The notion that Pakistan’s all pervasive Army-controlled Inter-Services Intelligence was unaware of bin Laden's presence beggars belief.
Although Bush-era National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley feigned total surprise about the location and its implications in an on-air interview after the news broke, Wikileaks, as well as other sources such as investigative journalist Bob Woodward's most recent book, tell a very different story. By 2008, the United States political and military leadership had lost all remnants of faith in the trustworthiness of the Pakistani military and its intelligence wing, the ISI, internally acknowledging that it consistently "hunted with the hounds and ran with the hares", including the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqanis, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba - and was involved in planning terrorist attacks from Kabul to Mumbai.
Pakistani intelligence has had a close relationship with bin Laden since the early 1980s, when he acted as a courier, transferring funds from Saudi intelligence and its establishment to the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami to support the anti-Soviet jihad. It is no surprise that bin Laden chose to relocate to eastern Afghanistan, an area within Pakistan's sphere of influence, in 1996 - after he was expelled from Sudan under US pressure. Of course, the relationship has never been smooth - Pakistan's opportunism alienated al Qaeda just as much as such behaviour alienated the United States - but also made it just as indispensable.
Funded by the US taxpayer
Despite this, the United States continued to funnel billions to the Pakistani armed forces in sophisticated weapons and cash - most recently a US$2billion package announced in October 2010 under the State Department’s Foreign Military Finance Program. The US is paying, not only for the use of Pakistan as a logistical corridor to its troops in Afghanistan, but for the privilege of conducting an increasingly aggressive covert counter-terrorism campaign on Pakistani soil - often against the Pakistani government's client groups.