Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

And next, Syria?

More impressions of Damascus from a returning exile

Idlib's people and dialect have become widespread, permeating government, administrative and security institutions, so much so that the running joke is that 'Idlibians' are the 'new Alawites' and that Idlib has become the 'new Qardaha'—a nod to the Assad family's hometown.
The new administration is heavily focused on external political communications, implementing internal military and security reforms, and holding meetings with local and expatriate business leaders. At the same time, a vibrant cultural and civil movement is emerging in venues like Al-Rawda Café and similar forums. However, these parallel paths—administrative reform and cultural engagement—have yet to intersect. So far, no intellectual, cultural, or political dialogues have occurred between the administration and politicians, intellectuals, or civil activists.
 
People displaced from Turkish occupied areas of northeast Syria





Dozens of displaced residents of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) staged a protest on Monday outside the United Nations office in Qamishli, calling for their safe return to their city, which remains under the control of Turkish forces and their affiliated opposition factions.
The 2019 Turkish incursion into Sere Kaniye, which was part of a broader offensive against areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), caused widespread displacement. Many residents have since been living in difficult conditions in camps or temporary accommodations, dependent on humanitarian aid.
 
Report from a few years ago on Arabs in the SDF - by Amy Austin Holmes

The Arab men and women discussed here have diverse class and educational backgrounds. They come from territory controlled by the SDF as well as territory controlled by the Asad regime. What they have in common is that they all joined the Kurdish-led SDF—rather than other armed opposition groups, most led by Arabs—and they joined the SDF at considerable risk to themselves. Why? One reason is because they all appear to support at least one or more of the key ideas inherent in Democratic Confederalism, which guides the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration and the SDF. These key principles include decentralization instead of rule by the central government in Damascus, a sense of brother or sisterhood among ethnic groups instead of sectarianism, gender equality and rejection of ISIS and other forms of religious extremism. Finally, I found that a large number of Arab respondents rejected the Turkish occupation of Syria and demanded that the land be returned to Syria. Contrary to analysts who portray the conflict as one solely between Turkey and the Kurds, my survey shows that Arab SDF members also view the Turkish incursions and expanding Turkish presence as an illegitimate foreign occupation of Syrian land.
Analysts have thus far tended to ignore those Arabs who support the political project in north and east Syria. Several observers have amplified the voices of those Arabs who are critical of it, perhaps because that narrative fits more easily into the simple trope of sectarianism. When the SDF’s policy of non-discrimination is seen in the context of the ideological transformation of the PYD-aligned movement from one that promoted Kurdish nationalism and separatism to one based on the notions of co-existence and decentralization, it should come as no surprise that the PYD’s political project would appeal to non-Kurds—or at least appear as more compatible with their own views.

eta: twitter thread

interview

videos of talks by the same author - from last year



 
Last edited:
Report from 2023 on talks between HTS and the SDF. It doesn't suggest good relations between HTS and Turkey at the time.

The talks also explored the possibility of establishing a joint civilian administration between HTS and the SDF. This would be contingent on HTS gaining control over areas currently held by the Syrian National Army. The SDF indicated that the United States is supportive of the unification of the northeastern and northwestern regions of Syria.
 
Editorial from the Front Line newspaper (Revolutionary Left Movement, Trotskyist)

The regime has fallen, but the revolution has not yet triumphed

On the eighth of the last month of last year, the bloody junta regime of the Assad family disintegrated and collapsed with astonishing speed, as the forces of aggression deterrence arrived from Idlib to Damascus in eleven days. This event sparked immense joy among Syrians, as if a nightmare had been lifted from their chests. At the same time, great prospects for liberation and open political activity opened up before them, accompanied by a sense of anxiety among segments of them about the identity of the new authority and fears of what might come.

In order to explain what happened, it is necessary to emphasize a number of facts.

After more than thirteen years of popular revolt and the regime’s brutal brutality in its attempt to crush the revolutionary masses by killing, destroying, and displacing them, and after the counter-revolutionary parties destroyed what remained of the popular revolutionary forces, the country and the Syrian people have reached the maximum degree of disintegration and social and geographical collapse. The Syrian revolution, despite its defeats, has shaken the regime’s foundations, and its continued survival depends on the will of its allies and their direct military intervention, especially Russia, Iran, its militias, and Hezbollah.

Despite its continued control over large parts of Syria, the regime has remained deaf to demands for political reform from a liberal opposition that is itself fragile and weak, and has turned its back on the hand extended to try to save it by some Arab countries and Turkey. Worse, the regime has sucked the last remaining lifeblood out of Syrians, especially its social support base, which has completely disappeared in recent years, as it has not only driven its people to certain death, but has brazenly plundered their resources and impoverished them further.

The vast majority of the Syrian people have been reduced to abject poverty, while the fleeing Assad regime has degenerated into a decrepit, failing regime that is waiting for someone to drop the kiss of death on it.

The opportunity came with a confluence of interests between regional and international countries that saw that the conditions had become favorable to sweep away this dying regime, which had become an obstacle and a meaningless burden, especially after its allies lost their ability and/or desire to maintain it. An armed force of about 40,000 fighters, characterized by acceptable discipline, was available only to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to draw the final curtain on the story of the declared death of a criminal, pariah, and moribund regime.

The main actor that gnawed away at the regime’s foundations and dismantled its components was the sacrifices of generations of Syrians, especially the popular masses in their great revolution of 2011. The Syrian masses struggling against the regime are the real liberators.

The masses rejoiced at the fall of the regime and immediately regained their freedom of expression, organization and protest.

Today, Syria is teeming with dozens of rallies and activities every day and is witnessing the beginnings of independent unions. The masses are once again practicing organized activism and freedom of expression. The space of freedoms won is a huge gain for the Syrian people that must be preserved and protected from any attempts to limit it, from any party.

The new interim authority, which is trying to find a social base on which to base itself, faces several pressures, the most important of which is public pressure from below to protect and expand the gained freedoms, build a democratic system and social measures in favor of the popular and impoverished segments in the face of calls for a free economy and massive layoffs of public sector employees and workers. On the other hand, there are pressures from some parts of the new authority to harden and adhere to its Salafi-jihadist project despite the changed circumstances. On the other hand, there is the Israeli aggression on Syrian territory and the pressure from Arab and Western regimes to secure their interests.

Today is only the beginning of a long process of political and social change, full of both opportunities and dangers. Therefore, what is urgently required at this critical moment is to work to organize social interest blocs, improve the ongoing mass struggles, and build united fronts based on programs of action on democratic issues, against sectarianism and chauvinism, on social issues, and on national issues to recover all occupied territories, support the Palestinian people for their liberation, oppose colonial and imperialist powers, and achieve justice, independence, and freedom for all Syrians.

All power and wealth for the people
Revolutionary Left Movement
January 2025
 

Translated thread from Cedric Labrousse
It's a small earthquake. Mazloum Abdi, a veteran of the PKK and HPG, then a YPG executive and commander-in-chief of the SDF, met Massoud Barzani, historical leader of the KDP (rival party of the PKK and supporter of the Roj Peshmergas close to the KDPS, the Syrian branch of Barzani's party) on January 16, 2025, in Erbil.

This meeting comes at a time when Marco Rubio, a future executive of the Trump administration, officially announced that the future US administration would still support the SDF and AANES. Let us recall that Massoud Barzani is historically an interlocutor of Turkey.

The lights are increasingly green regarding the future of the SDF and AANES for the medium term.

This meeting, moreover, is symbolic in the long term. Mazloum Abdi is a native of Kobane. However, during the winter of 2014-2015, when Kobane was besieged by the Islamic State, it was Peshmergas from the KDP who entered the city to support the FSA and the YPG who were resisting there.

An entry via Turkey that had allowed the jihadists, in the meantime, to advance for several months to Kobane (hoping for a victory of the jihadists and the fall of the YPG, but it was without imagining the international support that Kobane would receive).

Barzani and Abdi therefore have at least this point in common around a past issue.

Turkey, on the occasion of the Kobane affair, had clearly played the card of the enemy of my enemy can do what I would like to do (break the YPG).

The Islamic State had then flourished on the border with Turkey, from June-July 2013, first settling in Jarablus, Azaz, then in Manbij from 2014, before heading towards Kobane...

Turkey only reacted against the Islamic State in 2016 when... the YPG of Afrin were about to join up with those of Kobane. The primary motive was therefore in no way a desire to strike the Islamic State.
Damascus does not want a conflict with the SDF. And this is the main disagreement with Ankara. There is therefore no Damascus-Ankara axis on the subject. Ankara is isolated.

More symbolically, the United States will place a principle of lifting sanctions: not to touch the AANES and the SDF while waiting for more important negotiations. However, HTS needs the lifting of sanctions. Turkey has just lost its chess game. At least for several months if not a year.
 
Last edited:
Joshua Landis
Revenge killings in Syria need to be stopped by Ahmed Al-Sharaa. They will tear Syria apart. Police and Syria’s courts need to arrest those accused of crimes and try them.

The Bani Khalid tribe in the village of Al-Majdal in the northwestern countryside of Hama declares a general mobilization against the armed groups that kidnapped Professor Muhannad Al-Khaled, killed him, and threw his body in the village of Kafr Al-Tun, which angered the Bani Khalid tribe throughout Syria, and they came armed to the village of Al-Majdal to exact revenge on the killers.

eta: a long thread from Gregory Waters about the ongoing violence in areas controlled by HTS. It isn't easy to follow what's going on and I haven't found much reporting on it.
 
Last edited:
Red Flag article from Daraa

In Daraa, heroes of the revolution plan their future amid the ruins

Archived version: https://archive.ph/yM86T
“Each and every family has paid a price for our freedom”, explains a middle-aged man, his dark eyes betraying suppressed despair. “Some lost their homes, some lost years of their lives, and others lost their children, whether as exiles or martyrs.” Preferring to remain nameless out of fear of retribution, he spent seven years in jail for the crime of living in the Syrian town of Daraa, whose revolutionary spirit was a perpetual thorn in the side of the regime. He returned to his home, a shack in a refugee camp for Syrians displaced during the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, to find his neighbourhood destroyed. Yet another Syrian town turned to rubble.

Daraa was one of the birthplaces of the popular revolution against Assad, when a group of around twenty teenagers were arrested and tortured for anti-government graffiti. The local backlash to their abuse was the spark that inspired a heroic rebellion that lasted more than a decade. “We didn’t understand the full significance of what we were doing at the time”, explains Mouawiya, one of the teenagers involved in the action. “We were still just kids.”
 
Last edited:
Interstices-Fajawat have produced a list of sources for following events in Syria

It's not complicated: A note to help you understand Syria
In the age of social media and information for all and by all, it’s more than ever necessary to build up a reliable list of resources on the subjects you want to analyze and understand. Particularly when it comes to international geopolitics.

This note was prepared by “Interstices-Fajawat“. As an initiative connected to Syrian society, we have put together this note to share our sources of information on Syria. We do not claim that these sources are all impartial or neutral, as we believe that neutrality is often synonymous with blindness or complicity. We ourselves have our own bias regarding our beliefs in revolution and internationalism from below. Wherever possible, we have indicated the biases and partialities we have identified. We have chosen to retain in the list resources whose analysis we do not share, because they are nonetheless well-informed and transmit first-hand information, which just needs to be taken with great care.
 
Last edited:
Some Syrian rock music (from the Golan)

Adnan Samman
One of the biggest wins of the Syrian Revolution is the art and music scene coming to life after decades of suppression and censorship. This Sunday, TootArd will play their first concert in Damascus in support of @sednayamissing together with other Syrian musicians. Amazing.

I saw TootArd in Amman in 2014 and Amsterdam in 2023. Always thought it’s such a shame they can’t perform in their country. Well, no more! TootArd are coming home. Hopefully more artists from the region will get to perform there too.



eta: also playing and more my kind of music


 
Last edited:
Red Flag article on economic policy.

Can the Syrian people resist a new capitalist regime?

Archived version: https://archive.ph/ydLzk
The cuts are coming as part of an effort by the interim government to resolve what it calls the “obesity” and inefficiency of the public sector. “[The government] does not have a magic wand to solve Syria’s economic problems”, said the caretaker finance minister, echoing managers of austerity drives from time immemorial.

What they do have is a very large axe, and their target is to slash 300,000 jobs from a total government workforce of around 900,000. If allowed to proceed, this plan will leave many families without any source of income, increasing the poverty rate in one of the poorest countries on Earth.
 
Last edited:
Podcast with Loubna Mrie and Omar Dahi talking about Syria after Assad

In the month since Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was overthrown by a coalition of rebel forces, thousands of political prisoners have been released while many more remain missing, assumed lost to the regime. The most powerful group among the rebels, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has moved to take control of the country while Israel has seized the opportunity to carry out extensive bombing of Syria’s military facilities. In this episode, Adam Shatz is joined by Loubna Mrie and Omar Dahi to discuss these events and consider what the end of fifty years of Ba’athist tyranny means for the Syrian people both at home and in exile.
 
Loubna Mrie wrote this shortly after Assad fell. Since then things haven't been going well in Alawite areas.


Archived version: https://archive.ph/v6UcM
Today, the friends I talk with in Jableh express relief that Assad, who couldn’t muster the decency to acknowledge their sacrifices before boarding his plane to Moscow, is now gone. They are also relieved that the war, for now, has ended. But relief is not the same as peace. Many Alawites worry that one nightmare will merely give way to another—that the rebel groups’ revenge will be the answer to their unrequited loyalty to Assad.

Syria has an opportunity to overcome this bind. Fears fed by decades of sectarian propaganda won’t dissipate all at once, but the new government can help assuage them by holding rebel groups accountable and ensuring that justice is dispensed by lawmakers rather than by armed groups with scores to settle. Civil society can build trust by working with Alawite communities to expose and address acts of state violence or corruption.
 
This is a serious attempt to analyse the security situation. Report by Gregory Waters

Rumors of apparently sectarian-motivated violations by Syria’s new security forces against minorities have been widespread since Dec. 9, the day after the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad — rumors fueled by both pro-Assad fake news campaigns and the very real violations that had occurred within these communities. Many of these rumors are impossible to verify, while others are quickly disproven by fact-checking organizations like Verify-Sy. But the new government’s apparent use of extra-judicial executions of local ex-regime criminals has only cemented fears that innocent civilians are being targeted purely over their religion, while the lack of transparency has enabled others to impersonate security forces and carry out their own crimes.
 
Back
Top Bottom