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The Islamic state

On Rudaw ISIS feels the heat of a deadly rocket as it loses grip of Mosul
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The Americans have more men and women in this airfield, numbering 800. And they are using a powerful and deadly rocket called high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) against ISIS. This rocket is fired from trucks called launchers, they hit their target within five meters and each one costs $90,000. They have fired more than 290 of them against ISIS in less than three months, according to Staff Sergeant Thomas Morris.

A small group of specialists among them gunners and operators of the trucks sit in their tent close to the launchers and wait for target coordinates to come from their coalition or local partners. Then they drive the launchers to outside the airfield and fire the rockets into Mosul 70 km away.

These rockets are called in when those fighting on the ground think an airstrike too big for a certain target or when they worry about collateral damage, especially now that it is a house to house battle inside Mosul.

One of the gunners is 20-year-old Specialist Nathan Wedgeworth of Georgia who said he was happy to be contributing to the fight against ISIS and firing these rockets against them, because a group that beheads others “can't be good people.”

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More on HIMARS, it's a guided missile system.
 
In The Atlantic Death of an ISIS Ideologue
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The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide. Essentially, his position boils down to the attack’s “purpose and intent.” Suicide with the intent of ending personal woe, he held, is forbidden because it implies that the person in question is willfully ignorant of God’s mercy. However, if the intent is to “support” and “uphold” the religion, the same act of killing oneself becomes something honorable.

Lots of jurisprudents made similar arguments about suicide tactics, many of them before Muhajir—the majority stating that they become permissible if the suicide attacker’s intention is correct, the operation is occurring as a last resort in a state of war, and that it has significant benefit to the Muslim community. But the Egyptian lowered the bar for what constituted “benefit.” For him, suicide attacks didn’t need war-altering results in order to be permissible; the attacker just needed to want to die for the “right” reason. It doesn’t take a genius to see how this kind of flexibility works in the favor of groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Given his staggering ideological relevance to ISIS, it’s somewhat surprising that Muhajir ended up dying on the side of one of its most ardent adversaries. According to one former Jabhat al-Nusra leader, the animosity he felt toward his ideological progeny was intense, evidenced by an unsubstantiated claim that his “last wish” was to fight in the front lines against the self-proclaimed caliphate. Yet Muhajir’s tale fits a pattern; turncoat politics have long shaped Salafi-jihadism.

In any case, though, the precise circumstances of his death matter relatively little—particularly in this context, intellectual contributions can transcend group identity, especially when they have the ability to shape history.
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My bold, typical of Takfiri, absolutely typical.
 
On Lawfare The Limits of Air Strikes when Fighting the Islamic State
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Moreover, for air power to be effective, you need capable local allies. Their forces can provide the necessary intelligence to find and target Islamic State fighters. In addition, when they advance, they force Islamic State forces to mass—making them vulnerable to air power. If Islamic State fighters stay dispersed and hidden, then forces on the ground can root them out. Local forces can also fill the vacuum after victory, ideally establishing a legitimate government and preventing the terrorists from returning or new extremist groups from arising.

The trouble is that local allies are often themselves flawed instruments: corrupt, ineffective, and brutal. Often, U.S. troops are necessary to leaven local forces, provide necessary intelligence, and otherwise carry much of the burden.

Finally, by using air power, the United States becomes implicated in the local conflict. Bombing “the shit out of” the bad guys leaves an impression on more than just the bad guys. Although from a U.S. perspective the current intervention seems limited and low-risk, the perception may be different on the ground. The United States has taken sides in a war, and Washington’s partnership with local forces means locals do not always distinguish between more precise U.S. air strikes and more brutal and indiscriminate attacks from allied militias and forces.
Like all good things except sex and barbeque, in other words, air power is best in moderation. It can keep the bad guys off balance, tilt the playing field in favor of U.S. allies, and otherwise help in the fight against terrorism. But it is an imperfect instrument even when it works well, and absent other tools and a broader strategy its benefits will always be limited.
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I think one of the biggest dangers of airpower is it gives a false impression of control and action.

Both the current US and Russian air campaigns suffer from this. Neither have much control over their proxies on the ground in reality. The Russians are often blamed for regime airstrikes. In Iraq the US is widely suspected to be supporting IS. In Yemen the US is absorbing almost as much blame as the KSA with Northern Yemenis which can't be good. While it's seductively easy to engage you have little idea what is going on the ground in conflicts that are essentially political struggles.

There were problems with the heavy footprint of the Afghan and Iraqi invasion but it's become increasingly evident that SF is needed in some numbers alongside proxies and actually the trend is towards adding fire and logistical support troops as well in Iraq. With the Golden Division being ground down in Mosul the loan of a couple of USMC brigades might even be prudent.

You could contrast this with the IRGC who develop life long strategic relationships with their proxies rather than focusing on tactical objectives. Recently they have also become willing to put IRGC officers in harms way leading their Jihadis. AQ beards fronting revolt assaults in Syria are better loved than CIA bods handing out TOWs and salaries. The ironic thing here may be its Russian or US airpower that conquers but varieties of revolutionary beards that finally captures. You don't win many hearts&minds from 30,000 feet or for that matter from a rear echelon MOC.
 
CrabbedOne said:
My bold, typical of Takfiri, absolutely typical.
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Not sure that "turncoat politics" is the right phrase there, though. That phrase does suggest that the fault was with him (and done for personal ends), rather than it being down to his interpretation that they (IS) were failing to live up to the standards that were set by Him above.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 50, Dec 5, 2016
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Finally, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the press that Mosul could fall before Donald Trump was inaugurated president on January 20, 2017. That is a little more time than Prime Minister Haidar Abadi has talked about as he has set a date for the end of this year. Still, neither is probably right as it looks like taking the city will be a very drawn out fight.
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The ISF are progressing but very slowly.
 
On ISW Iraq Situation Report: December 1-6, 2016
ISIS spectacular attacks in Baghdad decreased from December 1-5, allowing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to deploy security forces from Baghdad to northern Iraq. The decrease is part of a trend over the past few weeks of limited or minor suicide attacks in Iraq’s capital. The ISF deployed an Iraqi Army (IA) brigade from Baghdad to eastern Mosul on December 1 to provide support to and operate alongside the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) in ongoing operations to recapture the city. This deployment follows the movement of the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade from the 17th IA Division to Shirqat on November 29. ISIS may try to exploit the reduced security in Baghdad and attempt further attacks in the city in order to draw ISF units back to Baghdad or prevent additional ISF units from deploying to northern Iraq.
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Deployment up by Mosul getting bigger.
 
From The Washington Institute The Battle for Mosul and Iran's Regional Reach
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MOSUL'S IMPACT
Given that the coalition campaign against IS will likely drive much of the group underground rather than out of Iraq, a victory in Mosul will create opportunities for Iran. Many key IS figures are former Baath regime military officers, and they will go to ground and live to fight another day as previous generations of Baathist officers did after the 1963 pro-Nasserist coup, the 2003 U.S. invasion, and the 2007 U.S. surge. IS functioned well as an underground terrorist network in 2011-2014, and Baghdad lacks the capabilities to deal with this threat. Unless there is a fundamental change in the nature of Iraqi politics, the battle for Mosul and its potentially messy aftermath may simply pave the way for the next Sunni insurgency -- whether in the form of "IS 2.0," a reborn al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a revived neo-Baathist organization like Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), or something else. This scenario is especially likely if IS remains ensconced in Syria and uses its presence there to stage operations in Iraq.

Such an outcome would ensure Baghdad's continued need for a capable security assistance partner/provider, whether Washington or Tehran. The United States has a keen interest in being that partner of choice, but Iran's proximity and lingering questions about American reliability mean that Iraq will probably keep hedging its bets with Tehran. Meanwhile, local Iranian proxies will continue to engage in the sectarian cleansing of "liberated" areas in order to secure critical lines of communication and safeguard isolated or beleaguered Shiite communities.

In addition, Iran will likely try to establish an overland route through Iraq to Syria in order to supplement its air corridor to Damascus, which it uses to resupply Hezbollah and the Assad regime while projecting influence in the Levant. Tehran generally seeks redundant lines of communication to provide resiliency to its network of proxies and partners. While the air corridor would remain the most convenient connection and the primary means of ferrying troops there, a land corridor would enable it to send less urgently needed supplies by the less expensive land route. It would also broaden Iran's options if the United States ever took the unlikely step of establishing a no-fly zone over Syria, or if Israel were to close Damascus airport during a future war with Hezbollah. Perhaps more important, a land corridor would enable Iran to broaden its contacts with local populations, creating opportunities to exert influence and shape developments across the breadth of the Levant. Indeed, there are signs that the Iranian-supported PMUs who recently captured Tal Afar air base from IS are now converting it into a staging area for projecting influence in northern Iraq and Syria, once Mosul falls and additional Iraqi Shiite militiamen become available.
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An angle of interest to the Israelis I expect the Trump administration to focus on.
 
On BuzzFeedNews “All My People Are Gone” — Inside Iraq’s Largest Mass Abduction
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But Iraqis say the most disturbing dimension of the Saqlawiyah episode was the alleged collaboration or acquiescence of the regular armed forces, as well as Sunni tribal militias now leading the fight to retake Mosul.

“What’s so horrible about what happened in Saqlawiyah is the participation of the army,” said one Anbar province security official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The events in Saqlawiyah point to subterranean tribal and regional animosities that are potentially just as dangerous as those between Iraq’s Shia and Sunni sects. In conversations with more than a dozen Sunni security officials and militia leaders in Anbar, many were sanguine, and some even tried to justify the alleged mass killings.

“The problem is half of the tribes in Anbar went with ISIS,” said Mohamed al-Shabaan, leader of a Sunni tribal militia in Anbar province. Shabaan said he had no idea what had happened to missing men from Saqlawiyah, but he had no pity for anyone who submitted to ISIS rule, regardless of whether they were a fellow Sunni.

“Anyone the Shia hashed arrests, they might kill him on the spot,” he said. “But if the Shia hashed kill them 50%, the Sunni hashed will kill him 100% of the time.”
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Town near Fallujah. Article suggests it was a reprisal for the larger Camp Speicher massacre.
 
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“Battles in Mosul have devastated the Iraqi forces’ elite,” an officer within the elite force told the newspaper, on condition of anonymity. “So, the forces have begun to summon infantry personnel from the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division from al-Mazraa camp east of Fallujah, and sent it to Mosul as per an urgent request from the special forces who have lost most of their troops in the grinding battles against ISIS east of the city.”

The officer blamed human losses to the Counter Terrorism Service to a “precipitous” decision by the international coalition command to engage them into the battles for Mosul districts. He said the move left the elite forces prey to “professionally setup ambushes,” as he put it.

He claimed that in Southern Mosul, federal police forces and SWAT teams have not yet responded to orders to advance towards Mosul airport fearing similar losses. “Iraqi forces have told the international coalition’s command that they will not delve deeper into the city except with the presence of foreign forces and an intensive air cover,” the officer said.
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But Tehran, anxious that retreating fighters would sweep back into Syria just as Iran's ally President Bashar al-Assad was gaining the upper hand in his country's five-year civil war, wanted Islamic State crushed and eliminated in Mosul.

The sources say Iran lobbied for Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization fighters to be sent to the western front to seal off the link between Mosul and Raqqa, the two main cities of Islamic State's self-declared cross-border caliphate.

That link is now broken. For the first time in Iraq's two-and-half-year, Western-backed drive to defeat Islamic State, several thousand militants have little choice but to fight to the death, and 1 million remaining Mosul citizens have no escape from the front lines creeping ever closer to the city center.

"If you corner your enemy and don’t leave an escape, he will fight till the end," said a Kurdish official involved in planning the Mosul battle.

"In the west, the initial idea was to have a corridor ... but the Hashid (Popular Mobilisation) insisted on closing this loophole to prevent them going to Syria," he told Reuters.
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Also mentions the Russian and French also preferred Mosul encircled. The Russians like the Iranians worried about effects in Syria. The French about a large contingent of their nationals fighting for IS escaping.

I've some problems with the spin of this article.

When some civilians fled West towards Syria there were complaints that there weren't facilities to cope with them. A lot of facilities, including Irbil's now choked hospitals are to the East of Mosul. There certainly weren't preparations East of Mosuls that could cope with 1.5 million evacuees. Some who went that way ended up in very inadequate camps in Rojava. The Iraqi government clearly planned for fighting a battle with the population in place. That's what is slowing up taking Mosul and it's pretty unrelated to anything the IRGC did.

IS also did not look like it would give up Mosul, the Caliphate's only large city and economic base, without a very tough fight. There's was an element of wishful thinking in the open horseshoe idea. ISF soldiers were also grumbling about the city not being encircled and wide open to resupply. It's a Hell of a big perimeter and it's going to be somewhat porous anyway.

There's been reports of Sunni Turkmen from the Salafi hotbed of Tel Afar fleeing to Syria. So an exodus happened anyway.

The original plan seems to have been to simultaneously attack Raqqa complicating but also perhaps triggering an IS retreat from Mosul. That basically fell apart because of the TSK's anti-PKK Euphrates Shield op and has only resulted in minimal shaping operations. The value of the horseshoe degraded anyway and it's pretty common to pinch-out the salient as a siege progresses. You could also blame Turkey for stoking up Iraqi anger over it's moves near Mosul for Baghdad permitting the Hashd thrust at Tel Afar.

As a US officer in the article says the very well telegraphed Hashd move on Tel Afar really doesn't make much difference to the battle plan.

It may be more signifiant in terms of Syria with breaking the IS siege of Deir and opening supply lines being in the IRGC's sights after Mosul.
 
On LWJ US military bombs Mosul hospital as Iraqi troops retreat
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“The Coalition complies with the Law of Armed Conflict and takes all feasible precautions during the planning and execution of airstrikes to reduce the risk of harm to non-combatants,” CENTCOM stated.

According to CENTCOM, Islamic State fighters were using the Al Salem hospital complex as “a base of operations and command and control headquarters.” Iraqi troops, likely US-trained special forces that have spearheaded the assault to retake Mosul, “attempted to seize” the hospital on Dec. 6, but Islamic State fighters counterattacked.

Iraqi troops were hit with six suicide car bombs “before retrograding a short distance,” or retreating, according to CENTCOM. The US military then “conducted a precision strike on the location to target enemy fighters firing on Iraqi forces” on Dec. 7.
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I do hope that's not the "last hospital" like the ones alway getting destroyed in East Aleppo by the villainous R+6.
 
teqniq said:
Still alive then, not looking so good though, not that it should come as any surprise.

View attachment 96730
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Didn't spot this on BBC anywhere - I think the major media have a policy now of not reporting on hostages, which reduces their value to captors I guess. A few years back this would have been treated as a major story. Not sure if this is something government-led or something that has been coordinated voluntarily by the press.
 
Another endangered salient; note the road out very close to being cut. IS in this area of Syria has a history of routing numerically superior regime forces.

Reports of population fleeing. Nicely timed with R+6 resources tied up in Aleppo.
 
On TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State’s Growing Body Count
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A December 8 report in Reuters quoted an anonymous U.S. defense official stating that the U.S. estimated it had killed as many as 50,000 Islamic State fighters to date. That this estimate is over 200% more than the original 2014 estimate of the group’s total strength does not mean it is wrong; it means the group was likely larger than initially believe, and had been able to replenish its ranks even as its territorial gains turned to losses. Currently—in both Iraq and Syria—the Islamic State is under the greatest level of military pressure it has faced. The group’s foreign fighter flow has been cut down to manageable levels and is no longer capable of replacing even a percentage of those fighters being killed on the battlefield. The challenge now is to protect as many of the civilians trapped or coerced by the Islamic State as possible, while killing as many of the group’s fighters as possible—a truly daunting task. Yet, as challenging as the present task may be, the real difficulty will lie in turning the increasing Islamic State body count into lasting, meaningful success.
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The idea that IS was oppressively ruling a dispersed population of several million over an area about the size of the UK with 20K beards while fighting on multiple fronts and actually expanding its territory always had plausibility problems. Like the sunny early CIA estimate of Taliban strength it was probably out by a factor of three. IS capacity to train new fighters would have to be very high to replenish at this rate.

As this points out they in fact had lots of local support in places. They swallowed up many Syrian rebel groups. In a lot of areas they were the only big employer. They had lots of tribal allies.

20K is just under the size of US occupation force sent to Nineveh Governorate under Gen P when the US invaded Iraq and they where supported by a large force of Pesh. It's a third to a half the size of the Mosul police force in 2014 before IS took the city.

25K within an Iraqi insurgency made up mostly of former Baathists of about 150K is about the estimated size of AQI at its peak. On the other hand AQI was estimated to be down to 1K on it's defeat in 2008. That's also probably double the size of AQ before 9-11. And IS often appears still tactically very capable in mid-sized battles. There's a lot of terrorist potential to be ground down still there.

The other thing is how can CENTCOM actually know some armed guys riding a Toyota are IS? They often can't; it's a guess with wide margins of error. We accidentally lit up a well known but often exchanged regime position in Deir a few months ago with perhaps 100+ killed. An enquiry found all SOPs were followed. And in the Israeli fashion any fighting aged male in proximity to a strike is automatically counted as a righteous kill. That could take 20% off the CENTCOM IS bodycount on a good day.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 54, Dec 9, 2016
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Several Iraqi intelligence officers spoke with the Associated Press. They told AP they wanted a slower approach to taking Mosul to allow for targeted strikes to take out IS leaders. Instead the pace was much quicker and the officers complained that most top ranking IS members got out of the city in October. More importantly the intelligence agents said that Iraq had plans to attack IS in Syria after the insurgents were defeated in Iraq.

Finally, the number of displaced took a slight dip. The International Organization for Migration reported that there were 82,698 displaced in Ninewa, down from 83,988 the day before. It said the reason for the decline was a more thorough vetting of those registered. Still even with the lower figure the number of people fleeing their homes has taken another decided jump. On December 2 there were 77,826 displaced meaning there has been a 4,872 increase in just a week’s time. More people continue to leave the battle zone. For example, the 16th Division noted that around 200 families evacuated the Hadbaa neighborhood in the north for the Iraqi lines. As the ISF pushes further into Mosul more people are likely to join the displaced.
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From that AP article:
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Iraq also wants to intervene against IS in Syria to ensure the group's de facto capital there, Raqqa, is retaken, a senior counterterrorism official said. Syrian Kurdish-led forces, backed by U.S. airstrikes, launched an offensive aimed at encircling Raqqa a month ago, but have made no significant advances on the ground.

The counterterrorism official said Damascus had quietly given permission for Iraq to carry out airstrikes by drone or warplanes in Raqqa. There was no way to confirm the plan with Syrian officials. The Syrian and Iraqi governments are both allied to Iran, and Iraqi Shiite militiamen have been fighting in Syria alongside the forces of President Bashar Assad.

To curtail the impact on the West from a decentralized IS, the officials said Iraq has stepped up existing coordination and exchange of information with authorities in Western Europe, the United States and Australia. The intention is to prevent attacks by sleeper cells and stop Western militants from returning home.

The counterterrorism agency had wanted the Mosul offensive to be delayed to give time to degrade IS before the full-fledged assault caused them to flee and disperse, the officials said.

"We had wanted them to stay put in Mosul, clustered together there while we hit them day after day with targeted airstrikes and intelligence operations," the senior counterterrorism officer said.
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On Syria Comment DAM WARS: How Water Scarcity Helped Create ISIS – by Quentin de Pimodan
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Matthew Machowski explainscxciv “When they [ISIS] restored water supplies to Mosul, the Sunnis saw it as liberation. Control of water resources in the Mosul area is one reason why people returned”.

In a Reuters articlecxcv, Aseel Kami quotes someone in one of those water-poor areas of Iraq: “‘We depend on this water truck. If it did not come for any reason, on that day a glass of water would be as precious as a human soul … we would be left without anything. No bathing and no drinking water,’ said Dakheel.” That is precisely what happened in Iraq…
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Big factor in instability all down the Euphrates.
 
On ISW The Campaign for Mosul: December 6-12, 2016
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The CTS, with the support the 16th Iraqi Army Division entering from the north, made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12. These gains have been the result of weeks of intensive and difficult block-by-block clearing operations. The CTS used this tactic in operations in Ramadi and Fallujah; it is not having the same level of effectiveness in Mosul as it did before, largely due to the dense civilian population remaining in the city whom ISIS has used as human shields. As a result the CTS requires additional time to advance, but it is still able to make gains against ISIS because of its superior skills and experience in urban warfare.

In the southeast quarter, the less experienced Iraqi Army has not been able to overcome ISIS’s resistance by grinding through block-by-block. As a solution, the ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4, calling for “surprise” operations that would seek rapid extensions into ISIS-held areas. The tactic was put to the test on December 6, when a unit from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division made a quick offshoot west in order to retake the Salaam Hospital, near the bank of the Tigris River. The move, however, left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks and ISIS, hidden in the area, launched a massive ambush on the unit on December 6 and 7. The failure required a Coalition airstrike and a rescue by the CTS to extract the unit on December 7, which reported one hundred casualties.
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On TNI Is the Battle for Mosul Doomed?
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This final line likely represents a very small portion of eastern Mosul, which the ISIS leadership believes is the most defensible, and they have no doubt established elaborate tunnel systems both within individual buildings, floors and rooms, and underground between strong points. If the defenders have resolved to fight to the death, they’ll contest each street, each house and possibly every room within strategic buildings. The intent will be to exact as high a death and wounded toll as possible on the attackers to sap their strength and domestic support.
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Well IS heart in Mosul is in the Western slums but they may have decided to preserve their social base there as they clearly intend to regroup and return.

Bit of an alarmist headline as this points out IS are cut off from reinforcement and resupply. The risk is the Iraqis can't sustain such a big deployment logistically or it get overtaken by politics. So far the big questions are not if they'll take Mosul but how they'll manage to hold it.
 
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