These two statements seem to contradict each other.
Not at all. The CPS don't say that there was no reason to use
any force - they say that the force used was unlawful - that may be on the basis that there was no lawful reason to use any force at all but I suspect that it was on the basis that it was excessive.
And what possible reason did they have for using some force? The bloke was walking down the street not doing anything.
If that's all he was doing, probably none. But if he, or any other protestors / people around him, were resisting the police's lawful attempts to move them down the street then some use of force to "hurry" them along would be justifiable and is
frequently used. Even if there was very little resistance then some force to turn him around or to propel him along in front of the police line would be justifiable as it is simply impracticable for there to be a debate with every individual person encountered by the police line to explain everything that is going on and try and persuade them to comply with the police request to go in a particular direction - the operation would simply grind to a halt and fall apart.
Also why didn't the CPS prosecute on common assault before the 6 month time limit and then go for a more serious charge if the investigation warranted it? Surely prosecuting on common assault wouldn't mean that more serious charges couldn't be brought?
Arguably it would - there is a principle called
autrefois convict (or
autrefois acquit) which means that if you are charged with something you have previously been convicted of (or acquitted of) the case will be thrown out and, so far as I am aware, that would apply in a case where a lesser charge based on exactly the same facts (i.e. the same use of force) had happened. It would be interesting to know whether or not they actually considered what to do at the six month stage (as opposed to realising they had missed it when finally realising they had no more serious charges likely to succeed).
Lastly you aren't a medical expert of any kind whatsoever yet you seem quite comfortable in stating that the views of the second two pathologists fundamentally depended on the findings of the first pathologist. Why are you so confident in that assertion? The second and third pathologist seem certain about their judgments.
I am a senior investigating officer and I understand how to put together and interpret evidence. I have experienced dozens of post-mortems and the various issues arising in cases where there are multiple post-mortems. The statement of the CPS (to the effect that the subsequent PMs were reliant on observations made in the first one) is absolutely consistent with all my experience. You only get to open a body up once. You only get to see the contents of the abdomen once. Bodies degenerate after death (despite refrigeration) and some aspects go quite quickly and so you only get one chance to see them. In this case, where abdominal bleeding is the postulated cause of death by the second and third pathologist, the exact nature of the three litres of fluid found in the first PM in the abdomen is of crucial importance. There was no sample and all they have is Freddy Patels observation about what it was ... and apparently there is some discreancy in how he described it (i.e. whether it was blood, or just contained a bit of blood - 3l of blood would be a major issue and even Freddy would have noticed that that might be a significant factor in cause of death so I suspect that it probably
wasn't blood ... but only he knows and the subseqent findings are reliant on his observation.
Given the first pathologist could well be found to be incompetent then the CPS could have proceeded on manslaughter and ABH charges. Whether a conviction would be be made is another matter, but there must surely be enough evidence to give it a go. The CPS could, they decided not to
They could have "given it a go" ... but that is not what they have a duty to do: they have a duty to, first, decide whether there is sufficient evidence on which a conviction is
likely (i.e. something over a 50% chance) and then (and only if they decide there is sufficient evidence) to decide whether it is in the public interest to proceed (something they would not have had any problem with in this case ... but they never got beyond their first question).