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Egypt anti-government protests grow

Yes but it fails to record that the Brotherhood are counter-revolution as well, that Brotherhood-loyal police existed.


Thats true enough, although I still dispute the exact extent of brotherhood-loyal police, as opposed to state-loyal police that would follow orders of whoever was in charge in much the same way that we have seen the state media in Egypt following whoever is in power at the time.

The only cover the MB had against claims they were counter-revolutionary was that they came to power based on the democratic gains of the revolution. In every other respect they attempted to make use of the long-standing aspects of control the state and army enjoyed, to 'brotherhoodise' these elements instead of genuinely reforming them.

If I ever sound sympathetic towards the MB its only because one of the only measurable gains from the uprising against Mubarak was the free elections, and now thats gone too, at least for now. All the other vital gains that a revolution should struggle to achieve have felt almost completely out of reach at all points, mostly due to the militaries unwavering levels of power in the country. Perhaps the best hope of more meaningful gains is if continued unrest continues to make economic recovery impossible, and thwarts the agendas of the old players at almost every twist and turn. Even then there is great risk that rather than gains this will only lead to a series of desperate and bloody measures that really stamp on the population hard, but I don't know what the alternative is.
 
I don't really understand this point. The army have been in charge before, but police were not welcomed into the square then.

The point is back then police were trying to squeeze disperse Tahrir protests. Now, the police are not on any orders not to disrupt the Tahrir protest camp. From the protestors there and their point of view:- what good does trying to banish them from the square do? Their line has quickly come round to being against needless blood. Unless police are arresting people from the Square they're not going to be attacked.
It's the not the protestors who are at fault here.
(The army is happy for the Tahrir protests to stay as a fig-leaf for their democractic credentials.)
 
It's the not the protestors who are at fault here.


I don't see why they should escape criticism for this fresh embrace of the police. If one of my relatives had lost an eye or their life in the clashes of prior years I would be going nuts right now about this betrayal.
 
If I ever sound sympathetic towards the MB its only because one of the only measurable gains from the uprising against Mubarak was the free elections, and now thats gone too, at least for now.

"Free elections" went with the constitutional decree imposed by Morsi in Nov 2012 and the Morsi-ordered arrest and imprisonment with Brotherhood judges of the 49 pro-womens and human rights organisations.

Also, if you dispute securalism was part of the aims of 25 January, free elections also weren't any part of the aim, and so aren't a 'gain'.
"Free elections" (how free any such election could be in a non-secular, military-guided system could be) were simply a compromise to avoid pushing the issue for the actual political reality of 'bread, freedom, justice' that the non-Mubarak opposition (Salafi and Brotherhood included) didn't agree on. "Free elections" =/= "freedom".
 
I don't see why they should escape criticism for this fresh embrace of the police. If one of my relatives had lost an eye or their life in the clashes of prior years I would be going nuts right now about this betrayal.

They're not embracing the police totally in that sense, even Tamarrod was explicit about the Brotherhood having shielded the police responsible for crimes.
On the ground, the police have weapons, so when armed Brotherhood onslaughts happen, many non-Brotherhood people are relying on the police, so that the clashes don't become outright armed confrontations swamping whole sectors of neighbourhoods. Many don't want to be armed, it's naive but there we are.
 
Well I fail to see how that kind of estimate could have accurately been made at the time. I would not dream of suggesting that the overwhelming majority of those killed had secular beliefs. Lots did, but since young MB etc supporters also tended to form a part of the front lines during various battles, I cannot make claims about overwhelming majorities. I also have to factor in the fact that due to language barriers we were more likely to hear first-hand reports in english from those on the secular and liberal side of things.

You think that the Brotherhood don't have qualified professionals who've studied in Europe or have learned English, constantly pumping their line outwards?
What on earth is this factoring? If there were many Brotherhood activists killed by police during the anti-Mubarak protests the Brotherhood would have gone against those responsible to sustain its base - to stop any cleavage.
They didn't, because they saw the secular protestors as from the wrong historical tradition unsuited to these parts of the world.

You have certainly hit the nail on the head when you mention conservatives (especially if we mean social conservatives). But much of the reason why I made my posts in the first place is that the conservative nature of many people in Egypt and elsewhere in the region cannot be brushed aside.

I am not brushing the conservatism aside, I am aware of it. I don't think it's nature though there's a specific economic and social nature to it. If you're a young woman growing up in a rural village, with a tribal system, or with a mosque appendage school, going against conservatism is difficult and offers no benefits apart from being killed and your death recorded as a suicide.

I am a secularist and I am not a conservative. But I cannot allow this fact and my ideals to distort the likely reality of what great swathes of the population in countries like Egypt believe. I cannot use it to make assumptions, or to make claims about what percentage of the population of Egypt share such beliefs. I would like to see people struggle for such things, for even if they do not succeed it would at least enable us to get a better sense of how much support such ideas have.

In the meantime, I continue to strongly dispute the idea that we have seen convincing evidence about levels of support.

I have made no claims about overall levels of support, my claim was about the 25 January protests (which excluded no one, given the Christians defending the Square as Muslim people did pray etc) and their composition.

Following on from my last point, I would actually like to see this struggle waged at all times. My main point has been to suggest that many those Egyptians who feel strongly about such things have failed to put this struggle at the heart of their message at any point, before, during or after the MB were in power.

You're right it hasn't featured heavily enough, in part for fear of being marked by conservative forces as foreign-inspired, as Western stooges, as people who want to end personal religion.

I suggest that this may mean they share my pessimism about how much support such things have. I am irrelevant to Egypt, they are not, and I cannot help but point out the difference between what they say and what you claim.

I have no idea what you think I'm claiming here, the point was about the original protests and the Brotherhood joining in only when the light of the resignation of Mubarak's could be seen. (Similar to how the military responded in fact. There were no military instances of coded support - of not spilling blood by trying clear people from their constitutional rights to protest until around 5 Feb 2011.)

claimed what you seem to think I have.
The secular side is not good at defending its rights, at organising to disrupt the Brotherhood's ca




It is possible, but under the current circumstances? They seem incapable of properly opposing the military and associated elements of the old regime, for obvious and depressing reasons. And the dangerous splits between masses of people at the moment make it even less likely that many will risk bringing another divisive issue to the centre of the stage right now.



As for female equality, one of the most depressing phenomenon in Egypt since the early days has been the sexual abuse of female protesters in Tahrir and elsewhere. We did see people trying to protect women and make a visible point of doing so.

The fresh assaults on women in Tahrir can no longer be blamed on the MB, but old regime supports can be blamed due to the counter-revolutionary elements that now make up a proportion of the protesters there, taking the place of 'Mubarak thugs infiltrating the square' in this narrative of denial.

Which fresh assaults do you mean? The recorders of sexual violence recorded around fifty cases of sexual violence in the anti-Morsi protests which were massive and went across large parts of cities featuring in some cases whole apartment blocks.
There was a gang rape of a Dutch journalist by five men outside of Tahrir Square - no one knows as yet who they were - they got away with it. I am not sure what the point is you're making.



But we also saw the usual blame game & denials, with 'regime thugs' and 'MB supports' sometimes blamed for the abuses instead of a more honest appraisal of attitudes towards women in Egypt across a greater swathe of the population.

Where did we see this "usual blame game and denials" of sexual assault from protestors? Seeing as you want evidence from me for my perceptions from the outside, where is your evidence?

I would agree that the Morsi regime has been terrible about the sexual violence, eg-

In November 2012, as demonstrations against Morsi’s constitutional declaration swelled, several documented gang rapes took place amid weak and disregarded condemnations.
...
The complicity and negligence of the state, evident in its outright public dismissal and failure to investigate or prosecute, allowed for an expanded scope of such crimes during the demonstrations that marked the second anniversary of the revolution two months later.

And the army is little better.

In conclusion, I doubt that my beliefs about what should happen differ greatly from yours, but what certainly differs is our respective appraisals of the levels of support for such ideas, how much they are actually trumpeted by opposition groups, and the reasons why they have not made these themes the centre of their messages.

If you want my feeling on the reasons for secularism in a nutshell: secularism and socialism are the losers, because the liberals give/gave leeway to both the Islamists and military. The military certainly do not want a struggle for secularism - now or ever (unless pushed) - and the liberals don't want that struggle against the military, they want to secure their position in the new order.
 
You think that the Brotherhood don't have qualified professionals who've studied in Europe or have learned English, constantly pumping their line outwards?
What on earth is this factoring? If there were many Brotherhood activists killed by police during the anti-Mubarak protests the Brotherhood would have gone against those responsible to sustain its base - to stop any cleavage.
They didn't, because they saw the secular protestors as from the wrong historical tradition unsuited to these parts of the world.

Brotherhood voices during the initial uprising were certainly underrepresented in English. If you recall, the early attempts by western media to define the composition of the uprising relied on ludicrously overstretched ideas that it was all about young, liberal people on twitter and Facebook.

Another factor behind my comment was the split in the MB ranks which we have already discussed. The fact that the official MB stance differed considerably from younger MB members who were on the streets. So I do not feel the official MB line at the time was an accurate reflection of participation on the ground at various points, certainly not to start with at least. For you to even be able to make the claim that the protests were 95% secular tells me that this distortion of the picture in the media worked to some extent, and I am clearly prepared to type to much in order to demonstrate my disdain for this distortion.

I have made no claims about overall levels of support, my claim was about the 25 January protests (which excluded no one, given the Christians defending the Square as Muslim people did pray etc) and their composition.

You made a very specific claim that the protests against Mubarak were 95% secular. I dispute that claim.

Which fresh assaults do you mean? The recorders of sexual violence recorded around fifty cases of sexual violence in the anti-Morsi protests which were massive and went across large parts of cities featuring in some cases whole apartment blocks.

On Wednesday night, when Egypt's army chief announced the forced departure of Mohamed Morsi, the streets around Tahrir Square turned into an all-night carnival. But not everyone there was allowed to celebrate. Among the masses dancing, singing and honking horns, more than 80 women were subjected to mob sexual assaults, harassment or rape. In Tahrir Square since Sunday, when protests against Morsi first began, there have been at least 169 counts of sexual mob crime.
"Egypt is full of sexual harassment and people have become desensitised to it – but this is a step up," said Soraya Bahgat, a women's rights advocate and co-founder of Tahrir Bodyguard, a group that rescues women from assault. "We're talking about mob sexual assaults, from stripping women naked and dragging them on the floor – to rape."
Since Sunday, campaigners say at least one woman has been raped with a sharp object.
Such crimes have been endemic at Tahrir protests since at least the 2011 revolution, but they have never been documented in such high numbers.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/05/egypt-women-rape-sexual-assault-tahrir-square


Where did we see this "usual blame game and denials" of sexual assault from protestors? Seeing as you want evidence from me for my perceptions from the outside, where is your evidence?

During the original uprising there were attempts to blame anything bad that happened at Tahrir on Mubarak thug infiltrators, or the MB. Not everyone was in a state of such denial or willing to go to such lengths of dishonesty in order to uphold the image of the protests. It may be hard for me to find evidence of this now since I probably saw some of it via tweets from 2011 which will be very hard to locate now. But when I find time I will try.

As for why I brought up this point, its because I have trouble taking the idea that the overall protest movement saw womens rights as central when they seem more interested in ejecting CNN and AlJazeera from Tahrir square than in making it safe for women. Such vile attacks on women could have been used to demonstrate why secularism and a struggle against conservative social forces was an important part of revolutionary struggle, and some did try to make that point, but hardly 95% of the movement or anything close to it.

If you want my feeling on the reasons for secularism in a nutshell: secularism and socialism are the losers, because the liberals give/gave leeway to both the Islamists and military. The military certainly do not want a struggle for secularism - now or ever (unless pushed) - and the liberals don't want that struggle against the military, they want to secure their position in the new order.


Which is why I dispute the idea that secularism was at the heart of the uprising. If few were prepared to make it a central demand, either in 2011 or even when directly protesting against the Morsi and the MB later, and if many were prepared to hold their noses and vote for the MB candidate in the presidential election, how can I reach any other conclusion? Especially since they were so ready to appeal to the military to intervene and get rid of Morsi despite knowing what the military stand for. The only time secular issues seems to gain any serious weight were when trying to guard against sectarian conflict, e.g. when Copts were being targeted, and even then it was hardly 95% of the people who were outraged by such attacks on Copts.
 
Oh and another quote from that Guardian article about sexual assaults that seems relevant.


Egypt's National Council for Women is working with the country's interior ministry to set up a system where women can report sexual harassment to a specialised team of female police officers – so that their cases might be taken more seriously. The group has also proposed new legislation to Egypt's cabinet that specifically outlaws sexual harassment.

But with Wednesday's coup changing the people in power, both projects may not happen. Besides, campaigners are adamant that the problems cannot be solved by legal tweaks alone.
 
A small selection of articles about sexual violence in recent years that cover pretty much the full gamut of factors, claims of responsibility, attempts to guard against this sort of things, etc:

http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsCon...he-silence-Mob-sexual-assault-on-Egypts-.aspx

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2011/02/did_anti-mubarak_protesters_as.html

http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/revolutionary-romance-over

The last one contains a paragraph which I consider quite relevant to my dispute about the '95% secular' claims about the original protests.

During those first 18 days, a man I know printed a big banner saying “Neither religious nor sectarian ... Egypt is a civil state” and hung it around many places in Tahrir Square, and no one objected. When Mubarak stepped aside, several disputes occurred over this same banner, one of which caused havoc on the stage of “Writers and Artists for Change” when a spectator objected to the banner and incited others violently shake the stage until it was removed.
 
And yes, by talking rather briefly about these sexual assaults and mentioning them in order to make only certain specific points, possibly in an ill-thought out way, I have likely done a great disservice to the issue as a whole. And I may have wandered away from the original point I was trying to make.
 
You made a very specific claim that the protests against Mubarak were 95% secular. I dispute that claim.

My claim was about the blood spilled - those killed the 800 or so anti-Mubarak protestors in that uprising.
That's an impression gleaned from someone from Alexandria whose siblings were there (they said 'none' for Islamists killed by Mubarak police units).
Morsi and associate begin negotiating immediately with Mubarak on 5th February (when Mubarak said he would stand down only once his term was completed) before Mubarak has even said he will resign.
Of course the Brotherhood speaks about the blood of those killed as martyrs, but it doesn't list them on its website - unlike the present new wave of martyrs displayed prominent - those calling for Morsi's return shot dead by the army.

It certainly didn't chase up any justice for them, the people who gave the order to fire and those who fired, leading to liberal consternation against the Brotherhood

https://twitter.com/Hana_Zuhair/status/319125380202106881

which has now with the army become a sort of liberal 'let's stop all politics and stop all street activity' because "we" might be pulled into street "civil war"

https://twitter.com/Hana_Zuhair/status/354133021856776192

More generally, the 'secular'/liberal/left side didn't press its claims against the Brotherhood and its justice which let the murderers get away. It let the Brotherhood take the legimitacy of the whole revolution "We won the election. The revolution's basic demand is free elections, bread and justice will come once things cool down. If you dislike our policies vote against us next time, don't betray the revolution. We are legitimate"

That's why I mentioned the 95% of the dead, they could have chased after justice for it against the new-old regime under Mubarak, to demand public re-trials with non-regime non-Brotherhood judges. I'm making a case for how tied up and incoherent the opposition has been to the Brotherhood, it couldn't even defend its own dead - the dead of ordinary people whose mantle it was meant to stand for against the partyist intrigue of the Brotherhood. The narrative will become "incessant opposition pressure on the Brotherhood" "didn't let the Brotherhood do its job" - it was anything but.

I can't see the liberals as a whole really running after justice for the people killed now from the Brotherhood side in the past few days. We might have expected it for those killed earlier but no, it wasn't there either, even though they will try to claim it was there for both groups .
 
Which is why I dispute the idea that secularism was at the heart of the uprising. If few were prepared to make it a central demand, either in 2011 or even when directly protesting against the Morsi and the MB later, and if many were prepared to hold their noses and vote for the MB candidate in the presidential election, how can I reach any other conclusion? Especially since they were so ready to appeal to the military to intervene and get rid of Morsi despite knowing what the military stand for. The only time secular issues seems to gain any serious weight were when trying to guard against sectarian conflict, e.g. when Copts were being targeted, and even then it was hardly 95% of the people who were outraged by such attacks on Copts.

I'd say it was part of the uprising perhaps not the heart - no one rises up for secularism alone - the recent anti-Morsi protests would have gotten nowhere without the frustrations against increasing unemployment since 2011.

It was expressed in the form of having both Muslim prayer sessions and an open church service on two consecutive Sundays.
800px-Copts_praying_in_Tahrir.jpg


It wasn't there as a pinned demand but it was there in spirit.
 
Another factor behind my comment was the split in the MB ranks which we have already discussed. The fact that the official MB stance differed considerably from younger MB members who were on the streets. So I do not feel the official MB line at the time was an accurate reflection of participation on the ground at various points, certainly not to start with at least. For you to even be able to make the claim that the protests were 95% secular tells me that this distortion of the picture in the media worked to some extent, and I am clearly prepared to type to much in order to demonstrate my disdain for this distortion.

It's not from the media that I get this impression, but from testimony mentioned above.
My impression is still that 95% of the protest casualties the brunt of those killed were secularists, some might be young people from Islamic families or Brotherhood families or 'shakir' types assidiuous in keeping to prayer and rosary-pulling, but their mindset was secular unlike that of their leadership which demanded the Muslim justice source article in the constitution.
 
Your original comment was 'despite the 95% secular effort in the overthrow of Mubarak'.

If you now want to change that so that effort = those who died, make assumptions about how secular the mindset of religious participants was, or take advantage of the fact that people were united by what they were fighting against as opposed to the detail of exactly what they hoped would replace the Mubarak regime, then maybe you can get to 95%. Congratulations.

I can see why it is not exactly an improper use of the term secular to attach it to protests which were in no way dominated by calls for Mubarak & Co to be replaced by an Islamist regime. But I think it is a serious misuse of the term and the circumstances in which it applied, e.g. people refusing to be suckered by the usual divide and conquer techniques of the regime, to then later use that as evidence of what exactly the bulk of protesters wanted in a new constitution.

The entire argument we have been having is a sign of not only the failures of traditional opposition parties, some of the protest groups and Morsi and the MB in power, but of the end of unity and the re-emergence of rule by division. I think some of your claims have fallen into that trap, and I have probably failed at times in my quest to pull this thread back from that brink. So be it, I tried, rather clumsily perhaps, but I am left deeply unimpressed by the divisive stats you've thrown around and I have little evidence that you have understood what I've been trying to get at. It might be my fault, but since nobody else has had a go recently and I'm sick of the sight of my own words I'm going to leave it now. I should have guessed that those on all sides that use the beard for political purposes, be they Islamists or those who see great use in hyping the Islamist bogeyman would win in the end.
 
Your original comment was 'despite the 95% secular effort in the overthrow of Mubarak'.

If you now want to change that so that effort = those who died, make assumptions about how secular the mindset of religious participants was

I apologise for suggesting participation was one sided my mistake in writing (agreed too much of it), but I do think effort - leading the charge paying the ultimate price - was. It was done by ordinary people from secular motivations. It's impossible to look on the martyr memorial sites and see references to Brotherhood allegiance or anger at Mubarak for not inserting more Islam into schools.

It's not controversial - the urban Brotherhood didn't give any go ahead for participation, until after some deal had been struck with the military. The rural Brotherhood branches wanted no incursion of protest into its sphere, and so stayed out of it altogether.

I can see why it is not exactly an improper use of the term secular to attach it to protests which were in no way dominated by calls for Mubarak & Co to be replaced by an Islamist regime. But I think it is a serious misuse of the term and the circumstances in which it applied, e.g. people refusing to be suckered by the usual divide and conquer techniques of the regime, to then later use that as evidence of what exactly the bulk of protesters wanted in a new constitution.

It's not a serious misuse of the term - they were secular protests no religious demands or demands for the interference of religion into public life were raised (though they could have been).

The entire argument we have been having is a sign of not only the failures of traditional opposition parties, some of the protest groups and Morsi and the MB in power, but of the end of unity and the re-emergence of rule by division.

The end of unity? :confused: What unity was there in the first place that's been lost? In what way were the Brotherhood ever united (with who?) as part of the revolution?
Likewise the military. They've both attempted to divert and restrain social demands from being reached.
That the Brotherhood and the military are going at each other - temporarily - doesn't mean the re-emergence of rule by division, divisions were sustained and imposed the day Mubarak stood down, and the military took over, they never went away.

I think some of your claims have fallen into that trap, and I have probably failed at times in my quest to pull this thread back from that brink. So be it, I tried, rather clumsily perhaps, but I am left deeply unimpressed by the divisive stats you've thrown around and I have little evidence that you have understood what I've been trying to get at.

Who's dividing what? The Brotherhood and the military do the division - the two poles that want domination. They've worked to ensure themselves of some prizes, and there has division on pro-or-anti-Brotherhooda and pro-or-anti-military lines.

The claim from people in Alexandria was that it was all secularists, that Islamists didn't do a damned thing, but assumed the fruits of other people's victory, by crawling to Mubarak and the military, when Tantawi and Mubarak's team were unsure of what was going to happen in that period at the middle of February.

I should have guessed that those on all sides that use the beard for political purposes, be they Islamists or those who see great use in hyping the Islamist bogeyman would win in the end.

The military might appear to be against the Brotherhood, in fact both are against the working class, and yes they will both "win", without pure working-class revolution, that is surely not a surprise.

I don't think the military will in the long-run necessarily hype the beard threat as much as stress stability, national unity and a return to 'normality', which the Brotherhood "couldn't provide". If the Brotherhood had been able to persuade a majority to swing behind it and offer stability, national unity and return to 'normality', the military would not have intervened. I don't think it's entirely a re-run of Algeria 1991.
 
The end of unity? :confused: What unity was there in the first place that's been lost? In what way were the Brotherhood ever united (with who?) as part of the revolution?

The claim from people in Alexandria was that it was all secularists, that Islamists didn't do a damned thing, but assumed the fruits of other people's victory, by crawling to Mubarak and the military, when Tantawi and Mubarak's team were unsure of what was going to happen in that period at the middle of February.

OK I will try one last time. Stop talking about Islamists and MB members as if they are all indivisible from the stance of the leaders of their movements. I don't know what happened in Alexandria in particular, but at times in Cairo during the protests against Mubarak there were awesome amounts of unity on the ground. People who could very much be described as having Islamist leanings were on the streets, and played an important role in areas such as manning makeshift medical facilities treating people who had been wounded on the front lines, regardless of what the MB leadership telling them to steer clear.

One of the great strengths of the protests on the streets is that plenty of people of all the anti-Mubarak political stripes broke free of the stale patterns the leaders of the organised parties had imposed over many years. Whether they were liberal, left-wing, or islamist, something fresh took hold and to a certain extent the differences between generations became more important than the differences between islamists and liberals. It was never likely to last, and its strength at that moment was always likely to become something of a weakness later on unless the vibrant new sense of hope and unity could somehow be turned into organised movements with staying power that continued to bridge these divides and were immune to being hijacked by the old established parties and party lines. Sure enough the MB took advantage, as did various liberal & other political parties. New youth movements are still around, and still have a voice, but they were understandably unable to keep the various flavours of old guard from getting in on the act.

The MB do deserve special attention due to their size, organisational prowess and election-winning abilities, and the fact they were the ones who ended up in a position to do the deal with the military and share power for a time at the expense of the aims of the revolution. But since a coup recently unfolded I have not been in the mood to condemn the MB on the one hand while at the very same time giving other political groups who have just sought to displace the MB and be the new partners of the military the benefit of the doubt. The narrative of the MB being crafty when they do it but other just being naive when they do pretty much the same thing does not wash with me.
 
OK I will try one last time. Stop talking about Islamists and MB members as if they are all indivisible from the stance of the leaders of their movements. I don't know what happened in Alexandria in particular, but at times in Cairo during the protests against Mubarak there were awesome amounts of unity on the ground.

This describes only those who were out on the ground in Tahrir yes unity there, and those who heeded the advice to not be on the ground 'this isn't our fight yet'.

You keep saying I am talking about Islamist party members and leaders but I have done no such thing, it's a silly trick you keep playing.

Some of the Brotherhood membership were able to countermand orders from above precisely because they were secular in outlook, standing for secular goals alone.

One of the great strengths of the protests on the streets is that plenty of people of all the anti-Mubarak political stripes broke free of the stale patterns the leaders of the organised parties had imposed over many years. Whether they were liberal, left-wing, or islamist, something fresh took hold and to a certain extent the differences between generations became more important than the differences between islamists and liberals.

They didn't 'break free', on the basis of political alignments they agreed to coalesce largely not dissimilar to an earlier experiment the Kefaya in 2004, 2005 - it was a coalition.
From my rough estimates what had changed was experience from the 'bread strikes' of 2008, revulsion at sectarian (I would say Islamist-caused) attacks in 2009, protests against 'nonpolitical' Khaleed Said's death at the hands of police in 2010, and perhaps most crucially the effect of the economic crisis as it deepened through into early 2011.

It was never likely to last, and its strength at that moment was always likely to become something of a weakness later on unless the vibrant new sense of hope and unity could somehow be turned into organised movements with staying power that continued to bridge these divides and were immune to being hijacked by the old established parties and party lines.

The point is there were no plans for organised movements because it was effectively a coalition. Even the Khaled Said facebook page moderated comments to stop political sentiments about most aspects of societies being aired. Could curse Mubarak, bemoan the economy all day long, but not put forward a either secular leftist or a secular liberal or a Brotherhood or a Salafi vision of anything.

Sure enough the MB took advantage, as did various liberal & other political parties. New youth movements are still around, and still have a voice, but they were understandably unable to keep the various flavours of old guard from getting in on the act.

The 'old guard' - if by that you mean people with a social vision and programme of action - were there in different ways, but they weren't absent.

The MB do deserve special attention due to their size, organisational prowess and election-winning abilities, and the fact they were the ones who ended up in a position to do the deal with the military and share power for a time at the expense of the aims of the revolution.

They ended up in this position as a direct result of their behaviour during the eighteen days. That's the point I would stress.

But since a coup recently unfolded I have not been in the mood to condemn the MB on the one hand while at the very same time giving other political groups who have just sought to displace the MB and be the new partners of the military the benefit of the doubt.

Have I said you should do this, or are you saying that this what I'm saying?
Not all supporters of the opposition want to be partners of the military.
My outside assessment is that their opposition electoral scores will not be as high they imagine they will be.

The narrative of the MB being crafty when they do it but other just being naive when they do pretty much the same thing does not wash with me.

In terms of collaborating with the military - once again, all collaboration with the generals should be condemned from Brotherhood and NSF and Nour.
Again, the base still involved with the NSF should have resigned at the very latest when opposition figureheads went on television with the generals.
 
Some of the Brotherhood membership were able to countermand orders from above precisely because they were secular in outlook, standing for secular goals alone.


I do actually agree with quite a lot of what you post, but its this claim that keeps winding me up. You simply cannot claim that they stood for secular goals alone, at best that is a massive assumption that happens to suit your position and for which evidence is largely unobtainable. Especially since in order to attract a wide enough cross section of people to the protests there were some who made a point of saying the protests 'were neither religious nor secular'.

It is simply too much of a leap to suggest that people prepared to put other differences aside for a shared cause, avoid sectarianism etc, perhaps only temporarily, stand for secular goals alone.
 
Especially since in order to attract a wide enough cross section of people to the protests there were some who made a point of saying the protests 'were neither religious nor secular'.

Who made a point of saying that and who does that represent? I genuinely want to know.
It's the kind of statement that only a liberal could make, but I could be wrong.
If the protests were not religious, not for religious goals, then they're secular protests.

Neither secular nor religious. Neither religious nor secular. Either way round still a fudge.
 
My tuppence worth is that the protests were secular in origin and the MB only came onside when it became apparent that they risked being sidelined and alienating some of their own supporters.
 
This describes only those who were out on the ground in Tahrir yes unity there, and those who heeded the advice to not be on the ground 'this isn't our fight yet'.

You keep saying I am talking about Islamist party members and leaders but I have done no such thing, it's a silly trick you keep playing.

A trick? You are the one who seems to place Islamists in one of two camps:

Those who are indivisible from the MB leadership, towed the party line and took no part in the uprising against Mubarak.

Those who took part and somehow magically became automatically secular as a result.

I am simply suggesting that there were participants along a spectrum in between these two extremes, and that I am not a fan of your suggestions that such types simply did not exist, or that you can work out what tiny percentage of people fitted into this category.
 
My tuppence worth is that the protests were secular in origin and the MB only came onside when it became apparent that they risked being sidelined and alienating some of their own supporters.


Thats accurate enough if MB equals the formal position of the MB, as if members of the MB who took a different view and participated were suddenly no longer Islamists.
 
Neither secular nor religious. Neither religious nor secular. Either way round still a fudge.


Any why was such a fudge deemed necessary? So that non-secular Islamists could join in, or at the very least not help to crush the protests, so that unity could be maximised. Which is the basis of my entire point really!
 
A trick? You are the one who seems to place Islamists in one of two camps:

Those who are indivisible from the MB leadership, towed the party line and took no part in the uprising against Mubarak.

Those who took part and somehow magically became automatically secular as a result.

I am simply suggesting that there were participants along a spectrum in between these two extremes, and that I am not a fan of your suggestions that such types simply did not exist, or that you can work out what tiny percentage of people fitted into this category.

Fair enough, give me a better indication how numerous the various points on the spectrum are. Agreed that there are more than two points.

It's been described to me as the Brotherhood fearing it would lose its next urban generation, because, harsh as it might sound, the protests did make participants who went along more secular. No one was turned away if they had a beard or veil, but the aims were secular (and none were religious for these entrants to be focused on at the expense of the secular aims, there was virtually no sense at all at Tahrir of a religious injustice against Sunnis that needed righting). I stand by the idea that the overpowering majority who took the brunt were people with a secular vision not a Brotherhood (base or leadership) vision.

This doesn't mean I'm infering that "secularists" are somehow undisputed good guys, after all, most of Mubarak's riot police and elite forces were also of a "secularist" persuasion, but I assume this is a given.
 
Any why was such a fudge deemed necessary? So that non-secular Islamists could join in, or at the very least not help to crush the protests, so that unity could be maximised. Which is the basis of my entire point really!

Who said it elbows where was it said?
 

It's OK but this is very odd:

The Iranian revolution -- closer to the Egypt of 2013 in space and time -- has been “hijacked” by authoritarian elements (or thus declared) several times over. Yet the upheavals in Iranian society that began in 1979 proceed apace.
What on earth does it mean?

This below is an odd phrasing of things turning 'revolutionaries' into one monolithic bloc.

Distrust between the Brothers and other civilian actors, whether reformists or revolutionaries, has likewise received a hefty shot in the arm. Some of the latter may see the destruction of the Brothers’ experiment as peeling away a layer of authoritarian dominion: Eliminate a non-democratic rival, keep up the mobilization and retarget the “deep state.” But the political arithmetic does not work. In 2011, the revolutionaries needed the Brothers to topple Mubarak; in 2013, they needed Mubarak loyalists and salafis to toss out the Brothers. What coalition can now form to tackle the structures of inequity, arbitrary rule and social strife in Egypt? In the near term, none leaps to mind.


Also it might be better stated "in 2011, the revolutionaries needed the military to topple Mubarak" - that's a more accurate assessment, because Tantawi became the prime mover when he gave Mubarak (that time in secret) an ultimatum (on or around 6 Feb) go within the week or the army will take you over by force and you won't even have the sympathy of avoiding violence.
The Muslim brotherhood - hard as it is to credit it now with the present violence - trailed the military in 2011 in terms of its 'support' for the population represented by the Square. Of course both in turn sought to exercise power over the Square by claiming to represent it - one from having made Mubarak stand down, the other because it won elections that were "the freest" in forty years.
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/w...at-undermined-morsi.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&

CAIRO — The streets seethe with protests and government ministers are on the run or in jail, but since the military ousted President Mohamed Morsi, life has somehow gotten better for many people across Egypt: Gas lines have disappeared, power cuts have stopped and the police have returned to the street.

The apparently miraculous end to the crippling energy shortages, and the re-emergence of the police, seems to show that the legions of personnel left in place after former President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011 played a significant role — intentionally or not — in undermining the overall quality of life under the Islamist administration of Mr. Morsi.

And as the interim government struggles to unite a divided nation, the Muslim Brotherhood and Mr. Morsi’s supporters say the sudden turnaround proves that their opponents conspired to make Mr. Morsi fail. Not only did police officers seem to disappear, but the state agencies responsible for providing electricity and ensuring gas supplies failed so fundamentally that gas lines and rolling blackouts fed widespread anger and frustration.

“This was preparing for the coup,” said Naser el-Farash, who served as the spokesman for the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade under Mr. Morsi. “Different circles in the state, from the storage facilities to the cars that transport petrol products to the gas stations, all participated in creating the crisis.”

Working behind the scenes, members of the old establishment, some of them close to Mr. Mubarak and the country’s top generals, also helped finance, advise and organize those determined to topple the Islamist leadership, including Naguib Sawiris, a billionaire and an outspoken foe of the Brotherhood; Tahani el-Gebali, a former judge on the Supreme Constitutional Court who is close to the ruling generals; and Shawki al-Sayed, a legal adviser to Ahmed Shafik, Mr. Mubarak’s last prime minister, who lost the presidential race to Mr. Morsi.

But it is the police returning to the streets that offers the most blatant sign that the institutions once loyal to Mr. Mubarak held back while Mr. Morsi was in power. Throughout his one-year tenure, Mr. Morsi struggled to appease the police, even alienating his own supporters rather than trying to overhaul the Interior Ministry. But as crime increased and traffic clogged roads — undermining not only the quality of life, but the economy — the police refused to deploy fully.

Until now.
 
Interesting stuff there J Ed. Thats the kind of thing I was getting at when going on about the police, but I didn't want to pushy he suggestion anything like as far as that article does since I'd not heard enough about it myself. Same with the fuel stuff, I'd only got as far as wiggling an eyebrow at that idea it may have been a somewhat manufactured situation, and hadn't looked into it further.

The vulgar nature of standard propaganda from the MB hasn't done them any favours now, since it makes it far easier to switch off when they start ranting about the 'deep state', even when there are reasonable-sounding suggestions of specific things the state did to set them up for this fall. And the mistakes they made and what they stand for makes it easy not to feel too sorry for them. Thats partly why I've been ranting for the last week+, to try to balance these things out in a manner that does not help paper over the shit that has happened in terms of coup and preparations for the coup.
 
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