Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

The Spanish Civil War. Casado's coup.

I’m not sure that anyone is doing that though. I’ve been trying to tease out , through the Stalinists and Franco were both shits smokescreen, what the reasons were for the anarchist support of Casado . It wasn’t just political support but military and included defeating the SCP troops and the execution of the SCP general . Casedo was for a negotiated surrender and yes there are times when the balance of forces dictate that that may be the only way forward. However the way I read it the negotiated surrender supported by anarchists centred around sacrificing the communist party members.

I appreciate that the very nature of anarchism means that there are different factions and tendencies that despite having separate militias there are many cases both during the Civil War and after where anarchists and communists fought together. I also appreciate that the fact that revolutionary and counter revolutionary situations are necessarily complicated , fraught with difficult and unwanted problems and dilemmas .
So what was the hoped for end goal of the anarchist support for Casedo’s coup?
 
Peirats and Fraser will be able to answer that better than I can, but I think the whole question of ending vs continuing the war would be pretty central in March 39. Beyond that I suppose you just get back into the debates around Lister in Aragon, May 37, Kronstadt etc.
 
By the time of the coup the civil war only had weeks left, everyone knew it was over and that Franco had won. The question was the terms on which surrender was to be made. Casado, a lifelong army man with a naive belief in the honesty of the opposing officer corp, thought they could negotiate a settlement where tens of thousands of fighters were allowed to leave. Negrin and the communists thought that they should stop the regime from becoming fully established by continuing resistance until the obviously upcoming european war started. The anarchists (following the lead of their french based leaders, according to Fraser) thought it best to get as many people out as possible, so sided with Casado. They (and the socialists and POUMsters who also went along with it) were undoubtedly influenced by the way the CP had enforced their dominance n Barcelona, but it seems mainly to have been purely tactical, to save as many lives as possible.

Of course, Casado's negotiations with the fascists failed. The new council offered an unconditional surrender even as many of its constituent members were saying they'd organise resistance. Being obviously unable to do both things at once, resistance was minimal and the fascist troops just marched straight into Madrid. Up north, the nazi's had just marched int Prague and France and France signed the agreement to protect Poland.

Agreeing how to lose is always gonna be harder than agreeing how to stand together and fight the common enemy and the distrust of the communists is hardly surprising. But the fuckers were probably right bout that one.
 
So, Catalonia had already fallen to the Francoists. ON 5-6 March Casado created the National Defence Council , a junta supported by the CNT bureaucrats like Eduardo Val, José Manuel González Marín to replace the pro-Stalinist Negrin government. General Miaja joined this and ordered the arrest of Communist militants in Madrid. Meanwhile, in Alicante, Negrin, who was preparing to flee to France with his ministers, ordered the Stalinist officer Luis Barcelo Jover , commander of the First Army Corps of the Centre, to try and take Madrid from Casado. As a result several days of fighting took place between his corps and the anarchist divisions commanded by Cipriano Mera. Barcelo surrendered on 12th March after learning that the Negrin government and Communist leaders like La Pasionaria had fled to France . Casado then began to negotiate a peace process with the Francoists. Franco responded by saying that he accepted only unconditional surrender.

The late Peter E. Newell wrote about Mera that, " On February 23, Colonel Casado, commander of the Army of the Centre in Madrid, together with the "socialist" Professor Besterio, and Cipriano Mera, the then commander of the IVth Army Group, came out against the pro-Communist government of Negrin. Casado banned the publication of the Madrid Communist newspaper, Mundo Obrero. The situation in the field was now hopeless. Casado, speaking of the devastation and starvation, insisted that the war must end. And Mera argued for "an honourable peace, based on justice and brotherhood", though he remained at his post. A junta was formed, while the Negrin "government" was in Elda in total isolation, and protected only by a tiny detachment of less than 80 Communist officers and other ranks. The Communists continued to make a show of resistance, but in fact abandoned their posts. By March 3, Casado told Mera to take command of the Central Army. By March 6, most of the Communist commanders, such as Lister, and the Communist politicians, such as La Pasionaria, took flight. A few Communist army corps remained in the Madrid area; and on March 7, one of them, led by Colonel Barcelo, was attacked by Mera. A week of "civil war" within the Republican camp resulted in the death of 2,000 in Madrid alone. By the end of March, there was no Republican Army. The Casado junta, which, in desperation, hoped for ,”an honourable" peace with Franco, held its last meeting on March 27. Casado left Madrid by plane. Everyone who could get out left. And hours before the arrival of the Francoists, Cipriano Mera also left. There was nothing he could do. Republican Spain was finished. Mera was, of course, criticised by some of his anarchist colleagues for throwing in his weight behind Casado. He was blamed for risking a "precipitous act", or a faux pas. He, like Federica Montseny and Garcia Oliver, was also criticised for abandoning social revolution for "collaboration" with the bourgeois State in order to defeat Fascism." It should be remembered that Mera had fiercely hated the Stalinists since the May Days in Barcelona in 1937 when the Stalinists launched a provocation against the CNT-FAI, and was disgusted by the behaviour of the Stalinist executioner Santiago Carrillo in Madrid.
The POUMist Ignacio Iglesias in his The Final Weeks of the Spanish Republic argues that since the National Defence Council eventually surrendered to Franco, the Communists denounced Miaja, Casado and Mera as traitors, while claiming that the Communist Party and Negrin wanted to continue the anti-fascist resistance. Iglesias shows that Negrin and the Stalinists (including the Soviet advisors) had already decided to leave Spain, and that all talk about resistance from their side was bollox. and "that the non-Communist coup was deliberately provoked by Negrin and the Communist Party, so that the non-Communists would be forced to surrender to Franco and thereby discredit themselves, while the Communists and their allies would mutter a few words in protest and then abscond unscathed."
 
Found out I do still have my copy of Blood of Spain after all. Dunno how much there is to add to the summaries above now, but here's what a CNT member remembered about it:
In Madrid, as Eduardo de Guzman, libertarian journalist, recalled, the other parties and organizations reacted out of fear of what might happen next.

"Especially after what had happened in May 1937, in Barcelona. If the communists succeeded in monopolizing power, it could only be at the expense of all other organizations. It was impossible to know whether the communists were manipulating Negrin or whether Negrin was manipulating them. Our reaction was designed as a purely defensive movement against a communist take-over..."
Also includes an interesting footnote about Negrin's attitudes to the war:
Immediately upon [Negrin's] return, he had left anarcho-syndicalist leaders with a different impression. Lorenzo Inigo, secretary-general of the libertarian youth, was one of three members who went to see him in Valencia to determine what the government proposed to do. Military leaders, said Inigo, maintained that resistance was possible for no more than two months; had the government the means to organize resistance? If so - and it would require more than verbal assurances - the libertarian movement would put itself at the head of the resistance, he told the prime minister. '"I congratulate your on your clarity," replied Negrin. "I will now answer with the same clarity and sincerity. The government has come to Valencia to save the moral values of the republic. We consider the war lost. There is no possibility of organizing resistance. I have already given orders to all civil governors to prepare the evacuation of men whose lives are at risk." There was no more to say; we left.'
Oh, and one more perspective:
Amidst the desolation of two simultaneous civil wars, Alvaro Delgado stood in the Plaza de Colon, discussing Goethe's Werther with the girl he had fallen in love with at the school of Fine Arts. A shell exploded, killing a man in front of them, his brains splattering onto a tree. 'We went on with our discussion. Our lack of concern for the war was total; we fled from reality into German romanticism and painting.'
 
I can't be arsed digging it out and going through it right now, but Ronald Fraser's Blood of Spain is a fantastic source for understanding the war through the eyes of the participants, if there's any English-language book where you can read what Madrid anarchists or anyone else who was around at the time thought of it it's likely to be in there I reckon.
Libcom has it in epub and mobi but not pdf, not sure what you'd need to open it in those formats?

One of the best oral histories ever produced. Judging by some the claims/statements on this thread it needs to be read more widely.
 
Back
Top Bottom