Evolutionary strategies/behaviours and culture

[littlebabyjesus]

That it is linguistically constructed and serves the interests of hegemonic power. Bascially dismantling the distinction between logic and rhetoric and claiming that everything is rhetoric. This dovetails with empiricism because it outlaws reason as a means to truth. Hence people who say "God/Geist doesn't exist, where is He then, show us a picture, go on..." and so forth.

Not quite. What I say, very precisely, is that the exisitence of the knower cannot be denied, but any speculation as to its nature is invalid and worthy of the label mysticism. Hence terms such as God/Geist are meaningless.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

No its not. It is to recognize an obvious truth: that our experience of the world is conditioned by the nature of our minds. We do not, and cannot, experience the world as it really is. But we do know that there is a world outside or beyond our experience of it. This follows from our recognition of the fact that our experience is specific and perspectival. Recognizing this, we will live and think in very different ways than if we assume, with the naive empiricists, that we can and do experience the world as it really is.

This is where the mysticism comes in. You have described a set of assumptions that we all make, but that, ultimately, cannnot be proved.

 

[Jonti]

Part of the motivation for logical positivism was to overthrow the idea that there could be meaningful and information-bearing truths, knowledge of which did not derive from experience ...

This sounds a lot like maths to me; I certainly see the truths of arithmetic and trigonometry as meaningful and, yes, bearing information. Sufficient to erect buildings, for one example.

Arithmetic would be true, even if there were no-one to experience it!

 

[phildwyer]

This is where the mysticism comes in. You have described a set of assumptions that we all make, but that, ultimately, cannnot be proved.

It can be proved that our experience is contingent and perspectival, can't it? And this recognition brings into existence the theoretical possibility of a non-contingent, non-perspectival experience. Obviously such an experience would not be human.

 

[118118]

often forms an unholy alliance with the postmodernist

like where?

 

[Fruitloop]

It can be proved that our experience is contingent and perspectival, can't it? And this recognition brings into existence the theoretical possibility of a non-contingent, non-perspectival experience. Obviously such an experience would not be human.

Does it though? The act of describing something doesn't imply its existence either in actual or in possible worlds; vis the Armando Ianucci example 'the opposite of a placard'.

Personally I can't imagine what a non-perspectival experience would be like, since our notions of what constitutes an experience seem to be strongly tied to the idea of what it's like to be something in particular (and thus already not 'everything').

 

[phildwyer]

Personally I can't imagine what a non-perspectival experience would be like, since our notions of what constitutes an experience seem to be strongly tied to the idea of what it's like to be something in particular (and thus already not 'everything').

I'm not saying we can imagine what it would be like. Clearly we cannot. But we can conceive of its existence, indeed we have to do so once we realize that our own experience is perspectival.

Armando Ianucci

I was once his drummer.

 

[kyser_soze]

Personally I can't imagine what a non-perspectival experience would be like,

I'm not saying we can imagine what it would be like. Clearly we cannot. But we can conceive of its existence,

Same as we can conceive of what came before the Big Bang but never actually 'know' it.

 

[Fruitloop]

They are both just an arrangement of words with no semantic content, IMO. If time begins at the Big Bang then what sense does 'before the Big Bang' make? I guess there are other examples of really existing unknowables, like the stuff inside a black hole, maybe, but I don't in any sense think that because a set of words can be arranged in a particular order that the concept so defined has any more claim to existence than it did before - it is simply 'the opposite of a placard'.

 

[CJohn]

So my question is, to what degree can the science of genetic evolution ever say anything about 'human nature' when culture seems to have such a strong influence? Can science provide useful information about 'human nature' at all when 'culture' is too complex a phenomenon for it to explain? Should whatever can be said about human nature be left to psychologists and social scientists (who take account of culture), or is it possible to discuss certain norms from the evolutionary angle?

Well, 'selfishness' and 'co-operation' in themselves only make sense as signifers within a culture which gives such terms meaning. In this sense, even genetic explanation already presupposes specific human concepts. Science is not outside of culture, and scientific descriptions always priviledge a cerstain cultural ideology.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Same as we can conceive of what came before the Big Bang but never actually 'know' it.

I would dispute even that. We cannot conceive what came 'before' time, since the concept 'before' requires a time reference to make any sense.

 

[gorski]

Have a look at Stephen Jay Gould's essay 'Kropotkin was no crackpot' (available on libcom) for an interesting read about the russian take on darwinian theory - very much along the lines that Darwin's work was too influenced by the UK and its conditions at the time.

"Libcom" meant this, I suspect:

http://libcom.org/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libcom

A bit of push for our forumites...

Thanx!

 

[Jonti]

Well, 'selfishness' and 'co-operation' in themselves only make sense as signifers within a culture which gives such terms meaning. In this sense, even genetic explanation already presupposes specific human concepts. Science is not outside of culture, and scientific descriptions always priviledge a cerstain cultural ideology.

So what "cultural ideology" are you aiming to privilege with your (meta)scientific claim? And, while you're at it, pleease explain what "cultural ideology" is promoted by Fleming's Left Hand Rule?

I think we should be told!!

 

[gorski]

That if you're a right handed person wanking with yer left is much more difficult...

 

[Jonti]

I think we should be told!!

And I don't think you can

 

[gorski]

Btw, dear Johhny boy, and the other political gun-slingers here: this thread is the LIVING EMBODIMENT OF JUST HOW I "DO NOT BACK MY CLAIMS UP"....

I prove them, in a step-by-step, point-by-point, toe-to-toe careful manner [like "we do not have any instincts" by teaching you the ABC of thinking in the area, from cleaning up the elementary notions and distinguishing the important ones in all of this - as opposed to you jumbling it all up together in a silly, mish-mash manner!] and you lot just continually keep claiming "we do 'ave 'em!" Smashing! Don't you just love that sort of "backing up one's claims"!

[Here is your scared shitless "logic": "Do not dare challenge the widely held beliefs, as we are not ready to give up on them yet, because we do not see anything better to replace it with -> so, we do not dare question it, ergo no one better dare, because anything critical towards it => regression and "playing for the other [the Church dogma] side!" WOW... ]

 

[Jonti]

I like you, you illustrate so very well the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of a generation of failed philosophers .

You have it all: the sneering superiority; the lofty snobbishness; the belief that only the elite can really understand How Things Are. If you didn't exist, a satirist would have had to invent you. But truth is stranger than fiction. I'm sure you will be a great inspiration to writers of political comedy!

 

[gorski]

There is no greater snob than you: it's the Science and the Sceintists who are the Superior lot to them all.... and Your glorious self is one of them, of course... as [at least] you can partly understand Them, unlike most of those Great Unwashed... Oh, please... Kettle and pot shite...

 

[gorski]

Btw, Nosos characterised you very nicely: if it ain't "simple and elegant" [so even you can understand it and it even may appeal to you] - it must be wrong! You twat!

 

[gorski]

Heheheheheeeeeee.... See this, please...

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071203/ap_on_sc/chimp_memory

Any comments?

 

[urbanrevolt]

Strangely enough I've been reading some quite interesting stuff on recirpocal altruism, Trivers, Dawkins, Maynard Smith etc for a course I'm doing.

Dawkins is by no means a genetic determinist and the prisoners' dilemma, hwaks/doves and other games I think yield important insights both about the evolution of genetic co-operation and in cultural evolution how meaning making beings e.g. humans (possibly chimps!) can get together to co-operate and punish defectors.

The chimp stuff is fascinating too.

I think it is probable that we have instincts but instincts we can over-ride ie. biases we can creatively rationally decide to not follow.

 

[urbanrevolt]

Matt Ridley's The Origin of Virtue is interesting particualrly Chapter 12 The Power of Property where he argues that communal ownership rights with local commune like democratic control is a way forward for protecting th environment avoiding the tragedy of the commons scenarios and perhaps a model for human development in general?

I also like the quote from Dawkins at end of Selfish Gene:
"We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and if necessary the selfish memes of our indoctrination... We alone on earth can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators." quoted p179 in Dennet's thought-provoking and generally excellent book Freedom Evolves.

By the way, Trivers who wrote intro to selfish gene (which popularised his among other views) was a good friend to huey P newton and later signed up member of the Black panthers. Maynard Smith was also a Marxist interestingly enough

quite good article here on Dawkins which avoids the all too common leftist stereotyping http://www.permanentrevolution.net/?view=entry&entry=1547

 

[Fruitloop]

Wow, that is actually startlingly reasonable. And they only used the word 'reductionist' once!

 

[urbanrevolt]

I'm not sure I completely agree with Matthew Cobb's rejection of memes, though.

Sure it's not established itself as a scientific theory but there are examples where cultural ideas can spread in a way at elast analagous to genes. an example might be co-operative behaviour for example. To some extent religion could be another.

However, where I probably would agree with Matthew is that other social explanantions should at least be considered as well, perhaps in addiiton or sometimes as th eprime explanation.

 

[SpookyFrank]

I'm not sure I completely agree with Matthew Cobb's rejection of memes, though.

Sure it's not established itself as a scientific theory but there are examples where cultural ideas can spread in a way at elast analagous to genes. an example might be co-operative behaviour for example. To some extent religion could be another.

However, where I probably would agree with Matthew is that other social explanantions should at least be considered as well, perhaps in addiiton or sometimes as th eprime explanation.

There's a good Steven Jay Gould essay called 'Shades of Lamarck' which discusses the simillarities between biological and cultural evolution. There are some very important differences which weaken Dawkins' analogy; particularly the fact that biological evolution by natural selection can only ever act at the level of a single individual rather than a population or a species, and that biological evolution depends upon discrete, observable factors (ie gene sequences and other biochemical thingumies) whilst things like co-operative behaviour are impossible to pin down to a single observable cause. Gould argues that the process of 'social evolution' is more like the way biological evolution was thought to occur before Darwin and Wallace showed up, so the idea of memes is probably counterproductive from the point of view of getting the real mechanism of evolution across to people.

Can't find a link to that essay, but it's in Gould's book 'The Panda's Thumb' which is easily my favourite science book ever

 

[Fruitloop]

I'm not sure I completely agree with Matthew Cobb's rejection of memes, though.

Sure it's not established itself as a scientific theory but there are examples where cultural ideas can spread in a way at elast analagous to genes. an example might be co-operative behaviour for example. To some extent religion could be another.

However, where I probably would agree with Matthew is that other social explanantions should at least be considered as well, perhaps in addiiton or sometimes as th eprime explanation.

Yeah, well the advantage of being a good reductionist is that you're only tied to notions of actual causality at the lowest level, so it's perfectly possible to have different schema for higher-level operations without that necessarily meaning that either is wrong.

 

[urbanrevolt]

Yeah, well the advantage of being a good reductionist is that you're only tied to notions of actual causality at the lowest level, so it's perfectly possible to have different schema for higher-level operations without that necessarily meaning that either is wrong.

Isn't that though what Matthew Cobb is arguing: Dawkins puts forward his idea of memes as an analogy to genetic evolution but that, Cobb argues, memes are not testable- it may or may not be a poetic metaphor but of no scientific exaplanatory power.

Cobb's argument, like yours, is cogently made

Dawkins’ dinner-party conceit has no way of explaining the success of one particular form over another. To take a trivial example – why did the “meme” of mini-skirts spread in the 1960s? Why was it subsequently supplanted? There is no answer to these questions at the level of the “meme” – they can only be answered by reference to cultural effects, which is a different level of analysis.

However, I think following Dennett that, while in many areas, memes are of no analytical use there might be some areas of human behaviour that can be effevtively modelled by behaviours that are replicated and through replication attain success- e.g. co-operative behaviour- you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours- and plausibly other tyoes of human behaviour may be modelled like that.

In the end, though, the question would be whether the models were of any use in predicting actual human behaviour- do they yield insights which allow us to model behaviour in complex situations which we would otherwise not be able to predict. Of course I don't know the answer but I think it's an intriguing possibility.

However, I think there are almost certainly whole areas of human behaviour where the appropriate level of explanantion is indeed cultural.

I will at some point check out the Gould book; thanks, Spooky Frank

 

[gorski]

Cultural and civilisational, epochally different, as we have changed the very nature of our societies and hence ourselves, that is to say how we reproduce our lives, life as such/mode of production, depending on the pillar relationship in a given epoch/civilisation/culture.

For instance, a quote from Wiki:

Human sexuality comprises a broad range of behavior and processes, including the physiological, psychological, social, cultural, political, philosophical, ethical, moral, theological, legal and spiritual or religious aspects of sex and human sexual behavior.

Sexuality varies greatly by culture, region, and historical period...

My comment:

Well, not "greatly" but essentially! Human "courtship" today and 2000 years ago in Rome, for instance, or 1000 years ago in feudal Turkey, have nothing in common, when it comes to "how one chooses a mate" [if one can choose at all, i.e. if it isn't all determined for one by others/customs] etc. Or how frequently one does it or whom with, which positions one assumes etc. etc. Ancient Greeks anyone? Victorian England? "Modern" Japan? Kama Sutra's India and today's India? And so forth...

So, how is this "natural behaviour" "natural" if women [or even men, as potential sexual partners, for that matter] can't choose for themselves for who knows how many thousands of years - and then, we change it drastically? What happened to "natural behaviour" up until then? And how can we be so presumptuous to claim that this behaviour we now established is an absolutely "natural" one, i.e. in accordance with [no less than] the "laws of nature" and hence "normative". From those, then, we start building legal, political, societal structures [customs and even "feelings" according to such "values/attitudes/principles"]... Should we not be really careful there?

Our 'mere observations', as seen above , are marred [frequently utterly uncritically] by our time and space, our experiences, education, our societal structures [Darwin and Wallace by Malthus, for instance] etc. etc.

"Objective" suddenly seems very temporary and heavily time/space dependent. We better answer those Q's before we jump to such far-reaching conclusions, with many potential consequences with regards to how we see ourselves, our very "nature" and then organise our societies in accordance with the "latest scientific 'insights'"...

One more important point: Modernity has different strands, one could say: an aggressive subject, forcing everything before him/herself, as it were, as well as the intersubjective strand, as Habermas would have us believe. Many consequences, many possibilities to be drawn from there...

 

[gorski]

Phildwyer said, btw, on the topic:

Dawkins does not espouse anything close to 'the standard evolutionary model.' Any attempt to apply Darwinian theory to human society is doomed to disastrous failure, and bound to produce reactionary politics.

Let everyone note Jonti's allusion here to Daniel Dennett's foolish and reactionary book, "Darwin's Dangerous Idea." Dennett is among the most blindly dogmatic sociobiologists, and he argues that all human societies and sciences can be reduced to the principles of natural selection. He also attacks SJ Gould's superb re-reading of Darwin. He is in short an ultra-Darwinist of the conservative, Dawkinsite tendency. So it seems that Jonti has inadvertantly revealed his true colours at long last.

 

[urbanrevolt]

Phildwyer said, btw, on the topic:



Let everyone note Jonti's allusion here to Daniel Dennett's foolish and reactionary book, "Darwin's Dangerous Idea." Dennett is among the most blindly dogmatic sociobiologists, and he argues that all human societies and sciences can be reduced to the principles of natural selection. He also attacks SJ Gould's superb re-reading of Darwin. He is in short an ultra-Darwinist of the conservative, Dawkinsite tendency. So it seems that Jonti has inadvertantly revealed his true colours at long last.

Couple of quick responses to this. haven't read Darwin's Dangerous Idea (DDI) but have read Dennett's Freedom Evolves and think it is mistaken to describe him (in that book at least) as dangerously dogmatic- of course we don't have to agree with every idea he has (and I admit I';ve not read DDI) but in Freedom Evolves he happily acknowledges that human beings have the freedom to act in ways not determined by their genes- though he does argue that we have instincts that are genetic- this should neither be rejected out of hand nor automatically assumed- it's an empirical question to an extent.

However, what is absolutely key and explicitly recognsed by Dawkins is that human culture has escaped genetic determinism- indeed whether we are the only animals to have done so is perhaps open to question but humans more than any other animal (as far as we know!) are thinking conscious beings. Dawkins recognises this as I commented earlier:

I also like the quote from Dawkins at end of Selfish Gene:
"We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and if necessary the selfish memes of our indoctrination... We alone on earth can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators." quoted p179 in Dennet's thought-provoking and generally excellent book Freedom Evolves.

The question of memes of course is a seperate one- but the argument that some of our behaviour is partly detemrined by learned repetivie behaviours that are replicated across populations and generations should neither be confused with genetic determinism nor the idea that we are fully determined by either genes or memes.

Hence Gorski's points are important when directed against those who really hold a simplisitc and reductionist view of human nature- indeed much of human sexuality as Gorski argues is historically and socially determined- in my opinion almost all the important facets of human sexuality (though I think it too hasty to reject entirely genetically based instincts- which can however be cultiurally over-ridden- though I have an open mind on this).


Hence his final point

One more important point: Modernity has different strands, one could say: an aggressive subject, forcing everything before him/herself, as it were, as well as the intersubjective strand, as Habermas would have us believe.

I think is more usefully related to the questions of capitalism and the constructions of identity through for example advertising, propaganda, class struggle and social movements.

In other words, the questions are political and social. That does not however preclude thoeries and models such as game theory as having potential insihts that can help us as conscious, creative socially networking beings in attempting to make a better society.