What's good about Heidegger?

[Dillinger4]

I read a little of that. I'm far from convinced.

I need to do something, I use a tool, be it my hand or a stick or a computer. That tool then becomes a part of me. Your brain, when you are for instance using a knife and fork, acts as if they are literally part of you. Where does 'technics' come in? I don't see where it is necessary to the description.

Read a little bit more.

 

[Dillinger4]

From the same link

We should pause for a moment and get our bearings:

Heidegger starts his essay with our everyday understanding of technology as instrumentality, as a way of getting things done.
He asks what we mean by "instrumentality" and moves into a discussion of "cause."
The examination of "cause," in turn, leads him to a discussion of poeisis as a bringing forth, a revealing of something that was concealed.
At the close of the last section, he relates this bringing forth to the Greek word for "truth."
If we continue to pursue the question of the essence of technology, Heidegger now argues, we will come to see that technology is a kind of poeisis, a way of bringing forth or revealing--and, as such, is "the realm of truth" (294).

What does Heidegger mean by this? What does he gain from the seemingly radical and far-fetched association of technology and poetry? At this point in the essay, we begin to see that Heidegger has been developing an alternative way of thinking about technology, one that is not strictly bound to instrumentality. And as we will soon see, he is pointing out the similiarities between the ways in which technology and poetry confront the world in order to contrast them later.

By now, it should come as no surprise that Heidegger turns again to etymology when he challenges us to "take seriously the simple question of what the word 'technology' means" (294).

Our word "technology" comes from the Greek technikon, which is related to the word techne. Heidegger makes two points about techne:
In the sense of "technique," techne refers to both manufacturing (the techniques of shoemakers and printers, for example) and to the arts (the techniques of poets and graphic designers, for example). Techne is part of poeisis.
In Greek thought from Plato on, the word is used in connection with the word episteme, from which we get the word "epistemology"--the branch of philosophy that examines how we know things. Techne, Heidegger concludes, is a kind of knowing. We might think of it as "expertise," which we generally understand as more than a set of practical skills. It is "know-how"; in Heidegger's words, "what is decisive in techne does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the revealing mentioned before" (295).
If we understand technology as deriving from this concept of techne, Heidegger continues, then we will see that its essence lies not in the instrumental production of goods or manipulation of materials, but in "revealing." Remember that Heidegger has said something similar about the silversmith, who, through his techne, brings together the form and matter of the chalice within the idea of "chaliceness" to reveal the chalice that has been "on its way" to existence.

At this point, Heidegger anticipates an objection to his representation of modern technology as "a mode of revealing."

edit - a few pages in

http://www.english.hawaii.edu/criticalink/heidegger/guide4.html

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Thanks for the extract. It sounds dangerously like phildwyer's idea that somehow the idea of a thing must exist for the thing to exist. This is imo redundant. I don't totally hate his idea of technie, but he appears to have an attachment to words in the wrong way - mistaking the symbol for that which is symbolised, as I said in another thread. This mistake can lead one to see significance where there is none.

 

[Luther Blissett]

Thanks, Dillinger!

I am thinking that Heidegger is taking his concept of technology from older debates on "Episteme and Techne" with little if any of his own 'tweaking', especially Heidegger's 'turn to etymology', which is straight out of Plato's Kratylos (or Cratylos, which are reconstituted dialogues between Socrates, Hermogenes and Kratylos - late 5th century BCE). At this moment, I am unable to accept his interpretation as original in any way. Until I've examined the differences further, at first glance of my eye, it appears to be a 20th century interpretation/translation of the 5th/4th/3rd century BCE philosophies on Episteme & Techne, i.e. from Socrates via Plato, Aristotle, et alia, with which I'm familiar. I'm prepared for my understanding to evolve tho, so don't take my current position/understanding as fixed or unable to be altered. In this understanding of Techne by Heidegger, I am reminded of Plato's Cratylos (or Kratylos), and also of Aristotle's 'theoria, praxis, and poeisis'. I will have to look into the similarities/differences/syntheses between these pre-Hellenistic philosophies and that of Heidegger's further.

Good summary of Episteme and Techne here. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/
(Do remember as you read, that these are 5th/4th/3rd century BCE understandings (before common era, so in the middle to early iron age for Britain, and the pre-Hellenic for Greece).

 

[Dillinger4]

Thanks for the extract. It sounds dangerously like phildwyer's idea that somehow the idea of a thing must exist for the thing to exist. This is imo redundant. I don't totally hate his idea of technie, but he appears to have an attachment to words in the wrong way - mistaking the symbol for that which is symbolised, as I said in another thread. This mistake can lead one to see significance where there is none.

I have to admit that I am already pretty out of my depth, in regard to Heidegger, so I don't know how well I will be able to answer this.

I think what you have to realize with Heidegger, first of all, is that he is taking a phenomenological approach to philosophical investigation, and this is fundamentally different to other philosophical approaches (there is good reason for the messianical streak within it!). Put simply, Phenomenology is:

the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions.

Husserl, and subsequent phenomenologists, in order to apply phenomenology properly, applied what is called the Epoché, which is a 'bracketing' or suspension of all human beliefs and descriptions, in order to describe the world being phenomenologically percieved, as it is. Obviously, it is a lot more complex than that, and pretty interesting:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology

Heidegger made the break away from the phenomenology over this point. Heidegger pointed out that we are unable to fully 'bracket' all our beliefs because we cannot 'bracket' ourselves, as we are 'beings-in-the-world'

Anyway, I can't really explain this as well as the links will do, so all I can suggest is that if it interests you, read about it. It will explain it better than I ever can. My only point here, by explaining the above, is to try and show that Heidegger is using a fundementally different philosophical approach, and I think that notions of the seperation of ideas and existence, and symbols and the symbolized, may not be quite accurate.

 

[Luther Blissett]

I'm out of my depth too, Dillinger, but I don't think it's a major problem, because we're being honest about that

 

[Spion]

So, as I understand it so far, Heidegger's thought is based on the idea that we do not know how to *be*. That our very words and our society have masked our true essence and we are incapable of living 'authentic' lives. So, we have strive to be authentic, to cut through the distracting noise which masks our ability to see our true selves and follow our fate.

There's tons of Nietsche in there, is there not?

A fair reading?

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Thanks, Dill.

This bit was particularly helpful:

"Heidegger made the break away from the phenomenology over this point. Heidegger pointed out that we are unable to fully 'bracket' all our beliefs because we cannot 'bracket' ourselves, as we are 'beings-in-the-world'"

 

[Dillinger4]

*phew*



I do worry that I am just talking shit. Especially when it comes to philosophy.

 

[Luther Blissett]

So, as I understand it so far, Heidegger's thought is based on the idea that we do not know how to *be*. That our very words and our society have masked our true essence and we are incapable of living 'authentic' lives. So, we have strive to be authentic, to cut through the distracting noise which masks our ability to see our true selves and follow our fate.

There's tons of Nietsche in there, is there not?

A fair reading?

I am not able to answer your question. Perhaps someone else will have a go!

 

[Dillinger4]

So, as I understand it so far, Heidegger's thought is based on the idea that we do not know how to *be*. That our very words and our society have masked our true essence and we are incapable of living 'authentic' lives. So, we have strive to be authentic, to cut through the distracting noise which masks our ability to see our true selves and follow our fate.

There's tons of Nietsche in there, is there not?

A fair reading?

That is a very simplistic, but probably fair, reading, yes.

There is Nietzsche in there, but I don't think he explicitly acknowledged by Heidegger himself. Nietzsche is widely considered to a kind of 'proto-existentialist', as is Kierkegaard, in that they too are focusing on the question of 'being'.

 

[Luther Blissett]

*phew*



I do worry that I am just talking shit. Especially when it comes to philosophy.

I think you're making an admirable attempt to answer the original question posed in post 1 in a neutral manner. I (and possibly others) really do appreciate this.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

That is a very simplistic, but probably fair, reading, yes.

There is Nietzsche in there, but I don't think he explicitly acknowledged by Heidegger himself. Nietzsche is widely considered to a kind of 'proto-existentialist', as is Kierkegaard, in that they too are focusing on the question of 'being'.

This is why philosophers should stick to semantics.

 

[Santino]

It always bothers me when people can't sum up a thinker and give and assessment of them. It makes me think the thinker in question actually hasn't got much to give.

That's probably a useful rule of thumb most of the time, but not in the case of Heidegger. It's hard to sum him up without distorting him, as this thread is demonstrating.

For example:

Thanks for the extract. It sounds dangerously like phildwyer's idea that somehow the idea of a thing must exist for the thing to exist. This is imo redundant. I don't totally hate his idea of technie, but he appears to have an attachment to words in the wrong way - mistaking the symbol for that which is symbolised, as I said in another thread. This mistake can lead one to see significance where there is none.

This would be a monstrous distortion of Heidegger. He is explicitly making a break with the Platonism and idealism of earlier philosophers. Husserl also attempted to define essences in a non-Platonic way, but Heidegger went evern further than that.

 

[Spion]

That's probably a useful rule of thumb most of the time, but not in the case of Heidegger. It's hard to sum him up without distorting him, as this thread is demonstrating.

So, how close am I getting here?

So, as I understand it so far, Heidegger's thought is based on the idea that we do not know how to *be*. That our very words and our society have masked our true essence and we are incapable of living 'authentic' lives. So, we have strive to be authentic, to cut through the distracting noise which masks our ability to see our true selves and follow our fate.

 

[Dillinger4]

What Alex B said ^^

 

[Santino]

So, how close am I getting here?

It's kind of a very loose approximation of a small part of his early stuff.

The idea of (in)authenticity has been bigged up because that was the aspect that was taken up by later thinkers, especially Sartre, who misunderstood Heidegger in every important way (I'm parroting someone else here, I know very little of Sartre). Heidegger himself was very ambivalent about convention - he saw it as necessary to make our existence possible, but in the next moment railed against doing things just because that's what everyone else does.

But that is only a tiny, tiny part of it.

 

[Dillinger4]

You are right about Sartre parroting Heidegger, and getting it very very wrong.

 

[Santino]

Someone add 'parrot' to the tags please.

 

[Luther Blissett]

Someone add 'parrot' to the tags please.

I'd rather that parrot was not one of the tags.
Can it be more appropriate instead? Maybe Sartre ?

e2a: Don't want a fight about this, but no 'parrot tag', ok.

 

[Santino]

I really enjoyed 'Q' by the way. And that hat-trick, awesome.

 

[Spion]

After a bit of reading and viewing on Heidegger, I’ve come to a few conclusions.

It seems to me he mainly addresses the issue of alienation – in the general sense of man being separated from his ‘true being’ in some way – and, overlapping this - the issue of freedom v necessity.

Central to his seems to be the idea that we are masked from our true state of being by humanist/rationalist/Cartesian thought which views us as subjects acting upon the world/objects. In this way language and the process of thought-action deny us the experience of our true being.

He seems to reject the idea of man as a rational man, as a subject who apprehends the reality and meaning of the external world. Instead we are asked to experience the world, seemingly without thought, with truth ‘revealed’ as a soldier might when faced with a life and death choice, or a rural craftsman may fashion an object from wood (both scenarios to which he makes reference). This is what I take him to mean by da-sein, there-being – ie, being there in the now, not thinking, doing, as we are truly meant to, with ‘authenticity’.

A corollary of this is his focus on technology, which it seems to me, is another form of ‘language’ for him which separates us from our true selves.

OK, so what do I think of it all?

1. It seems a pretty asocial way of looking at our relationship to the world. OK, so he deals with the social to an extent but there is no analysis of society. All focus is on the immediate question of thought and action. It therefore seems wide open to allow almost any kind of action, or rather inaction – being quietist in its implications, as we should submit to an unthinking acceptance of destinies that we acquiesce to in our ‘being there’.

2. It seems very much a product of his time and place. In the broad sense by Romantic German nationalism and that ideology’s appeal to some Greek precedent (in his idea of reality being revealed by aletheia, for example). On the other hand it seems very much a product of a post WW1 pessimistic malaise in which technology was seen to have shown itself in the mechanised killing fields as an evil that confirmed its antipathy to man’s true being. At a more personal level Heidegger was of rural background and seemed wedded to the ‘authenticy’ of such a life and its practices. He lived in an environment of rural conservatism where humanist and left wing ideas seemed a disruptive and alien force.

3. His ideas of the rejection of thought-action and substitution for it of da-sein seem to me to be merely a construct. I’ve not come across him presenting any evidence for the erroneousness of the former or the correctness of the latter, or even of where man has ever really been the way he describes. He simply doesn’t like the idea of man as a rational being who observes, understands and acts based upon his appreciation of the world around him.

4. He clearly was a practising Nazi, and his thought allowed him to be. He was, after all, simply submitting to destiny, and not letting humanist ideas of thought-action and deriving ethical principles to get in the way.

5. Is he any use? I can’t honestly see any. His chief ‘philosphical’ ideas seem to be constructs of the way he wanted things to be rather than being a reflection of reality.

 

[Santino]

He seems to reject the idea of man as a rational man, as a subject who apprehends the reality and meaning of the external world. Instead we are asked to experience the world, seemingly without thought, with truth ‘revealed’ as a soldier might when faced with a life and death choice, or a rural craftsman may fashion an object from wood (both scenarios to which he makes reference). This is what I take him to mean by da-sein, there-being – ie, being there in the now, not thinking, doing, as we are truly meant to, with ‘authenticity’.

I disagree. He wasn't denying that we are rational, he was examining and criticising the traditional picture of what it is to be rational.

 

[Dillinger4]

I disagree. He wasn't denying that we are rational, he was examining and criticising the traditional picture of what it is to be rational.

Indeed.

 

[Spion]

I disagree. He wasn't denying that we are rational, he was examining and criticising the traditional picture of what it is to be rational.

But does it make any sense at all? It seems like a weird kind of wishful thinking to me

 

[Santino]

But does it make any sense at all? It seems like a weird kind of wishful thinking to me

It is certainly worthy of consideration. At the very least he makes us think about things we take to be true that we hadn't even thought were up for discussion.

 

[Spion]

It is certainly worthy of consideration. At the very least he makes us think about things we take to be true that we hadn't even thought were up for discussion.

I guess. Like how the hell some hick nazi got excused for his appalling real life politics and what his rehabilitation says about the bankruptcy of post-WW2 'philosophy'.

That's my 'gloves-off' assessment

 

[gorski]

My 2 p...

In all seriousness, we shouldn't let his appalling political judgement get in the way of appreciating his philosophy. He grappled with and described many phenomena which had been ignored or misdescribed by all thinkers before him.

None, actually. He brought nothing New to Philosophy.

After Hegel the themes of death, struggle and labour have been always taken piecemeal. Marx got the latter two, Heidegger the former.

Even when he ventures into the questions of Historicity and "threatens" to come up with something Novel [thanx to people investigating before him, like, for instance, Dilthey] he comes up with reactionary ideas.

When talking about authenticity and the faceless "One does" [das Man] he is doing it at the same time as another political failure, Lukacs, who did it inspired by Marx's early works, recently discovered, back then. But if you think that such a theme or what was said is somehow a New subject to Philosophy - I think you need to seriously re-think!

Even when "making one's time as one's own time", dense and meaningful, having finally met one's maker, as it were, having faced the "questions of meaning of one's existance" at the deepest level - whatever Heidegger sees as "answers" to such serious questions, I think they are all deeply flawed.

He is in deep need of "rooting" it all in some sort of safe and sound, secure, fixed "foundation". Adorno kept slapping him and provoking a response - but in vain! - where does the need for such "firm grounding" come from?!?

Heidegger, on the other hand, kept insisting that the only dialogue worth having was with Marx [i.e. the best thinkers of that general direction], somewhat being unkind to his colleagues from the Right, calling them sycophantic and so on - alas he never engaged any of them, remaining forever a hypocryte!

It's a sad episode, somewhat similar to what we have seen on the Left as well...

 

[gorski]

Would I be right in saying that Heidegger's was fundamentally a dialectic approach, which is where he differs from/improves upon Husserl?

Interpreters call it a "dialectical slide", as opposed to an "iron logic of Hegel", for example. In other words, notions "sliding/slipping" from the preceding analysis, rather than logically and necessarily following the inner logic of a philosophical analysis.

 

[Spion]

A good contribution, Mr Gorski.