Balkanisation of Libya, and international impact?

[teqniq]

Libyan forces claim capture of Sirte port from Isis as street battles rage

 

[teqniq]

Quelle surprise

These Qaddafi Henchmen Wanted For Stealing Millions Are Living In Britain

 

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Libyan forces say capture Sirte convention center from Islamic State

 

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Libya’s Future and Haftar’s Oil Grab

 

[teqniq]

No shit Sherlock. Odd though how the report gets published right after he's resigned as an MP

David Cameron blamed for rise of Isis in damning report

 

[CNT36]

Full report here.

Here is the summary

In March 2011, the United Kingdom and France, with the support of the United States, led the international community to support an intervention in Libya to protect civilians from attacks by forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi. This policy was not informed by accurate intelligence. In particular, the Government failed to identify that the threat to civilians was overstated and that the rebels included a significant Islamist element. By the summer of 2011, the limited intervention to protect civilians had drifted into an opportunist policy of regime change. That policy was not underpinned by a strategy to support and shape post-Gaddafi Libya. The result was political and economic collapse, inter-militia and inter-tribal warfare, humanitarian and migrant crises, widespread human rights violations, the spread of Gaddafi regime weapons across the region and the growth of ISIL in North Africa. Through his decision making in the National Security Council, former Prime Minister David Cameron was ultimately responsible for the failure to develop a coherent Libya strategy.

Looking to the future, the United Nations has brokered the formation of an inclusive Government of National Accord (GNA). Stable government is the sine qua non for the resolution of Libya’s ongoing humanitarian, migrant, economic and security crises. However, regional actors are currently undermining the GNA by flouting the United Nations arms embargo and using Libyan militias as proxies. The GNA is the only game in town. If it fails, the danger is that Libya will descend into a full-scale civil war to control territory and oil resources. The international community must support the United Nations and the people of Libya by uniting behind the GNA; the alternative is political fragmentation, internecine violence, economic collapse and even more human suffering.

 

[CNT36]

Just had a read.

Spoiler: A few highlights

18.We were told that the political momentum to propose Resolution 1973 began in France.42 France sustained its push for international action in relation to Libya throughout February and March 2011. For example, former Defence Secretary Dr Fox MP explained how France accelerated progress towards Resolution 1973 by recognising the National Transitional Council as the legitimate Government of Libya in March 2011.43 Former French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, who introduced Resolution 1973, asserted in his speech to the Security Council that “the situation on the ground is more alarming than ever, marked by the violent re-conquest of cities”. He stressed the urgency of the situation, arguing that “We have very little time left—perhaps only a matter of hours.”44 Subsequent analysis suggested that the immediate threat to civilians was being publicly overstated and that the reconquest of cities had not resulted in mass civilian casualties [see paragraphs 31 to 37].

19.Looking beyond the arguments advanced in the United Nations Security Council, other factors in addition to civilian protection appeared to influence French policy. Libyan exiles based in France were influential in raising fears about a possible massacre in Benghazi. Visiting Professor at King’s College London, Professor George Joffé, told us that “the decisions of President Sarkozy and his Administration were driven by Libyan exiles getting allies within the French intellectual establishment who were anxious to push for a real change in Libya.”45

20.A further insight into French motivations was provided in a freedom of information disclosure by the United States State Department in December 2015. On 2 April 2011, Sidney Blumenthal, adviser and unofficial intelligence analyst to the then United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reported this conversation with French intelligence officers to the Secretary of State:

According to these individuals Sarkozy’s plans are driven by the following issues:

a. A desire to gain a greater share of Libya oil production,

b. Increase French influence in North Africa,

c. Improve his internal political situation in France,

d. Provide the French military with an opportunity to reassert its position in the world,

e. Address the concern of his advisors over Qaddafi’s long term plans to supplant France as the dominant power in Francophone Africa.46

The sum of four of the five factors identified by Sidney Blumenthal equated to the French national interest. The fifth factor was President Sarkozy’s political self-interest.

29.We asked Dr Fox whether he was aware of any assessment of the extent to which the rebellion involved militant Islamist elements. He replied that he did not “recall reading anything of that nature.”66 It is now clear that militant Islamist militias played a critical role in the rebellion from February 2011 onwards. They separated themselves from the rebel army, refused to take orders from non-Islamist commanders and assassinated the then leader of the rebel army, Abdel Fattah Younes.67

30.Lord Hague also acknowledged the lack of reliable intelligence. He argued in mitigation that Muammar Gaddafi’s intelligence service “did not understand the militias, the tribes, the movements and what was happening in their own country, so there is not much hope that a foreign intelligence service would have a more profound understanding.”68 However, Muammar Gaddafi’s actions in February and March 2011 demonstrated an appreciation of the delicate tribal and regional nature of Libya that was absent in UK policymaking. In particular, his forces did not take violent retribution against civilians in towns and cities on the road to Benghazi. Alison Pargeter told us that any such reprisals would have “alienated a lot of the tribes in the east of Libya” on which the Gaddafi regime relied.69

 

[CNT36]

Spoiler: And some more

The evidence base: rhetoric
31.Given the lack of reliable intelligence, both Lord Hague and Dr Fox highlighted the impact of Muammar Gaddafi’s rhetoric on their decision-making. Dr Fox cited “Gaddafi’s 70-minute diatribe on TV against his own people—if you remember, he was talking about how he was going to repeat some of the crimes of history, praising Tiananmen Square, Waco and the destruction of Fallujah, and saying that he was going to visit this on Benghazi.”70 Lord Hague told us that

their stated intention, from Gaddafi himself, was to go house to house, room to room, exacting their revenge on the people of Benghazi…It would be a brave assumption, given the history of Gaddafi, the situation and the disposition of forces, that his army would drive into Benghazi and they would all behave like pussycats. A lot of people were going to die.71

[paste:font size="5"]72 During fighting in Misrata, the hospital recorded 257 people killed and 949 people wounded in February and March 2011. Those casualties included 22 women and eight children.73 Libyan doctors told United Nations investigators that Tripoli’s morgues contained more than 200 corpses following fighting in late February 2011, of whom two were female.74 The disparity between male and female casualties suggested that Gaddafi regime forces targeted male combatants in a civil war and did not indiscriminately attack civilians. More widely, Muammar Gaddafi’s 40-year record of appalling human rights abuses did not include large-scale attacks on Libyan civilians.75[/QUOTE]

43.Resolution 1973 called on United Nations member states to ensure the “strict implementation of the arms embargo”.94 However, we were told that the international community turned a blind eye to the supply of weapons to the rebels.95 Lord Richards highlighted “the degree to which the Emiratis and the Qataris…played a major role in the success of the ground operation.”96 For example, Qatar supplied French Milan anti-tank missiles to certain rebel groups.97 We were told that Qatar channelled its weapons to favoured militias rather than to the rebels as a whole.98

44.The combination of coalition airpower with the supply of arms, intelligence and personnel to the rebels guaranteed the military defeat of the Gaddafi regime. On 20 March 2011, for example, Muammar Gaddafi’s forces retreated some 40 miles from Benghazi following attacks by French aircraft.99 If the primary object of the coalition intervention was the urgent need to protect civilians in Benghazi, then this objective was achieved in less than 24 hours.100

47.We asked Lord Richards whether the object of British policy in Libya was civilian protection or regime change. He told us that “one thing morphed almost ineluctably into the other” as the campaign developed its own momentum.106 He expressed his concern about the strategic direction of the campaign in March 2011:

During Benghazi, an increasingly influential set of people started saying, “If we’re really going to protect civilians, you’ve got to get rid of Gaddafi.” That is when I said, “Well, is that really sensible? What are we going to do if he goes?” and all the things that I had learned through bitter experience. That was rather ignored in the majority view, which was, “We need to get rid of him, simply to make sure we meet the political aim of preventing large-scale civilian loss of life.”107

48.When the then Prime Minister David Cameron sought and received parliamentary approval for military intervention in Libya on 21 March 2011, he assured the House of Commons that the object of the intervention was not regime change.108 In April 2011, however, he signed a joint letter with United States President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy setting out their collective pursuit of “a future without Gaddafi”.109

57.Political options were available if the UK Government had adhered to the spirit of Resolution 1973, implemented its originalcampaign plan and influenced its coalition allies to pause military action when Benghazi was secured in March 2011. Political engagement might have delivered civilian protection, regime change and reform at lesser cost to the UK and to Libya. If politicalengagement had been unsuccessful, the UK and its coalition allies would not have lost anything. Instead, the UK Government focused exclusively on military intervention. In particular, we saw no evidence that it tried to exploit former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s contacts and influence with the Gaddafi regime.

The international community’s inability to secure weapons abandoned by the Gaddafi regime fuelled instability in Libya and enabled and increased terrorism across North and West Africa and the Middle East. The UK Government correctly identified the need to secure weapons immediately after the 2011 Libyan civil war, but it and its international partners took insufficient action to achieve that objective. However, it is probable that none of the states that intervened in Libya would have been prepared to commit the necessary military and political resources to secure stocks of weapons and ammunition. That consideration should have informed their calculation to intervene.

90.In September 2011, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2009, which set out the mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).190 UNSMIL was empowered to “support” and “assist” Libyan national efforts to restore security and state authority. Resolution 2009 did not empower UNSMIL to exercise leadership, which was a fatal omission bearing in mind the limited capacity of the Libyan state and politicians.

91.President Barack Obama expressed his disappointment in the UK and France for not exercising leadership on stabilisation and reconstruction, stating that “I had more faith in the Europeans, given Libya’s proximity, being invested in the follow-up.”191 He added that the then Prime Minister David Cameron stopped paying attention and became “distracted by a range of other things.”192

92.We recognise that the damaging experience of post-war intervention in Iraq engendered an understandable reluctance to impose solutions in Libya. However, because the UK along with France led the military intervention, it had a particular responsibility to support Libyan economic and political reconstruction, which became an impossible task because of the failure to establish security on the ground.

The FCO must set out and re-examine the evidence base underpinning its assertion in October 2014 that “planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean … create an unintended ‘pull factor’, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing”. It must also assess whether planned search and rescue operations encouraged migrants to cross the Mediterranean in the first half of 2016 in the light of people smugglers’ current methods of operation in relation to international search and rescue. It should support Italian and wider European efforts to secure the agreement of countries of origin to accept, where possible, the repatriation of irregular migrants who have arrived in Europe but do not meet asylum criteria, as well as the need to tackle the main factors fuelling the desire to migrate. Given its role in the conflict and subsequent destabilisation in Libya, the UK has a particular responsibility in relation to migrants and refugees, an issue which has been exacerbated by the collapse of the Libyan state.

 

[CNT36]

Spoiler: You might as well read the whole bloody thing

The UK could directly support the GNA with British combat troops. British Special Forces have reportedly been deployed to Libya, where they apparently engaged in frontline combat in May 2016.237 It is difficult to square reports of British Special Forces participating in combat with the comment by the Secretary of State for Defence in May 2016 that

we do not intend to deploy ground forces in any combat role. Before engaging in any military operation in Libya, we would of course have to seek an invitation from the Libyan Government, and would also have to involve this Parliament.238

The GNA has not invited the UK to deploy combat troops in Libya and the UK Parliament has not considered the matter.

123.Special Forces operations in Libya are problematic because they necessarily involve supporting individual militias associated with the GNA rather than the GNA itself, which does not directly command units on the ground. For example, British Special Forces reportedly engaged in combat to support a militia from Misrata rather than a Libyan Army unit directly commanded by the GNA.239 When we asked Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Tobias Ellwood whether British Special Forces had been deployed to Libya, he repeated the standard UK Government line that “no Minister ever comments on the role or otherwise of the Special Forces.”240 However, Mr Ellwood acknowledged that the RAF had flown missions over Libya in 2016.241

124.Special Forces missions are not currently subject to parliamentary or public scrutiny, which increases the danger that such operations can become detached from political objectives. For example, French Special Forces apparently supported Khalifa Haftar’s operations against Islamist militias in Benghazi. Le Monde reported in February 2016 that a detachment of French Special Forces was supporting the Libyan National Army from a base at Benghazi airport.242 French President François Hollande confirmed that such a deployment had occurred when he announced that three soldiers had been killed when their helicopter was shot down during an operation near Benghazi in July 2016.243 In other words, French Special Forces facilitated the combat performance of a militia that rejected the authority of the GNA and that prolonged the Libyan civil war, despite the success of the GNA being a stated French Government foreign policy objective. Whilst not hindering the UK Government’s ability to use Special Forces without sanction from or scrutiny by Parliament, this latitude should not be abused to circumvent the normal parliamentary authorisation for military deployments, especially when Special Forces are used in a role more usually performed by Regular Forces.

 

[teqniq]

A reporter’s journey through Tripoli: Long lines, kidnappings and murder

 

[elbows]

I've only been partially keeping up with things but it sounds like Hafter won some battles, gained ground, was given some 'international credibility' by being invited to an official meeting overseas, etc. Hard to establish whether Qatars isolation played a part in him winning the battle for Benghazi or whether it was a coincidence of timing.

In any case, it seems his attention has turned to port control in the east and establishing more revenue, with the 'Egyptian Model' (argh!) being touted....

https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/10/13/tobruk-port-closed-on-hafters-instruction/

Torbuk port has been closed to international shipping. It follows an order by the head of the Libyan National Amy, Field Marshal Khalifa Hafter, to General Transport Authority director Mohamed Abdelgader, to stop imports and exports through Tobruk, and that foreign vessels should use the port of Benghazi instead.

Oil shipments through Tobruk’s Hariga terminal are not affected by the order.

Last week, the port authorities in Benghazi were ordered not to refuel any vessels or supply them with oil products. That was now the monopoly of the Military Authority for Investment and Public Works.

It is now reported that the authority has also taken over control of moving containers and storage security at the port. It is also reported that it intends to set up a similar operation at Tobruk port but that this has not yet happened.

The LNA company is based on the model of the Egyptian army’s involvement in commercial affairs.

 

[teqniq]

 

[elbows]

Always interesting and disturbing to see such footage, but I seem to feel the need to comment on the wording of that tweet.

Firstly its a city of over half a million people and I doubt it is accurate to say the city has been destroyed. Clearly some districts got hammered, and I will try to find time in the next day or 3 to see if I can get some sense of the scale of destruction there. Because the drone footage shows terrible destruction in all its eerie hideousness, but it doesnt give me an accurate sense of scale or anything approaching a full view of city life.

As for the idea that ISIS & Al Qaeda took the city in 2014, well no, it was nowhere near that simple. Certain islamist groups took chunks of the city and at some points they had something approaching control and probably made some grand declarations. They certainly werent ISIS though. Something which is obvious when we see that the international media organisations and various governments had every reason to talk up the ISIS threat to Libya, very much including during that time period, but those that wanted to do this whilst retaining some credibility did not try to paint Benghazi as having been taken over by ISIS, but rather picked on the location or two in Libya that were actually taken over by ISIS for a time. And that wasnt Benghazi. As for Al Qaeda, since that has always tended to be a wider term and there are (or were) plenty of affiliations between groups under this banner, there could be a little truth to that. But it ignores the other dimensions to this battle, such as the 'Libyan army' just being another faction not a real state army (and its the one Hafter has power over), and the idea which was hard to get a proper handle on but often came up from time to time, that some of the groups battling Hafter in Benghazi has as much to do with powerful factions elsewhere in the country such as Misrata, and alternative government in Tripoli, and thus the east-west struggles, not to mention various different groupings along tribal lines, as it did about Islamists. And of course also very much along those east-west lines and competing alternative governments and armies, we have the various countries that have continued backing various sides with money, equipment and arms long after the original 'get rid of Gaddafi' phase, often using Libya as a proxy for their other disputes. This broad picture is often acknowledged but seldom do we get the specific detail as to which countries have been backing which groups in particular, at least on some of the sides (we do, for example, get plenty of obvious stuff in regard Hafters backer nations, but not so much about who exactly Qatar sponsors).

 

[elbows]

I thought I probably had very little chance of getting a real sense of scale in regards the damage to Benghazi, but I stumbled upon this series of maps which have been analysed for visible damage. Its a little dated now, 2016, but starts to give a sense of the various parts of the city that were hit hard during the years of fighting, and some that fared better.

I'm speaking of the first three maps on this site:

Maps: Libya

As for my previous comments about ISIS in Benghazi, my claim is not that there were zero ISIS or ISIS-affiliated fighters in the city at any point. Especially after they lost territory in Sirte, it is entirely reasonable to expect that some fighters of this type ended up in Benghazi. But ISIS never controlled Benghazi, and I dont see any evidence that they were really very relevant to the way the battle evolved there over a number of years, not at the start, in the middle or at the end. So when they are given headline billing in relation to Benghazi, its either sloppy, lazy or sensationalistic journalism, unhelpful shorthand, or particular agendas at play.

 

[teqniq]

Whilst I recall you are largely right in your claims, I posted it for the footage. She's usually one of the better journalists reporting from the region, a bit more detail in the thread if you care to look.

 

[elbows]

Yeah, I think the footage is important so I'm not complaining at you for posting it, but am just being tedious about various details. Especially stuff that seeks to simplify the situation, given the number of different groups and power struggles that plague Libya.

There has been quite a lot of fighting between certain groups in Tripoli over the last week or so, sounds like the latest ceasefire attempt actually held for a while but I've no idea what will happen next and as usual there isnt much info or analysis of what factors exactly are behind this fight.

 

[teqniq]

*bump*

I am kinda surprised that no-one else has posted anything on recent developments in Libya.

Haftar the warlord of Benghazi fame is making a power grab for Tripoli lots of fighting going on over the past couple of weeks and now reports of atrocities are surfacing.



Depressingly it has been alleged that Haftar has the backing has the backing of France.

Libya’s UN-backed govt accuses France of supporting Haftar, ends cooperation

Unsurprisingly Egypt too

Libya crisis: Egypt’s Sisi backs Haftar assault on Tripoli

 

[elbows]

I havent posted mostly because participation in the thread fell too low. And I went on and on about Haftar so much in the past, I was not too surprised by recent events. I am some days out of date right now though, so I will try to get up to speed and will post here if I hear anything interesting.

 

[elbows]

With a few exceptions, most of the battles for territory and resources that have occurred since the fall of Gaddafi have not resulted in very high death counts. Mostly because despite people whizzing about on pickup trucks with mounted guns, the real action was often to be found in deals and the switching of allegiances. Clearly the situation is different this time, although the end game could still involve deals being done.

Ever since the 'war on terror' rhetoric post 9/11 I'm sure many people have been on the lookout for overt and blatant examples of western misuse of this rhetoric. Obviously there have been some, but I think the emerging ones in support of Haftar are especially blatant. Haftar has used such rhetoric for a long time, sometimes with some actual justification (clearing Benghazi of particular Islamist groups for example). But the US have been very blatant by parroting his rhetoric/justification for violence:

A White House statement said that in the phone call on Monday, Trump “recognized Field Marshal Haftar’s significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil resources, and the two discussed a shared vision for Libya’s transition to a stable, democratic political system”.

Acting U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan also said that Trump supported Haftar’s “role in counterterroism” and that Washington needed Haftar’s “support in building democratic stability there in the region.”

(from Thousands demonstrate against Hafter Tripoli attack amidst international split on Libya )

Oh god, 'building democratic stability'. People would have been loudly all over this shit if it had been said 15 years ago but the public debates in the world seems to have moved on due to the nature and quantity of events this century.

 

[elbows]

I mean really, even by the historical standards of US rhetoric, using counterterrorism rhetoric when Haftar is currently fighting the UN-backed administration is a bit of a stretch!

 

[Idris2002]

"Portugese" mercenary shot down by rebels:

VIDEOS show capture & questioning of ‘Portuguese mercenary’ pilot shot down over Libya

Shades of Colonel Callan?

 

[elbows]

"Portugese" mercenary shot down by rebels:

VIDEOS show capture & questioning of ‘Portuguese mercenary’ pilot shot down over Libya

Shades of Colonel Callan?

Accusations of foreign mercenaries featured throughout the uprising against Gaddafi. For a mixture of reasons including historical ones (eg Gaddafis own use of foreign mercenaries in decades past), but certainly this sort of thing has been used extensively for propaganda purposes by various sides over the years, often raising suspicions to levels where war crimes are blatantly committed. Nationalism and racism often a part of it, and I doubt its any different this time. Thats not to say I dispute all facts in this particular instance, but sadly we learnt years ago that the quality of information from Libya is often low and the propaganda shameless and vulgar. And at times of uncertainty, rabid concerns involving skin tones are often to be found being peddled quite deliberately from various quarters.

 

[Idris2002]

I remember a thing in the Observer, in the early days of the post-Gadaffi war, which described a pro-government general as "looking like Monty". Lads, come on.

 

[elbows]

This article is some days old now but its not bad (it doesnt have that much competition really).

Snatched selfies along Libya's frontline point to long war - Reuters

 

[elbows]

Also I havent tried to get access to the full version of this article, but the intro is sort of enough and its not surprising.

The leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt successfully lobbied President Trump to shift U.S. policy in Libya and reach out to the general leading an offensive against the country’s United Nations-backed government, a senior U.S. administration official and two Saudi officials said.

In early April, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi urged Mr. Trump to back Gen. Khalifa Haftar, whose forces are seeking to capture the Libyan capital Tripoli amid a long-running battle for control of...

Trump Backed Libyan Warlord After Saudi Arabia and Egypt Lobbied Him

 

[elbows]

Libya being used for proxy conflicts is always a big part of the story, even though in most media stories about it, it just gets a passing mention and we may be left with some or no idea which nations are involved exactly, and how the different sides align.

Well, its rather exploded into the open with this:

Turkey threatens Libya as six citizens detained

Turkey says it will "retaliate in the most effective and strong way" to any threats from the Libyan warlord's Khalifa Haftar's army.

The warning came after Gen Haftar's Libyan National Army said it would strike Turkish vessels in Libyan waters and view Turkish businesses as targets.

The LNA controls most of the east and south of Libya and started an offensive against the internationally recognised government in April.

Turkey supports the Libyan government.

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that his country supplies weapons and drones to Tripoli's Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minster Fayez al-Sarraj.

He said Turkish backing helped "rebalance" the fight against Gen Haftar, who has backing from UAE and Egypt.

 

[elbows]

Oh, even while I was writing that last post the BBC updated the story and its headline to reflect a new event:

Turkey says warlord Khalifa Haftar's eastern Libyan forces will become a "legitimate target" if they do not immediately release six Turks.

The Turkish foreign ministry said the detention of its citizens "amounts to banditry and piracy".

 

[elbows]

On Thursday, the GNA reclaimed the strategic town of Gharyan, a main supply base for Gen Haftar's forces in their offensive on Tripoli.

I'm not sure if this change on the ground has anything to do with Haftars approach to Turkey suddenly escalating, I am not familiar with much detail about what exactly triggered this right now. If it is someones deliberate strategy then it seems rather risky!

I am familiar with the broad grouping of sides in the region along the sort of Turkey, Qatar & Muslim Brotherhood vs UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia fault line.

And obviously this particular area of conflict, power struggles, ganging up and proxy shit in the region has seen action beyond Libya this decade. Much of it Arab Spring related, with Egypt having its year with a MB president, and then that being reversed via military coup. And then Qatar being deliberately isolated, borders shut, demands made, etc.

That particular fault line may be less well known because events and nations interfering in Syria, and the Saudi+others vs Iran power struggle and Yemen war, easily overshadow these other conflicts and regional power struggle dynamics.

 

[elbows]

"Portugese" mercenary shot down by rebels:

VIDEOS show capture & questioning of ‘Portuguese mercenary’ pilot shot down over Libya

Shades of Colonel Callan?

There has been quite a development to this story!

The mercenary fighter pilot captured after being allegedly shot down near Tripoli in early May by the Khalifa Hafter aligned Libyan National Army (LNA) forces, has turned out to be a U.S. citizen.

The captured pilot, photographed bleeding and receiving treatment from LNA forces, had initially claimed his name was Jimmy Rees and that he was Portuguese.

It now transpires, according to the Washington Post who broke the story, that he is a U.S. Air Force veteran named Jamie Sponaugle from Miami.

It reported that he was released yesterday to Saudi Arabia after the Kingdom acted as intermediary for the U.S.

It is still unclear why the American was flying a Mirage F1 fighter jet for the Faiez Serraj internationally recognized Presidency Council and Government of National Accord (PC/GNA).

LNA captured Portuguese mercenary pilot turns out to be US citizen – freed to Saudis

 

[elbows]

Haftars forces released the 6 Turkish detainees.

Haftar's forces release six Turkish detainees in Libya: Turkey FM

Given the LNAs history of bombing civilian areas, the following is alarming but not terribly surprising.

"[The anti-Turkish sentiments have grown] especially after Haftar lost the strategic town of Gharyan, south of Tripoli, which is considered a major setback for his troops fighting the government forces in the west of the country."

Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) launched a campaign on April 4 to seize the Libyan capital, but has been pushed back by the government forces.

On Monday, LNA Commander Mohamed Manfour announced the beginning of a new aerial bombardment campaign after "traditional means" to "liberate Tripoli" had been exhausted.