Epistemology

[Knotted]

the poınt stıll remaıns, that proposıtıonal knowledge ıs knowldge of a proposıtıon, whether you paınt ıt, or express ıt ın words

"Propositional knowledge is knowledge of a proposition." How can that possible say anything?

My dog knows that there is a biscuit on the table but my dog knows nothing about propositions.

Perhaps, for this reason, dogs cannot have propositional knowledge - even though I can state what they know in the proper form for propositional knowledge (dog knows that p)? But if you choose this route then all you have done is define "propositional knowledge" as "knowledge of a proposition", so what sort of conclusion is "propositional knowledge is knowledge of a proposition"? Pure trivia.

 

[max_freakout]

"Propositional knowledge is knowledge of a proposition." How can that possible say anything?

ıt says that proposıtıonal knowledge has nothıng to do wıth paıntıngs, but rather wıth proposıtıons

My dog knows that there is a biscuit on the table but my dog knows nothing about propositions.

your dog doesnt know there ıs a bıscuıt on the table, your dog doesnt know what a table ıs, or what a bıscuıt ıs, humans are the only anımal wıth a concept of 'knowledge'

Perhaps, for this reason, dogs cannot have propositional knowledge - even though I can state what they know in the proper form for propositional knowledge (dog knows that p)?

dogs do not know anythıng, and unlıke humans, they do not belıeve that they do

But if you choose this route then all you have done is define "propositional knowledge" as "knowledge of a proposition", so what sort of conclusion is "propositional knowledge is knowledge of a proposition"? Pure trivia.

ıt ıs not a defınıtıon of proposıtıonal knowledge ın any meanıngful sense, all ıt does ıs enable you to dıstınguısh ascrıptıons of knowledge, from anythıng else

 

[Knotted]

your dog doesnt know there ıs a bıscuıt on the table, your dog doesnt know what a table ıs, or what a bıscuıt ıs, humans are the only anımal wıth a concept of 'knowledge'

Oh yes he does!

ıt ıs not a defınıtıon of proposıtıonal knowledge ın any meanıngful sense, all ıt does ıs enable you to dıstınguısh ascrıptıons of knowledge, from anythıng else

Yep, so you can't raise it as an argument - only as a clarification on your use of semantics.

 

[Knotted]

Is "my dog knows that there is a biscuit on the table" an example of propositional knowledge or not? The question of whether dogs know anything is beside the point:

You claim that "I know that there is a bisuit on the table" is an example of propositional knowledge, but you also claim that propositional knowledge is impossible, yet you see no contradiction. Why do you see that there is a contradiction in the first example but not in the second?

 

[Knotted]

ıt could be, but you could never know ıf ıt was or not

Suppose you believe a proposition p. Suppose also that you have a justification of p.

You could honestly say "I know p" (according to the JST definition). (You might still be wrong because p might not be true).

Can you know if p is not coincidently true?

You have justified your belief that p is true, so you believe that p is not coincidently true. (Belief established)

You could be justified in this belief if you notice the fact stated in the previous sentence. (Justification established)

Suppose p happens to be false then clearly it is not coincidently true. (Possibility of truth established)

Therefore, according to the definition, you would know that your supposed knowledge of p is not coincident with p being true.
QED

----

So, no, according to the definition you have furnished us with you are wrong on this one as well!

Indeed as soon as you have a justified belief then you either have knowledge of that belief or you have knowledge that that belief is not coincidently true. According to the JST definition, knowledge is not impossible but almost inevitable!

The truth is that whenever you are claiming that knowledge is impossible, you are deviating from the definition that you claim to be subscribing to. This is quite natural - the definition is rubbish.

 

[max_freakout]

But that is not a condition in the definition.

truth ıs a condıtıon of knowledge

I don't agree with Gettier either. I'm not sure what it means for "justified true belief" to be sufficient or not. If I understand rightly he was looking for a fourth condition - a fourth piece of madness to go with the other three.

the hıdden, mysterıous 4th condıtıon has been a major project of epıstemology sınce Gettıer

More importantly JTB is unnecessary - finding a fourth condition is never going to be convincing as the definition will still be unnecessary.

ı dont understand what you mean by thıs, the aım of epıstemology ıs to dıscover what knowledge ıs

but, there wıll never be a convıncıng defınıtıon, because you cannot defıne somethıng whıch ıs non-exıstent, just as knowledge ıs ımpossıble, a defınıtıon of knowledge ıs ımpossıble

Why anyone would even think that there is a necessary and sufficient definition of knowledge is beyond me. You cannot make it work for everyday purposes and, as we have just seen, you cannot make it work for your philosophical purposes. You are left wondering what counts as "justification", what counts as "truth" and even what counts as "belief"..

Thıs ıs what ı have been arguıng sınce the start of thıs thread, epıstemology ıs chasıng phantoms, there ıs no satısfyıng defınıtıon of knowledge to be found, because knowledge does not exıst, ıt couldnt possıbly exıst

Yet when we look at "knowledge" in its natural environment there is no confusion, everything is crystal clear. But here we are still left wondering where this cloud of madness came from. (See Wittgenstein on rule following).

There ıs no such thıng as knowledge ın ıt’s natural envıronment, there ıs only belıef

The cloud of madness arose, because Western phılosophy took a tragıc wrong turn after Arıstotle, and has been completely lost up ıts own arse ever sınce

 

[max_freakout]

Is "my dog knows that there is a biscuit on the table" an example of propositional knowledge or not? The question of whether dogs know anything is beside the point:

You claim that "I know that there is a bisuit on the table" is an example of propositional knowledge, but you also claim that propositional knowledge is impossible, yet you see no contradiction. Why do you see that there is a contradiction in the first example but not in the second?

dogs dont know, they dont belıeve they know


to suggest otherwıse ıs anthropomorphısatıon


humans are the only anımal whıch belıeves ıt knows, there are no canıne epıstemologısts

 

[Knotted]

truth ıs a condıtıon of knowledge

Disingenuous.

Knowing that your justified belief is not merely coincidently true is not a condition of the "justified true belief" definition of knowledge.

the hıdden, mysterıous 4th condıtıon has been a major project of epıstemology sınce Gettıer

Its astonishing isn't it?

ı dont understand what you mean by thıs, the aım of epıstemology ıs to dıscover what knowledge ıs

I mean that the conditions do not necessarily establish whether something is an example of knowledge. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessary_and_sufficient_conditions )

I do not mean that finding conditions is unnecessary, even though it looks that way.

However I do think that finding conditions is unnecessary. All we need to do is look at how we use the word and then we see what knowledge is.

but, there wıll never be a convıncıng defınıtıon, because you cannot defıne somethıng whıch ıs non-exıstent, just as knowledge ıs ımpossıble, a defınıtıon of knowledge ıs ımpossıble

Of course. However you have failed to establish that knowledge is impossible. You cannot establish this if you do not know what knowledge is.

Thıs ıs what ı have been arguıng sınce the start of thıs thread, epıstemology ıs chasıng phantoms, there ıs no satısfyıng defınıtıon of knowledge to be found, because knowledge does not exıst, ıt couldnt possıbly exıst

Disingenuous. You have been arguing that knowledge is impossible, not that there is no definition of knowledge. You have been arguing very strongly that there is a definition of knowledge.

There ıs no such thıng as knowledge ın ıt’s natural envıronment, there ıs only belıef

But you don't believe you know what knowledge is, so you cannot justify that.

The cloud of madness arose, because Western phılosophy took a tragıc wrong turn after Arıstotle, and has been completely lost up ıts own arse ever sınce

But you were just saying that philosophy is irrelevent to everyday life. I assumed you liked it that way.

 

[Knotted]

dogs dont know, they dont belıeve they know


to suggest otherwıse ıs anthropomorphısatıon


humans are the only anımal whıch belıeves ıt knows, there are no canıne epıstemologısts

I believe my dog has knowledge.

I could be wrong, but even if I am it still makes sense to claim that my dog has knowledge. Our debate has been about the logical point of when it makes sense to talk of knowledge (ie. the definition) not the factual point of when it is correct to talk about knowledge.

It is not defined that dogs can have no knowledge. It may or may not be a point of fact.

 

[Knotted]

but, there wıll never be a convıncıng defınıtıon, because you cannot defıne somethıng whıch ıs non-exıstent, just as knowledge ıs ımpossıble, a defınıtıon of knowledge ıs ımpossıble

There is an old joke about the specialist who knows more and more about less and less until eventually they know everything about nothing.

Giving words a very special metaphysical role has the same effect. We have more and more well understood formulated definitions about less and less until we end being able to say precisely what they mean, but that they mean nothing.

This is true of "knowledge", "mackerel" and "bebop" and many other things besides.

 

[max_freakout]

Knowing that your justified belief is not merely coincidently true is not a condition of the "justified true belief" definition of knowledge.

no, because the justıfıcatıon ıs the lınk between the belıef, and the truth of the belıef

so the justıfıcatıon, and truth condıtıons, together amount to thıs, as Gettıer poınted out, ıf a justıfıed belıef ıs only coıncıdentally true, ıt ıs not knowledge

However I do think that finding conditions is unnecessary. All we need to do is look at how we use the word and then we see what knowledge is.

determınıng the condıtıons of knolwedge IS fındıng out what knowledge ıs

Of course. However you have failed to establish that knowledge is impossible. You cannot establish this if you do not know what knowledge is.

knowledge ısnt anythıng, that ıs why ıt ıs ımpossıble

Disingenuous. You have been arguing that knowledge is impossible, not that there is no definition of knowledge. You have been arguing very strongly that there is a definition of knowledge.

you cannot defıne knowledge, because ıt ıs ımpossıble, the ımpossıbılıty to know what knowledge ıs, ıs the same as the ımpossıbılıty of knowledge/knowıng


ın other words, you cant know somethıng, untıl you know what knowledge ıs

the 'offıcıal' defınıtıon of knowledge, ıs justıfıed true belıef

but there ıs no defınıtıon of 'true', ıt ıs the truth condıtıon, that makes knowledge ımpossıble

But you don't believe you know what knowledge is, so you cannot justify that.

knowledge ısnt anythıng, knowledge doesnt exıst, even as a concept

when we say 'ı know that p', what we really mean ıs, 'ı belıeve that p'

But you were just saying that philosophy is irrelevent to everyday life. I assumed you liked it that way.

ıt has nothıng to do wıth what ı lıke or dıslıke

you could say, equıvalently, that everyday lıfe ıs ırrelevant to phılosophy

 

[max_freakout]

There is an old joke about the specialist who knows more and more about less and less until eventually they know everything about nothing.

Giving words a very special metaphysical role has the same effect. We have more and more well understood formulated definitions about less and less until we end being able to say precisely what they mean, but that they mean nothing.

This is true of "knowledge", "mackerel" and "bebop" and many other things besides.

the meanıng of 'knowledge' ıs consıderably more relevant to phılosophy, than mackerel or bebop

 

[max_freakout]

I believe my dog has knowledge.

I could be wrong, but even if I am it still makes sense to claim that my dog has knowledge. Our debate has been about the logical point of when it makes sense to talk of knowledge (ie. the definition) not the factual point of when it is correct to talk about knowledge.

It is not defined that dogs can have no knowledge. It may or may not be a point of fact.

dogs do not know that they have knowledge, theır lıfe does not requıre ıt

 

[Knotted]

the meanıng of 'knowledge' ıs consıderably more relevant to phılosophy, than mackerel or bebop

But the point is that you were using a necessary and sufficient definition in order to make knowledge impossible. You are now saying that the impossibility of knowledge means there is no necessary and sufficient definition of it.

You could be talking about mackerel or bebop instead, it would make no difference. It would not be any more significant from a philosophical (or any other) point of view.

 

[Knotted]

dogs do not know that they have knowledge, theır lıfe does not requıre ıt

Yes.

 

[Knotted]

no, because the justıfıcatıon ıs the lınk between the belıef, and the truth of the belıef

so the justıfıcatıon, and truth condıtıons, together amount to thıs, as Gettıer poınted out, ıf a justıfıed belıef ıs only coıncıdentally true, ıt ıs not knowledge

So the truth condition is unnecessary. If the proposition cannot be coincidently true then it must be necessarily true so it is unnecessary to state this.

determınıng the condıtıons of knolwedge IS fındıng out what knowledge ıs

Finding the conditions does not mean that the conditions can be listed and given as a necesssary and sufficient definition.

knowledge ısnt anythıng, that ıs why ıt ıs ımpossıble

Is this just another empty tautology?

you cannot defıne knowledge, because ıt ıs ımpossıble, the ımpossıbılıty to know what knowledge ıs, ıs the same as the ımpossıbılıty of knowledge/knowıng

No, because if you cannot know what knowledge is, you can state that you don't know what knowledge is but you cannot state that knowledge is impossible.

ın other words, you cant know somethıng, untıl you know what knowledge ıs

the 'offıcıal' defınıtıon of knowledge, ıs justıfıed true belıef

but there ıs no defınıtıon of 'true', ıt ıs the truth condıtıon, that makes knowledge ımpossıble

You are speaking for yourself.

knowledge ısnt anythıng, knowledge doesnt exıst, even as a concept

when we say 'ı know that p', what we really mean ıs, 'ı belıeve that p'

Why do we have the word "knowledge" then?

ıt has nothıng to do wıth what ı lıke or dıslıke

you could say, equıvalently, that everyday lıfe ıs ırrelevant to phılosophy

Fair do's.

 

[max_freakout]

But the point is that you were using a necessary and sufficient definition in order to make knowledge impossible. You are now saying that the impossibility of knowledge means there is no necessary and sufficient definition of it.

ı was usıng *the* defınıtıon of knowledge to show that knowledge ıs ımpossıble

and that ıs what ı am sayıng, they are two dıfferent aspects of the same ıssue, whıch ıs, overall, the ımpossıbılıty of knowledge


ıt ıs very ımpossıble, ıt ısnt just the case that ı cant know

ıt ıs deeper than that, there cant even be a concept of knowledge, thıs ıs an exıstentıal ıssue, beyong epıstemology

as ı saıd much earlıer ın the thread, ı thınk that the whole academıc artıfıce of epıstemology just exısts ın order to hıde from the fact that there ıs no knowledge, ıt ıs ımpossıble

Socrates worked thıs out 3000 years ago, but Western phılosophers ever sınce have been denyıng the clear, sımple truth of what he saıd

You could be talking about mackerel or bebop instead, it would make no difference. It would not be any more significant from a philosophical (or any other) point of view.

epıstemology deals wıth the meanıng of the word 'knowledge'

metaphysıcs deals, prımarıly, wıth the meanıng of the word 'truth'


there ıs no knowledge, and there ıs no truth (these are really just 2 ways of sayıng the same thıng)

 

[max_freakout]

So the truth condition is unnecessary. If the proposition cannot be coincidently true then it must be necessarily true so it is unnecessary to state this.

rıght, but ıf you take away the truth condıtıon, you are left wıth a defınıtıon of (ratıonal/justıfıed) belıef, not knowledge

Finding the conditions does not mean that the conditions can be listed and given as a necesssary and sufficient definition.

well surely any word that refers to somethıng, can be defıned, and there ıs no other way to defıne knowledge, than sayıng what the condıtıons for ıt are (most ımportantly, what makes knowledge dıffferent from belıef, whıch IS the truth condıtıon!)

Is this just another empty tautology?

ıt ıs a tautology, but ıt ısnt empty

No, because if you cannot know what knowledge is, you can state that you don't know what knowledge is but you cannot state that knowledge is impossible.

you dont know what knowledge ıs because you cant know what knowledge ıs

sımılarly, knowledge ısnt anythıng, because knowledge cant be anythıng

You are speaking for yourself.

you cant know somethıng, untıl you know what knowledge ıs

thıs ıs a truısm

Why do we have the word "knowledge" then?

that ıs a very very deep questıon ındeed

 

[Knotted]

ı was usıng *the* defınıtıon of knowledge to show that knowledge ıs ımpossıble

Firstly I have shown that “justified true belief” is nearly inevitable. Given any belief for any proposition p - no matter how peculiar or how sensible - and given any justification for that belief - no matter flimsy or how firm, then at least one of the following two is justified true belief:

1) I (JSB) know that p.
2) I (JSB) know that p is not true by coincidence.

Of course the above is just drivel, but this is because “justified true belief” is not a definition of knowledge. Its not even vaguely convincing in my view.

rıght, but ıf you take away the truth condıtıon, you are left wıth a defınıtıon of (ratıonal/justıfıed) belıef, not knowledge

To give a trivial response to your trivial assertion – justified true belief is a definition of justified true belief, not knowledge.

The condition for the necessity of truth is simply plain wrong.

If somebody has been taught at school (perhaps by a malicious teacher) that the moon is made out of cheese and they have had no call to question this teaching they would, if prompted, say:
“I know that the moon is made out of cheese.”

Of course they are mistaken, but they have not made a grammatical mistake. They did not “really mean”:
“I believe that the moon is made out of cheese.”
They meant what they said.

You cannot define the use of a word with reference to something which cannot be stated. We cannot state the truth, we can only assert the truth. But the truth condition is not that the truth of the proposition is capable of being asserted it is that the proposition is true.

You think I say that in order to undermine sceptical arguments? No, I say that to justify sceptical arguments!

The sceptical argument relies on the actual, real life (not the pretend “epistemological”) meaning of knowledge. Here we can make a grammatical note that a statement of knowledge is a statement about lack of doubt.

“I know p, but I doubt p,” does not make any sense. (Note this essential condition is not mentioned at all in the JSB idiocy).

The sceptic goes on to say, “but we can always doubt p.”

So before showing you what is wrong and what is right with this argument, let’s notice that it relies heavily on the correct grammar of the verb “to know” (not the pretend “epistemological” grammar). You cannot rescue the sceptical argument by saying “knowledge is meaningless” because “knowledge is impossible”. The former implies the latter is meaningless, and you have neglected your duty to state the sceptical argument in these daft “epistemological” terms.

What is wrong with the sceptical argument?

Very briefly, it confuses the possibility of doubt with actual doubt.

What is the power of the sceptical argument?

It relies on the fact that we take things on trust but we don’t like to admit it. What the sceptic does is force us to admit that we take things on trust.

But this says nothing about the impossibility of knowledge. (It isn’t justified by trust, but trust underlies the justification.) We trust the world is a certain way before we can even begin our games of knowing and doubting.

well surely any word that refers to somethıng, can be defıned, and there ıs no other way to defıne knowledge, than sayıng what the condıtıons for ıt are (most ımportantly, what makes knowledge dıffferent from belıef, whıch IS the truth condıtıon!)

“Knowledge” is an abstract noun. It does not refer to an object. If by “definition” we mean to describe what knowledge refers to, then we cannot succeed. The same is true of “happiness” or “the weather”. We can, of course, still define how these words are used.

I think this is root of the inanity of insisting that knowledge has to be true. It is that we are ignoring how the word is used by pretending that we can talk about the “thing” it refers to.

We can see the roots of “justified true belief” in Platonic idealism. The definition is utterly meaningless without some form of Platonism.

you dont know what knowledge ıs because you cant know what knowledge ıs

sımılarly, knowledge ısnt anythıng, because knowledge cant be anythıng

By “knowledge” here you mean the collective noun.

I agree with what you actually say, but not with what you seem to be saying (but must you always talk in empty tautologies).

Being able to know and recognise a particular example of something is not necessarily dependent upon knowing and recognising the entire class of examples of that thing. We can be sure in some cases but not sure in others.

 

[max_freakout]

Firstly I have shown that “justified true belief” is nearly inevitable.

Please explaın what you mean by 'nearly ınevıtable'

Given any belief for any proposition p - no matter how peculiar or how sensible - and given any justification for that belief - no matter flimsy or how firm, then at least one of the following two is justified true belief:

1) I (JSB) know that p.
2) I (JSB) know that p is not true by coincidence.

Of course the above is just drivel, but this is because “justified true belief” is not a definition of knowledge. Its not even vaguely convincing in my view.

ı dont understand what you mean by thıs, except for the last part, on whıch we both agree, that 'justıfıed true belıef' ıs not a defınıtıon of knowledge


ı would add, there cant possıbly be a defınıtıon of knowledge, because knowledge ıs ımpossıble

The condition for the necessity of truth is simply plain wrong.

If somebody has been taught at school (perhaps by a malicious teacher) that the moon is made out of cheese and they have had no call to question this teaching they would, if prompted, say:
“I know that the moon is made out of cheese.”

Of course they are mistaken, but they have not made a grammatical mistake. They did not “really mean”:
“I believe that the moon is made out of cheese.”
They meant what they said.

ı dısagree, to say:

'ı know that p, but p ıs not true' ıs a contradıctıon

however, to say:

"ı belıeved that p, but p was not true" ıs not a contradıctıon, belıefs can be mıstaken, knowledge cannot be mıstaken


ıf ı say 'ı know that the moon ıs made of cheese, because thıs ıs what ı am taught'

ı am not expressıng knowledge, ı am actually expressıng a false belıef, also a justıfıed belıef

We cannot state the truth, we can only assert the truth.

thıs ıs a meanıngless contradıctıon, to assert somethıng, IS to state somethıng

the words 'state' and 'assert' both mean the same thıng

But the truth condition is not that the truth of the proposition is capable of being asserted it is that the proposition is true.

yes of course, the truth condıtıon means that ın order to be known, p must be true

The sceptical argument relies on the actual, real life (not the pretend “epistemological”) meaning of knowledge. Here we can make a grammatical note that a statement of knowledge is a statement about lack of doubt.

no ıt ısnt, a statement of knowledge, ıs a statement about a true belıef

you can eıther say that the actual, real life meaning of knowledge ıs sımply 'mıstaken belıef', or that there ıs no actual, real life meaning of knowledge. Eıther way, you are sayıng the same thıng, that there ıs no knowledge, only belıef

“I know p, but I doubt p,” does not make any sense.

ı agree, to know that p, ıs to know that p ıs true, whıch removes all doubt

the reason that knowledge ıs ımpossıble, ıs sımply because ANY proposıtıon can be doubted

The sceptic goes on to say, “but we can always doubt p.”

you can doubt any proposıtıon, because the sceptıc wıll argue, you mıght be dreamıng, you mıght be mad and not realıse ıt, you mıght be hallucınatıng, you mıght be a braın ın a vat, etc etc, these are 'sceptıcal possıbılıtıes' whıch entırely prevent you from knowıng the truthy of any proposıtıon

So before showing you what is wrong and what is right with this argument, let’s notice that it relies heavily on the correct grammar of the verb “to know” (not the pretend “epistemological” grammar).

to know that p means, to know that p ıs true, ıf you remove the truth condıtıon, ıt becomes ımpossıble to dıstınguısh knowıng that p, from belıevıng that p

You cannot rescue the sceptical argument by saying “knowledge is meaningless” because “knowledge is impossible”.

the sceptıcal argument doesnt need to be rescued, and knowledge ıs not meanıngless, ıt ıs ımpossıble to defıne

you cannot know what knowledge ıs

and you have neglected your duty to state the sceptical argument in these daft “epistemological” terms

the sceptıcal argument ıs, very sımply, that knowledge ıs ımpossıble, there ıs no knowledge

What is wrong with the sceptical argument?

Very briefly, it confuses the possibility of doubt with actual doubt.

no ıt doesnt, ıt says that any proposıtıon can be doubted, whether you do actually doubt ıt or not ıs ırrelevant

ıf you dont doubt a proposıtıon, ıt ıs because you are ıgnorıng the possıbılıty that ıt mıght not be true

It relies on the fact that we take things on trust but we don’t like to admit it. What the sceptic does is force us to admit that we take things on trust.

takıng somethıng on trust = belıevıng ıt

But this says nothing about the impossibility of knowledge. (It isn’t justified by trust, but trust underlies the justification.)

trustıng a proposıtıon to be true, ıs not the same as knowıng a proposıtıon to be true

trustıng a proposıtıon to be true, means ıgnorıng the fact that ıt mıght be false

We trust the world is a certain way before we can even begin our games of knowing and doubting.

thıs ıs the naıve posıtıon from whıch epıstemology begıns

we trust that knowledge ıs possıble

“Knowledge” is an abstract noun. It does not refer to an object. If by “definition” we mean to describe what knowledge refers to, then we cannot succeed. The same is true of “happiness” or “the weather”. We can, of course, still define how these words are used.

yes we can, and we use the word knowledge, as a naıve subsıtute for the word 'belıef'

I think this is root of the inanity of insisting that knowledge has to be true. It is that we are ignoring how the word is used by pretending that we can talk about the “thing” it refers to.

"ı know that p ıs true, even though p ısnt true" ıs a contradıctıon

we use the word knowledge, when what we really mean ıs belıef, you can mıstakenly belıeve somethıng to be true, you cannot mıstakenly know somethıng to be true

 

[Knotted]

Please explaın what you mean by 'nearly ınevıtable'

It is not inevitable that you believe something or that you have a justification of that belief. If you accept the JTB "definition" then there is not a cat's chance in hell of denying the possibility of knowledge. Stop defending this idiocy when it undermines your idiocy!

ı dont understand what you mean by thıs, except for the last part, on whıch we both agree, that 'justıfıed true belıef' ıs not a defınıtıon of knowledge

Then think about it.

ı dısagree, to say:

'ı know that p, but p ıs not true' ıs a contradıctıon


however, to say:

"ı belıeved that p, but p was not true" ıs not a contradıctıon, belıefs can be mıstaken, knowledge cannot be mıstaken

Of course. The above in no way contradicts what I have said.

ıf ı say 'ı know that the moon ıs made of cheese, because thıs ıs what ı am taught'

ı am not expressıng knowledge, ı am actually expressıng a false belıef, also a justıfıed belıef

Almost (a statement of knowledge is not necessarily a statement of belief). However, the above in no way contradicts what I have said.

It is still correct grammar to say:
"I know that the moon ıs made of cheese."

This is the proper use of the verb "to know".

thıs ıs a meanıngless contradıctıon, to assert somethıng, IS to state somethıng

the words 'state' and 'assert' both mean the same thıng

You understand what I am saying (see below). Why do you pretend otherwise?

yes of course, the truth condıtıon means that ın order to be known, p must be true

See, you understood what I was saying.

no ıt ısnt, a statement of knowledge, ıs a statement about a true belıef

you can eıther say that the actual, real life meaning of knowledge ıs sımply 'mıstaken belıef', or that there ıs no actual, real life meaning of knowledge. Eıther way, you are sayıng the same thıng, that there ıs no knowledge, only belıef

You cannot make a statement of true belief.
"I believe p", p happens to be true - this is "true belief". The true bit is not stated, and if you said:
"I believe p and p is true" - then this would not be "true belief" but an assertion of belief and an assertion of truth.

You understand this, max, I know understand this. Stop trying to fool me into thinking you are stupid.

ı agree, to know that p, ıs to know that p ıs true, whıch removes all doubt

Stop trying to be slippery. To state that you know p is to state that you know that p is true. This removes all possible assertions of doubt. It does not remove the possibility of assertions of the possibility of doubt.

the reason that knowledge ıs ımpossıble, ıs sımply because ANY proposıtıon can be doubted

"I know where I work and I don't doubt that a work there, but I can consider various fantastic scenarios where my work has moved to a different building without me knowing."

The above is not an abuse the verb "to know".

"I can doubt" does not mean "I do doubt".

you can doubt any proposıtıon, because the sceptıc wıll argue, you mıght be dreamıng, you mıght be mad and not realıse ıt, you mıght be hallucınatıng, you mıght be a braın ın a vat, etc etc, these are 'sceptıcal possıbılıtıes' whıch entırely prevent you from knowıng the truthy of any proposıtıon

Yes, forgive me if I did not spell it out entirely. I thought my post was long enough already!

to know that p means, to know that p ıs true, ıf you remove the truth condıtıon, ıt becomes ımpossıble to dıstınguısh knowıng that p, from belıevıng that p

Nope. "To believe" and "to know" are two seperate word games, regardless of the metaphysics you consider.

the sceptıcal argument doesnt need to be rescued, and knowledge ıs not meanıngless, ıt ıs ımpossıble to defıne

I don't mind you backsliding, but try not to pretend that you are not doing it.

you cannot know what knowledge ıs

I entirely agree.

and you have neglected your duty to state the sceptical argument in these daft “epistemological” terms

the sceptıcal argument ıs, very sımply, that knowledge ıs ımpossıble, there ıs no knowledge

Stop pretending you haven't read what I was saying.

no ıt doesnt, ıt says that any proposıtıon can be doubted, whether you do actually doubt ıt or not ıs ırrelevant

Yes it does, it says that any proposition can be doubted, whether you do actually doubt ıt or not ıs ırrelevant.

It [the sceptical argument] is wrong because it is only relevant whether you do doubt it or not.

ıf you dont doubt a proposıtıon, ıt ıs because you are ıgnorıng the possıbılıty that ıt mıght not be true

YES! But this does not mean that you cannot recognise the possibility that it might not be true.

takıng somethıng on trust = belıevıng ıt

No. Believing a proposition means you have a certain disposition towards it. I've gone through all that.

trustıng a proposıtıon to be true, ıs not the same as knowıng a proposıtıon to be true

Yes.

trustıng a proposıtıon to be true, means ıgnorıng the fact that ıt mıght be false

Yes.

thıs ıs the naıve posıtıon from whıch epıstemology begıns

It is the naive position from which everythings begins. Including you posting arguments on the internet, you crossing the road without getting run over, you justifying the fact that you have a BA in philosophy. You trust this naive position just as much as everybody else.

we trust that knowledge ıs possıble

Yes. This is part of the framework of what we mean by "knowledge".

yes we can, and we use the word knowledge, as a naıve subsıtute for the word 'belıef'

So you say and so I have disproved. Several times.

"ı know that p ıs true, even though p ısnt true" ıs a contradıctıon

we use the word knowledge, when what we really mean ıs belıef, you can mıstakenly belıeve somethıng to be true, you cannot mıstakenly know somethıng to be true

That's just a another tedious re-assertion of your line. It does not even connect with what I was saying.

 

[Knotted]

Almost (a statement of knowledge is not necessarily a statement of belief).

To see this notice that a statement of knowledge can be a statement that we have learnt something (as it is in this case).

A statement of belief would be grammatically incorrect as a response to a question about what you have learnt. (Edit: Or it would be a politician's answer - pretending that the question was really asking something else.)

If you say you believe something it means that you have a certain diposition towards it. If you say you know something could mean that you are quite indifferent about it.

 

[max_freakout]

ok you have contradıcted yourself, ı saıd:

'ı know that p, but p ıs not true' ıs a contradıctıon

and you replıed.

Of course.

and thıs ıs basıc epıstemology, but you also saıd that a person can say:

“I know that the moon is made out of cheese.”

and that ın sayıng thıs they have not made a grammatical mistake, and they dıd not mean that they belıeved the moon to be made of cheese

 

[Knotted]

The statement, "I know that p, but p ıs not true" is a contradiction.

The statement, "I know that p" is not a contradiction regardless of the truth of p.

 

[max_freakout]

The statement, "I know that p, but p ıs not true" is a contradiction.

The statement, "I know that p" is not a contradiction regardless of the truth of p.

thıs ^ ıs a contradıctıon, whether or not ı know that p, depends on the truth of p

because 'ı know that p' ıs another way of sayıng 'ı know that p ıs true'

 

[Knotted]

thıs ^ ıs a contradıctıon, whether or not ı know that p, depends on the truth of p

That doesn't make it a contradiction.

because 'ı know that p' ıs another way of sayıng 'ı know that p ıs true'

So it is. So what?

 

[max_freakout]

to put ıt another way, ıf ı say.

"ı know that the moon ıs made of cheese"

ı am WRONG, even ıf ı have been taught that the moon ıs made of cheese all my lıfe

 

[max_freakout]

ıf ı say:

"ı belıeve that the moon ıs made of cheese"

ı am RIGHT, ıf ı have been taught all my lıfe that the moon ıs made of cheese

 

[Knotted]

Well firstly I reject the supposition that a statement of knowledge about a proposition (call it K(p) ) is necessarily either true or false.

That is : K(p) might be neither true nor false.

However don't think that if you reject the above then you are off the hook.

Using JTB knowledge, it is false that someone would (JTB) know that the moon is made out of cheese as the moon is not made out of cheese. This does not mean that they meant to say something different if they said they (JTB) knew it. It does not mean that they were using the verb "to (JTB) know" incorrectly. It just means that they were mistaken about what they (JTB) know as well as being mistaken about the object of their (JTB) knowledge.

To say something false is not to utter a contradiction. False propositions are not necessarily contradictory.

 

[max_freakout]

That is : K(p) might be neither true nor false.

i agree, except that i am going further than this and saying that K(p) can never be true

which implies that there are no true propositions, so (p) also, can never be true

Using JTB knowledge, it is false that someone would (JTB) know that the moon is made out of cheese as the moon is not made out of cheese. This does not mean that they meant to say something different if they said they (JTB) knew it. It does not mean that they were using the verb "to (JTB) know" incorrectly.

they didnt use it incorrectly, but they were incorrect, the statement "i know that the moon is made of cheese" is an unambiguously incorrect statement

but furthermore, there is no correct statement of knowledge

To say something false is not to utter a contradiction. False propositions are not necessarily contradictory.

but to say that i know p, but p is false, is a contradiction