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Gulf of Mexico oil spill

I swithered whether to post this as there is enough conspiracy theory in a world where cock-up transcends conspiracy 10:1. Some plausible elements: BP contributes to Obama campaign, secures a $10bn liability cap against a $1 trillion/nationalise the company deal. US Army Corp and FEMA leak sources? Plausible. Classifed military satellite imagery showing Everest sized holes? I have no idea what they are talking about. File under "interesting", with a health warning.

The Oil Slick Coverup, marketoracle, May 06
 
They are trying to get their dome located over the leak.

Apparently there is a problem with hydrates blocking up the top of the dome. Whatever they are?
 
They are trying to get their dome located over the leak. Apparently there is a problem with hydrates blocking up the top of the dome. Whatever they are?
Hydrates are crystalline water based molecules formed between water and gas under particular combinations of temperature and pressure. They look like ice, but aren't. They tend to form where temperature and/or pressure have changed--typically you get them in flowlines and instrumentation piping. The dome is a perfect environment--the hot pressurised wellbore fluid is depressurising and cooling rapidly and going through the gas hydrate pressure/temperature window.

You prevent it either by keeping things warmer (it isn't "ice", but is is temperature dependent), pressurised or inhibiting by injecting ethanol or methanol. That works in confined geometries (like in the wellbore, a pipeline, and in the flowline from this dome to the surface), but not in the dome which is open to the ocean.

Which is why BP was engaging in so much expectation management prior to deploying it. They knew it wasn't going to work.
 
... Which is why BP was engaging in so much expectation management prior to deploying it. They knew it wasn't going to work.

If they knew it was not going to work, why try .. there must have been a chance that it could have worked.
 
If they knew it was not going to work, why try .. there must have been a chance that it could have worked.
Maybe it's a bit of both. I wonder if it may have been a million-to-one shot, but from a PR point was better than appearing to do absolutely nothing. *shrug*
 
I'm wondering who will be held legally responsible: BP, BP America, Transocean, Halliburton or the US government.

Three separate congressional committees will also take a close look at offshore drilling and the disaster this week, with testimony from the executives of BP America, Transocean, the company which owned the sunken rig, and Halliburton, which made the cement cap on the well, whose failure set the disaster in motion.
From guardian article, the US government has "waived environmental reviews for 26 new offshore drilling projects even as the BP oil disaster spewed hundreds of thousands of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico, environmental activists said today".

So: BP, BP America, Transocean, Halliburton or the US government (which was clearly happy enough with all the safety arrangements if it's carrying on as usual)?

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/09/oil-spill-ecological-review-environment

Will keep m'learned friends happy for many prosperous years to come.
 
Which is why BP was engaging in so much expectation management prior to deploying it. They knew it wasn't going to work.

BP really needs to account for why they hadn't tested (or even constructed) this type of device at this depth prior to actually drilling..apart from maximising their profits, of course. That strategy worked, didn't it...
 
BP really needs to account for why they hadn't tested (or even constructed) this type of device at this depth prior to actually drilling..apart from maximising their profits, of course. That strategy worked, didn't it...
Well, leaving aside some of the cynicism, I expect that their view was that the blowout preventer was more than adequate for the job.

I agree with your cynicism to a degree, in that it is quite likely that nobody was exactly falling over themselves to wonder what the consequences - or the fallback position - might be if the BOP failed, and from there what they needed to do to have a) a Plan B, and b) the implications for making absolutely, positively sure that the BOP wasn't going to fail.

Our history is littered, though, with fine hindsight, and I am sure that anyone who's been involved in even the most mundane IT project (for example) has experienced that chain of events which simply should or could not have happened - after reading the book of that name, I've tended to think of it as the "Jurassic Park syndrome".

We are bloody awful at spotting the deficiencies in our own plans - we have too much invested in our ideas being right to start planning for the possibiity of them being wrong. I know that I was terrible at testing my own code: I often caught myself quite unconsciously avoiding testing certain things that might well result in faults, and I know from watching others doing their testing that the same applies elsewhere. I also have no reason to think that it's any different in oil exploration than it is in IT or any other remotely complex field of endeavour: it's what we have risk assessments for.

But risk assessments, if they're carried out by people who identify too closely with the enterprise, are just as much at risk of unwarranted optimism or blind spots. If I were running BP now, I'd be announcing that I would be organising some kind of arm's-length oversight committee, full of common-sense old ladies, philosophers, mathematicians - anyone, in fact, except for oil people - and having them scrutinise all my plans and be empowered to ask very pointed and quite possibly extremely stupid questions. All I'd have to do them would be to get my people to listen to the questions and not try to answer them too quickly.

I don't suppose anything like it will happen.
 
Also doubtless partially a PR exercise so that they can meet criticism with 'well we're trying right now to remedy the situation, wait until we see whether this works'.
 
On CNN last week there was a story that BP were making local fisherman sign a legal waver, so if they had an accident or damaged their boat or equipment while helping with the clean up they could not take legal action against BP.

Once this letter make it into the public domain the head of BP said "this isn't something that came from our office, we are looking into it" and went on to say on live TV that the document would not be used by BP for legal reasons and he will ensure it is withdrawn.

This was big news on CNN but I didn't see it reported on BBC world
 
I can't access that, firewalled. How big is it in that well known measurement unit....the size of Wales?

2vmjbpi.png
 
Apparently BP has lowered a smaller funnel to the sea bed now, because the bigger one had failed.

No news on whether the smaller one has been successful.
 
.... We are bloody awful at spotting the deficiencies in our own plans - we have too much invested in our ideas being right to start planning for the possibiity of them being wrong. I know that I was terrible at testing my own code: I often caught myself quite unconsciously avoiding testing certain things that might well result in faults, ....

Perhaps you should peform FMEAs on your programming.

FMEAs are from the Auto industry and are quite good at wheedling out weaknesses and risks.
 
oh dear....

One analysis suggests gusher is 70,000 barrels daily, or an Exxon Valdez every four days, and 12 times more powerful than estimates by Coast Guard or BP

Marine scientists were carefully viewing footage of oil and gas billowing out of a ruptured well on the ocean floor today, to try to deliver the first reliable estimates of the crude gushing into the Gulf of Mexico – it could be as much as 70,000 barrels a day.

The video could help resolve the increasingly contentious debate about the scale of the disaster, and the oil companies' willingness to give access to any information.

BP has claimed repeatedly there is no way of measuring the scale of the leak. The US Coast Guard, meanwhile, has stuck to an early estimate of 5,000 barrels a day.

Independent marine researchers have suggested the spill could be much larger.

National Public Radio in the United States last night reported that the well is spewing up to 70,000 barrels of oil a day – the equivalent of an Exxon Valdez disaster every four days. Nearly 11 million gallons of oil were spilled in Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989 when the Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground, oiling beaches and poisoning marine life for generations. NPR said scientific analysis of newly released video footage from the ocean floor suggested the gusher was 12 times more powerful than estimates offered so far by the Coast Guard or BP.

Its analysis was conducted by Steve Werely, an associate professor at Purdue University, using a technique called particle image velocimetry, a method was accurate to 20%. That puts the range of the oil spill from 56,000 to 84,000 barrels a day.

Werely told The Guardian he based his estimate on techniques which track the speed of objects travelling in the flow stream.

"You can see in the video lots of swirls and vortices pumping out of the end of the pipe, and I used a computer code to track those swirls and come up with the speed at which the oils is shooting out of the pipe," he said. "From there it is a very simple calculation to figure out what is the volume flow."

He said he had use the method for 15 years, and elsewhere it had been in use for 25 years.

Scientists had spent the day scouring the video footage of the gushing pipe on the ocean floor to try to arrive at estimates.

Eugene Chiang, an associate professor at the University of California Berkeley who teaches a course on measurement, said he had been copied on an email which set it as a science challenge for academics.

"It was just like estimating the number of jelly beans in a can, it had that kind of a feeling – but of course with much more serious consequences," he told the Guardian.

Chiang said he used relatively "back of the envelope" calculations to put an estimated rate for the spill at 20,000 to 100,000 barrels a day.
 
Perhaps you should peform FMEAs on your programming.

FMEAs are from the Auto industry and are quite good at wheedling out weaknesses and risks.
I got out of the coding game a LONG time ago! But when I was doing teamwork, what we did was to make sure we had a testing protocol that meant that the coder themselves was never the only one who was testing their own code...but it was interesting to note that we were all much better at finding our own bugs if we knew someone else was going to be looking, too!

Which is probably why I now work in a more psychologically-oriented field now :)
 
It has estimated ultimate reserves of about 600 million barrels (95 million m³)
according to Wikipedia. And i saw this....

Speaking on National Public Radio on May 6, lawyers for some survivors of the blast claim that their clients were kept in boats and on another rig for 15 hours or more before being brought to shore, and when they did get to shore, "they were zipped into private buses, there was security there, there was no press, no lawyers allowed, nothing, no family members. They drove them to this hotel and they escorted them into the back of this hotel, once again under escort". Secluded at the hotel for several hours, they were questioned by company consultants and investigators and given a form to sign.
 
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