The issue of what she said was of limited significance; that's not what you claimed, though. You said that consent was irrelevant. You were wrong.
semantics, it amounts to the same thing.
Again, you misunderstand. If he did not reasonably believe that she had the capacity to consent, then it follows that he cannot reasonably have believed that she had, in fact, consented, notwithstanding what she may or may not have said.
no, I've not misunderstood, I've outlined it as clearly as I can, and am saying the same thing as you are.
Ok. So in a case where someone says 'yes' but doesn't have the capacity to consent, has she consented or not?
as of this case she hasn't consented legally, prior to this case she would have been viewed as having consented.
OBut you're wrong about what previous cases said, and what this one means.
oh really? Well I've the one who's specifically quoted the previous case law on the subject to back up my point, you're the one who merely asserts that I've got it wrong but refuses to give any specifics.
You are wrong. There are previous cases in which it was made clear that voluntary intoxication can remove capacity, so as to vitiate consent. This was explicitly addressed in Bree, and before that, in Lang.'
OK, sorry for the delayed response, but I've just been through all the previous judgements via the
R v Malone court of appeal judgement, and confirmed what I thought, that none of them had previously involved a situation where the defendants were both claiming that the woman involved had actually consented, and the woman involved had given no evidence to the contrary, as in this case.
All of them in one way or another had the woman saying that she'd not consented, with Malone being about the closest to saying that he thought she had, although only implied consent as opposed to this case where both the male witnesses stated that she had given her verbal consent to having sex with the 2nd guy, and the woman has merely said that she can't actually remember what happened.
And this was the most recent appeal court judgement on the matter prior to this case from R v Bree
However where the complainant has voluntarily consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to do so, this would not be rape.
this is also a repeat of the previous R v Malone judges summary.
In drink in this case the woman allegedly agreed to have sex with him, and didn't offer any evidence to the contrary in court, and yet he was found guilty on the basis that she was actually judged to have been too drunk to have had the capacity to give her consent.
In the second case to which reference was made, the appellant Lang was charged with rape, the only effective issue at the trial being whether the girl had consented. The prosecution’s case was that the girl had submitted only after a struggle and in the belief that further resistance was useless. The defence introduced the question of her drinking in an attempt to show that she might well have consented, being in a less inhibited state of mind than she would have been had she taken no drink.
You do realise that those things are crimes, unlike being raped? Otherwise guilty people ought not to be afforded a defence by virtue of their own voluntary intoxication. But you seem to be suggesting that they ought to be afforded a defence by virtue of their victim's voluntary intoxication!
no, I'm suggesting that if someone is capable of being held criminally responsible for their actions when drunk, then they also ought to be held to be capable of being responsible for their actions when deciding whether or not to agree to have sex with someone.
Your obfuscating again. Is the law (principally s.1 and the case law around consent) wrong? Or has it simply been wrongly applied here?
It looks to have been wrongly applied in this situation to me. The previous court of appeal judgements make broad sense, and I don't have a problem with them. This one seems inconsistent with all of them. The judge seems to have effectively directed the jury that if she was drunk then she couldn't legally give her consent, which is the opposite of the appeal court ruling in Bree.
So you will need to consider the evidence of the complainant's state and decide these two questions: was she in a condition in which she was capable of making any choice one way or another? If you are sure that she was not, then she did not consent.
which is a lot different to the bree judgement
However where the complainant has voluntarily consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to do so, this would not be rape.
Had the judge merely read that out rather than embellishing it in his own words, then I'd strongly suspect that the jury would have returned a different verdict.
I also don't think the specific grounds used in his appeal were done well, as they make no reference to the Bree judgement compared to the judges summary. Presumably this is why he's replaced his legal team.
I think that's me done with this topic for a while, hopefully this has helped to clarify my position on it, and why I've been saying all along that this judgement is at odds with all previous judgements on the subject.
If people want to think of me as a rape apologist etc then that's their choice, I've merely been pointing out that in no previous court case would this have been considered as being rape, and that I think this sets a dangerous precedent that really did deserve at the very least to go to the court of appeal as it seems to be at odds with their previous rulings on the subject.