Finished the main section of this military history of the Palestine revolt. As had been reading about British empire before events in Israel / Gaza this is going back to look at how British empire worked.
It's straight forward military history. Does not go into depth about the political factors. It's how Britain "pacified" Palestine /why they succeeded/ why revolt failed.
This is little known full on revolt. Only finally put down when Chamberlain Munich deal freed up troops to send to Palestine. Even then took six months to put down completely.
The long term result was that Palestinians were in no way ready or able to defend themselves against Zionists in 48.
The revolt was weakened by divisions in leadership/ local commanders not working in coordinated way/
Secondly due to divisions in leadership political strategy was not clear. And compromises decisions not able to be decided. IRA taken as one example. They took compromise of Free State. The Palestine leadership was so divided that British were able to work to undermine them
Matthew Hughes argument is that this pacification was not fully martial law not was it a dirty war like in Algeria. ( I can't judge on that as I don't know about Algeria)
The British army was used in conjunction with civil authority. Not always happily. It was measured violence. Excesses did happen but they were not the policy as such
Given that the regulations ( yes British were sticklers for regulations. Whole chapter in book on this) included interment without trial/ collective punishment like house demolition and fining.
Fining of villagers was effective. If British troops were shot at nearest village would be collectively punished. Houses chosen for demolition and or fines.
Fines could be devastating. These were poor farmers. If had no money then crops / cattle were taken
It was system of carrot and stick. Cooperative villages had less fines and searches.
It was grinding people down who might support rebels.
These things were allowed under Emergency regulations. To my suprise this kind of thing was standard British imperial behaviour.
The British emergency regulations live on in way Israel controls West Bank.
Due to lack of troops Zionist were used as police and armed . British army were equivocal about this.
Orde Wingate , famous in Israel and also in WW2, set up Special Night Squads of Jews and regular British troops. His harsh methods meant he got sent home after six months. As book states measured violence was the norm and Wingate was a maverick. Whose methods some in army thought counterproductive.
Still Zionists played a role. Particularly in intelligence.
And in military training. Wingates Special Night Squads had later leaders of Israel like Ariel Sharon
Unit 101 , the Israel army unit , that took part in border wars after 48 was clearly modelled on Wingates Special Night Squads. So Wingates long term influence was out of proportion to his involvement.
Given Matthew Hughes emphasis that this pacification was within the bounds of what was acceptable to British at that time seems to me he also catalogues a lot of oppression and violence that underpinned British imperial rule.
Chatting to friend and some of these methods were used in Ireland.
The book is highly detailed calm look from a military point of view or how to conduct the ending of a revolt
Cambridge Core - Twentieth Century British History - Britain's Pacification of Palestine
www.cambridge.org
en.m.wikipedia.org
Bbc series on iplayer The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs
www.cfr.org
www.middleeasteye.net
