Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

The 'Kalam' Cosmological Argument

Well that's a deist God without all the bells and whistles that William Craig wants. The problem with these proofs/arguments that the terms particularly the term "God" is not defined beforehand. It's defined afterwards.
Strict deism strikes me as functionally equivalent to atheism. Fine if that's what you fancy, but it doesn't answer any interesting questions from what I can tell.

This does sometimes lead to misunderstandings, though. I've known people who are simply mystified by atheism. For them the existence of god is self-evident. But if it's self-evident, it's also kind of useless.
 
Strict deism strikes me as functionally equivalent to atheism. Fine if that's what you fancy, but it doesn't answer any interesting questions from what I can tell.

This does sometimes lead to misunderstandings, though. I've known people who are simply mystified by atheism. For them the existence of god is self-evident. But if it's self-evident, it's also kind of useless.
I think this is very close to what Aquinas was saying
 
Well that's a deist God without all the bells and whistles that William Craig wants. The problem with these proofs/arguments that the terms particularly the term "God" is not defined beforehand. It's defined afterwards.
Yes, it's a long road from "proving" that the cosmos was created by a god, to "proving" that a set of statements in a text are instructions about how human affairs should be organised.
 
fwiw my hunch is that any system of physics that eliminates time as a variable necessarily has to introduce another concept that is time-like in its function.

For example, thought requires ordering. Jane gave birth to Mary. You can link together Jane and Mary in a timeless bundle with the concept of 'gave birth to', but to specify that Jane gave birth to Mary and Mary did not give birth to Jane, you need to put markers of some kind indicating a directional relationship between Jane and Mary mediated by the concept of 'gave birth'. That ordering is a time-like concept even if you're not labelling it as time.
 
By the way I think that the scientific discipline of cosmology has a beginning of the universe problem. The big bang theory is pretty much established fact now, but it doesn't tell us why there is something rather than nothing. There is a huge explanatory gap there. But there being a gap doesn't mean that you can insert whatever you want into that gap and claim the gap itself is proof of the thing you have inserted. A scientific discussion on cosmology is not necessary to discuss the cosmological argument, there won't be any new discoveries that will prove or disprove the existence of a Godlike creator.
 
By the way I think that the scientific discipline of cosmology has a beginning of the universe problem. The big bang theory is pretty much established fact now, but it doesn't tell us why there is something rather than nothing. There is a huge explanatory gap there. But there being a gap doesn't mean that you can insert whatever you want into that gap and claim the gap itself is proof of the thing you have inserted. A scientific discussion on cosmology is not necessary to discuss the cosmological argument, there won't be any new discoveries that will prove or disprove the existence of a Godlike creator.
THE END
 
By the way I think that the scientific discipline of cosmology has a beginning of the universe problem. The big bang theory is pretty much established fact now, but it doesn't tell us why there is something rather than nothing. There is a huge explanatory gap there. But there being a gap doesn't mean that you can insert whatever you want into that gap and claim the gap itself is proof of the thing you have inserted. A scientific discussion on cosmology is not necessary to discuss the cosmological argument, there won't be any new discoveries that will prove or disprove the existence of a Godlike creator.
Is the question "why is there something rather than nothing" a meaningful question?
There surely cannot be a thing (force, particle, interaction, whatever) without which there would be nothing.
There would be nothing without this thing? Well, yes, there would be nothing without something.
Can "nothing" be a logical posibility?
 
Is the question "why is there something rather than nothing" a meaningful question?
There surely cannot be a thing (force, particle, interaction, whatever) without which there would be nothing.
There would be nothing without this thing? Well, yes, there would be nothing without something.
Can "nothing" be a logical posibility?
Everything that can happen happens. And how could it not?

All statements and questions of this kind are pretty arbitrary. In some ways the questions we favour are a matter of aesthetic taste as much as anything. They are the forms we choose to express frustration/wonder/joy/anger at the unknowable.
 
fwiw my hunch is that any system of physics that eliminates time as a variable necessarily has to introduce another concept that is time-like in its function.

For example, thought requires ordering. Jane gave birth to Mary. You can link together Jane and Mary in a timeless bundle with the concept of 'gave birth to', but to specify that Jane gave birth to Mary and Mary did not give birth to Jane, you need to put markers of some kind indicating a directional relationship between Jane and Mary mediated by the concept of 'gave birth'. That ordering is a time-like concept even if you're not labelling it as time.
We could imagine reversing time, and there being reversed causality. The green ball hits the blue ball and causes it to move; in reverse-time mode the blue ball hits the green ball and causes it to move.
We can imagine Mary being unborn, as she re-enters the womb. Nine months earlier the sperm leaves the ovum, causing it to be unfertilised, causing Jane to be unpregnant.
If there is no time, can there be causality, can there be any change at all?
There seems to be some evidence of effect preceding cause on a small scale, but even such a phenomenon would depend on time.
 
Without time as the possibility of change, you can't have anything. Space is meaningless, distances don't matter if nothing moves, forces can't act on anything. It's literally inconceivable.

None of which means that we're thinking about time in the correct way.
 
Well this is one of the mysteries! Physics laws are generally entirely time-reversible. But we see glass shatter, and we don't see glasses forming out of shards. The arrow of time is predicated on a direction from lower to higher entropy, which in turn demands a low-entropy early universe. Did the early universe have a special very low-entropy state, and if so, why? Another important open question in physics for which a variety of answers have been suggested, including by the likes of Julian Barbour, who thinks our whole way of thinking about entropy is wrong.

tbh this is one of the reasons why I find theological questions rather dull. The real problems out there are far more interesting.
 
Well this is one of the mysteries! Physics laws are generally entirely time-reversible. But we see glass shatter, and we don't see glasses forming out of shards. The arrow of time is predicated on a direction from lower to higher entropy, which in turn demands a low-entropy early universe. Did the early universe have a special very low-entropy state, and if so, why? Another important open question in physics for which a variety of answers have been suggested, including by the likes of Julian Barbour, who thinks our whole way of thinking about entropy is wrong.

Julian Barbour is probably right. Though not in the way he thinks he is.
 
The claim that the cosmos has always existed is more plausible then the claim that there exists an eternal being that created the cosmos. For we have evidence that there is a cosmos, but there is no evidence for an eternal being that created it. If we are to opt for the assertion that requires the fewest assumptions, then we have to adopt the hypothesis that the cosmos has always existed and was not created.
There is a thread on Occam's Razor in this forum that is relevant here.

At the risk of derailing from my original point, I just want to comment on this.

It might seem counterintuitive but even if we ignore people's claims that God can be known directly and just assume for the sake of argument that He can't be known, God does not become less likely on account that the cosmos can be known.

Occam's Razor should only be applied in scenarios where you are adding understood components beyond necessity. So if I guess blind that you got on a bus today let's say I have a 50/50% chance of getting that right. If I also add that you ate something on that bus let's say that now goes down to 20/80%.

But complexity can also be more likely. For instance hypothetically a protected tribe might imagine that a torn-up eagle they find is the victim of an even bigger giant predator bird being that they know what birds and bird predators are. They might find the more complex theory that a huge flying metal jet engine made by thousands of people, systems, computers, electron-beam welding, lazor drilling, etc, etc was actually the culprit. But of course they would be wrong to think it's less likely - reason being that they don't know the likelihood of what they don't know.

But let's not also forget that I deliberately ignored the claim that God can be known directly in order to better make the argument above. For some it is also claimed that God is knowable as with the cosmos.
 
I think you need to provide us with a working definition of 'god' here. It's not a concept I find of utility, so I don't really have a good definition in mind. It's up to those introducing the concept to provide the definition really.
 
Is the question "why is there something rather than nothing" a meaningful question?
There surely cannot be a thing (force, particle, interaction, whatever) without which there would be nothing.
There would be nothing without this thing? Well, yes, there would be nothing without something.
Can "nothing" be a logical posibility?

I'm not 100% sure I'm following you. But take the solar system instead of the universe. We can now understand and model how the solar system began, but in the time of Kepler and Newton we didn't. The solar system would have seemed like it was a thing that was just a thing and that's the way it is. They didn't know about other solar systems or what the stars were. There was an explanatory gap there. Why is there a solar system instead of no solar system? Actually that turned out to he a valid question with answers.
 
I think you need to provide us with a working definition of 'god' here. It's not a concept I find of utility, so I don't really have a good definition in mind. It's up to those introducing the concept to provide the definition really.
Assuming you're talking to me:

I don't know what kind of God PTK was comparing to the cosmos in terms of plausibility, but I believe my two points responding to ptk are less dependent on that and work more generally speaking.

I believe you also were contributing on the Occam Razor thread and came to some agreement.
 
I wouldn't invoke Occam's Razor here. But I still say it is incumbent on those using the term 'god' to define it.
Well, I was invoking Occam's Razor in reference to the plausibility claim made earlier. Can't say much more in response because not much more has been said here.

In terms of the word 'god', you are referring to the word 'god' as I was referring to it and I was referring to it as ptk was referring to it. If you like, I was talking about any god that one might conceive could fit ptk's claim that simple knowledge of the cosmos tips the scales of probability. That was the focal point not the specifics of the God - as in this case it is assumed that whatever the specifics may be, the scale is tipped, not by the specifics but by an assumption about how probability works.
 
I'm not 100% sure I'm following you. But take the solar system instead of the universe. We can now understand and model how the solar system began, but in the time of Kepler and Newton we didn't. The solar system would have seemed like it was a thing that was just a thing and that's the way it is. They didn't know about other solar systems or what the stars were. There was an explanatory gap there. Why is there a solar system instead of no solar system? Actually that turned out to he a valid question with answers.
Not "Why is there a solar system instead of no solar system?"
but "Why is there a solar system instead of nothing?"
Nothing as no particles, no energy, no vacuum, nothing (veen what we call the vacuum has an energy.
 
Not "Why is there a solar system instead of no solar system?"
but "Why is there a solar system instead of nothing?"
Nothing as no particles, no energy, no vacuum, nothing (veen what we call the vacuum has an energy.

The solar system was the known universe. So no solar system meant nothing.
 
The solar system was the known universe. So no solar system meant nothing.
"No solar system" is not the same as "nothing".
If someone asks "why is there is a solar system rather than no solar system?" they coud be asking "why is there a solar system rather than a cloud of gas {or whatever}".
 
"No solar system" is not the same as "nothing".
If someone asks "why is there is a solar system rather than no solar system?" they coud be asking "why is there a solar system rather than a cloud of gas {or whatever}".

Yes, by today's understanding!

I get where you're coming from I think. In physics there isn't really a concept of nothing. There isn't really a concept of strict causality. There isn't really a concept of "before time". I get it. It's a nitpick I think though.
 
Yes, by today's understanding!

I get where you're coming from I think. In physics there isn't really a concept of nothing. There isn't really a concept of strict causality. There isn't really a concept of "before time". I get it. It's a nitpick I think though.
I don't think it a nitpick, for if it is the case that it is logically impossible for there to be nothing, then the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" is an invalid question.

A valid question is: how did things get to be the way they are now? Or: how did the structures we see come to be?
 
I don't think it a nitpick, for if it is the case that it is logically impossible for there to be nothing, then the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" is an invalid question.

A valid question is: how did things get to be the way they are now? Or: how did the structures we see come to be?

Questions don't have to be coherent to be valid. There is still a mystery that could conceivably be resolved whether or not the question is framed right.. The cosmological argument does not need to be completely coherent. The problem with it is much more basic - "insert God where there is a mystery" is not a solution to that mystery.
 
Questions don't have to be coherent to be valid. There is still a mystery that could conceivably be resolved whether or not the question is framed right.. The cosmological argument does not need to be completely coherent. The problem with it is much more basic - "insert God where there is a mystery" is not a solution to that mystery.
The ontological argument for the existence of God is worse.
 
Back
Top Bottom