This is merely a formality.
Formal logic has no content.
But the meaning can be preserved in certain cases when we swap propostional statements with non-propositional statements.
Yes.
See post 1262
Epistemology
- Thread starter bodach
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This is merely a formality.
Formal logic has no content.
But the meaning can be preserved in certain cases when we swap propostional statements with non-propositional statements.
Yes.
See post 1262
Good point.
I think it if it makes sense to know a proposition then it makes sense to believe that proposition.
However, I refer to post 1264 for an example of how knowing a proposition and believing a proposition are radically different.
And I refer to 1262 for an example of how knowing a proposition is the same as know how.
Yes but you say that knowing any facts about chemistry is impossible, while "knowing a bit about chemistry" might be possible. How is this possible?
We can also see that some of these propositions are heavily dependent on know how.
1) Water boils at 100C
2) I know how to tell when water is about to boil by putting a thermometre in it and observing when it approaches the 100C mark.
If we can justify 2) then we can justify 1). We could call 1) a summary of 2) (and perhaps other similar "know how statements") and mean no more by it.
We can't discuss qualities of "knowledge of one type" in isolation of "knowledge of other types".
Its like building only the walls of a house which make living in it less exposed to the elements. If we ignore supporting walls then the house is likely to collapse.
If we take out all the supporting knowledge of our house of knowledge and leave only the bits which technically support our specification - the propositional bits - then it is no surprise that the house of knowledge collapses.
max_freakout
Nothing matters
knowing anything is impossible
no i have not said whether this is possible or impossible, it is a vague statement and would have to be thoroughly specified before it could be analysed
max_freakout
Nothing matters
i dont understand the relevance of either of these ^ statements to waht i was asking you
epistemology studies propositional knowledge, when i say knowledge is impossible, i mean this in the epistemological sense
i disagree, they cannot be meaningfully swapped round, ie "how to ride a bike" can not be expressed as a proposition
max_freakout
Nothing matters
the examples you gave did not address the point
try to think of one proposition that can be known, without being believed, there isnt one
and try to think of a proposition, the truth of which can be expressed as a proposition, again, there isnt one
max_freakout
Nothing matters
2 is a justification of 1
epistemology studies propositional knowledge in isolation from other types of knowledge, so this ^ is not true
the reason for this, is that the central issue of interest for philosophy in general, is TRUTH, and propositional knowledge is the only kind of knowledge which is relevant to truth
Any proposition is vague. What's water? How much impurities can we have in water before it ceases to be water? Do we count only H2O molecules as water? How about H4O2 or H6O3? What about quantum supperpositions of molecules?
Has anybody really analysed what we mean when we say water boils at 100C?
We can still say water boils at 100C.
max_freakout
Nothing matters
yes i agree, you can say, and believe, whatever you want, and all propositions are inherently vague
but this has no bearing on the fact that knowledge is impossible
Don't worry, I'll remind you next time you say nothing.
I didn't say this could always be done. I have never said there is no distinction. I have said there is no sharp distinction.
The postbox is opposite the garage.
I presume the "proposition" in the above should be "non-propostion".
Of course non-propositions cannot be true - this is just a formal point.
But we can swap a proposition for a know-how statement without changing the meaning.
The only type of wall which shelters us from the elements are walls which shelter us from the elements. We are not concerned with supporting walls.
Empty tautology followed by willful stupidity.
max_freakout
Nothing matters
propositional knowledge involves propositions
non-propositional knowledge doesnt involve propositions
this is a sharp, unambiguous distinction, it divides up all knowledge ascriptions into propositional and non-propositional
It has bearing on the possibility that "I know a little chemistry" is not too vague to be assessed.
This is the formal difference and the formal difference is indeed sharp, but trivial.
I was talking about meaning not exact formulations.
Edit: Ferchrissake, obviously "know that" is formally different from "know how" - the words "that" and "how" being different. They sound different and they are spelt differently. Yes there is a very sharp distinction here. Obviously I was not talking about this!
max_freakout
Nothing matters
from the point of view of philosophy, it is not trivial, because overall, philosophy is about truth, more than anything else, and only propositional knowledge is about truth
there is no 'truth' in knowing how to ride a bike, so the analysisof this kind of knowledge, is not relevant to philosophy
max_freakout
Nothing matters
"I know a little chemistry" is not about truth, and as such it is uninteresting to epistemological study of knowledge
max_freakout
Nothing matters
this is no different from any other proposition, it is just a trivial example of a proposition
"The postbox is opposite the garage" = p
if i know that p, it necessarily follows that i also believe that p
no you cant, and that is why non-propositional knowledge is relatively uninteresting to epistemology
consider the following:
"i know how to ride a bike"
what is the propositional version of this ascription? There isnt one
because "how to ride a bike" is not something that can be true or false
and the other way round:
"i know that the moon is made of cheese"
what is the know-how version of this ascription? There isnt one, because the proposition "the moon is made of cheese" can only be true or false, it cant be anything else
Yes, yes, no. I have demonstrated the "no". You have yet to object to it.
But I have demonstrated that you can. You have yet to object to this demonstration.
This is correct. There is no sharp distinction. There is a distinction.
I have given an example of where the distinction blurs. You have yet to respond to it.
This is correct.
The moon is not made of cheese. There is no way to know that the moon is made of cheese because it isn't true. No amount of know-how will show you that the moon is made of cheese.
Maybe. But I am showing you the meaning of "knowing". To know something does not necessitate conceiving it.
Another angle:
We can act on our beliefs.
But what does it mean to act on our knowledge?
max_freakout
Nothing matters
no you havent, if i know that the postbox is opposite the garage, then i also believe this to be the case
you didnt demonstrate this
there is a razor sharp distinction, in the sense that for any knowledge ascription, it is immediately obvious which type it is
and also, there is another distinction, which is that only propositional knowledge has anyhting to do with the concept of truth and falsity (which is what philsophy and epistemology is concerened with)
you havent, you were mistaken to think that this blurs the distinction, and i explained to you why you were mistaken
exactly, because there is a completely clear, sharp and unambiguous distinctio between propositional and non-propositional ascriptions of knowledge
max_freakout
Nothing matters
to know someting does necessitate believing it
there is no difference, my actions may be influenced by something i believe, o by something which i know
No - see my example to see why this is so.
There is a razor sharp formal distinction. Yes you can tell whether something is a proposition or not. You have repeatedly pointed out this trivial point.
You cannot always tell whether a statement is equivalent to a propositional truth. There is no sharp distinction between knowing how and knowing to. I have demonstrated this. You have repeatedly failed to engage with this point.
Except when philosophy/epistemology isn't concerned with it.
In this case yes. This is why there is a distinction. There is, however, no sharp distinction.
You will not prove your point with examples. You will be proving a negative. Fortunately I have disproved this negative. See my example.
Why do we not say, "he acted according to his knowledge" instead of "he acted according to his beliefs".
Why do we not say, "we act according to our best beliefs" instead of "we act according to our best knowledge".
See the difference?
max_freakout
Nothing matters
your example is no different than any other proposition
i dont know what you mean by trivial
it is a sufficiently un-trivial distinction, that it gives academic epistemology a way of distinguishing between philosophically useful knowledge ascriptions, and philosophically un-useful ascriptions
you can always, easily tell between a proposition (ie a subject-predicate statement) and anything else (ie 'how to ride a bike' which is not of the form subject-predicate)
philosophy/epistemology is concerned with the truth/falsity of knowledge ascriptions, and propositions, this is the reason why epistemology is only concerned with propositional knowledge
give me any knowledge ascription, and i will immeditaley distinguish what type of ascription it is, the reason i am able to do this, is because i can apply the sharp distinction (concerning truth and propositionality) which i outlined earlier
max_freakout
Nothing matters
a counterexample to answer this question:
he knew there was a glass of water in the next room, so he went into the the next room because he was thirsty
when x went into the next room to drink the water, he was acting according to his knowledge (of the whereabouts of water)
this involves the propositional knowledge ascription
x knows that p
where p = "there is a glass of water in the next room"
you could say either, as i have just demonstrated
although by adding the word 'best', you demonstrate the point that whereas a belief might not be true, knowledge has to be true, so it would be much more accurate to omit the word 'best' when you use the word 'knowledge'
My example was not just an example of a proposition. It was an example of a proposition in a context.
I'll try to remember to point it out when I see it.
Oh.
This is trivial, but true.
Sometimes.
Of course you can (this is trivial).
I can tell whether a statement about knowledge or belief is an ascription about knowledge or an ascription about belief. I notice words like "know", "knowing" or "knowledge" in the first type. I notice words like "belief", "believing" or "believable" in the second type. Give me an example and I will show you which type of statement you are making (you can of course combine the two).
Does this demonstrate that there is a sharp difference between knowledge and belief?
Why does that sound so odd though?
What else did he know? He knew that water is not poisonous. He knew that there was no lion in the next room. He knew what a room was.
Did he act according to all this? Was there some sort of calculation involving all these facts?
If somebody asked me what I knew at such and such a time (say when I was walking down the street just then), I wouldn't know where to start. It would be like listing all the objects in China. A huge task. But also an ambiguous task. When is one fact seperate from another fact? When is one object seperate from another object?
If somebody asked me what I believed when I was walking down the street, then I would not know what they were talking about at all. If somebody asked me what I believed when I ran down the street late for work, I might reply that I believed that I might miss my bus and that I might be in trouble with my new boss.
This is why acting according to belief makes sense, whereas acting according to knowledge does not.
If anything its the reverse!
If knowledge has to be true then what does "best knowledge" mean? What does "best truth" mean?
It perhaps looks as if I am countering the idea that knowledge is a type of belief - true and justified belief - by conversely asserting that belief is a type of knowledge - some sort of intentional knowledge.
Both views are quite silly, even if there is a certain cheeky tastiness to countering the former with the latter.
One is not an type of the other. They are just different, and I've shown the differences.
Both views are quite silly, even if there is a certain cheeky tastiness to countering the former with the latter.
One is not an type of the other. They are just different, and I've shown the differences.
