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On ISW Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul
The recapture of Mosul can reset the balance of power between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq and in the region. Iran has tolerated U.S. presence in Iraq because the U.S. provided sufficient airpower and training to combat ISIS. It has also backed Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi because his premiership was a condition of U.S. support and because PM Abadi is too weak to resist Iranian control. Pro-Iranian groups in Iraq will likely consider the recapture of Mosul as the end of major anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and continued U.S. presence unnecessary and unwelcomed. Recent U.S. statements suggest that the U.S. may increase, not decrease, its involvement in Iraq after Mosul, which is likely accelerating Iran’s efforts to expel the U.S. from the region. Iran has started to consolidate its proxies in Iraq, including a reconciliation between Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr and senior pro-Iranian officials, in order to both increase pressure on PM Abadi against further Western support and establish Iraq as a base from which it can project regional influence. Iran’s support for PM Abadi’s premiership could also waver, especially if a more pro-Iranian candidate emerges.
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Just as Trump gets his first term going.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 101, Jan 25, 2017
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Nearly every week there are stories that IS members are fleeing to Syria. How could this be if the Hashd had cut off that route months ago? That’s because there are holes in that line. One is at a small town called Ein al-Hassan by the Sinjar mountains. The village is held by Kataib Hezbollah and the mountains by the Peshmerga, but the low ground between them is under IS control. It’s said that there is a tunnel system from the area to Syria, and the insurgents still move at night as well. There are probably other areas not patrolled or garrisoned where militants can get through as well.

Hashd spokesman Ahmed al-Asadi held a press conference to let people know that its forces would take part in the next phase of the Mosul battle. He said the Hashd would be in involved in west Mosul all the way to Tal Afar. The Ali Abbas division is scheduled to join the ISF inside the city, and the Hashd have been around Tal Afar for weeks now. Asadi’s statements appeared to be aimed at showing that the Hashd were still playing an important role in the campaign. In fact, they have been largely in a support role with less to do since the government forces have not taken Tal Afar. That could change as National Security Adviser Falah Fayad said there was nothing stopping the Hashd from entering the town. That could upset the rough relationship with Turkey, which has strenuously objected to any Hashd going into Tal Afar claiming they will carry out abuses.
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I find it a bit strange that no ISF Brigade has even had a go at Tel Afar being that it's quite a hot potato with Turkey if the Hashd get tired of waiting and walk in. It's an old AQI hotspot and IS might well resupply West Mosul from it. There are nearly 60K folk deployed in the Mosul op.
 
On Prism An Interview with General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal
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What lessons should we have learned from Afghanistan and Iraq?

McChrystal: In the case of Afghanistan, immediately after 9/11, in terms of military action we should have done nothing initially. I now believe we should have taken the first year after 9/11 and sent 10,000 young Americans—military, civilians, diplomats—to language school; Pashtu, Dari, Arabic. We should have started to build up the capacity we didn’t have. I would have spent that year with diplomats traveling the world as the aggrieved party. We had just been struck by al-Qaeda. I would have made our case around the world that this is a global problem and that the whole world has to deal with it. I would have spent the full year in preparation. I would not have been worried about striking al-Qaeda that year; they weren’t going anywhere. We could have organized, we could have built the right coalitions, we could have done things with a much greater level of understanding than we did in our spasmodic response. Politically, doing what I described would have been very difficult. But I believe that kind of preparation was needed.

With Iraq, even though we had from 1990 on to prepare, we didn’t really dissect that problem in the way we should have either. Once the decision was made to invade we focused far too much on the invasion and dealing with fortress Baghdad. Phase 4, and even beyond Phase 4, the permanent situation in the Middle East with a different regime in Iraq should have been something we spent a lot of time thinking about. The military part was the easy part. There was no doubt we could do the military part. What there was a doubt about was, once you remove one of the key players in a region—and one could argue that Saddam Hussein was such a key player— you change the dynamic in the whole region. We were not ready for that. We really needed to be thinking about that and building a diplomatic coalition. We ended up getting a different Iran than we might have wanted and we certainly have a different Syria than we wanted. Of course you can’t say Syria would not have happened without the invasion of Iraq, but we certainly should have thought through the unanticipated consequences of our actions and been better prepared for the things that happened.

What would you have done differently in Syria?

McChrystal: It’s easy to criticize American foreign policy in Syria. It has been very difficult. In retrospect it’s clear that one of the things we are paying a high price for is reduced American credibility in the region. After 9/11 initially we responded very forcefully both militarily and diplomatically. But then we showed the region just how long the dog’s leash was. Once they saw not only all that we could do but also all we could not, or would not do, they saw the limits of American power and the limits of American patience. Suddenly our ability to influence the region declined. And as we started to show political fatigue and frustration, people in the region started to make new calculations. If you look at the behavior of the various countries—some former allies, the Saudis for instance—they have recalibrated their relationship with us and their role in the region, because they perceive that going forward the United States will have a different role than in the past. That has weighed very heavily in Syria. We have signaled very precisely all the things we will not do. Once you signal all the things you will not do, your opponent has the luxury of saying, “I know where my safe zone is.” That was probably a mistake. There needs to be some ambiguity about what we will and won’t do so that our foes are in doubt, and don’t know where we’ll stop.
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This is the terrifying chap who ran the JSOC hunter killer program against AQI in Iraq. He goes on to say IS is not a cause but a symptom. That its elimination will change little. He thinks folk who think great power conflict in Europe may get a nasty surprise. That technology empowers the weak and individuals in a way 20th Century superpowers didn't have to face.

Can anyone imagine Trump saying of 9-11 saying that one needed a year of thinking on and diplomatic preparation? He might get at a gut level that a little strategic ambiguity was necessary to keep an opponent off balance.

It ends:
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It seems like we have the wrong mind-set; war and peace, when it’s neither of those the way we used to think of them. What we are in is more like perpetual struggle. In the 1990s two Chinese Air Force colonels wrote something called “Unrestricted Warfare.” They seemed to get it.

McChrystal: Yes, I did read that. The Russians may get it also, though I haven’t read enough on current Russian thinking to know for sure. I’m watching their actions, for example what they did in Crimea and are still doing in Ukraine, particularly on the tactical level. We didn’t see the problem that way when we invaded Iraq or Afghanistan. When I would go to the Pentagon in late summer 2002, and speak to people planning the invasion of Iraq, I was really surprised, I had no idea they were doing that. And as I observed the planning process, I asked myself “Does anybody know what we’re talking about?” We were completely focused on how many ships and planes would be required over there. We got so wrapped around the axle on deployment and mobilization, we never stepped back and considered, “Wait a minute. We’re about to go to war.”
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The Russians have a ratio of 4:1 information/political actions to military. They act incrementally with fairly small commitments that can be revised and rolled back. They often bungle things and don't know how it ends but it's very different from the great logistical task of Operation Iraqi Freedom all those years ago. So named with transformational ambitions but not really with a baldy clue what that would mean.
 

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Now the Iraqi National Security Advisor Falah Fayad says the PMU forces could enter Tal Afar.

“Turkey is preoccupied with the PKK in northern Iraq and mostly dropped its agenda of pushing Baghdad away from Mosul and Tal Afar,” Ali Özkök, a Eurasia-Analyst told ARA News.

“Baghdad reportedly signed a deal with Turkey to keep Hashd [PMU] out of Mosul and have army and police take it,” Joel Wing, an Iraq expert who runs the Musings on Iraq blog, told ARA News.

“Now that’s apparently changed and the PMU will liberate the town of Tal Afar probably because they don’t have enough ISF forces with the attack on west Mosul coming up and Turkey hasn’t said anything yet,” Wing said.

The new agreement would most likely be a victory for Iran that backs the Shia military groups to create a corridor from Tal Afar to Syria.

“The PMU have talked about protecting the Shiite Turkmen population there for a long time,” Wing told ARA News.

“Iranian-backed groups also want to control it because it is a route to the Syrian border and would allow Tehran to ship men and material from Iran through Iraq to Syria [in support of Assad regime],” he concluded.

After the US removed Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, Tal Afar became a smuggling hub for Al-Qaeda militants in Iraq, and the Assad regime ferried in foreign fighters into Iraq to destabilize the country. “Now Iran wants to use it to prop up the Syrian regime,” Wing.
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On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 102, Jan 26, 2017
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Finally, there were new casualty figures. Based upon reading over 40 papers a day and releases by aid agencies a total of 5,404 deaths have been counted and 16,983 wounded from October 17, 2016 to January 21, 2017. The vast majority of those are civilians with 4,741 killed and 14,842 injured. The Islamic State has been accused of executing 2,798 people. Coalition air strikes have been blamed for another 561 fatalities and 653 wounded. The fighting caused the rest.
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Wing adds this comment on the Hashd going for Tal Afar:
...This will be a huge victory for the Hashd. They have talked about protecting the Shiite Turkmen in the area. The Iranian linked units would also like a presence there because it is a gateway to Syria. That would allow Tehran to move men and material straight across from Iran through Iraq to Syria. If that happened it would be highly ironic. Tal Afar used to be the route Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Assad government ferried in foreign fighters into Iraq to destabilize the country. Now Iran wants to use it to prop up the Syrian regime.
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Turkey being seen to back down as well will be gravy for the IRGC.
 
Peshmerga able to remove ISIS from remaining areas in Shingal region, says ex-army chief

but interestingly various units either PKK or affiliated have stated that they are willing to co-operate with the Peshmerga in any operations:

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – Veteran Peshmerga and Former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army Babakir Zebari says the Peshmerga forces stationed in Shingal are capable of routing ISIS from remaining small pockets of land in the region and that they do not need help from anyone.


Zebari referred to fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) or their affiliate groups based in the area who have expressed willingness for participation in any future offensive against ISIS in the region.

“If the Peshmerga needs them [PKK], then they will undoubtedly cooperate with the PKK, but the existing force there is able to liberate areas still held by ISIS in the Shingal region as we saw them in the first phase of the Mosul operation liberating many areas in Khazir and other areas,” Zebari told Rudaw....
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On Musings On Iraq Effect Of Iranian Propaganda On Iraq
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A group of three researchers working for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology interviewed 1,668 Iranians and 2,410 Iraqis during Arabaeen in Karbala in 2015. Those questioned overwhelmingly supported Iran’s policies in the Middle East. When asked what motivated Iran in the region the most popular response for Iraqis, 40.68%, was to protect Shiite communities. That compared to 27.33% of Iranians selecting that choice. That showed how effective Iran’s propaganda campaign was within Iraq. Iraqis felt like Tehran was helping them more than Iranians themselves. This was of course in the middle of the war with the Islamic State, Iraqis were still feeling vulnerable, and when Iran was pumping up its role in Iraq far above the U.S. led Coalition, which preferred having the Iraqis claim responsibility for their victories. Other factors shaping the response would be the negative view most of those interviewed had of America, as well as religious Shiites being more open to Iran’s role then others. In contrast, a plurality of Iranians, 39.28% believed that national security was the main driver of Tehran’s foreign policy.
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Consider that these are two countries that fought a bitter war in the 80s with huge losses on both sides. It wasn't just a period of great patriotism Shia Iraqis where mostly very against Iran at the time. The moral centre of Shia Iraq in Najaf has also been very suspicious of the heretical rule next door and Iranian encroachments on Iraqi sovereignty.

Whether this change of mind is more down to clever IRGC Information Operations or IS's fondness for massacring Iraqis and posting it up on YouTube is a moot question. What Safavid hating IS created was mostly a surge of patriotic resistance to them. The IRGC were off the blocks very quickly to support both Baghdad and Irbil.

In contrast Obama really dropped the ball in sulkily trying to shift all blame onto Baghdad for the failure of the US withdrawal instead of leaping to protect the threatened capital the way he did Irbil. It was a move that left Iraqi's scratching their heads about US motivations as they often have since Saddam fell. This charmless little incident of his typically lofty behaviour comes to mind as well.


Trumps recent weird grumpy uncle bragging on stealing Iraq's oil is a very bad start. Little Abadi who tries hard to lean towards the US to counter Iranian influence was quite baffled by it.
 
In Military Times Report: Children held by Kurdish forces allege torture
IRBIL, Iraq — Children detained by Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government on suspicion that they have connections to the Islamic State group are alleging they were tortured, according to a report from an international human rights group published Sunday.

The children — who have not been formally charged with a crime — recount being held in stress positions, burned with cigarettes, shocked with electricity and beaten with plastic pipes, according to Human Rights Watch, a New York based international watchdog.

More than 180 boys under the age of 18 are currently being held, HRW estimates, and government officials have not informed their families where they are, increasing the likelihood the children could be disappeared.

The rights group says they interviewed 19 boys aged 11 to 17 while they were in custody at a children's reformatory in Irbil. The group says the interviews were conducted without a security official or intelligence officer present.
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Pesh have similar reputation to The Christian Brothers in this respect.
 

What I was saying. Various moves by Iraqi politicians to cancel US oil contracts and bar entry to US citizens. Seem to be symbolic.
 
On Syria Comment The KRG’s Relationship with the Yazidi Minority and the Future of the Yazidis in Shingal (Sinjar)
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Therefore, the desire of most of the Yazidis who join the YBŞ is not to support the pan-Kurdish ideology of the PKK, but rather to protect their own homeland and strengthen their capacity for local governance. They simply do not see an alternative sponsor qualified to defend Yazidi interests at the moment. For the Yazidis, the issue is not a choice of loyalty between Erbil versus Baghdad, but is about creating a framework for self-administration—something that Erbil will never tolerate. By rejecting Erbil’s claims to Shingal (something the vast majority of Shingali Yazidis are united in), Yazidis are not expressing some kind of preference for a special relationship with Baghdad. Rather, they simply want to work within the framework of the government that will best provide the opportunity for self-administration.

The KDP had a decade to convince the Yazidis to join with them instead of seeking their own administration under Baghdad. They failed in this endeavor because they used excessive intimidation rather than extending goodwill and respecting the right of the Yazidis to choose. When I was in Shingal in the summer of 2015, I spoke to wheat and barley farmers who had left the camps in Dohuk to temporarily return to their farms on the north side of the mountain, in order to harvest their fields that had been left standing after the genocide. They hoped to sell their grain and return to the camps. But instead of facilitating this effort on the part of the poor families, Peshmerga leaders in charge of the area after the liberation of the mountain’s north side were not allowing Yazidis to bring their grain to Dohuk. (This was prior to the economic blockade discussed in this article.) The Peshmerga leaders were forcing the Yazidi farmers to sell their grain within Shingal, below the current price, to the Peshmerga leaders themselves, who were then transporting it to the Kurdistan Region to sell for a large profit. This is only one example of the kind of corruption that Shingal suffers under single-party rule and it was heartbreaking to see a broken people continue to be subjected to such exploitation even after the genocide.

Today should mark the end of these abuses. The desire of the Yazidis for self-administration within Iraq’s legal framework should now be respected by all sides. The wishes of the Yazidis are not unreasonable or unrealistic. They are not asking to secede from Iraq and create their own country. They simply want to work within the parameters of the Iraqi constitution to effectively manage and protect their historic region. Such goals are sensible—if this minority is to survive in its homeland—and achievable with local and international support.
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This rather looks like KDP complicity in an attempted genocide followed by systematic state persecution. Completely ignored by Obama.
 
On Iran Tracker
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Advisor to Soleimani: “Victory in Mosul will bring 250 kilometers of security to Iran.” IRGC Brig. Gen. Iraj Masjedi, a senior advisor to IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, praised Iran’s efforts in Iraq and Syria. He stated, “The defenders of the shrine are defending Iran’s geopolitical situation in addition to defending sacred sites.” Iranian officials use the term “defenders of the shrine” to refer to Iranian forces and Iranian-backed militias fighting in Syria and Iraq. Masjedi also noted that recapturing Mosul will bring “250 kilometers of security to Iran,” underscoring the Iranian regime’s perception of northern Iraq as part of its strategic depth. Masjedi is slated to become Iran’s new ambassador to Iraq. (Tasnim News Agency)
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Key to understanding how Iran views Iraq.
 
On ISW The Campaign for Mosul: January 24-31, 2017
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PM Abadi is at increased risk of losing his premiership. Former PM Nouri al-Maliki is maneuvering to reclaim the position by appealing to Iranian interests and courting the pro-Iranian support base away from PM Abadi. PM Abadi, who has been receptive to and supported by the U.S., may need to make concession to the pro-Iranian political base in order to ensure his position, especially if U.S.-Iraq relations strain. PM Abadi compromised on the appointment of a Badr Organization member as the Minister of Interior on January 30, despite previous reservations. He may also need to appease political parties by allowing their affiliated militias greater latitude in anti-ISIS operations.
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It's just as well there's not a loud mouth in the Whitehouse banging on about stealing Iraq's oil.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 106, Jan 31, 2017
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The Hashd is pushing its own propaganda. A captain from the forces told Rudaw that his unit had been given the job of securing Mosul University. The Joint Operations Command just said that only the ISF would be in the city so it’s yet to be seen whether this report was true or not. In a similar vein spokesman Ahmed al-Asadi said that the Hashd were preparing to assault west Mosul. They have been making this claim with increasing frequency, but Prime Minister Haider Abadi said from the start that they would not take part in the battle inside the city. Former Ninewa Governor Atheel Nujafi’s Hashd al-Watani was included in the northern front and did enter the city, but they have since been told to leave because of an arrest warrant against Nujafi. Where there is no question about the Hashd role is west of Mosul in the Tal Afar district. There they are increasingly interested in Baaj. This is where IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other IS commanders have reportedly been staying for months now, which means the Hashd are more and more interested in attacking the area and seeing what is there.
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My bold, Baaj is a half hour drive SW of Sinjar.
 
On ISW Iraq Situation Report: January 25 - February 1, 2017
ISIS continued to reestablish its presence in its historic support zones around Tikrit, Diyala, and the Euphrates River Valley from January 25 to February 1. ISIS launched several attacks against security forces between Tikrit and the Hamrin Mountains as part of a developing trend of ISIS rebuilding its capabilities in the area to launch attacks and to penetrate high levels of security. ISIS launched a major attack against an oil facility on the Diyala-Iran border. Its continued encroachment on Iran’s doorstep could prompt Iran to more aggressively intervene in Iraq, as it did when ISIS neared its borders in 2014. Meanwhile, ISIS demonstrated that it has advanced its capabilities in the Euphrates River Valley, carrying out the first successful spectacular attack in Ramadi since the city’s recapture in February 2016. ISIS attempted an attack in the city in November 2016, but it was thwarted. The January 25 attack, though it produced limited casualties, underscores that ISIS has reestablished significant capabilities and a network in Ramadi, likely by infiltrating the city through returning refugee flows.
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My bold, what's that they were saying about “250 kilometers of security to Iran,”?
 
On Niqash.org Frenemies United: Security Problems, Scrappy Militias Delay Fight Against Extremists In Western Mosul
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Additionally, and unfortunately, the different groups don’t always get along well. Last Friday Sunni Muslim politician, Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of Ninawa who is allegedly in charge of the locally-created militias, said that the Iraqi government had given them the mandate to maintain security in certain neighbourhoods in Mosul, while the counter-terrorism troops were withdrawn to prepare for the battle for western Mosul.

But the Iraqi government backed off that plan within hours and said they would pull the local militias, made up of former police officers in Ninawa and Sunni Muslim tribal fighters, out of the city after complaints from Shiite Muslim politicians and Shiite Muslim militia leaders. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence also said that if al-Nujaifi tries to enter the city again he will be arrested.

Part of the reason for this is that the militias that al-Nujaifi has marshalled are backed by Turkey and both the federal police and Shiite Muslim militias in the area say they are not to be trusted. An official statement from a local Christian militia, the Babylon Brigades – made up of Christian Iraqis but also closely associated with two of the more forceful Shiite Muslim militias, the League of the Righteous and the Badr brigades, both of which have strong links to Iran – demanded that the government check the Sunni Muslim militia for any terrorists in their midst. The Christian militia’s statement also demanded that al-Nujaifi be arrested and that the Shiite Muslim militias be allowed to participate fully in the fighting for Mosul.

These kinds of political conflicts between the different forces led to Abdul Amir Yarallah, the commander of the military campaign in Mosul, to decide that it was best that the Iraqi army stay in charge of maintaining security in Mosul. But clearly the Iraqi military, and their elite counter-terrorism troops, cannot stay there forever and guard eastern Mosul if western Mosul is to be fought for. This means any further operations in Mosul could be delayed.
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It's not the taking of the Caliphate's cities that is the hard part it's holding them.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 107, Feb 1, 2017
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The Associated Press was the latest to report on the militant’s drone program. IS has not only been using drones to drop explosives on east Mosul, but was using them to guide suicide car bombs during the fighting there. One of the first report of the group using the devices came from the Turkish army based in northern Ninewa in early 2016. The Turks saw a drone hover around their base for around 15 minutes and then they were shelled by IS. In east Mosul one drone usually scouts out an area, and then a second one is sent in to drop explosives on civilians or the security forces. Drones are relatively cheap and easy to operate, and IS has been able to fashion them into a poor man’s Predator.
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Always innovating like HA.
 
On Musings On Iraq Securing Mosul Interview With Niqash’s Mustafa Habib
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1. What Iraqi units are currently in east Mosul, what areas are they in, and do they have enough to hold it, while attacking the west?

There are now almost 20-25 thousand Iraqi fighters, three brigades of the anti-terrorism forces (deployed in city center and overseeing the security file in all eastern Mosul), an Iraqi army division in the northern neighborhoods with hundreds of of Nineveh guard forces, two brigades of Federal Police with about 2000 local policemen from Mosul residents with a brigade of quick response forces with hundreds of fighters from the popular crowd (Shiite Shabak) in east neighborhoods.

The government will rely on these forces to liberate western Mosul, and there will not be enough to hold the east while attacking west.

2. How many police were in Mosul before it fell to the Islamic State in 2014?

Before the fall of Mosul, there were about 60-70 thousand men. There were 9 brigades from the federal police and army, and 6 brigades of the local police. These forces were in all Ninewa province, 60 percent of these forces were in Mosul.
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Note the size of the Mosul police force before the fall to IS. This is about the size of the entire besieging forces. Mosul still fell to IS after a terrorist campaign of a year or so. It had never really been still at any time since our invasion.

Just for comparison The Met has about 32K PC's plodding around a Greater London four or five times bigger than Mosul.
 
Al-Bab almost encircled now. The Turks have taken the town immediately to the East, Bza'a - and will probably head south the Tadif in the next days. Elsewhere, Turks reportedly preparing to attack YPG in Efrin canton, not far to the north-west of Al-Bab
 
Flavour said:
Al-Bab almost encircled now. The Turks have taken the town immediately to the East, Bza'a - and will probably head south the Tadif in the next days. Elsewhere, Turks reportedly preparing to attack YPG in Efrin canton, not far to the north-west of Al-Bab
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The IS al Bab salient almost encircled because the SAA are moving up from the South threatening to cut IS supply lines/line of retreat. They've got the PKK to the East and the West.

Or you could say the TSK are in a rather exposed themselves and they've had to heavily reinforce. Which is what retired Turkish generals actually predicted would happen. I doubt the Turks will actually widen that front by attacking Afrin.
 
On ISW Warning Update: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency Begins as ISIS Loses Ground in Mosul
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ISW also forecasted in November 2016 that AQ would likely try to co-opt and mature insurgent groups in Iraq. AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiricalled in August 2016 for Iraqi Sunnis to resume a “long guerrilla warfare” and urged AQ in Syria to support the rebuilding process in Iraq, as we noted in that essay.

There are early indicators that AQ is present in Iraq and may be establishing ties with insurgent groups.

  • Local police in Samarra arrested two militants on January 31 who confessed to ties to AQ. Shi’a-dominated security units, in particular, often try to force Sunnis to confess to terrorist groups, so many arrests are the results of sectarian abuse, not actual crime. Reports of forced confessions have usually claimed that the arrested person had ties to ISIS, not AQ, making this artifact meaningful.
  • ISW previously assessed that AQ would likely reenter the Iraqi theater from Syria through the Euphrates River Valley. Its emergence in Samarra may suggest that AQ is reviving sleeper cells in Iraq in addition to or before sending envoys from Syria. Alternatively, it may suggest that AQ is prioritizing major Shi’a targets in Iraq such as the shrine cities.
Regional states may be accelerating an insurgency by enabling Sunni armed groups.

  • Saudi Arabia is funneling arms shipments to Sunni tribes in Anbar in anticipation of a showdown with the Shi’a Popular Mobilization units, according to a CENTCOM official in December 2016.
  • Turkey's support of AQ and other Sunni opposition groups in the region, particularly in Syria, may allow or directly facilitate AQ’s return to Iraq, likely by way of Mosul.
ISW will reassess some previous attacks it has attributed to ISIS to determine whether they in fact should be attributed to other insurgent groups. As ISIS loses capabilities, the insurgent organizations rising in its wake may share attack patterns with one another and with the diminishing ISIS. ISW will consider its attribution of attacks such as IEDs targeting ISF convoys. The ability to distinguish between ISIS and insurgent groups will remain difficult while dormant groups revive their organizations and reestablish capabilities.
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AQ's rise within the Syrian revolt does make this likely.
 

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Now the Iraqi leader is coming under pressure. Lawmakers are demanding he reduce cooperation with Washington in the future, limit or prevent American troops from staying in the country after the defeat of IS, and reciprocate for any travel ban on Iraqis. Members of powerful Shiite militias have outright warned of retaliation against Americans if the U.S. carries out any military action against Iran, their patron.

"Trump embarrassed al-Abadi," said Saad al-Mutalabi, a lawmaker and long-time ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, one of al-Abadi's most powerful political opponents.

"There will be a general consensus that Americans should not stay in Iraq after Mosul, after the statements and the executive order from Trump," he said. "We believed that we had a strategic agreement with the U.S."

"We are fighting ISIS on behalf of the entire world," he added, using an alternative acronym for IS. "This has been a severe, severe disappointment among all Iraqis."

Publicly, al-Abadi has maintained measured tones. While he called Trump's ban an "insult," he refused to enact a reciprocity measure despite a strong call from Parliament to do so.

The U.S. government has been reaching out regularly to al-Abadi's government to try to prevent the situation from escalating, sending the message that the U.S. is well aware of the potential consequences if Iraqis turn against it, said a U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly.

Thursday's call was seen as a positive step toward defusing some of the tension, with Trump telling al-Abadi he would see what he could do to lessen the impact on Iraqis who shouldn't be kept out of the U.S., the official said. Since Trump announced the order, many in the U.S. government have been encouraging the White House to remove Iraq from the list. Although there has been no indication that Trump plans to delist Iraq entirely, he could take steps to exempt more Iraqis from the ban.
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Playing right into Iran's hands.
 
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