If a computer was powerful enough would it generate consciousness?

[Jonti]

... the inner workings that decide whether to fire or not are most definitely analogue.

Plus, remember that the brain is asynchronous and so needs to be modelled in analogue time as well.

planck length = shortest move a particle can make, due to uncertainty principle. therefore plancklength/c=a very small amount of time.

trouble is that in the real world, this happens asynchronously - but a computer considers a simulation in 'frames' where the state of all elements changes at the same time, every time.

Even if it is happenening asynchronously it's not like all the asynchronous bits can communicate directly with each other instantaneously. ...

Ah, but you need to take entanglement into account. It's not communication that matters so much as co-ordination.

All the asynchronous bits co-ordinate with each other instantaneously.

Not quite sure what "entanglement" you are talking about. I agree that all the asynchronous bits need to coordinate with each other instantaneously. I can't see why this couldn't be achieved using a computer (or two).
I'm going to the pub now.

The point I was trying to make is that in the physical brain co-ordination of the physical states of its minutest parts may happen instantaneously, and as near to cantorian continuity as it's possible to get.

One can make a distinction between simulating that kind of thing in a Turing machine, and a physical system that actually behaves that way because of its physical structure.

 

[axon]

The point I was trying to make is that in the physical brain co-ordination of the physical states of its minutest parts may happen instantaneously, and as near to cantorian continuity as it's possible to get.

I might be getting what you, I might not though.
When you say "coordination of physical states may happen instantaneously"... Obviously the brain has lots of bits, and they are all doing something at exactly the same time, but the bits cannot interact with each other instantaneously, this takes time.
If you couldn't have lots of different bits in different states at the same time in a computer, then why not use lots of computers*? They couldn't talk to each other instantaneously, but then neither can the different brain bits.

*connected in exactly the same way as bits of brain.

 

[Jonti]

Well, it's not my own line of argument, but I thought I might have understood what Crispy was getting at when he mentioned a computer simulation needs to use time frames (and the real world doesn't). The real world has a non-local aspect which we may simulate in a general purpose computer; but if the physical substrate of the brain takes advantage of non-locality in some way, the simulation will never amount to a replication.

But I think it's premature to try to anchor things in physics right now; we simply are not yet clear enough what it is we are talking about to take that step. There seems to be no empirical evidence (despite decades of research) for the proposition that consciousness can 'spontaneously' arise in a big enough electrically connected network. Nor Is there any theoretical justification for that view; there's no theory of mind that indicates how just moving electrons around can create consciousness!

I'm more inclined to keep hammering away at the explanatory gap, in an attempt to obtain greater conceptual clarity around the issues.

 

[Jonti]

Not everyone will want to plough through the paper I cited immediately above, so here's a thought experiment to help readers understand what philosophers mean by 'the explanatory gap'.

Some people are born without cones, the specialised cells responsible for colour vision, in the retina of their eyes. Such unfortunates, known as achromatics, have only rods, the cells responsible for black and white vision. They have exceptional night-time vision, and are very sensitive to movement, but colour is not part of their world -- only shades of grey. The old proverb "all cats are grey in the dark" reflects the fact that the retinal cones do not work well in low levels of light, so we see no colour by the light of the moon, for example.

Silver

Slowly, silently, now the moon
Walks the night in her silver shoon;
This way, and that, she peers, and sees
Silver fruit upon silver trees;
One by one the casements catch
Her beams beneath the silvery thatch;
Couched in his kennel, like a log,
With paws of silver sleeps the dog;
From their shadowy coat the white breasts peep
Of doves in a silver-feathered sleep;
A harvest mouse goes scampering by,
With silver claws, and silver eye;
And moveless fish in the water gleam,
By silver reeds in a silver stream.

An achromatic could, of course, study neurophyiology and become a world expert. She could learn everything that we know about how retinal cone cells work, and about the processing of visual information in the brain. But what our theoretical achromat would never understand is what it is like to perceive the sensation of red, or of green or blue. What you and I (excepting any achromatics who may read this) understand by these terms would never become apparent to our achromatic neuroscientist.

Hence the term "explanatory gap"

 

[Blagsta]

Otherwise known as the qualia problem.

 

[Jonti]

Qualia aren't a problem, they're a fact

But there's an explanatory gap between what most people mean by red, and what our imaginary neuroscientist can understand. The neuroscientist may have all the information she wants, yet the chromatic sense of the meaning of red stiil elude her.

The poem means less to our imaginary neuroscientist than it does to chromatic typicals. Somehow most of us bring more information about the world to our reading of Walter's poem, so it can mean more to us.

 

[Kameron]

i don't understand thread title (

That is all right, neither does my computer! yet.


Big thumbs up to dirtyfruit for the is our world really analogue comment, I'd never thought about that before but of course relativistic physics puts us in a very non-analogue place, atoms and non-continuous energy states and all. Very interesting.

 

[*Miss Daisy*]

so can it then???



*thread to long to read whilst stoned*

 

[Blagsta]

Qualia aren't a problem, they're a fact

But there's an explanatory gap between what most people mean by red, and what our imaginary neuroscientist can understand. The neuroscientist may have all the information she wants, yet the chromatic sense of the meaning of red stiil elude her.

The poem means less to our imaginary neuroscientist than it does to chromatic typicals. Somehow most of us bring more information about the world to our reading of Walter's poem, so it can mean more to us.

In philosophy what you mentioned is called the problem of qualia
http://www.def-logic.com/articles/silby014.html

 

[118118]

i read a case for existenialist philosophy of science [one of the beginning claims was that science is meaningless under analytic philosophy. i think it's on line actually]. anyway, it was crap

 

[Aldebaran]

I don't need to read this long thread since I know why I have consciousness (most of the time, anyway).
I am an Alien Computer disguised as a red star.

salaam.

 

[dash_two]

How would people know if the computer was conscious or not anyway?

 

[Crispy]

How would people know if the computer was conscious or not anyway?

How do I know you are?
We'd have to trust it.

 

[GarfieldLeChat]

You assume that the electrical impulses are the only important part.

or you assume that there is anything else other than electrical impulses...

 

[Crispy]

or you assume that there is anything else other than electrical impulses...

eg. hormones, neuroreceptors, ion channels, all sorts of cheemistry.

 

[dash_two]

Crispy: It's parsimonious to assume that another person is conscious of things just as you are, because they're the same sort of biological being as you.

A computer might be designed to lead people into believing that it is conscious. But what would such a demonstration prove? Only that it is possible to widen the generally accepted meaning of such words as 'conscious', 'sentient', 'thinks' etc.

By analogy, we say that birds fly and aircraft fly, even though they achieve flight by very different means. In contrast, we say that ships and submarines sail, but that fish and ducks swim. No machine is currently said to swim.

Suppose then that someone designs a robot duck, which propels itself through the water by paddling its feet. People would probably say that the robot swims, rather than sails - a first for machine swimming! But what facts would such a demonstration uncover?

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Crispy: It's parsimonious to assume that another person is conscious of things just as you are, because they're the same sort of biological being as you.

You assume that being a 'biological being' is in some way a prerequisite for consciousness. Since there is no scientific basis for any kind of 'seat of consciousness' (most neuroscientists, like axon, consider consciousness to be an illusion created almost as an accidental byproduct of brain activity), it is far from obvious that being 'biological' has anything to do with the phenomenon of consciousness.

That's an unfounded assumption.

 

[Fruitloop]

Carbon fascism on urban75!

 

[GarfieldLeChat]

eg. hormones, neuroreceptors, ion channels, all sorts of cheemistry.

all conducted by and generated by what???

 

[Crispy]

all conducted by and generated by what???

what do you mean? nothing's in 'control' it's a complex mishmash of stuff all interacting.

re: How Do We Know It's Conscious?
I imagine that knowing how to test for it will be a prerequisite for creating it in the first place

 

[littlebabyjesus]

re: How Do We Know It's Conscious?
I imagine that knowing how to test for it will be a prerequisite for creating it in the first place

Or, more likely, you will reach a point where all the boxes are ticked, and you have to assume it is conscious in the same way as I assume that you are conscious.

More likely still, I think, those who actually create artificial intelligence will treat consciousness as an irrelevant illusion and won't worry about it in the slightest as they design intelligent machines.

 

[dash_two]

You assume that being a 'biological being' is in some way a prerequisite for consciousness. Since there is no scientific basis for any kind of 'seat of consciousness' (most neuroscientists, like axon, consider consciousness to be an illusion created almost as an accidental byproduct of brain activity), it is far from obvious that being 'biological' has anything to do with the phenomenon of consciousness.

That's an unfounded assumption.

Of course consciousness is a biological function, just as respiration is. It's one of the things the brain does. As regards a unitary seat of consciousness in the brain, maybe not. But there are specific brain areas and systems which are involved in consciousness. Lesions or other damage to those systems produce quite specific impairments in what people are aware of, eg the phenomenon of blindsight.

The 'consciousness is an illusion' line is one I've never understood - it sounds almost tautological.

As regards it being an accidental byproduct, like the warmth given off by the valves in an old radio, again, this doesn't make much sense. If it were the case, why aren't people able to access directly, say, what's happening early on in the visual system? Or, why don't we have conscious experiences of the activities of the brain systems which modulate our circadian rhythms?

I suggest that consciousness is an evolved function which allows conscious brains to do certain things which non-conscious brains can't.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

One of the most convincing - and disconcerting - 'proofs' that consciousness is best treated as an after-the-fact illusion is that our consciousness of a decision we have made to act often only occurs after we have begun to act. This has been proved experimentally, and it shakes to its core our commonsense ideas about ourselves.

Eta: busy at work, but when I get a minute, I'll give you a reference

 

[sleaterkinney]

Readers can decide for themselves.

Nice selective quoting there.

Well awareness is simply a response to stimulus.

No, awareness is not simply a response to stimulus. A response, an action of some sort, is not the same kind of thing as awareness.

Yes it is you have to have a stimulus before you have an action. It doesn't come from nothing.

 

[GarfieldLeChat]

what do you mean? nothing's in 'control' it's a complex mishmash of stuff all interacting.

all impuses and indeed for all aspects of control of the human body and min includeing "hormones, neuroreceptors, ion channels, all sorts of cheemistry" are created by what?

the electrical impulses....

human beings are inessence nothing mor ecomplext than a serise of resistors which respond to electricla impluses dependant on the strenght or conductiviety of the resistor which thenc ontrols other fucntions.....

 

[dash_two]

One of the most convincing - and disconcerting - 'proofs' that consciousness is best treated as an after-the-fact illusion is that our consciousness of a decision we have made to act often only occurs after we have begun to act. This has been proved experimentally, and it shakes to its core our commonsense ideas about ourselves.

Eta: busy at work, but when I get a minute, I'll give you a reference

I've read about those experiments. They address issues of free will. You might argue that free will is an illusion. But it is meaningless to say that consciousness is an illusion.

 

[axon]

But I think it's premature to try to anchor things in physics right now; we simply are not yet clear enough what it is we are talking about to take that step. There seems to be no empirical evidence (despite decades of research) for the proposition that consciousness can 'spontaneously' arise in a big enough electrically connected network. Nor Is there any theoretical justification for that view; there's no theory of mind that indicates how just moving electrons around can create consciousness!

I think there is empirical evidence. I cite the Roomba robot I mentioned earlier. Admittedly it shows very limited consciousness, but then again it only had a few wires, sensors, and outputs. And you can build larger networks that show reaction to stimuli, responses, and decision making. And to be honest I show very limited consciousness some times.

I think you need to get away from consciousness being produced by 'electrons moving about'. <Pedant mode> as it's large ions not electrons mostly moving <Off> I think it's more that electrical currents generated allow the detection of stimuli, either external or from the memory, then a bit of computation, then elicitation of a response.

I'm more inclined to keep hammering away at the explanatory gap, in an attempt to obtain greater conceptual clarity around the issues.

I haven't read the article yet but from your explanation I would say that the explanatory gap is a problem between any two conscious beings. How do I know that what you perceive as red is the same as what I perceive. We could test, and agree on objects that have a red colour, but I may be perceiving a blue feeling for all red objects.

 

[CJohn]

For me consciousness is not some mythical or spiritual thing, it is the product of a biological system, yet at the same time, our phenomenological experience of consciousness - our sense of subjectivity – will always elude being reducible to specific brain functions or operations, that is, the objective description and quantification of it via science. A description of consciousness as a fact of biology says nothing of the experience of being conscious. The experience of consciousness is a totality which cannot be dissected and abstracted from the world in which it arises. In this sense you cannot objectively model consciousness through science, consciousness can only be grasped as a subjective experience, immersed in a world of multi-layered meanings, interpretations, signs and signifiers.

At least thats my initial thoughts on it...

 

[Mation]

Just posting now to remind myself to come and read this thread tomorrow. 'Scuse the indulgence.

 

[NoEgo]

For me consciousness is not some mythical or spiritual thing, it is the product of a biological system, yet at the same time, our phenomenological experience of consciousness - our sense of subjectivity – will always elude being reducible to specific brain functions or operations, that is, the objective description and quantification of it via science. A description of consciousness as a fact of biology says nothing of the experience of being conscious. The experience of consciousness is a totality which cannot be dissected and abstracted from the world in which it arises. In this sense you cannot objectively model consciousness through science, consciousness can only be grasped as a subjective experience, immersed in a world of multi-layered meanings, interpretations, signs and signifiers.

At least thats my initial thoughts on it...

I've always wondered what is it that creates consciousness....