The "illusion" of consciousness

[8ball]

The convention on these boards is that it is the OPer who gets to decide what the interesting question is.

See the thread title?

Good.

 

[phildwyer]

The convention on these boards is that it is the OPer who gets to decide what the interesting question is.

See the thread title?

Good.

But did *you* see the way in which the OP framed the question, to wit:

Of course consciousness is not an illusion. Whatever half-baked "Buddhists" and behaviourists might say, the fact of one's own existence is one of the few things of which each of us can be certain. Descartes was right to insist "Cogito ergo sum".

As you can see, the OP naively confuses the question of whether consciousness is an illusion with the question of whether "one's own existence" is illusory. It is therefore our duty to correct him and show him the true nature of the question he has clumsily attempted to formulate.

 

[Jonti]

Click here to add phyldwyer to your ignore list ​

 

[phildwyer]

Click here to add phyldwyer to your ignore list ​

Deal with the objection. Do not run away from it.

 

[Jonti]

Suppose consciousness is an illusion.

Then the people who believe consciousness is an illusion would be right.

Jonti would be wrong.

As would I.

Obviously.

So the people who are right are the people who actually are conscious that consciousness is an illusion.

That consciousness of consciousness being an illusion is itself an illusion.

So, collapsing the brackets, they're actually wrong and consciousness is not an illusion.

QED.

feeling really clever now

Nice one, 8ball. The fact of consciousness is not seriously disputed by many people, not anymore, although Susan Blackmore may well be an exception. The interesting question is not whether or not one is conscious, but the nature of that consciousness.

It's worth noticing that one's consciousness comes and goes (every night, we have periods of dreamless sleep in which we are unconscious). Poets even compare the nothingness into which we fall every night with the void of death itself. Our sense of an enduring self would seem to be, in some sense, illusory.

 

[phildwyer]

Nice one, 8ball. The fact of consciousness is not seriously disputed by many people, not anymore. The interesting question is not whether or not one is conscious, but the nature of that consciousness.

It's worth noticing that one's consciousness comes and goes (everynight, we have periods of dreamless sleep in which our sense of self effectively vanishes). Poets even compare the nothingness into which we fall every night with the void of death itself. Our sense of an enduring self would seem to be, in some sense, illusory.

The question of whether there is an "enduring self" cannot be answered ahistorically. Such a self exists in certain circumstances and not in others. Our current historical epoch is one in which the unitary subject has been effectively eroded by economic and ideological factors. The truly interesting question is whether the unitary subject *should* exist: is it a politcally repressive phenomenon, as Judith Butler and other postmodernists hold, or is it the bastion of freedom and liberty, as the Enlightenment tradition suggests? But your attempt to decide the issue without reference to wider factors is futile and doomed to failure.

 

[ska invita]

It's worth noticing that one's consciousness comes and goes (every night, we have periods of dreamless sleep in which we are unconscious). Poets even compare the nothingness into which we fall every night with the void of death itself. Our sense of an enduring self would seem to be, in some sense, illusory.

There are accounts of masters of meditation (and consciousness) who claim that they remain conscious right up to the point of sleep, and then on through into sleep. Once asleep and dreaming they claim to be able to control their dreams more vividly than you or I.

Sometimes called Lucid Dreaming:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucid_dreaming

 

[Jonti]

I'm rather fond of lucid dreaming myself, and teach my children to do it. Children can have utterly terrifying nightmares, but they can learn to "jump out" of a bad dream, or to take charge of it, provided only they realise they are dreaming. That's the hard part, but it gets easier with practice.

But no, one does not remain conscious throughout the period of sleep. Although one cannot have direct access to the mind of another, there has been extensive research into the patterns of electrical activity that can be picked up with ECG machines and other instruments. Deep sleep is dreamless.

Even a Zen Master is rendered unconscious by a sufficiently robust right hook, or a good whiff of Xenon.

 

[ska invita]

Even a Zen Master is rendered unconscious by a sufficiently robust right hook, or a good whiff of Xenon.

Fair enough, but I dont really get what the point is you're making about the "enduring self". What do you mean by this phrase... a soul? Is that what you're trying to disprove as illusory?

Define the "enduring self" please. I'm not sure I know what it is.

 

[ska invita]

The question of whether there is an "enduring self" cannot be answered ahistorically. Such a self exists in certain circumstances and not in others. Our current historical epoch is one in which the unitary subject has been effectively eroded by economic and ideological factors. The truly interesting question is whether the unitary subject *should* exist: (eh? ) is it a politcally repressive phenomenon, as Judith Butler and other postmodernists hold, or is it the bastion of freedom and liberty, as the Enlightenment tradition suggests? But your attempt to decide the issue without reference to wider factors is futile and doomed to failure.

I dont understand what you're sayng - less highbrow please with some concrete examples. explain it to us...or at least to me!

 

[Jonti]

By "enduring self" I meant only that one may seem to be continuous through time, but a little reflection dispels the notion. One is not present to oneself in a coma. One's consciousness *can* cease to exist, and then be restored. It happens every night.

It is just a fact that one (in the sense of one's conscious self) blinks in and out of existence, and we think nothing much of that. One cannot step into the same river twice, but there is still the river.

 

[Jonti]

I dont understand what you're sayng - less highbrow please with some concrete examples. explain it to us...or at least to me!

The poster you're addressing is not remotely highbrow, merely obscure.

I am not sure he understands the discussion. At any rate, his contribution is a diversion, for we may be confident that the natural meaning of consciousness is not affected by the particulars of human history.

I ignore him myself.

 

[ska invita]

By "enduring self" I meant only that one may seem to be continuous through time, but a little reflection dispels the notion. One is not present to oneself in a coma. One's consciousness *can* cease to exist, and then be restored. It happens every night.

It is just a fact that we blink in and out of existence, and think nothing much of that. One cannot step into the same river twice, but there is still the river.

Yep, I dont have a problem with that - that is the nature of our conscious mind - it can switch off or be distracted or it can work at an incredible rate with fantastic consequences.

I dont feel that this threatens my enduring sense of self or ego - Im happy with the fact that I will not endure forever, or may fall ill and become a zombie, with a nervous system but failed conscious mind - so be it. But I would still shy away from using words like illusion.

If the human body is a machine that can create consciousness one way or another that consciousness is real, no matter what process is required to achieve that goal, and no matter if consciousness is intermitent and relies on memory for continuity - it does not mean that the enduring self is an illusion, it jsut means that when the frontal conscious bit dissapears other bits take over - or not in the case of a coma, perhaps (not sure what happens in a coma).

Phazing in and out of consciousness is all part and parcel of the self - it is sometimes a good and necessary experience to better understand your self. It certainly gets you in touch with your mortality (as your poet quote suggests). In fact for me this kind of experience reaffirms my sense of enduring self! Geting knocked out and forgetting yourself completely, the nreawakening is like being born again - then as your memories flood back you reaffirm your self, and almost meet yourself as a new experience.

I recognise how fragile and temporary that self is in the grand scheme of things, but it endures with its creaky front consciousness, eratic subconscious and catalogues of memory nonetheless.

I wonder how much "ego" is getting in the way of this conversation - do different results apply to Man A with a huge ego than to Woman B who has transcended and killed her ego? How are their conscious experiences different? What is the enduring self like for someone who can claim to have no, or little, ego?

Perhaps this is what Blackmore is referring to, or muddling up, namely the illusion of the ego?

...right, time to get some very unconscious sleep!

 

[ska invita]

But no, one does not remain conscious throughout the period of sleep.

Just remembered a little anecdote - A friend lives near heathrow under the flightpath - at 5am the planes start coming in and making a lot of noise - his little daughter sleeps through the noise, no problem - but when he tries to tiptoe into the room she wakes up, having sensed him. By what part of her mind has she sensed him with, considering that she is asleep?

Im sure you could think of other parallel sleeping examples, where your awareness is working and will wake youdespite seeming not conscious of the event.

I wonder how you imagine the subconscious and conscious mind to fit together - I picture it a bit like a watery puddle with oil in it - the oil holds together but swims around in the other liquid, and vice versa, the oil being say the subconscious and the water consciousess - they are an integrated whole in my mind, and at different times one or the other is at the forefront to different degrees.

So much of what has been said is about what happens when consciousness isnt being percieved - if the conscious/subconscious mind is a fluid whole as i imagine, then rather than being illusory and unenduring this time of non-perceptible conscoiusness is jsut a time when the subconscious swims to the forefront (whatever that forefront may be in reductionist, materilaist terms!)

 

[phildwyer]

I dont understand what you're sayng - less highbrow please with some concrete examples. explain it to us...or at least to me!

OK. The human self (or "subject") is not a static entity. It changes with history, culture and circumstance. The literature and philosophy of the past, and of other cultures, tell us that the "self" was a very different thing for a slave in ancient Athens than it was for a peasant in thirteenth-century England or than it is for a present-day Bushman of the Kalahari.

Jonti's attempt to decide whether the self "exists" or not fails to take account of this fact, since it remains mired in an ahistorical, scientisitic methodology which cannot usefully be applied to human beings.

The modern, Western self is the product of two eighteenth-century movements of thought: Enlightenment and Romanticism. Some people (known as "postmodernists") think this kind of self is repressive, because among many other reasons, it privileges "male" traits such as reason over "female" ones such as emotion. Other people think it is good, because among many other reasons, it provides the standard for universal human rights.

This, rather than the ahistorical issue of whether the self "exists," seems to me the truly interesting question: *should* it exist, in its "modern" form, or should we embrace the new forms of selfhood that postmodernity seems to be constructing? Is that clearer?

 

[Jonti]

...Just found this -a 2 part interview/argument between Blackmore and Chalmers (havent read it yet)
Part 1
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/mind/stories/s1183559.htm
Part 2
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/mind/stories/s1184056.htm

From Part 2 ...

Paul Davies: This is where you’ve got to make this distinction between you know the easy problem and the hard problem because it seems to me, I can understand that there are very good evolutionary reasons why responding in the appropriate way to a complicated set of circumstances has advantage. I can also understand why language which is such an important part of our conscious experience confers survival advantage on organisms, all of that is easy to see.

What I cannot see is why possible use my experiencing the redness of red as opposed to simply responding to the red traffic lights in the appropriate way, what possible reason there can be that that is emerged in nature, it seems to have nothing to do with survivability and that’s just surplus to requirements, it’s sort of tacked on as an extra isn’t it. So I enjoy those red light experiences.

The only thing that consciousness can do that an unconscious automaton cannot, is make a choice. Conscious bodies can make choices, but mechanical (and electro-mechanical) devices cannot; they can only react to a situation. Conscious bodies, because they are able to add information to their situation, are able not just to react, but to make a novel response.

That gives them a larger space of potential behaviours than unconscious automatons -- thus the survival advantage.

 

[snorbury]

it's no choice it's did it or diddernotta do it

everytime watch out

 

[ska invita]

Additional backing for the "consciousness al the way down" model has come from the rather stiff Royal Institution of Great Britain, by way of its director and neuroscientist Baroness Susan Greenfield.
http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/news/ar...sciousness_a_headache_on_a_dimmer_switch.html

Greenfield doesnt seem to go as far as Wilber or Lipton, and stops at consciousness being present at anything with a nervous system, but I wonder if she would dare point to what is exactly the first/lowest point at which consciousness can be found?

Certainly a single cell amoeba could be said to have a nervous system.

Maybe someone who knows about these things could suggest what this smallest unit could be that could be said to have a nervous system?

 

[Jonti]

Biology-online.org defines nervous system as ...

The entire integrated system of nerve tissue in the body: the brain, brainstem, spinal cord, nerves and ganglia. The sensory and control apparatus consisting of a network of nerve cells.

So, no, an amoeba would not be said to have a nervous system. Only certain types of multicellular animals have a nervous system, in the biological meaning of the term.

But of course, given our present state of knowledge, we can only infer consciousness from an organism's behaviour. Until we understand how consciousness arises, it is, strictly speaking, premature to assert or deny its existence depending on a body's physical structure. That's precisely the problem we are trying to solve

In part, we recognise life-like behaviour by its intentionality, and intentional behaviours can certainly seem conscious. But we also know it is fairly easy for automata to display intentionality and other life-like behaviours. What automata cannot do is transcend thier programming -- they cannot choose. To be able to choose means that one is able to create (not merely derive one's responses from antecedent conditions, but able genuinely to innovate) into the future. And, for the exercise of choice, consciousness is a sine qua non.

Existentially, we may say that the past is fixed, and the future flows from the past. And yet, we can change our feelings about the past, and our attitude towards past events. We can see things in a new way, perhaps as a result of a realisation, or by learning something new about the past events. Then as a result of this new stance to past events, our reactions in the present will also be modified.

Nervous tisue is clearly implicated in this generation of novelty. But we can still ask what it is about the structure of nervous tisues that allows for the creation of the new. Perhaps the trick depends on some common feature of cellular architecture and construction, and nerve cells are adapted especially to integrate and systematise the sentience that accompanies the creation of the new.

In this view, the smallest unit would be the smallest system that is able to create new information. Why should nervous cells be unique among eukaryotic cells in their ability to do this? It seems at least plausible that they are merely(!) specialised adaptations to make the most of an ability potentially present in all eukaryotes, by virtue of their cellular architecture and construction.

This is not to assert that a mushroom enjoys any kind of integrated and structured consciousness -- that there is something it is like to be a mushroom! Far from it, for a mushroom lacks the specialised tissues necessary for the integration of the myriad of the tiniest sparks of consciousness (each accompanying the creation of a single bit of new information in its cells) into a sensorium of any sort.

 

[ska invita]

Biology-online.org defines nervous system as ... So, no, an amoeba would not be said to have a nervous system.

But of course, given our present state of knowledge, we can only infer consciousness from an organism's behaviour. Until we understand how consciousness arises, it is, strictly speaking, premature to assert or deny its existence depending on a body's physical structure. That's precisely the problem we are trying to solve

True true. ITs a slippery slope using physical structure. But I think it is true that all nervous system beings have sentience, or a dim consciousness.

Recognising where consciousness is to be found is an important and relevant activity though, and shouldnt be dismissed out of hand - it amy well be the only way for science to understand how consciousness first arises. At what point in evolution does this happen?

Again I point to Lipton's work, where he recognises that amoeba at least "possess the cytological equivalents of a digestive system, an excretory system, a respiratory system, a musculoskeletal system, an immune system, a reproductive system and a cardiovascular system, among others" http://www.brucelipton.com/article/insight-into-cellular-consciousness

...whether they have a nervous system or "brain" is debatable - Lipton would certainly recognise them as having a brain of sorts (see the link, and how cells control themselves).

I get the feeling that this admission by Baroness Greenfield will be the thin end of the wedge - she has dared to say (although not specifically) where the lowest form of consciousness is to be found , in which case you can then take a step down the ladder (yes I know its not an evolutionary ladder) and work out the point in evolution where consciousness begins. -

I have a hunch you will find that that point is all but impossible to identify, and there will be a slip lower and lower back as scientific research goes on.

At first sight this says nothing about the hard problem, but if consciousness can be deemed to go all the way down this does have significant consequences for how we begin to approach the hard problem.

**It wasnt that long ago that I heard scientists say for certain that dogs where automatons and human care for dogs was anthropomorphism gone mad...

 

[Jonti]

**It wasnt that long ago that I heard scientists say for certain that dogs where automatons and human care for dogs was anthropomorphism gone mad...

Woof!

 

[Jonti]

My answer to the question "At what point in evolution does this (consciousness) happen?" is, when bodies started to act, rather than merely react. The possession of a larger potential behaviour space would seem to confer such an evolutionary advantage (particularly in competition with similar but entirely reactive organisms) that I would expect it very early in the evolution of life.

Also, evolution implies that random variation plus selection can create new information. The evolution of new species brings new information -- the information coded in the genotype -- into the world. If, as I conjecture, the creation of information is accompanied by sentience (the smallest spark of sentience being associated with the creation of a single bit of information)*, then indeed one is obliged to say that evolution itself creates sentience.

That's not to say there is anything it is like to be evolution, no more than there is anything it is like to be a mushroom. There's no hint of any process by which the smallest sparks of sentience, could cohere into an organised whole, a sensorium.

This idea of the smallest spark of sentience seems to map quite nicely onto MacLennan's protophenomena, with my conjecture answering Chalmer's point (a) in the quote below from Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness

I think MacLennan's idea of "protophenomena" (or "phenomenisca") as basic elements of consciousness is particularly interesting, and promises considerable rewards if it can be further developed. For a precise theory, I think we will need an account of (a) precisely when a protophenomenon is associated with a physical process, (b) what sort of protophenomena will be associated, depending on the characteristics of the physical process, and (c) the principles by which protophenomena combine into a unified conscious experience.

* remember you read it here first, folks

 

[bluestreak]

i guess the biggest question really has to be, what difference does it make?

 

[Jonti]

It's only science stuff, but I like it

 

[ska invita]

My answer to the question "At what point in evolution does this (consciousness) happen?" is, when bodies started to act, rather than merely react. The possession of a larger potential behaviour space would seem to confer such an evolutionary advantage (particularly in competition with similar but entirely reactive organisms) that I would expect it very early in the evolution of life.

THere is a problem here in defining what is action and reaction - as I mentioned I heard a scientist a couple of years back absolutely convinced that a dog was an automatoc, incapable of action, only reaction. Im sure other vivesiectionists feel the same way.

If consciousness can be scaled down to a minutia then how can it be recognised?

Another interesting question arises with plant life - a long way down the evolutioanary chain, creatinaly capable of reaction to stimulus. Is there any possibility of "dim" consciousness being present? Consciousness certainly doesnt require awareness of self to exist in a sentient state...the question is, is sentience a very dim form of consciousness?

Also, evolution implies that random variation plus selection can create new information. The evolution of new species brings new information -- the information coded in the genotype -- into the world. If, as I conjecture, the creation of information is accompanied by sentience (the smallest spark of sentience being associated with the creation of a single bit of information)*, then indeed one is obliged to say that evolution itself creates sentience.

sentience certainly grows with evolutionary complexity. If "the smallest spark of sentience [can be] associated with the creation of a single bit of information" - does that meant that any living thing that has been through a process of evolutionary adaptation is sentient?

 

[Jonti]

Ahh, no, just that sentience, qua elemental "I-ness" will likely occur very early in the evolution of life.

I was trying to get at the idea that if we can pin down precisely when a protophenomenon ("smallest spark of sentience") is associated with a physical process, then we may well find there's a lot of it about, albeit not as unified conscious experience.

I'm using sentience to mean unreflective consciousness, the sort that is not aware of itself, as when one is absorbed in one's actions or thought. Conscious awareness is sentience reflected back on itself. So yes, perhaps there's lots of the tiniest glimmerings of "I-ness", elementary unreflective sentience, happening in plant cells. Perhaps. It all depends on what physical process in associated with protophenomena.

 

[Mation]

i guess the biggest question really has to be, what difference does it make?

No difference at all, I don't think. Those of us who think and feel we are conscious will continue to think so (ketamine etc aside). Obviously.

I've never really understood the 'hard problem' - that there's some sort of explanatory gap between the workings of the brain and a feeling of subjective experience.

That's just what happens when this sort of brain functions, isn't it?

I am interested in how the brain functions and realise that there's much to be understood, I just don't get what other sort of investigation might explain qualia.

 

[118118]

That's just what happens when this sort of brain functions, isn't it?

Thats not a very good explanation though. Cos by the same reasoning I could just say the earth goes round the sun becase it just does. If there is a point where empiricism/naturalism whatever has to stop, not through lethargy but because it can't explain whatever state of affairs then everything is not natural.

Its not just about, as far as I know, naturalizing how the neural state correlates with an itch but about naturalizing states of consciousness - maybe this is the same thing. Eta: I mean, I think that you would be unable to study the mind, ethically at _least, without a phenomenology.

 

[8ball]

You're all automatons - you're just designed to say you're conscious.

 

[Jonti]

To whom?