Determinism, Randomness, and Free Will

[Santino]

That's pretty much the standard model these days.

What do you think it is?

I'm not sure, but it's not (just) a machine that processes propositional content. What makes us able to think rationally about explicit beliefs is based on a more basic ability to cope with the world. So much of the stuff we do, we do without having articulated thoughts that could be explicitly spelled out.

 

[kabbes]

Indeed, we're far more of an emotion processor than a logic processor. Most of our activity is, like all animals, created by pretty automated reactions to emotional states that are created by environmental context. We have the capacity to filter those emotional states through our cognition, but this is not actually necessary and frequently doesn't happen.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Indeed, we're far more of an emotion processor than a logic processor. Most of our activity is, like all animals, created by pretty automated reactions to emotional states that are created by environmental context. We have the capacity to filter those emotional states through our cognition, but this is not actually necessary and frequently doesn't happen.

Yes, and then we make up after-the-fact stories about what we did and why we did it, and indeed what 'we' are. Those stories often don't make a huge amount of sense when analysed too closely.

 

[8ball]

This article: Is Neuroscience a Bigger Threat than Artificial Intelligence? - suggests that modern neuroscience proves that we are not really conscious.

Kinda reminds me of this.

 

[8ball]

Indeed, we're far more of an emotion processor than a logic processor. Most of our activity is, like all animals, created by pretty automated reactions to emotional states that are created by environmental context. We have the capacity to filter those emotional states through our cognition, but this is not actually necessary and frequently doesn't happen.

Let's give it 200 years and see what your thoughts are on the "necessary" bit.

 

[cheesethief]

Theists often claim the opposite: that free will is only possible if there is an omnipotent being to bestow it upon us. It is only such a supernatural entity that can insert a break in the casual chain of effects that would otherwise compel our conduct and thoughts.

If one rejects both libertarian free will and compatiblism then I think one has to accept this conditional form of the theist argument is right but of course one can simply conclude from it that there is no free will because there is no such supernatural entity.

If God bestows free will (thanks G, btw), then she gives us the ability to make decisions that she cannot predict. A God that doesn't know the future is a pretty low budget deity. Imagine asking her: "Are you the one true God?" She says: "Deffo". You say: "What about this time next week?". She says: "Erm, hopefully, I guess..."

 

[TruXta]

If God bestows free will (thanks G, btw), then she gives us the ability to make decisions that she cannot predict. A God that doesn't know the future is a pretty low budget deity. Imagine asking her: "Are you the one true God?" She says: "Deffo". You say: "What about this time next week?". She says: "Erm, hopefully, I guess..."

I think you are missing the point here. An omnipotent god can do whatever the hell they want.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

I think you are missing the point here. An omnipotent god can do whatever the hell they want.

True, but an *all knowing* god has to know all past, present and future events. The question then becomes whether free will is compatible with a universe in which all outcomes are known in advance, and always were known.

 

[butchersapron]

True, but an *all knowing* god has to know all past, present and future events. The question then becomes whether free will is compatible with a universe in which all outcomes are known in advance, and always were known.

Do they?

This is the same line as if you can imagine a god then they must exist as existence is a required attribute of any god that you can think about. Having to be perfect and that.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

Do they?

Omniscience means the state of knowing everything and future events are part of everything so, on the face of it at least, the answer seems to be 'yes'.

 

[kabbes]

Omniscience means the state of knowing everything and future events are part of everything so, on the face of it at least, the answer seems to be 'yes'.

One of the number of ways the apparent contradiction can be solved by having a multiverse in which you both do and do not do the thing.

 

[butchersapron]

Omniscience means the state of knowing everything and future events are part of everything so, on the face of it at least, the answer seems to be 'yes'.

But omniscience is your idea of what a god would entail.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

True, but an *all knowing* god has to know all past, present and future events. The question then becomes whether free will is compatible with a universe in which all outcomes are known in advance, and always were known.

Here we can get stuck within our own fuzzy concepts. Time is one of the biggies - it helps us to make sense of things, but it is created by us for that purpose. Can a mind exist without time would perhaps be the question. Given that our minds are dependent upon physical processes that need to be ordered by time to have the necessary structure, the answer could well be 'no'.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

One of the number of ways the apparent contradiction can be solved by having a multiverse in which you both do and do not do the thing.

Doesn't that just push the problem back rather than solve it? God would stand above all the multiverses and know the outcomes of all of them if (s)he was truly omniscient, no?

But omniscience is your idea of what a god would entail.

Not my idea but a commonly held one by many theists. Sure a different conception of god is possible in which (s)he is not omniscient and such a conception would not run into the apparent tension identified by cheesethief.

 

[NoXion]

Do they?

This is the same line as if you can imagine a god then they must exist as existence is a required attribute of any god that you can think about. Having to be perfect and that.

But nobody's trying to define God into existence here. If you think omniscience is itself not a coherent attribute for even a hypothetical entity to have, then I'd be interested to hear your reasoning.

But omniscience is your idea of what a god would entail.

I imagine that most believers, if they were asked, would credit their deities with omniscience. Am I wrong?

 

[kabbes]

Doesn't that just push the problem back rather than solve it? God would stand above all the multiverses and know the outcomes of all of them if (s)he was truly omniscient, no?

Yes, how is that a problem? In each universe within the multiverse, the residents have free will. And in each of them, God knows what will happen, because God observes all the universes at once.

 

[butchersapron]

But nobody's trying to define God into existence here. If you think omniscience is itself not a coherent attribute for even a hypothetical entity to have, then I'd be interested to hear your reasoning.



I imagine that most believers, if they were asked, would credit their deities with omniscience. Am I wrong?

I'm sure they 100% would. That's my point. That's how a human would define a god.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Yes, how is that a problem? In each universe within the multiverse, the residents have free will. And in each of them, God knows what will happen, because God observes all the universes at once.

'Everything that can happen happens'

And how could it not?

On the one hand, that feels like a cop-out. On the other hand, it does solve a few knotty problems.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

'Everything that can happen happens'

And how could it not?

On the one hand, that feels like a cop-out. On the other hand, it does solve a few knotty problems.

I wonder if it does solve the free will problem though. If everything that can happen does happen does that not just reduce every actor in each multiverse to a mere script follower after all?

 

[kabbes]

I wonder if it does solve the free will problem though. If everything that can happen does happen does that not just reduce every actor in each multiverse to a mere script follower after all?

No, they each choose their own way. With a suitably large infinity of universes, everything that can play out still does because that’s what a suitably large infinity actually means.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I wonder if it does solve the free will problem though. If everything that can happen does happen does that not just reduce every actor in each multiverse to a mere script follower after all?

I don't think there is a free will problem. I think the problem disappears when you realise that its fault lies not in the possible answers but in the question - namely you haven't defined 'free will' adequately so the question is meaningless. Same kinds of problems arise with questions to do with infinity.

 

[TruXta]

I don't think there is a free will problem. I think the problem disappears when you realise that its fault lies not in the possible answers but in the question - namely you haven't defined 'free will' adequately so the question is meaningless. Same kinds of problems arise with questions to do with infinity.

My infinite is bigger than yours

 

[Jeff Robinson]

No, they each choose their own way. With a suitably large infinity of universes, everything that can play out still does because that’s what a suitably large infinity actually means.

But I take it that each multiverse has to be in one way distinct from all the others? If that's the case then in each one there is only one vacancy for choice (1) at time (1) under circumstance (1). If that's the case then individuals in the other multiverses cannot do the same - each is merely filling the vacancy that is required of them for all possible outcomes to occur.

 

[8ball]

I don't think there is a free will problem. I think the problem disappears when you realise that its fault lies not in the possible answers but in the question - namely you haven't defined 'free will' adequately so the question is meaningless. Same kinds of problems arise with questions to do with infinity.

Ah, the "blaming the question" gambit.

 

[Jeff Robinson]

I don't think there is a free will problem.

I was referring to the much narrower point concerning omniscience and free will.

 

[kabbes]

But I take it that each multiverse has to be in one way distinct from all the others? If that's the case then in each one there is only one vacancy for choice (1) at time (1) under circumstance (1). If that's the case then individuals in the other multiverses cannot do the same - each is merely filling the vacancy that is required of them for all possible outcomes to occur.

I think you should check into Hilbert’s hotel and have a rethink.

 

[Santino]

But I take it that each multiverse has to be in one way distinct from all the others? If that's the case then in each one there is only one vacancy for choice (1) at time (1) under circumstance (1). If that's the case then individuals in the other multiverses cannot do the same - each is merely filling the vacancy that is required of them for all possible outcomes to occur.

There could be infinite identical universes, and still be room enough for all the other universes that are different.

 

[8ball]

True, but an *all knowing* god has to know all past, present and future events. The question then becomes whether free will is compatible with a universe in which all outcomes are known in advance, and always were known.

No it doesn't. If God knew all events on a single timeline in this simple kind of way, He would either be impotent, or his interventions (if any) also inevitable. In any case, whether interventionist or not, He would just be the puppet of another Master.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Ah, the "blaming the question" gambit.

Well I was serious at the start of this when I asked for a definition of free will. I still haven't seen one.

 

[8ball]

Well I was serious at the start of this when I asked for a definition of free will. I still haven't seen one.

Well, it's too late now.