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Standalone interesting political articles thread

Thing is, as wonderful as leather seating, pub food and a better choice of games are, there were downsides to that era of government meddling that are still unfortunately present when they have absolutely no need to be.

For example, I rarely if ever drink spirits in pubs. Why? Because you get absolutely fucking ripped off. For three pounds or more you get this tiny little dribble of fluid that could barely lubricate a teetotal rat.

Whereas in Spain, they actually fill your glass up.
 
The Soviet Hippies

Although veteran leftists may wince at the notion, hippie culture remains associated with political protest in the popular imagination. During the height of student radicalization in the 1960s, the music, clothing, and visual aesthetic associated with the hippie movement permeated the protest culture of the New Left. This image continues to animate right-wing caricatures of the Left even today.

While this particular type of cultural rebellion was most prominent in the Fordist societies of the capitalist West, it found its way across the Atlantic and took on a unique form in Leonid Brezhnev’s stuffy and increasingly stagnant Soviet Union. There, thousands of disaffected young citizens banded together in an underground network of self-identified hippies calling themselves Sistema, or “the system.” The largely forgotten movement’s story serves as the focus of a recent documentary titled Soviet Hippies, capturing a unique slice of Cold War culture in which diffuse, anti-authoritarian sentiment resonated with young people on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Jacobin contributing editor Loren Balhorn recently spoke with the film’s director, Terje Toomistu.
 
The Making of an American Nazi

Fascinating story, much in it is personal to the individual but it is interesting just how much overlap there is with many on the far-right and indeed Islamist terrorism - history of abusive misogyny, online radicalisation, drug-taking and alienation.

Yoiks! Interesting and sobering read, thank you for sharing. I've seen the "lost boys" theory referenced elsewhere in regards to young mass killers (both ISIS recruits and mass shooters). I buy it. I can't recall anything much in the way of ideas to stop these young people from going down that path - other than saying they should go to college, get a job, get married, have kids...

Sometimes the internet terrifies me.
 
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/11/progressive-neoliberalism-trump-beyond/

Progressive neoliberals did not dream up this political economy. That honor belongs to the Right: to its intellectual luminaries Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and James Buchanan; to its visionary politicians, Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan; and to their deep-pocketed enablers, Charles and David Koch, among others. But the right-wing “fundamentalist” version of neoliberalism could not become hegemonic in a country whose common sense was still shaped by New Deal thinking, the “rights revolution,” and a slew of social movements descended from the New Left. For the neoliberal project to triumph, it had to be repackaged, given a broader appeal, linked to other, noneconomic aspirations for emancipation. Only when decked out as progressive could a deeply regressive political economy become the dynamic center of a new hegemonic bloc.

It fell, accordingly, to the “New Democrats” to contribute the essential ingredient: a progressive politics of recognition. Drawing on progressive forces from civil society, they diffused a recognition ethos that was superficially egalitarian and emancipatory. At the core of this ethos were ideals of “diversity,” women’s “empowerment,” and LGBTQ rights; post-racialism, multiculturalism, and environmentalism. These ideals were interpreted in a specific, limited way that was fully compatible with the Goldman Sachsification of the U.S. economy. Protecting the environment meant carbon trading. Promoting home ownership meant subprime loans bundled together and resold as mortgage-backed securities. Equality meant meritocracy.

The reduction of equality to meritocracy was especially fateful. The progressive-neoliberal program for a just status order did not aim to abolish social hierarchy but to “diversify” it, “empowering” “talented” women, people of color, and sexual minorities to rise to the top. And that ideal was inherently class specific: geared to ensuring that “deserving” individuals from “underrepresented groups” could attain positions and pay on a par with the straight white men of their own class. The feminist variant is telling but, sadly, not unique. Focused on “leaning in” and “cracking the glass ceiling,” its principal beneficiaries could only be those already in possession of the requisite social, cultural, and economic capital. Everyone else would be stuck in the basement.

Skewed as it was, this politics of recognition worked to seduce major currents of progressive social movements into the new hegemonic bloc. Certainly, not all feminists, anti-racists, multiculturalists, and so forth were won over to the progressive neoliberal cause. But those who were, whether knowingly or otherwise, constituted the largest, most visible segment of their respective movements, while those who resisted it were confined to the margins. The progressives in the progressive neoliberal bloc were, to be sure, its junior partners, far less powerful than their allies in Wall Street, Hollywood, and Silicon Valley. Yet they contributed something essential to this dangerous liaison: charisma, a “new spirit of capitalism.” Exuding an aura of emancipation, this new “spirit” charged neoliberal economic activity with a frisson of excitement. Now associated with the forward-thinking and the liberatory, the cosmopolitan and the morally advanced, the dismal suddenly became thrilling. Thanks in large part to this ethos, policies that fostered a vast upward redistribution of wealth and income acquired the patina of legitimacy.

To achieve hegemony, however, the emerging progressive neoliberal bloc had to defeat two different rivals. First, it had to vanquish the not insubstantial remnants of the New Deal coalition. Anticipating Tony Blair’s “New Labour,” the Clintonite wing of the Democratic Party quietly disarticulated that older alliance. In place of a historic bloc that had successfully united organized labor, immigrants, African Americans, the urban middle classes, and some factions of big industrial capital for several decades, they forged a new alliance of entrepreneurs, bankers, suburbanites, “symbolic workers,” new social movements, Latinos, and youth, while retaining the support of African Americans, who felt they had nowhere else to go. Campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1991/92, Bill Clinton won the day by talking the talk of diversity, multiculturalism, and women’s rights, even while preparing to walk the walk of Goldman Sachs.
 
How Obama Destroyed Black Wealth

After the 2008 collapse, the Wall Street banks that caused the crisis got spectacular sums in the form of the Trouble Asset Relief Package (TARP) and discount loans from the Federal Reserve. According to one estimate, they received a staggering $29 trillion in cash and loans.

For homeowners, the largest source of potential relief was, ironically, that same bank bailout, which contained an unspecified appropriation to “prevent avoidable foreclosures.” The Obama administration designed and implemented the foreclosure relief effort, calling it the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), and set aside $75 billion for the effort.

But HAMP proved to be an abject failure. The basic problem was that the government paid mortgage servicers (who process the payments and paperwork for the mortgage owner) to conduct mortgage modifications. Servicers have an incentive to keep people paying on a high principal, since they receive a percentage of the outstanding debt. They even have an incentive to foreclose, because they are paid from the proceeds of a foreclosure sale before the actual owners.

Lax oversight from both the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice made things worse. Some servicers tricked people into foreclosure, according to several investigations and sworn testimony from Bank of America whistleblowers. And by repeatedly “losing” people’s paperwork or engaging in other tricks, the servicer squeezed out a final few payments and fees before foreclosing.

This kind of chicanery was illegal, and also violated the administration’s rules. But they didn’t bother to seriously investigate servicer abuses. The Treasury Department didn’t even permanently claw back a single one of its payments to abusive servicers.

Why not? Neil Barofsky, the bailout inspector general, later testified that protecting the banks was the actual goal. The administration’s aim was to “foam the runway” for the banks, as Barofsky witnessed Tim Geithner tell Elizabeth Warren. HAMP failed, in other words, because it was not designed to help homeowners.

As a result, in many cases HAMP actively enabled foreclosure. Its re-default rate — the fraction of people who got a modification and later defaulted out of the program — was 22 percent as of 2013. Only about $15 billion of the original $75 billion appropriation was spent by mid-2016.

Out of an initial promised 4 million mortgage modifications — itself a drastic underestimate — by the end of 2016 only 2.7 million had even been started. Out of that number, only 1.7 million made it to permanent modification, and of those, 558,000 eventually washed out of the program

Well worth a read, might be some clues in here about depressed black turnout in 2016.
 
Marco D'Eramo: Geographies of Ignorance. New Left Review 108, November-December 2017.

As my son turned sixteen, I realized something odd. Travelling with his mother or me, he had visited four continents, cities from Jakarta to Los Angeles, Nairobi to Moscow, but he had never been to Lucca, Pisa or Florence. He was acquainted with distant places, but those nearby were unknown, foreign to him. However, as I thought it over, it came to me that this situation was paradoxical only by the standard of the past, and represented the new normality of the present and still more the future. Once ‘faraway lands’ were swathed in the fascination of the exotic, no less so if they were crossed by the trails of our own ancestors, like Bruce Chatwin’s Patagonia. The farther away they were, the more wrapped in the mists of the unknown, the more they were to be ‘explored’. The paradigm of our consciousness of the world was, so to say, concentric. We knew all about what lay around us and what we had contact with. Then, as the distance increased, we would become ‘disoriented’, ever more completely ‘foreigners’. But the communications revolution, both material (low-cost airlines) and immaterial (radio, tv, cellphones, the internet) has meant that ‘faraway lands’ no longer exist. There is nowhere on the planet that cannot be reached in thirty hours’ flying or observed from the sky in real time on Google Earth. The faraway is now close at hand, in sight or in range.

However, this revolution has had an unintended consequence: as the faraway has been brought closer, what was nearby has become distant. This distancing of the contiguous comes about in part because of the finite nature of human life and its span of years. The more we chat by network with remote interlocutors, the less time we have to talk to our neighbours. The more we splash about in the waters off Sharm El Sheik or Puerto Rico or the Maldives, the less we find out about Calabria’s Ionian coast: this is one reason why Italians from the North are so ignorant of the South.

The distance between places is now calculated not so much in kilometres as in the level of expense and inconvenience involved in travel from one to another. In this perspective, New York is nearer to Milan than a Sicilian city like Trapani. The effect of this geographical abridgement is also one of social estrangement: it is easier to communicate with an interlocutor who, though far away, is compatible with us in culture, income and status, than with a neighbour from a different social class. (It is for this reason that many no longer pursue discussion or interact with those who think differently, as on the internet, where groups tend to form around shared ideas and opinions, confirming one another in their own beliefs—and fixations.) The end result of all this spatial disturbance is that our experience of the world is no longer concentric but maculate, like a leopard’s skin. We have a good knowledge of far-off atolls and bits of reality near at hand, all surrounded by a sea of nescience. The same city in which we were born and grew up now reveals entire neighbourhoods that are stranger, more exotic than a faraway metropolis. As with my son and Florence or Pisa, it happened to me, on the outskirts of Rome, that I came across a wholly Chinese district I’d been completely unaware of and wouldn’t be able to find again.

In his fine study, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century, Wolfgang Schivelbusch reflects on the difference between ‘landscape’ and ‘panorama’. He associates the concept of panorama with train travel because, as viewed from the small window, the foreground ran past so quickly it had to be omitted from the scene. The panorama is a landscape whose foreground, the part closest to the viewer, has been cut away. Today, for us, the entire world is viewed in panorama. We are now blind to what moves in the foreground, right in front of us, and we cannot reconstruct the landscape. Exoticism is born just around the corner or at our feet; to discover it there is no need to embark on a long flight. Instead, we need to cultivate an explorer’s sensitivity to everything that surrounds us, and which we filter out, like so much background noise. Lévi-Strauss would no longer need to go to Amazonia, nor Malinowski to Melanesia: they would be fascinated by the banlieue of Sarcelles, just north of Paris, or the hinterland of London’s orbital m25.

Comparing the two centuries, we see another map of ignorance that differentiates the twentieth from the twenty-first. I think back on the journeys my generation made, hitchhiking through Kurdistan, Iran and Afghanistan to Nepal, or the friends who bought a second-hand Peugeot in Marseille and sold it in Abidjan, travelling from the Mediterranean to Equatorial Africa. The difference between then and now is that, a half-century ago, those journeys were adventurous, but only up to a point. Today, no one would dream of repeating them, because the world has become so much more dangerous: not only the consciousness of war but also the actual state of belligerency, whether pursued on official or guerrilla terms, appears like those leopard’s spots. Who would set out now as a tourist in Somalia?

Globalization has abolished many borders. Perhaps the one mythic country that remains today is not the Amazonian jungle or the highlands of Papua New Guinea but Kim Jong-un’s North Korea, a place so shrouded in mystery as to leave us free to weave whatever fantasies we like about it. But many borders have been closed again, rendered impassable by asymmetrical guerrilla warfare. Even such sacred sites of world tourism as Paris, Barcelona or Istanbul have seen visitor numbers slump in the wake of bloody attacks. Better to wait and see. Who would risk going to Palmyra today? The same goes for exploring our inner cities. In the us, it has long been known that the first thing to ask is which parts of the city are safe. Once, before leaving home, we would check the weather to see how to dress. Today, before setting out on a journey, we check the course of wars and local gang feuds—or the incidence of rape. And so what had been brought near recedes into the distance again
 
One for the brexit thread. We could even do a map of the most ignorant places in the country.

Yes, there is something very uncomfortable about the way in which he describes the upper-middle-class experience which requires far more disposable income than most have as somehow a universal one, clearly not many sixteen year olds have visited four continents. Still, I thought the article was interesting, he is describing a very real phenomenon and it seems plausible enough to me that the sort of process he is describing must have a huge effect on identity formation for liberals who find it so easy to dismiss the majority of people who they share a country with.

As far as a map of the most ignorant places in the country, according to this maybe we should be starting with places like Cambridge and Brighton?
 
Yes, there is something very uncomfortable about the way in which he describes the upper-middle-class experience which requires far more disposable income than most have as somehow a universal one, clearly not many sixteen year olds have visited four continents. Still, I thought the article was interesting, he is describing a very real phenomenon and it seems plausible enough to me that the sort of process he is describing must have a huge effect on identity formation for liberals who find it so easy to dismiss the majority of people who they share a country with.

As far as a map of the most ignorant places in the country, according to this maybe we should be starting with places like Cambridge and Brighton?
Bristol and london too. Btw d'ermao write that great piece on populism for the NLR. He also did a scorching review of the liberal's fav on populism - Jan-Werner Müller - book on the same. Behind a paywall but i've put it here. Both deserving of being on this thread.
 
The Tropical Trump: what the rise of Jair Bolsonaro means for Brazil

In the past 18 months, one Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, has been impeached, and her replacement has faced allegations of corruption. Another former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has been accused of masterminding the largest bribery scheme in Brazilian history, yet is favourite to reclaim the post in this year’s election. Can anything top that in 2018?

Yes it can, says the man Brazilian media has dubbed the “Tropical Trump.” Jair Bolsonaro, a controversial far-right populist who is something of a mix between Donald Trump and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, is now polling between 13 and 17 per cent—second only to Lula—following a series of controversial political interventions.

The gun-loving lawmaker and former army captain caught the nation’s attention on live television when he dedicated his congressional vote that helped to impeach Rousseff to an army colonel notorious for brutality during Brazil’s military dictatorship, which ruled the country from 1964 to 1985. It was particularly shocking given that Rousseff had been tortured by the military unit the colonel had headed.

Speaking to me in his office in an upmarket district of São Paulo, Bolsonaro’s son and campaign manager, Eduardo, tried to suggest democracy has been worse for Brazil than dictatorship. “We don’t recognise it as a dictatorship—it was a military regime,” he said. Some 400,000 people went missing or died during those two decades, but Eduardo argues that pales into insignificance compared to the 50,000 people who currently die each year as a direct result of crime

Law enforcement is one of Bolsonaro’s key campaign strategies. He plans to end gun control. Outside the wealthiest state of São Paulo, urban violence has soared, with six Brazilian cities recording a homicide rate last year of 40 deaths per 100,000 citizens. (By contrast, in 2014, the UK’s rate was just under one.) Only 8 per cent of Brazilian crimes are resolved, and a recent survey found more than half of Brazilians said they would vote for an authoritarian candidate if it meant they would be safer. In another, 60 per cent of adults agreed with the statement “most of our social issues would be solved if we could get rid of immoral people, delinquents and perverts.”

Like Trump, Bolsonaro is a master of social media. His straight-talking tweets speak directly to Brazilian voters tired of false political promises. Television remains the biggest campaign driver in Brazil though, and unlike Trump, Bolsonaro won’t be getting much airtime. “He’ll only have a one-minute slot on television when the campaign kicks off,” says Thiago de Aragão a political analyst at Arko Advice, a consultancy based in Brasilia. “The three major parties in Brazil can buy airtime and destroy a newcomer.”

Bolívar Lamounier, a Brazilian political scientist, argues Bolsonaro’s law and order campaign is not a sufficiently powerful platform to beat a mainstream candidate in crime-ravaged Brazil. “Unlike the sort of campaigns in the United States, no one in Brazil believes he has a solution to crime. Because Brazil has no solution, or at least not in the time of one single term of office,” he says, “Bolsonaro has been overestimated.”

What the rising popularity of a far-right candidate does represent for Brazil is a lurch towards conservatism, disrupting the political landscape for the first time in decades. Eduardo agrees. He expects many more right-wing deputies to be elected to parliament: “We don’t want to win next year’s race: we want conservatism to return.”
 
The Man from Red Vienna by Robert Kuttner. 21/12/17
Review of Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left by Gareth Dale
Polanyi believed that the only way politically to temper the destructive influence of organized capital and its ultra-market ideology was with highly mobilized, shrewd, and sophisticated worker movements. He concluded this not from Marxist economic theory but from close observation of interwar Europe’s most successful experiment in municipal socialism: Red Vienna, where he worked as an economic journalist in the 1920s. And for a time in the post–World War II era, the entire West had an egalitarian form of capitalism built on the strength of the democratic state and underpinned by strong labor movements. But since the era of Thatcher and Reagan that countervailing power has been crushed, with predictable results.
 
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