Epistemology

[max_freakout]

The postbox is oposite the garage.

Anne might have always thought of the post box being on the street corner. It is only on reflection that she knows that it is opposite the garage.

It makes no sense to have a belief about something you haven't thought about. But you could still know it.

so before she reflected, she believed that the postbox is opposite the garage

in truth, this is not the case, so anne's belief was false

then when she reflected on it, she realised the falsity of her belief, and what the truth was

this does not involve her knowing something but not believing it

she believed the postbox was somewhere where it wast, so she didnt know where the postbox was

 

[max_freakout]

Then Moore's paradox is not a paradox but just an plain absurdity.

it very nicely illustrates the fact that knowledge is impossible, it is a paradox

 

[Dillinger4]

epistemologically puzzled cat
<ed: no, thanks>

is epistemologically puzzled

Longcat is loooooong.

 

[Knotted]

so before she reflected, she believed that the postbox is opposite the garage

in truth, this is not the case, so anne's belief was false

then when she reflected on it, she realised the falsity of her belief, and what the truth was

this does not involve her knowing something but not believing it

she believed the postbox was somewhere where it wast, so she didnt know where the postbox was

I am assuming that the postbox is both on the corner and opposite the garage. I am assuming that Anne knows where the postbox is. This does not mean that she believes it to be opposite the garage, even if she knows it.

The question, "does Anne believe the postbox is opposite the garage?" assumes that Anne has made some sort of indication about her beliefs about the location of the postbox and we are judging that statement. It assumes that at some point the question was on her mind.

The question, "does Anne know the postbox is opposite the garage?" does not make this assumption.

Put down the dictionary and try it. See?

 

[Knotted]

it very nicely illustrates the fact that knowledge is impossible, it is a paradox

Now you're just stating what would please you to be the case.

 

[max_freakout]

I am assuming that the postbox is both on the corner and opposite the garage. I am assuming that Anne knows where the postbox is. This does not mean that she believes it to be opposite the garage, even if she knows it.

The question, "does Anne believe the postbox is opposite the garage?" assumes that Anne has made some sort of indication about her beliefs about the location of the postbox and we are judging that statement. It assumes that at some point the question was on her mind.

The question, "does Anne know the postbox is opposite the garage?" does not make this assumption.

Put down the dictionary and try it. See?

i see what youve done here, but it doesnt work

using the example you have given, tell me which proposition is known but not believed


there isnt one, try and find it in your example

 

[Dillinger4]

Now you're just stating what would please you to be the case.

*speechless*

This is what he DOES.

 

[Knotted]

i see what youve done here, but it doesnt work

using the example you have given, tell me which proposition is known but not believed


there isnt one, try and find it in your example

The proposition that the postbox is opposite the garage.

 

[Santino]

vanishing cat





has vanished

 

[Fruitloop]

What was longcat again?

 

[Knotted]

From Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:

There are various kinds of knowledge: knowing how to do something (for example, how to ride a bicycle), knowing someone in person, and knowing a place or a city. Although such knowledge is of epistemological interest as well, we shall focus on knowledge of propositions and refer to such knowledge using the schema ‘S knows that p’, where ‘S’ stands for the subject who has knowledge and ‘p’ for the proposition that is known.
[emphasis added]

 

[max_freakout]

The proposition that the postbox is opposite the garage.

if she remembers the postbox being opposite the garage, then she knows it and believes it

if she cant remember this, then she doesnt know it and doesnt believe it

 

[max_freakout]

From Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:

There are various kinds of knowledge: knowing how to do something (for example, how to ride a bicycle), knowing someone in person, and knowing a place or a city. Although such knowledge is of epistemological interest as well, we shall focus on knowledge of propositions and refer to such knowledge using the schema ‘S knows that p’, where ‘S’ stands for the subject who has knowledge and ‘p’ for the proposition that is known.
[emphasis added]

ok well i never studied that kind of knowldge, i am unaware of any famous epistemology essays that mention it analytically

and when i say knowledge is impossible, i am just referring to propositional knowledge

 

[Knotted]

if she remembers the postbox being opposite the garage, then she knows it and believes it

if she cant remember this, then she doesnt know it and doesnt believe it

Yes and yes. But what if she does not try to remember it? Just because we are considering the question does not mean Anne is considering the question.

 

[Knotted]

ok well i never studied that kind of knowldge, i am unaware of any famous epistemology essays that mention it analytically

and when i say knowledge is impossible, i am just referring to propositional knowledge

But there are no sharp distinctions. I gave you an example and you correctly said I was muddling "knowing that" and "knowing how". You could not unmuddle this.

 

[max_freakout]

Yes and yes. But what if she does not try to remember it? Just because we are considering the question does not mean Anne is considering the question.

i would say, having only just thought about this, that until she is consciously aware of the postbox being opposite the garage, she does not know it


to put it another way, you can ascribe knowledge (or lack of) about a proposition, to a person, in the following way:

theoretically stop time at any point, and ask some one "is it the case that p?" if they are able to answer this truthfully, with justification, then they know that p at that moment in time

 

[max_freakout]

But there are no sharp distinctions. I gave you an example and you correctly said I was muddling "knowing that" and "knowing how". You could not unmuddle this.

i totally disagree, your muddling consisted in many different knowledge ascriptions, all mixed together, you can unmuddle them just by separateing them out into individual ascriptions, you could number them all for example


the sharp distinction between knowing that and knowing how, is the distinction about whether or not the object of knowledge is a proposition

 

[Knotted]

i would say, having only just thought about this, that until she is consciously aware of the postbox being opposite the garage, she does not know it

But can we ask if someone knows something without assuming that they have thought about it? Why is it that when we ask if they believe something we assume (perhaps wrongly) that they have thought about it?

to put it another way, you can ascribe knowledge (or lack of) about a proposition, to a person, in the following way:

theoretically stop time at any point, and ask some one "is it the case that p?" if they are able to answer this truthfully, with justification, then they know that p at that moment in time

You are saying that you only know when you are thinking about the subject. We don't talk this way.

"I know a bit about chemistry."

Does this mean I have in my head everything I know about chemistry? For example I know that the formula for Ammonia is NH3. Was I necessarily thinking about this when I said "I know a bit about chemistry"?

While we're at it what does "I beilieve a bit about chemistry" even mean?

 

[Knotted]

i totally disagree, your muddling consisted in many different knowledge ascriptions, all mixed together, you can unmuddle them just by separateing them out into individual ascriptions, you could number them all for example


the sharp distinction between knowing that and knowing how, is the distinction about whether or not the object of knowledge is a proposition

This is the embodyment of metaphysics. If the form is different the actuality is different.

We can say the same thing in a propositional way and in a non-propostional way and the meaning does not change. It depends on the use we put our utterances to.

 

[Knotted]

But further to this notice the way max distinguishes between "knowing how" and "knowing that" is utterly trivial. Merely a matter of labelling. When the language we use is trivial we can only use if for trivia - like "knowledge is impossible".

 

[max_freakout]

You are saying that you only know when you are thinking about the subject. We don't talk this way

no i am saying (tentatively) that you only know if, when asked, you would be able to recall the truth, with a justification

 

[max_freakout]

But further to this notice the way max distinguishes between "knowing how" and "knowing that" is utterly trivial. Merely a matter of labelling. When the language we use is trivial we can only use if for trivia - like "knowledge is impossible".

this isnt my disinction, it is the distinction that epistemological theory makes

if you think it is trivial that is your opinion, but to epistemology, it is an essential distinction for the purpose of analysis

 

[Knotted]

no i am saying (tentatively) that you only know if, when asked, you would be able to recall the truth, with a justification

That sounds good to me.

 

[max_freakout]

"I know a bit about chemistry."

While we're at it what does "I beilieve a bit about chemistry" even mean?

again, this is not propositional knowledge



modify it a bit, say "i know that sodium reacts with water"

this implies that

"i believe that sodium reacts with water"


and it also implies that "sodium reacts with water" is a true statement

 

[Knotted]

this isnt my disinction, it is the distinction that epistemological theory makes

Stop hiding behind what some textbook somewhere might say.

if you think it is trivial that is your opinion, but to epistemology, it is an essential distinction for the purpose of analysis

Its not the distinction it is the criteria for the distinction we are looking at.

If you can say there is a definite way of making the distinction in all cases then the distinction is trivial and we proceed by reasoning in tautologies ie. saying nothing.

If, on the other hand, there is no particular method for distinguishing between "knowing how" and "knowing that" then there is no sharp distinction. But this is not to say that there is no distinction and we cannot tell one from the other.

 

[Knotted]

again, this is not propositional knowledge



modify it a bit, say "i know that sodium reacts with water"

this implies that

"i believe that sodium reacts with water"


and it also implies that "sodium reacts with water" is a true statement

The proposition that "I know a bit about chemistry" happens to be true.

 

[Knotted]

And are you really saying that it is possible to know a bit about chemistry but impossible to know anything in particular about chemistry?

 

[max_freakout]

Stop hiding behind what some textbook somewhere might say.

the subject of this thread is epistemology

Its not the distinction it is the criteria for the distinction we are looking at.

the criteria for the distinction is simply, whether or not the object of knowledge is a proposition

If you can say there is a definite way of making the distinction in all cases then the distinction is trivial

why?

There is a definite way of making the distinction in all cases, you look at whether or not the 'thing that is known' is a proposition


in the case of "i know how to ride a bike"

the thing known, is not a proposition, so knowing how to ride a bike, is not propositional knowledge

If, on the other hand, there is no particular method for distinguishing between "knowing how" and "knowing that" then there is no sharp distinction. But this is not to say that there is no distinction and we cannot tell one from the other.

there is a totally sharp, totally unambiguous distinction, between propositional knowledge (ie knowledge of truth and falsity), and any other kind of knowledge

 

[max_freakout]

And are you really saying that it is possible to know a bit about chemistry but impossible to know anything in particular about chemistry?

no, i am saying that propositional knowledge, is knowledge of particular propositions

you could list a set of propositions about chemistry, such as

1. sodium reacts with water
2. water boils at 100C
3. water freezes at 0C

etc etc

and for each proposition, a person 'knows' it, if and only if, they believe it, and they are justified in believeing it, and it is true

 

[max_freakout]

The proposition that "I know a bit about chemistry" happens to be true.

but the object of knowledge is 'a bit about chemistry' which is not a proposition


so this is not propositional knowledge