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Osama bin Laden killed by US forces in Pakistan

Threat to US-Pakistan relations threat may be overhyped at the moment, hard to be sure. It was already in a bit of trouble, although I note that the Pakistani authorities quietly released that CIA bloke some weeks back.

Certainly in the early years after 9/11 it was very noticeable that when it came to discussion in the USA about of the role of other nations and the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was made invisible and attention was directed towards Saudi Arabia instead. I assume this was partly because of the sensitive relationship between US and Pakistan, and also the troublesome period in history where OBL & pals were on 'our side'. I note that this stuff was handled in a blatantly iffy way on the BBC news last night, where the John Simpson-narrated obituary skipped conveniently from 'Osama found a cause to fight for' straight to his anti-western terrorism in the late 90's.

One other thing to take into account - at least on the wider level - is Pakistan's developing relationship with China.
 
used to be such a nice thread too :(

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etc etc
 
Forgive me if this has been mentioned...



If they want anyone to believe anything they find, they'd better arrange for it to be leaked and protest vehemently. Who would believe an official statement claimed to be based on these?

I notice they're already saying 'be ready for a posthumous OBL tape, it proves nothing' :D
 
In a few bullet points, off the top of my head, this is what I see as some of the broad implications of these events.

1. I think there will be increased pressure on Obama to take a harder line on Pakistan. In particular for him to demand more active support for US policy in Afghanistan and in particular for more open support for US cross border military action in Pakistan. This may well take the form of threats of the withdrawal of financial aid to Pakistan. Currently Pakistan recieves $1.5 billion in military aid and £1 billion in non military aid annually. Obama is on a high right now and his domestic opposition are on the backfoot. Pakistan and demands for withdrawal of financial aid are just the issue that they can use to beat him with.

2 His response will have very important implications for Pakistan because US military action in Pakistan is extremely unpopular, especially the use of drones. Pressure on the civilian leadership of Pakistan for them to move against terror and Afghan rebel forces operating within the country will put them in a direct conflict path with the Pakistani population. The Pakistani Taliban is a significant military force within Pakistan, so strong that the Pakistan government has been following a policy of negotiation. This may go out of the window if Pakistan responds to US demands. Thus increased internal conflict seems inevitable and may well increase the influence of both the Pakistani Taliban and religious parties at the cost of further weakening the Pakistani civilian elites.

3. Karzai has been eagerly siezing on Pakistans involvement in hiding Al Qaeda in order to attack Pakistan. By doing this he adds further pressure on both the US and on Pakistan to act against Afghani insurgents within Pakistan.

4. The US may take this opportunity, effectively the end of the original motivation for invading Afghanistan, to end the counter insurgency and nation building operation in Afghanistan, to withdrawal significant forces and to replace that policy with a counter terrorism policy in Afghanistand and Pakistan

There are many other factors of course but I focus on these for one reason. All of the above points to one very worrying thing. That the expansion of the Afghan war into Pakistan is a very real possibility. Pakistan is to Afghanistan what Cambodia was to Vietnam. A sideshow as William Shawcross famously put it., But a side show that led to the destruction of Cambodian society and to the rule of Pol Pot. The analogy is limited of course but accurate enough. If we replace Pol Pot with the Taliban the future of Pakistan is looking very dark indeed.
 
One flaw in the final paragraph's analogy is that the KR was a tightly knit and highly disciplined controlled from within by a secret party - whereas the Taliban seem to be a much more diffuse and fractionalised movement. Though maybe the ISI fills the role of the 'secret organisation'.
 
Forgive me if this has been mentioned...



If they want anyone to believe anything they find, they'd better arrange for it to be leaked and protest vehemently. Who would believe an official statement claimed to be based on these?

wonder what his porn collection consisted of?
 
Not the best analogy. The 'sideshow' was eventually to get out militarily. And as a side note, it could be said that Shawcross actually offered his tacit support for Pol Pot (re the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea), when turning around from his earlier positions on the US waging one of the most brutal onslaughts on an unarmed peasantry, and saw a need to prevent Soviet influence from spreading in Indochina after 1979. With a Socialist Vietnam as its bridgehead.
 
One flaw in the final paragraph's analogy is that the KR was a tightly knit and highly disciplined controlled from within by a secret party - whereas the Taliban seem to be a much more diffuse and fractionalised movement. Though maybe the ISI fills the role of the 'secret organisation'.

I think the analogy is limited as I said nevertheless it remains a worthwhile one. Cambodia was a country that became dragged into a neighbouring countries war. Experienced US political interference (a CIA supported coup), cross border military raids and (secret and illegal) bombing which in turn drove the population into the arms of the resistance. Cambodia was a country that was given an ultimatum of "you are with us or against us" and by choosing the US fuelled a vicious civil war and led to Pol Pot.

Pakistan is a country that may be dragged into a neighbouring country's war. May experience US political interference (massive financial aid and threats of withdrawal of that aid) Is facing cross border raids and bombing which is increasingly alienating the population against its civilian leadership. May well face a US ultimatum of "you are with us or against us" and by choosing the US may fuel a vicious civil war and lead to an Islamist victory. The analogies bear consideration
 
Not the best analogy. The 'sideshow' was eventually to get out militarily. And as a side note, it could be said that Shawcross actually offered his tacit support for Pol Pot (re the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea), when turning around from his earlier positions on the US waging one of the most brutal onslaughts on an unarmed peasantry, and saw a need to prevent Soviet influence from spreading in Indochina after 1979. With a Socialist Vietnam as its bridgehead.

Yes indeed he did. He has the dubious honour of disowning his own (excellent) book. As far as the sideshow being to eventually get out militarily, this may turn out to be the case in Afghanistan too. See bullet point 4 in my post above
 
One flaw in the final paragraph's analogy is that the KR was a tightly knit and highly disciplined controlled from within by a secret party - whereas the Taliban seem to be a much more diffuse and fractionalised movement. Though maybe the ISI fills the role of the 'secret organisation'.

The Khmer Rouge were never really tightly knit. One of its main weaknesses as an armed movement then revolutionary government was that it was fractionalised. The Pol Potists, if you could call them that (an intellectual core allied, in an ad hoc fashion, with militarist peasant rebels) tried to concentrate power in their hands. The DK regime, after all, was characterised by a bloody power struggle between conflicting figures and groups based on regional influence, divides going back to the late 1960s insurgency and 1970-75 civil war. An attempt was made by Pol Pot and his associates, through 1975-79, to subordinate regional political and military power to a central authority.
 
Now that would be outstandlingly stupid.

Power in Pakistan gets seized by the wahabi faction of the ISI, with nuclear weapons?
 
Theres a world of difference between a few senators saying stuff and the US government actually taking action. And I grow somewhat weary of your trumpet blowing, oh fountain of wisdom.
 
Now that would be outstandlingly stupid.

Power in Pakistan gets seized by the wahabi faction of the ISI, with nuclear weapons?

There is no significant wahabi faction of the ISI. Pakistan's approach to the Taliban is strategic not ideological
 
Theres a world of difference between a few senators saying stuff and the US government actually taking action. And I grow somewhat weary of your trumpet blowing, oh fountain of wisdom.

Ouch!.:(

(far more important than whether my analysis is correct or not is the implications of my analysis if I am right. They are not good)
 
The Khmer Rouge were never really tightly knit. One of its main weaknesses as an armed movement then revolutionary government was that it was fractionalised. The Pol Potists, if you could call them that (an intellectual core allied, in an ad hoc fashion, with militarist peasant rebels) tried to concentrate power in their hands. The DK regime, after all, was characterised by a bloody power struggle between conflicting figures and groups based on regional influence, divides going back to the late 1960s insurgency and 1970-75 civil war. An attempt was made by Pol Pot and his associates, through 1975-79, to subordinate regional political and military power to a central authority.

You win this round, FWC autodidact - but we shall meet again. :mad:
 
See the Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman was at pains to emphasise a willingness to cooperate with the US in the 'global war on terror' while simultaneously backing up Pak govt claims to have known nothing.
Don't think they're in a position to set up a separate camp altogether quite yet and also find the WOT rubric useful in their own Central Asian relations. Also strikes me that none of the rumoured ISI shenanigans (which must be true at some level) would be news to anyone of any seniority in US policy circles, so barring a bit of shouting from the usual suspects is it really going to change relations that much while there's still pragmatic reasons to maintain the fiction of Pakistan as an ally?
 
What would the Pakistan Govt/military have to gain from sheltering OBL? Or rather, what would elements of Pakistan Govt/militaty have to gain?
 
What would the Pakistan Govt/military have to gain from sheltering OBL? Or rather, what would elements of Pakistan Govt/militaty have to gain?

As I read, part of their strategy to contain/oppose India, which is their top priority. Networking with Islamists who can be brought into play as required in Kashmir and in actions like the Mumbai massacre.
 
Ouch!.:(

(far more important than whether my analysis is correct or not is the implications of my analysis if I am right. They are not good)

My criticism came out harsher than I intended, apologies. Its nice to be right and its not always easy to downplay such feelings.

As for what happens with Pakistan, we will just have to wait and see - they will be made to feel the heat for this Osama stuff for a while, especially in the press, but Im still skeptical as to whether they will suffer any profound consequences as a result. The implications of your analysis are the exact reason why I dont think such a turn of events is a given by any means, the stakes are high and I dont think the USA can afford to wash its hands of Pakistan.
 
As I read, part of their strategy to contain/oppose India, which is their top priority. Networking with Islamists who can be brought into play as required in Kashmir and in actions like the Mumbai massacre.

Can't really see the military popping round the compound for a bit of networking with OBL, tbh
 
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