Gulf of Mexico oil spill
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spring-peeper
Well-Known Member
Barking_Mad
Non sibi sed omnibus
Humanity, we really are a set of cunts.
dilute micro
esse quam videri
Can't even tell what kind of bird that is.
There's something about our nature that we must feel like we can solve any problem. There will be millions spent on "clean up" and ultimately it won't be a drop in the bucket, probably undetectable. It's a psychological band-aid.
This could be it for the Kemps Ridley sea turtle. You can't take but so many tyson blows and you have to do down. And they're not the only thing.
ferrelhadley
There is no love between us anymore.
GOM spill likely to affect most of the panhandle
http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=1500
http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=1500
Barking_Mad
Non sibi sed omnibus
Something about methane calthrates forming (essentially icing it up)
weltweit
Well-Known Member
Oh, aha, yes that might make sense, I think now that you mention it I did hear someone talking about that. I can't claim to fully understand it.
It does make me wonder though how long in the hurricane season they can keep tankers on station above the leak pumping oil. I imagine there may come a time when the ship has to be elseware ..
dilute micro
esse quam videri
Wow look how fast the oil goes once it hits the gulf stream.
This is based on the oil flowing freely. Even though they're collecting some of the oil it is bound to change once a storm comes.
http://theweek.com/article/index/203730/prediction-the-bp-spill-will-reach-the-east-coast
If this happens there are no words to describe the level of 'fucked up' it would be.
This is based on the oil flowing freely. Even though they're collecting some of the oil it is bound to change once a storm comes.
http://theweek.com/article/index/203730/prediction-the-bp-spill-will-reach-the-east-coast
If this happens there are no words to describe the level of 'fucked up' it would be.
miss minnie
Well-Known Member
dilute micro
esse quam videri
That's also based on the oil being at the surface.
Regardless of what BP is saying, we know an unknown amount of (chemically treated) oil is below the surface. So I guess we won't know when the oil rides the stream. Maybe it'll just show up or dead things will wash up on the shores.
Regardless of what BP is saying, we know an unknown amount of (chemically treated) oil is below the surface. So I guess we won't know when the oil rides the stream. Maybe it'll just show up or dead things will wash up on the shores.
dilute micro
esse quam videri
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_gulf_oil_spill
What does that mean? Is that 1/10th of the original leak or the amount after the pipe had been cut which made it ~20% more than the original leak?
ferrelhadley
There is no love between us anymore.
That youtube video was posted about 6 posts before yours.
And I am not sure why you think this would be such a huge fuck up in the gulf stream. The more diluted the oil becomes the less of a problem it is. This is an enivromental and economic catastrophe in the GOM and some of the US Atlantic sea board. Not beyond that.
The one major unknown and real danger (as has been said several times on this thread) is if leaked oil is staying deep. This would be toxic to many life forms, would not be broken up by surface storms and could create huge blooms of life that feed on oil, these blooms would cause anoxia in the deep water. This is very much an unknown, the GOM is no stranger to artificial anoxia (dead zones) but this one could be really huge. Perhaps big enough to create a sulpher dioxide spike.
AnandLeo
Tipple Ripple
Engineering Safety, Environment and Risk Assessment
The current subject extends on several aspects including: stemming the spill of oil from the ruptured undersea pipes, environmental catastrophe and the adverse socio-economic impacts of the affected communities.
The oil industry uses the state-of the –art technology for oil exploration and the associated safety, health and welfare concerns. The state-of the-art of deep sea oil exploration is somewhat mind-boggling. The normal practice and current technology on this case failed to ensure the effectiveness of safety and health imperatives. What the industry and the enforcement agencies have to learn from the disaster is there is need for more redundancy in safety and health, welfare and environment protection measures.
The irony is some of the measures attempted to stem the oil spill into sea are unconvincing, primitive and haphazard; methods not tried and tested, but concepts known to the industry. It seems that safety, health and welfare wherewithal imperatives of the oil industry is primitive, relying on the good fortune of low probability of risk of environmental disaster. The technology so far that has been effective in recovering the spilling oil is basic common sense techniques that can be attempted with robust undersea submersible robot technology.
New technology is evolved by research and development in the universities, industrial innovations and joint efforts by universities and the industry. Only small amount of research and development is actually adopted in the industry for practical, reliable usage. In a disaster like this and in hypothetical scenarios people are urged to produce ideas and solutions to address the problem. In this context, simple means of improving the redundancy of safety and health in the event of wellhead blowout is a relevant strategy. A valve system on the rig riser pipe below the malfunctioned wellhead protection plant to stop and divert the flow of oil which can be operated with the submersible robot is one possibility.
Risk assessment is quintessential imperative of any industry with the potential of creating such a calamity. What has not been effective is risk assessment of the failed wellhead protective plant. The need for practical efficient redundancy measures in oilrig wellhead protection is evident in the current disaster.
The aerospace industry is prominent in risk assessment, and is littered with case studies of disasters attributed to disputes between management and engineers. Globally, disputes between managers, engineers, technicians and craftsmen can also be attributed to risks in engineering.
What has gone wrong in this case is risk assessment. I mean balancing the imperative of redundancy of safety measures and developing reliable state-of the- art technology comparable with deep sea oil exploration technology against the colossal consequences of the current disaster.
The current subject extends on several aspects including: stemming the spill of oil from the ruptured undersea pipes, environmental catastrophe and the adverse socio-economic impacts of the affected communities.
The oil industry uses the state-of the –art technology for oil exploration and the associated safety, health and welfare concerns. The state-of the-art of deep sea oil exploration is somewhat mind-boggling. The normal practice and current technology on this case failed to ensure the effectiveness of safety and health imperatives. What the industry and the enforcement agencies have to learn from the disaster is there is need for more redundancy in safety and health, welfare and environment protection measures.
The irony is some of the measures attempted to stem the oil spill into sea are unconvincing, primitive and haphazard; methods not tried and tested, but concepts known to the industry. It seems that safety, health and welfare wherewithal imperatives of the oil industry is primitive, relying on the good fortune of low probability of risk of environmental disaster. The technology so far that has been effective in recovering the spilling oil is basic common sense techniques that can be attempted with robust undersea submersible robot technology.
New technology is evolved by research and development in the universities, industrial innovations and joint efforts by universities and the industry. Only small amount of research and development is actually adopted in the industry for practical, reliable usage. In a disaster like this and in hypothetical scenarios people are urged to produce ideas and solutions to address the problem. In this context, simple means of improving the redundancy of safety and health in the event of wellhead blowout is a relevant strategy. A valve system on the rig riser pipe below the malfunctioned wellhead protection plant to stop and divert the flow of oil which can be operated with the submersible robot is one possibility.
Risk assessment is quintessential imperative of any industry with the potential of creating such a calamity. What has not been effective is risk assessment of the failed wellhead protective plant. The need for practical efficient redundancy measures in oilrig wellhead protection is evident in the current disaster.
The aerospace industry is prominent in risk assessment, and is littered with case studies of disasters attributed to disputes between management and engineers. Globally, disputes between managers, engineers, technicians and craftsmen can also be attributed to risks in engineering.
What has gone wrong in this case is risk assessment. I mean balancing the imperative of redundancy of safety measures and developing reliable state-of the- art technology comparable with deep sea oil exploration technology against the colossal consequences of the current disaster.
I have a different view. A useful way to think of safety is as a series of layers. Each layer corresponds to a category of safety, ranging from primary engineering, through instrumentation and control systems, auditing and maintenance, procedures and ultimately the human layer.What has gone wrong in this case is risk assessment. I mean balancing the imperative of redundancy of safety measures and developing reliable state-of the- art technology comparable with deep sea oil exploration technology against the colossal consequences of the current disaster.
There is no level of risk assessment which can render any layer to be entirely free of defects, principally because of the "don't know what we don't know" category of defects. So each layer has conceptual holes in it, like slices of swiss cheese. When potential accidents are blocked by one or more layers (for example, a design defect is detected by safety instrumentation and controlled by a procedure), we are safe. When all the holes line up, we die.
Furthermore, there is a vicious "diminishing returns" dynamic in safety: the more you add, the more holes you introduce, and the more the risk of a single point of a failure in the safety system causing a failure in the device it is supposed to be protecting. There is a nasty reverse psychology mechanism at work too. Ask yourself which car you would drive more safely - one with fantastic brakes and a big airbag, or one with a 12 inch stainless steel spike installed in the steering wheel directed at your forehead. More safety systems in the physical layer reduces the integrity of the human layer, which is the dominant one.
In that context, depletion of conventional oil is driving two things which are causing the level of complexity necessary to sustain oil production to rise faster than our capacity to manage it:
(1) The complexity of many of the layers is growing rapidly. The design of a deepwater platform and associated wells is orders of magnitudes more complex than that of shallow water and onshore facilities. There are therefore orders of magnitude many more "holes" in the safety systems, only some of which we can anticipate.
(2) The magnitude of any failure, when it occurs, is now significant at the scale of the biosphere.
We are witnessing the technical limits of the industry, and therefore of the production rate.
dilute micro
esse quam videri
Yeah I didn't see it. Well we'll have to wait and see. It only has to be problem enough. It matters to me because we have a tough enough time trying to keep our own government straight with not letting them destroy the coastal ecosystems - or the islands themselves. It'd be fucked up if it came from elsewhere.
I think the unknown danger is the chemically treated oil or whatever concoction it turns into and what it does. From what I understand it isn't as easy to break down.
dilute micro
esse quam videri
At least they're collecting a little more than a 1/3rd of what's coming out of the well. Still have 798,000 gallons being released into the ocean every day.
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/07/gulf.oil.spill/
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/07/gulf.oil.spill/
little_legs
Поехали!
.
green peace uk is offering anyone interested to redesign the green BP (which apparently stands for beyond petrolium) logo
lots more bp logos here: http://www.flickr.com/photos/greenpeaceuk/sets/72157623796911855/
.
green peace uk is offering anyone interested to redesign the green BP (which apparently stands for beyond petrolium) logo
lots more bp logos here: http://www.flickr.com/photos/greenpeaceuk/sets/72157623796911855/
.
Matt Simmons on MBNC yesterday. Summary: the Deepwater Horizon was the size of an aircraft carrier and took two days to burn - BP claimed it was on board diesel stocks, but that can't be. Suggests a massive explosion, pressure fed at 50,000 psi, that blew the BOP off the well and possibly the entire casing out of the well. NOAA have deployed the Thomas Jefferson research vessel to survey a 100 mile diameter, 500 foot deep oil lake on the sea floor some miles away. He thinks they are about to find an open hole some miles away from the current site, which is the actual site of the well. Relief wells cannot possibly work if the well is open hole. Meanwhile, oil showing up at the seawater intakes of the Gulf refineries will shut them down and drive a US gasoline crisis.
The missing piece for me is how the BOP can appear to be connected to a well if it has been blown off--BP should know within a few meters the lat and long of the BOP and therefore whether it is off location. Also, what is coming out of the riser on the cam--there isn't enough visible flow to account for the surface and estimated subsurface volumes, but there is more than can be accounted for by the inventory of a detached riser venting to sea. So neither the official explanation nor Simmon's theory is fitting.
So need to watch this survey vessel closely.
MSBNC, Matt Simmons 7 Jun 2010 (via businessinsider.com)
The missing piece for me is how the BOP can appear to be connected to a well if it has been blown off--BP should know within a few meters the lat and long of the BOP and therefore whether it is off location. Also, what is coming out of the riser on the cam--there isn't enough visible flow to account for the surface and estimated subsurface volumes, but there is more than can be accounted for by the inventory of a detached riser venting to sea. So neither the official explanation nor Simmon's theory is fitting.
So need to watch this survey vessel closely.
MSBNC, Matt Simmons 7 Jun 2010 (via businessinsider.com)
Jackobi
swallows anything
Attachments
AnandLeo
Tipple Ripple
Potential Hazards of this Industry
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/index.html
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6421
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/index.html
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6421
Some story links:
US Congressional Research Service: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill - an in depth report
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf
Various report links on the possible to probable lack of internal structural integrity of the Gulf well
http://beforeitsnews.com/news/74/93...tself_May_Have_Lost_Structural_Integrity.html
I don't think there is much risk of this in the North Sea, but beyond the technology and safety issues being studied in the Gulf, one thing I think would be worth looking at is considering the effect of seismic & volcanic activity and tectonic changes and shifts, and how this could affect pressure levels in deep oil pockets such as Deepwater.
There was an extraordinary flurry of seismic and volcanic activity in the run up to and in the aftermath of the Deepwater blow-out. There were large earthquakes in Chile, Haiti, California and several others. All far away from the Gulf, as far as 'the crow flies' goes, but conditions and structural relationships between continents and countries deep underground are quite, quite different from the surface. Much more fluid and chaotic.
All the tectonic plates are all connected, shifting about - miles down deep within the earth - on a viscous 'sea' of molten rock. Who knows? Several earthquakes, a few volcanic eruptions or two and a few shifts in the tectonic plates could potentially have a 'squeeze' effect in a high pressure deep well scenario like Deepwater (that overwhelms existing load levels) that haven't yet been fully appreciated or factored into risk management protocols.
US Congressional Research Service: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill - an in depth report
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf
Various report links on the possible to probable lack of internal structural integrity of the Gulf well
http://beforeitsnews.com/news/74/93...tself_May_Have_Lost_Structural_Integrity.html
I don't think there is much risk of this in the North Sea, but beyond the technology and safety issues being studied in the Gulf, one thing I think would be worth looking at is considering the effect of seismic & volcanic activity and tectonic changes and shifts, and how this could affect pressure levels in deep oil pockets such as Deepwater.
There was an extraordinary flurry of seismic and volcanic activity in the run up to and in the aftermath of the Deepwater blow-out. There were large earthquakes in Chile, Haiti, California and several others. All far away from the Gulf, as far as 'the crow flies' goes, but conditions and structural relationships between continents and countries deep underground are quite, quite different from the surface. Much more fluid and chaotic.
All the tectonic plates are all connected, shifting about - miles down deep within the earth - on a viscous 'sea' of molten rock. Who knows? Several earthquakes, a few volcanic eruptions or two and a few shifts in the tectonic plates could potentially have a 'squeeze' effect in a high pressure deep well scenario like Deepwater (that overwhelms existing load levels) that haven't yet been fully appreciated or factored into risk management protocols.
Barking_Mad
Non sibi sed omnibus
Better quality video of oil spilling into the gulf
http://edition.cnn.com/video/?/video/us/2010/06/08/vo.new.oil.spill.high.resolution.bp
by the way, curious but not necessarily sinister that this isnt a direct feed, but a cam of some video feed. The reflection of a door opening at 27 seconds gives it away...
http://edition.cnn.com/video/?/video/us/2010/06/08/vo.new.oil.spill.high.resolution.bp
by the way, curious but not necessarily sinister that this isnt a direct feed, but a cam of some video feed. The reflection of a door opening at 27 seconds gives it away...
