Moral consquences of determinism

[bhamgeezer]

Simple question really, do you believe that the free will / determinism issue has any implications upon our moral attitudes?

Personally I do not believe that whether the world is determinate or not has any consquences for our moral attitudes at all. It is simply not an issue. I guess I am a compatibilist in this regard, at least when the term "free will" is meant strictly in a moral sense rather than as an exception to our scientific understanding of the physical world.

 

[purves grundy]

In a nutshell, nah. Why that should be the case is a more interesting question.

 

[8ball]

It quite obviously has major implications.

 

[Santino]

I think it rules out absolute moral ideas such as Evil-with-a-capital-E. You can still evaluate and rank actions and intentions, but determinism doesn't support the notion that people do bad things just because they are bad people. It also brings into question the idea that people deserve things, such as punishment and rewards. You don't have to do away with punishment and reward, but you do have to re-consider the justification for them.

 

[bhamgeezer]

It quite obviously has major implications.

Really? It doesn't seem to me be an obvious issue at all considering all the academic thought that has been put into it.

I ask you, can you imagine giving up your moral attitude due to the truth of determinism? (assuming for a moment that such a thesis is potentially provable)

Do you believe that we would have no sanction for our morality if determinism was the case?

 

[bhamgeezer]

I think it rules out absolute moral ideas such as Evil-with-a-capital-E. You can still evaluate and rank actions and intentions, but determinism doesn't support the notion that people do bad things just because they are bad people. It also brings into question the idea that people deserve things, such as punishment and rewards. You don't have to do away with punishment and reward, but you do have to re-consider the justification for them.

So you would suggest the efficacy of reward and punishment were sufficent justification for their practice?

 

[Santino]

So you would suggest the efficacy of reward and punishment were sufficent justification for their practice?

In the broadest sense, and with plenty of qualifications, yes.

It makes sense to imprison people to stop them harming others, for example.

Even a determinist can admit that certain kinds of actions are to be desired more than others, and punishment/reward is a part of the expression of that desire-structure.

 

[bhamgeezer]

In the broadest sense, and with plenty of qualifications, yes.

It makes sense to imprison people to stop them harming others, for example.

Even a determinist can admit that certain kinds of actions are to be desired more than others, and punishment/reward is a part of the expression of that desire-structure.

I certainly agree that reward and punishment can be justified in this respect, however I would go a step further and claim that even in a determinate world we can still hold an individual morally culpable in the same way that one would if one had belief in free will that supervened determinism.

My reason for holding this position this position is my belief that their is no relationship between determinism and our moral judgements and thus the verity of the thesis exacts no influence on how we should make moral decisions.

 

[Santino]

I certainly agree that reward and punishment can be justified in this respect, however I would go a step further and claim that even in a determinate world we can still hold an individual morally culpable in the same way that one would if one had belief in free will that supervened determinism.

My reason for holding this position this position is my belief that their is no relationship between determinism and our moral judgements and thus the verity of the thesis exacts no influence on how we should make moral decisions.

In common understanding we distinguish between things that are beyond people's control - like their physical inheritance, and their actions. If one's actions are as determined as one's physical inheritance, could you not therefore - by your thesis - make moral judgements about the colour of someone's skin? And assuming that you wouldn't, why not?

 

[bhamgeezer]

In common understanding we distinguish between things that are beyond people's control - like their physical inheritance, and their actions. If one's actions are as determined as one's physical inheritance, could you not therefore - by your thesis - make moral judgements about the colour of someone's skin? And assuming that you wouldn't, why not?

As far as I understand you I don't believe you could, simply as we understand the moral act of judging someone baised on race to be wrong and this is completely irrelevant to whether they made a conscious choice to belong to that race (if such a thing was possible) or if it was physically determined.

I am not 100% sure I have fully understood your point however so please explain further.

 

[8ball]

Really? It doesn't seem to me be an obvious issue at all considering all the academic thought that has been put into it.

I ask you, can you imagine giving up your moral attitude due to the truth of determinism? (assuming for a moment that such a thesis is potentially provable)

Do you believe that we would have no sanction for our morality if determinism was the case?

Morality means nothing where behaviour is pre-determined.

 

[8ball]

My reason for holding this position this position is my belief that their is no relationship between determinism and our moral judgements and thus the verity of the thesis exacts no influence on how we should make moral decisions.

In a deterministic universe there is no 'should'.

There is only 'is'.

 

[bhamgeezer]

Morality means nothing where behaviour is pre-determined.

So you are effectively taking a pessimists position in that you require the falsity of the thesis of determinism to maintain a moral attitude?

 

[bhamgeezer]

In a deterministic universe there is no 'should'.

There is only 'is'.

Care to explain this rather ambiguous statement

 

[NoEgo]

I think bad things and bad actions are the product of free will and not determinism.
People might disagree with me depending on how they define "bad things" or "bad actions" of course.

 

[bhamgeezer]

I think bad things and bad actions are the product of free will and not determinism.
People might disagree with me depending on how they define "bad things" or "bad actions" of course.

So you agree with 8ball in the sense that you believe free will in the moral respect requires the falsity of determinism. Therefore if we want to judge a person for "bad action" that action must have been the product of a true "free will" (not just a free will in the sense of moral accountabilty) as opposed to a unchangable sucession of events?

For both you and 8ball I ask, do you believe that inanimate objects behave in a determinate fashion?

 

[8ball]

For both you and 8ball I ask, do you believe that inanimate objects behave in a determinate fashion?

Mostly.

 

[8ball]

So you are effectively taking a pessimists position in that you require the falsity of the thesis of determinism to maintain a moral attitude?

I don't require that it be proven false, if that's what you're driving at.

 

[8ball]

Care to explain this rather ambiguous statement

Molecules say no.

 

[bhamgeezer]

I don't require that it be proven false, if that's what you're driving at.

Not at all, I am merely suggesting that you cannot concieve of a determinate world in which morality genuinely exists.

 

[bhamgeezer]

Mostly.

Care to elborate?

 

[bhamgeezer]

Molecules say no.

Well I will just run a thought experiment by you.

John is the inhabitant of a determinate universe, ignoring the question whether cognition is possible in a determinate universe for a moment, he is faced with two options, he can go see his sick grandmother or he can go see his new girlfriend, John is aware that he should go see his sick grandmother however desires to see his girlfriend. Due to the influence of various predetermined factors John visits his girlfriend.

Surely this is an example of how a "should" type moral influence can exist in a determinate world, the only difference is that really their was truely not a "choice" in the matter as if we knew all the physical information about John and his universe and the abilty to understand it (imagining such a thing was possible for the sake of the argument) it would be possible to know the outcome of John's decision prior to it being made.

 

[8ball]

Not at all, I am merely suggesting that you cannot concieve of a determinate world in which morality genuinely exists.

Fairy nuff, then.

 

[8ball]

Care to elborate?

Well, there are two main avenues of elaboration which I'm sure you've already worked out since you seem to know the ley lines of this argument.

Let's, as a short cut, consider that I have elaborated on both of them.

 

[8ball]

. . . John is the inhabitant of a determinate universe . . . he can go see his sick grandmother or he can go see his new girlfriend, John is aware that he should go see his sick grandmother however desires to see his girlfriend. Due to the influence of various predetermined factors John visits his girlfriend.

Surely this is an example of how a "should" type moral influence can exist in a determinate world . . . .

Because you are drawing a line between what his loins are telling him to do and what his superego (for want of a better term) is telling him to do?

I think you are just pitting aspects of the 'self' against each other, then deciding that the stronger drive has won out in order to remove any real moral agency from the equation.

It's just a paraphrasing of the old Christian 'sins of the flesh' nonsense. I still see no real moral agency in the absence of 'choice'.

 

[bhamgeezer]

Because you are drawing a line between what his loins are telling him to do and what his superego (for want of a better term) is telling him to do?

I think you are just pitting aspects of the 'self' against each other, then deciding that the stronger drive has won out in order to remove any real moral agency from the equation.

It's just a paraphrasing of the old Christian 'sins of the flesh' nonsense. I still see no real moral agency in the absence of 'choice'.

Well you see I wouldn't percieve it as an absence of choice, as I believe free will in the sense that supervenes determinism is nothing more than an oversimplification of the situation that serves a moral purpose. For me a moral decision is a determinate one, anything would have to be by definition not due to eternal factors and thus completely random behaviour which is clearly not what occurs when an individual make a moral choice.

 

[ItWillNeverWork]

The world isn't deterministic, it's probablistic. And given an infinite amount of time, it's probable that a world emerges where free will is a real factor in influencing what happens. Whether or not that world is this world I'll let you decide.

 

[bhamgeezer]

The world isn't deterministic, it's probablistic. And given an infinite amount of time, it's probable that a world emerges where free will is a real factor in influencing what happens. Whether or not that world is this world I'll let you decide.

Frankly I would have to disagree, I believe the world is determined, quantum mechanics gives us no reason to believe this is not the case, it merely suggests that a comprehensive understanding of this determinism may be forever beyond the limits of our knowledge, this was something known long before such a scientific theory was suggested.

 

[inflatable jesus]

I think the only time I ever see this come up is in the atheism arguments where religious people try to accuse atheists of denying the existence of free will and thereby excusing everyone of personal responsibility for their actions.

It's a weird line of argument. I think that 'free will' might be a reasonable shorthand for saying that we are primarily responsible for the effect our own actions, but it's not a thing that exists on it's own that is not caused by something else.

 

[Johnny Canuck3]

Simple question really, do you believe that the free will / determinism issue has any implications upon our moral attitudes?

Personally I do not believe that whether the world is determinate or not has any consquences for our moral attitudes at all. It is simply not an issue. I guess I am a compatibilist in this regard, at least when the term "free will" is meant strictly in a moral sense rather than as an exception to our scientific understanding of the physical world.

No. Because you don't know what's coming, you still have to make choices, so there is a place for moral actions.