maliki government. It also seems to assume that ISIS has no internal divisions, that all members have the same motivations as the leadership or propagandists whether they are in Iraq, Syria, France or elsewhere (given my exclusive focus on Iraq above I know thats a bit rich). My point is even concluding that they are not a reaction to western policy it doesn't mean that policy hasn't contributed to their rise.
It attacks some people who deserve to be attacked but they all seem to use the word "reaction" whether they are talking about western foreign policy/imperialism or some other synonym and side step another question: Are they a result of western foreign policy? The answer isn't a simple yes obviously and there are other factors. The reaction angle allows articles to say that it is down to the Saudi's throwing their money around without looking at the relationship with the west, arms sales and oil. In the article above Sunny is able to talk about ISIS's sectarianism without considering how the aftermath of the 2003 invasion increased sectarian tensions and led to the Maliki government. It also seems to assume that ISIS has no internal divisions, that all members have the same motivations as the leadership or propagandists whether they are in Iraq, Syria, France or elsewhere (given my exclusive focus on Iraq above I know thats a bit rich). My point is even concluding that they are not a reaction to western policy it doesn't mean that policy hasn't contributed to their rise.
Pickman's model
Starry Wisdom
just looking at the national counterterrorism center website.Mullah Omar’s Death Is a Big Blow to al Qaeda—and a Win for ISIS
Mullah Omar's death is a big blow to al Qaeda and a win for ISIS
very stange story this as it appears Omar has been dead for almost two years but the taliban/al Qaeda were pretending he was alive and recently issued a statement in his name
they're still offering $10m for yer man
anyone up for a trip to afghanistan with bucket and spade?
LDC
On est tous des pangolins
Nice to know it's not just slack leftie campaigns and groups that can't keep their websites up to date.
bluescreen
tofu eating wokerati
Jeez, Cantlie. I can't imagine. I can't judge him.
Idris2002
Christmas Eve, you know?
OK, so here's a link citing Jason Bourke and arguing that the roots of Daesh can be traced back to before the 2003 war, and to the use of religion by Saddam Hussein in his last years in power:
Roots of ISIS go deeper than the 2003 invasion of Iraq
It's not a bad idea to complicate things, but I'm not sure about this. Religion/politics - these things are not mutually exclusive. Also, a secular ruler turning to religion to shore up his rule has a precedent in Sudan in the last days of Nimeiri's regime in the 1980s. There the outcome was different - a Islamist movement did eventually seize power, but it has been in the end a case of 'in the Third World, ideology is a convenience'. Turabi, the original ideas man of the Sudanese Islamist regime was gaoled by Bashir when he decided that Bashir wasn't being Muslim enough for him. That's no consolation for the people of Darfur, or anyone else trapped at the sharp end of things in Sudan, but it's a definite contrast with the trajectory displayed by Daesh and its ancestor organizations.
In other words, it's important to point (as this link does) that Saddam definitely flirted with religion as a tool to shore up his power in the last years of his regime. But can we really conclude that this is the real origin point of Daesh? Or does that point lay a bit further on in the timeline, when someone lit a flame in the region that would burn even more harshly?
They conclude by saying this:
"If we only see ISIS as a product of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, we’re not going to see how its emergence needs to be placed in a wider historical perspective: as a product of the failure of Arab secular nationalism and authoritarian rule.
The uprisings of 2011 during the Arab Spring posed a threat to every single government across the region. What has in large part saved most of them from the threat of democracy is the subsequent growth of a threat from terrorism.
ISIS as a reactionary political force has played a major role in shifting the regional debate from a contest between dictatorship and democracy, to a bloody struggle between stability and chaos.
Those who are threatened by ISIS’s expansion nevertheless also benefit from its existence. Stability becomes imperative only when instability is seen as the sole alternative.
This is how Bashar al-Assad, in spite of destroying much of Syria and driving half the population out of their homes, is succeeding in keeping tyranny alive."
That failure of Arab secular nationalism can't be ascribed entirely to external imperialism, but the role of that factor can't be left out entirely. And the threat of instability was always there in the region, but it was made massively more threatening by the destabilizing effects of the 2003 war.
Roots of ISIS go deeper than the 2003 invasion of Iraq
It's not a bad idea to complicate things, but I'm not sure about this. Religion/politics - these things are not mutually exclusive. Also, a secular ruler turning to religion to shore up his rule has a precedent in Sudan in the last days of Nimeiri's regime in the 1980s. There the outcome was different - a Islamist movement did eventually seize power, but it has been in the end a case of 'in the Third World, ideology is a convenience'. Turabi, the original ideas man of the Sudanese Islamist regime was gaoled by Bashir when he decided that Bashir wasn't being Muslim enough for him. That's no consolation for the people of Darfur, or anyone else trapped at the sharp end of things in Sudan, but it's a definite contrast with the trajectory displayed by Daesh and its ancestor organizations.
In other words, it's important to point (as this link does) that Saddam definitely flirted with religion as a tool to shore up his power in the last years of his regime. But can we really conclude that this is the real origin point of Daesh? Or does that point lay a bit further on in the timeline, when someone lit a flame in the region that would burn even more harshly?
They conclude by saying this:
"If we only see ISIS as a product of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, we’re not going to see how its emergence needs to be placed in a wider historical perspective: as a product of the failure of Arab secular nationalism and authoritarian rule.
The uprisings of 2011 during the Arab Spring posed a threat to every single government across the region. What has in large part saved most of them from the threat of democracy is the subsequent growth of a threat from terrorism.
ISIS as a reactionary political force has played a major role in shifting the regional debate from a contest between dictatorship and democracy, to a bloody struggle between stability and chaos.
Those who are threatened by ISIS’s expansion nevertheless also benefit from its existence. Stability becomes imperative only when instability is seen as the sole alternative.
This is how Bashar al-Assad, in spite of destroying much of Syria and driving half the population out of their homes, is succeeding in keeping tyranny alive."
That failure of Arab secular nationalism can't be ascribed entirely to external imperialism, but the role of that factor can't be left out entirely. And the threat of instability was always there in the region, but it was made massively more threatening by the destabilizing effects of the 2003 war.
The Pale King
Well-Known Member
Wow - that's remarkable. Re-orienting Antisemitic tropes toward Islam allows the Mail to indulge itself fully. Repulsive.
This goes into a bit more detail tracing it back to the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam's lack of religious credility compared to the Ayatollahs and accusations that Iraq was a godless state.
butchersapron
Bring back hanging
It's irrelevant whether people believed he was religious, he established and funded networks and organisations that were based on islamist recruitment and principles and gave then to the keys to secret gladio-style arms dumps (but on much larger scale than gladio) which then formed the material and organisational backbone of the anti-US movement that morphed into wider islamist movements. Utterly crucial after the idiots shut down the army and fired all baathist members.
DrRingDing
'anti-human wanker'
So, you don't think it was a tactical decision to create instability?
butchersapron
Bring back hanging
I think it was simply an attempt to head off any organised institutional opposition with the potential to develop into resistance. No need for any conspiracy type stuff - esp given the wide recognition across all interests and fields of of it's colossal stupidity and blowback.
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