And I do know a few things about how a little problem of "freedom" looks like when mathematical logics is applied and a jolly "thinker" tries to say anything meaningful about it from such a grand and sound foundation, so I don't need any big advice about just how far a mathematician could possibly go...
Well if you won't take my advise try Hegel's. You are complaining about the fact that mathematical thinking tends to express things in no uncertain terms ie. it represents a method of determination of things.
Try this for size:
"Mention has already been made above of the thing-in-itself, and it was remarked that the thing-in-itself as such is nothing but the empty abstraction from all determinateness, of which admittedly we can know nothing, for the very reason that it is supposed to be the abstraction from every determination. The thing-in-itself being thus presupposed as the indeterminate, all determination falls outside it into an alien reflection to which it is indifferent. For transcendental idealism this external reflection is consciousness. Since this philosophical system places every determinateness of things both as regards form and content, in consciousness, the fact that I see leaves of a tree not as black but as green, the sun as round and not square, and taste sugar as sweet and not bitter, that I determine the first and second strokes of a clock as successive and not as one beside the other, nor determine the first as cause and the second as effect, and so on, all this something which, from this standpoint, falls in me, the subject. This crude presentation of subjective idealism is directly contradicted by the consciousness of freedom, according to which I know myself rather as the universal and undetermined, and separate off from myself those manifold and necessary determinations, recognizing them as something external for and belonging only to things… I have shown elsewhere that this transcendental idealism does not get away from the limitation of the ego by the object, but only changes the form of the limitation, which remains for it an absolute, merely giving it a subjective instead of an objective shape and making into determinatenesses of the ego and into a turbulent whirlpool of change within it (as if the ego were a thing) that which the ordinary consciousness knows as a manifoldness and alteration belonging to things external to it." Hegel, Remark on the Thing-in-itself of Transcendental Idealism, Science of Logic (translated by A.V. Miller).
So in locating the Notions of Malthus in the Notions of Darwin you see only a new subjective shape of the Notion. The falsity of Malthus lives on in Darwin. This is what happens when you consider only the subjective.
Notice that this subjective idealism, according to Hegel, implicitly rejects the subjectivist's own cherished concept of "freedom of the consciouness".
Notice also the rigid way in which you see people of different "traditions" as being unable to communicate their ideas to one another. Again denying your cherished concept of "freedom".
Of course I think all this talk of freedom is just idealist angels on pinheads stuff. But it is worth pointing out that Hegel, despite all his faults, was a realist. He was unafraid of objectivity, of truth and all the formal judgements that accompany the formal logic of truth. This indeed was a special case of his philosophical system.
"Objective truth is no doubt the Idea itself as the reality that corresponds to the Notion, and to this extent an object may or may not possess truth; but, on the other hand, the more precise meaning of truth is that it is truth for or in the subjective Notion, in knowing. It is the relation of the Notion judgement which showed itself to be the formal judgement of truth; in it, namely, the predicate is not merely the objectivity of the Notion, but the relating comparison of the Notion of the subject-matter with its actuality." Hegel, Idea of Truth, Science of Logic.
In other words the criteria for truth are not found in the "Notion" that we have but in how the "Notion" relates to the subject-matter.
So all this pure ideological/methodological criticism (while ignoring all the work done by scientists on the subject-matter with a few smilies and a "yeuuk!!") cannot say anything about the subject-matter and in doing so (according to Hegel) can only restrict our freedom.
All this is strongly related to Hegel's concept of "Aufheben" - negating while preserving. Roughly - what Hegel calls "Notions" (not to be confused with "Ideas") cannot be negated and cast aside as they, considered in themselves do not relate to the "Actuality". Hence Hegel rejecting the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity and so forth in logic.
Again there is no Aufheben in what you say. Malthus was wrong, wrongity wrong, wrong wrong. Yet this says nothing about applying his "Notions" to a new subject-matter.
Of course the way I argued it the first time round - without the philosophical detour - was much better.
Ayayayyaaaaaayyy...
