Alain Badiou

[Knotted]

If Alain Badiou is really saying maths is ontology then I wish he would take the maths more seriously. "There exists an infinite and open set of laws and experiments."

The problem with statements like that is that they are using highly formal language in a highly informal manner. Firstly - what is the criteria for inclusion in the set of experiments? Secondly if we are talking about an open set we have to have metric on that set, how is this defined? What is the distance from one experiment/law to another?

This is metaphorical language or it is nothing.

 

[Knotted]

On that line of thought, many biologists regard evolution as a creative process, one that brings new information into play. It's no exaggeration to say they find the claim by (some? most?) physicists that all the information in the world already existed from the get go, and will never be supplemented by events, as riscible.

There is no contradiction here. If an organism/species of organisms were a closed system then there would be a contradiction. To be a closed system would mean that there would be no photosynthesis or respiration, there would be no energy or matter from the surroundings there would be no consumption of anything. There are no lifeforms which do not consume anything.

 

[Jonti]

The thesis that I support does not in any way declare that being is mathematical, which is to say composed of mathematical objectivities. It is not a thesis about the world but about discourse. It affirms that mathematics, throughout the entirety of its historical becoming, pronounces what is expressible of being qua being.

In other words, it is not some platonic idea of number or whatever that provides the bedrock ontology. Instead, math is considered ontologically primary because it expresses every possible form that reality could adopt (I think).

9. Badiou’s equation of mathematics and ontology does designate the former as the sole discourse about being. However, mathematics does not describe being. His view — an initially surprising one, but the only one befitting a materialist philosophy — is rather that mathematics is the literal inscription of being. it refers to nothing other than itself, it embodies nothing, it reveals nothing. The simple marks themselves are the sole reality of mathematical discourse.

both quotes from Jon Roffe's review of Being and Event

 

[Jonti]

There is no contradiction here. If an organism/species of organisms were a closed system then there would be a contradiction. To be a closed system would mean that there would be no photosynthesis or respiration, there would be no energy or matter from the surroundings there would be no consumption of anything. There are no lifeforms which do not consume anything.

I don't think anyone has suggested that organisms are "closed systems"

Perhaps you are trying to save the hypothesis of strict determinism that "there is nothing new under the sun". That's a view that Badiou seems to reject. I only observed that biological scientists in particular would find it easy to agree with Badiou's view of the world as being in some sense open-ended.

 

[Knotted]

In other words, it is not some platonic idea of number or whatever that provides the bedrock ontology. Instead, math is considered ontologically primary because it expresses every possible form that reality could adopt (I think).

OK, fair enough then.

 

[Knotted]

I don't think anyone has suggested that organisms are "closed systems"

But has anybody ever said that information can never be created in an open system?

You can "create" a ball in a box by putting the ball in the box. Considering only the cotents of the box and neglecting the environment of the box then this is exactly what happens.

 

[Knotted]

My position on determinism is that it is incoherent because indeterminism is incoherent. If something occurs randomly, this means that we don't fully understand it. To give this randomness an ontological status makes no sense. Therefore it makes no sense to talk about determinism - the negation of nonsense is nonsense.

 

[kopelgep]

In other words, it is not some platonic idea of number or whatever that provides the bedrock ontology. Instead, math is considered ontologically primary because it expresses every possible form that reality could adopt (I think).
both quotes from Jon Roffe's review of Being and Event

To clarify: Maths=ontology because it the discourse which most closely enables us to say that something is without recourse to saying what it is. But this does not mean that maths=being, that being is mathematical or numerical (we are not made out of numbers). Merely that the discourse (the theory) which enables us to discuss being is mathematical in form.

Badiou isn't interested in anything outside of a very very narrow purview of sequences. What is interesting is when you take the rare idea of the event and place it as the motor of history, or change indeed, itself. This is what his pupil Meillassoux is doing, to create a theory of "time without becoming". The event is now a micro-rupture, and is everywhere.

The mathematics gives Badiou his description of ontology. But in terms of say, the sequence which follows an event (which is not ontologically grounded- it cannot be) here it is aleatory processes which dominate. There is nothing which determines the order of enquiries which a subject makes between elements of a situation and the name of the event. This is why he allows a radical freedom to the subject.

But Jonti you are correct his Subject is not a consciousness in any way shape or form, nor does he pretend it is. On the matter of consciousness the work of Thomas Metzinger is currently extremely interesting (my next book to read is his Being No-one). Metzinger's claim is that "no-one ever was or had a self" and that really consciousness generates a sequence of self-models.

 

[Jonti]

My position on determinism is that it is incoherent because indeterminism is incoherent. If something occurs randomly, this means that we don't fully understand it. To give this randomness an ontological status makes no sense. Therefore it makes no sense to talk about determinism - the negation of nonsense is nonsense.
emphasis added by Jonti

Well, I suppose that depends what one means by "understand".

Plenty of people would agree that we don't really "understand" the strange theory of light and matter (meaning quantum electrodynamics "QED"). All the same, the scientific theory that we use to predict phenemona and make gadgets is one of the most stupendously accurate and successful scientific theories of all time. Point being that QED does encompass random events.

Sure, people can argue that there may be a better theory that shows these apparently random events to be the determinate outcome of a deeper reality. But that theory, if it exists, is not yet to hand in a form that commands a broad consensus.

As a general rule, I don't think it's really legitimate for philosophy to legislate for science. Lofty declarations like "the same conditions always produce the same result" (which is, I guess, equivalent to denying that anything truly random ever happens) are essentially philosophical. We really do need to see if that is actually true in the real world. And, as far as we can tell right now, it is the case that we can set up simple experiments in which the same conditions do not always produce the same result.

Science continues regardless!

Badiou's philosophy embraces this kind of "rupture" with the past, making it an indispensable part of his world-view. I think that is legitimate. For one, the indeterminacy of the future with respect to the past is quite consistent with current QED. So it's certainly respectable, scientifically speaking, to take this view. And secondly, regardless of the source of the uncertainty (whether it is a necessary feature of the kind of world we live in, or is contingent on our relative ignorance), practical realities mean that that is how the world will necessarily sometimes appear to beings like ourselves.

 

[Jonti]

But has anybody ever said that information can never be created in an open system?

You can "create" a ball in a box by putting the ball in the box. Considering only the cotents of the box and neglecting the environment of the box then this is exactly what happens.

This is possibly a sematic quibble. The ball can be transferred to the box, and information transmitted from one place to another. Neither of these would constitute an "event" or rupture with the past in Badiou's terms. For something like Badious's "event" to occur genuinely new information would need to come into play.

 

[revol68]

Just saw this, I've only read his Ethics and I didn't sayhe was shite, I said it was good but yes his idea of the 'event' as a total rupture from the everyday reeks of Maoist shit.

 

[Knotted]

Well, I suppose that depends what one means by "understand".

It has to be something meaningful to us. It needs to connect or unify different concepts. For example Einstein's famous equation E=mc^2 unifies energy and matter. This is incredibly insightful. General relativity made novel predictions, it didn't just describe existing data or just make predictions similar to previous experiments.

Plenty of people would agree that we don't really "understand" the strange theory of light and matter (meaning quantum electrodynamics "QED"). All the same, the scientific theory that we use to predict phenemona and make gadgets is one of the most stupendously accurate and successful scientific theories of all time. Point being that QED does encompass random events.

Newtonian mechanics is stupendously accuate and useful etc. But its also wrong.

Sure, people can argue that there may be a better theory that shows these apparently random events to be the determinate outcome of a deeper reality. But that theory, if it exists, is not yet to hand in a form that commands a broad consensus.

The point is not that a better theory will describe similar things with greater accuracy, a better theory will unexpectadly describe other apparently unrelated phenomenon. The randomness is merely an indication that we don't quite know what's going on - although really its quite explicitly accepted that we don't know what's going on in quantum thoery of any stripe. The question is only whether this matters and whether the philosophical position that there is a knowable limit to what we can know is tenable.

As a general rule, I don't think it's really legitimate for philosophy to legislate for science. Lofty declarations like "the same conditions always produce the same result" (which is, I guess, equivalent to denying that anything truly random ever happens) are essentially philosophical. We really do need to see if that is actually true in the real world. And, as far as we can tell right now, it is the case that we can set up simple experiments in which the same conditions do not always produce the same result.

But in quantum mechanics we don't know what the initial conditions are, we only know what we can observe them to be. The same applies to the results. We also know that we cannot describe the process of getting from one to the other in similar terms without a hidden variables theory of some type, and hidden variable theories are usually deterministic.

Science continues regardless!

Well physics - and we really are talking about physics here not science in general - is not continuing on regardless. Its hopelessly stuck in a rut. I think jettisoning these positivistic philosophical assumptions is necessary for getting out of this rut. Other scientific fields do not adopt this sort of philosophy. Biology should be the paradigm for good scienctific philosophy, not physics IMO. Physics is the sick man of science.

Badiou's philosophy embraces this kind of "rupture" with the past, making it an indispensable part of his world-view. I think that is legitimate. For one, the indeterminacy of the future with respect to the past is quite consistent with current QED. So it's certainly respectable, scientifically speaking, to take this view. And secondly, regardless of the source of the uncertainty (whether it is a necessary feature of the kind of world we live in, or is contingent on our relative ignorance), practical realities mean that that is how the world will necessarily sometimes appear to beings like ourselves.

I'm not sure I understand what Badiou is saying, so I'll refrain from commenting. However, I obviously strongly disagree with his categorising of biology as a non-science.

 

[Knotted]

This is possibly a sematic quibble. The ball can be transferred to the box, and information transmitted from one place to another. Neither of these would constitute an "event" or rupture with the past in Badiou's terms. For something like Badious's "event" to occur genuinely new information would need to come into play.

All I'm trying to say is that when we are talking about information creation then you have to consider whether the system you are looking at is closed or open. Its fundamental. If you are talking about whether the world is full of surprises, then that's a very different question.

 

[Jonti]

In the context of Badiou's work, I think it's fair to say that change (as he thinks of it) occurs because new information comes into play. This is just because only an entirely predictable future can be mapped out from information that exists in the present moment. And things proceeding entirely predictably from present circumstances is the antithesis of Badiou's "event".

 

[kopelgep]

Jonti its not quite new information. Its the subjective ability to generate new information made possible by an event.

 

[revol68]

Jonti its not quite new information. Its the subjective ability to generate new information made possible by an event.

Surely that's just the transformation of information?

More interesting is the political implications of this radical 'event', what does that mean for class struggle, isn't it volunteerist elitist shit that raises "political" struggle above the daily struggles of the working class. Revolution becomes about fidelity to a 'truth' rather than a process of continuous struggle.

 

[kopelgep]

Surely that's just the transformation of information?

More interesting is the political implications of this radical 'event', what does that mean for class struggle, isn't it volunteerist elitist shit that raises "political" struggle above the daily struggles of the working class. Revolution becomes about fidelity to a 'truth' rather than a process of continuous struggle.

Its the creation of a new situation based on a process of essentially establishing how each element within the old stands in light of the event- so in a sense it is the transformation of old knowledges.

Its not based on negation of the negation. So it has no recourse to conventional dialectics. It isn't voluntarist as there is a big question over the role of choice here (I'm not sure if there is any ability to choose or not).

But it is far from elitist, in some senses its less elitist even than certain strains of Marxism-- it has no recourse to a party schema to activate or make consist the working classes for a start, and is egalitarian to a fault. To be political for Badiou is to be under the axiom of equality, to work towards what he terms the generic. The Event bit can be taken too far (reified even). Its not as if there is an elite party to some event and the rest are nothing. Fidelity to a truth is a formalised way of stating what often (in political terms) is identical with class struggle.

Further, its not as if we are to await some fundamental "rupture". Rather there have been events and there are processes which are unfolding in response to these. Its not that the event is elitist which is the problem, but that his theory offers so little in direct conceptual technology to tackle the immediate situation- ie the kind of theoretical understanding of the mechanisms of capitalism necessary to properly engage with it. In this regard Marx and latterly Deleuze and Guattari's models of Capitalism have much to recommend them- Its just the rest of their theories (esp D+G's) which are fatally flawed...

 

[revol68]

Well yes i'd agree the first problem is how far removed his talk of 'event' is from anything concrete, but there is clearly a residue of leninism in it, fidelity to the 'event' in contrast to the 'everyday being' comes across to me as an abstract restatement of ideological socialism versus 'trade union consciousness'.

I can see your point about fidelity to the truth being a formalised reference to class struggle but the problem is that class struggle is not some 'event', it's something that goes on everyday and constitutes 'being', whether or not one recognises this 'truth' or not. By making such a split between 'the event' and the everyday 'being' it makes class struggle primarily about fidelity to an ideal, with 'being' the equivalent of 'trade union consciousness' and the 'event' being the truth of socialism, as if they are seperate.

 

[Jonti]

All I'm trying to say is that when we are talking about information creation then you have to consider whether the system you are looking at is closed or open. Its fundamental. If you are talking about whether the world is full of surprises, then that's a very different question.

I don't think that follows. One need only(!) ask if the overall information content of the world is increased.

 

[kopelgep]

Well yes i'd agree the first problem is how far removed his talk of 'event' is from anything concrete, but there is clearly a residue of leninism in it, fidelity to the 'event' in contrast to the 'everyday being' comes across to me as an abstract restatement of ideological socialism versus 'trade union consciousness'.

I can see your point about fidelity to the truth being a formalised reference to class struggle but the problem is that class struggle is not some 'event', it's something that goes on everyday and constitutes 'being', whether or not one recognises this 'truth' or not. By making such a split between 'the event' and the everyday 'being' it makes class struggle primarily about fidelity to an ideal, with 'being' the equivalent of 'trade union consciousness' and the 'event' being the truth of socialism, as if they are seperate.

Definitely Badiou thinks politics, genuinely revolutionary struggle, is a matter of subtraction, of separation as he puts it in Metapolitics, a separation from the state of the situation (which in terms of politics is actually often the actual state itself). Its not really, for him at least, about conflict, or at least, it is a mater of subtraction, not destruction. But this may be effectuated on a daily basis, and the truth to which fidelity is given may be very simplistic (largely related to the generic nature of human beings- that everyone in France counts as French, say). Fidelity to a truth requires an event, yes, but for Badiou a truth process is not itself an event (ie- it is post-evental) and they can extend for lengthy periods of time. But like many French anti-humanists, Badiou has a problem with a straight-up analysis of class, in that for him class is a matter of the situation, which needs to be broken down.

In separating out trades unionism from revolution, I think he is right-- for a start trades unionism actually assists the overarching functions of capitalism (almost undeniably so). Whilst in micro terms it might oppose a certain given company's desires (to extract maximum value from its workers say), on a macro scale it operates as a negotiating function, enabling capitalism to assuage and ameliorate conditions, whilst always ultimately maintaining an alienating regime. But this is where other thinkers are more useful- all Badiou can say of the matter is that trade unions are a function of the situation.

 

[revol68]

Definitely Badiou thinks politics, genuinely revolutionary struggle, is a matter of subtraction, of separation as he puts it in Metapolitics, a separation from the state of the situation (which in terms of politics is actually often the actual state itself). Its not really, for him at least, about conflict, or at least, it is a mater of subtraction, not destruction. But this may be effectuated on a daily basis, and the truth to which fidelity is given may be very simplistic (largely related to the generic nature of human beings- that everyone in France counts as French, say). Fidelity to a truth requires an event, yes, but for Badiou a truth process is not itself an event (ie- it is post-evental) and they can extend for lengthy periods of time. But like many French anti-humanists, Badiou has a problem with a straight-up analysis of class, in that for him class is a matter of the situation, which needs to be broken down.

In separating out trades unionism from revolution, I think he is right-- for a start trades unionism actually assists the overarching functions of capitalism (almost undeniably so). Whilst in micro terms it might oppose a certain given company's desires (to extract maximum value from its workers say), on a macro scale it operates as a negotiating function, enabling capitalism to assuage and ameliorate conditions, whilst always ultimately maintaining an alienating regime. But this is where other thinkers are more useful- all Badiou can say of the matter is that trade unions are a function of the situation.

It's not just french anti humanists like Badiou or say Foucault who understand class as a matter of situation rather than essence, it can be found in any decent reading of Marx.

You've entirely misunderstood my point about 'trade union consciousness', it's not that I think 'trade union consciousness' is revolutionary, by befault it isn't. Trade Union Consciousness was Lenin's term for the level of consciousness that the working class could arrive at through their everyday struggles, he opposed it to actual socialist ideology that was the product of intellectuals. Lenin was saying that day to day struggles couldn't move beyond this level or produce a socialist consciousness, that it required an outside truth, a socialist political ideology seperate from the day to day struggles, rather like an event entirely distinct from being.

 

[kopelgep]

It's not just french anti humanists like Badiou or say Foucault who understand class as a matter of situation rather than essence, it can be found in any decent reading of Marx.

You've entirely misunderstood my point about 'trade union consciousness', it's not that I think 'trade union consciousness' is revolutionary, by befault it isn't. Trade Union Consciousness was Lenin's term for the level of consciousness that the working class could arrive at through their everyday struggles, he opposed it to actual socialist ideology that was the product of intellectuals. Lenin was saying that day to day struggles couldn't move beyond this level or produce a socialist consciousness, that it required an outside truth, a socialist political ideology seperate from the day to day struggles, rather like an event entirely distinct from being.

Ah thank you, yes that makes sense. And of course for Marx class is a matter of situation, of historical contingency not essence. But Badiou goes a bit further I think in denying any kind of Hegelian/Marxist dialectical relation in class struggle.

But I take it you would have a problem with Lenin's trades union consciousness/ socialist ideology split also then? Presumably you see them as inseparable? My issue would be that it assumes some kind of inert working class, who have to be forced into action/enlightenment etc by the Party. This kind of thing that Merleau-Ponty lambasted Sartre for believing in the early 50s.

 

[kopelgep]

double post.

 

[revol68]

But I take it you would have a problem with Lenin's trades union consciousness/ socialist ideology split also then? Presumably you see them as inseparable? My issue would be that it assumes some kind of inert working class, who have to be forced into action/enlightenment etc by the Party. This kind of thing that Merleau-Ponty lambasted Sartre for believing in the early 50s.

The split necessitates the Party working on an inert working class who's role is to essentially provide the brawn, whilst the Party the brains, one follows from the other.

I think Badiou's split between the 'being' of everyday life and the 'event' recreates this leninist split albeit on a much more abstract plane.

 

[revol68]

I think in denying any kind of Hegelian/Marxist dialectical relation in class struggle

I'm really not sure what this means, it seems to make dialectics some sort of thing in itself rather than a relationship between things? What specific relations are not dialectical?

I think the distinct split between being and event is non dialectical but that's a failing in my view and requires some mysterious outside force, a dialectical approach makes much more sense, as the rupture is a possibility within 'being'.

 

[kopelgep]

I'm really not sure what this means, it seems to make dialectics some sort of thing in itself rather than a relationship between things? What specific relations are not dialectical?

I think the distinct split between being and event is non dialectical but that's a failing in my view and requires some mysterious outside force, a dialectical approach makes much more sense, as the rupture is a possibility within 'being'.

Relation isn't intrinsically dialectical though, is it? By which I mean that whilst it can be thought as such, it can and has been thought otherwise. Not everyone is a Hegelian are they? B's notion of being is non-relational though, it has to be as it is grounded in set theory, and set theory in and of itself doesn't give any structure to the things which are counted within a given set. He puts relation on the side not of being, but of appearing, of "being there" or "being in the world".

Also: The event for B is a possibility within being- the kind of situations he terms "historical" are those which contain an evental site, a structural weakness where an event may occur.

 

[kopelgep]

The split necessitates the Party working on an inert working class who's role is to essentially provide the brawn, whilst the Party the brains, one follows from the other.

I think Badiou's split between the 'being' of everyday life and the 'event' recreates this leninist split albeit on a much more abstract plane.

Agree with the first bit, that seems about right. But I don't think the analogy holds to the being/event dyad. Since with the former we are dealing in some sense with subjects, in the latter case an "event" has no being at all. If you mean that he posits some "truer" existence in the truth process, then this is correct though, but it definitely doesn't replicate the party structure- it dissolves it completely. In Théorie Du Sujet B worked along semi-Leninist lines, but his later works entirely abandon this...

 

[revol68]

Relation isn't intrinsically dialectical though, is it? By which I mean that whilst it can be thought as such, it can and has been thought otherwise. Not everyone is a Hegelian are they? B's notion of being is non-relational though, it has to be as it is grounded in set theory, and set theory in and of itself doesn't give any structure to the things which are counted within a given set. He puts relation on the side not of being, but of appearing, of "being there" or "being in the world".

Also: The event for B is a possibility within being- the kind of situations he terms "historical" are those which contain an evental site, a structural weakness where an event may occur.

I agree that there are other ways of understanding relations that don't need to use dialectical method or metaphor. Of course not everyone is Hegelian but the fact is that Marx's concept of the proletariat, the antagonism between capital and labour rests on a dialectical approach and to be honest it makes the most sense to understand it on those terms.

From reading Ethics his concept of Event didn't seem to be contingent within 'being' infact he seemed to be at great pains to point out it's externality, infact it didn't seem like a kick in the arse off Foucault's episteme break and likewise it doesn't impress me with it's ability to explain the movement prior to this break. Then again his discussion of 'being' and 'event' is so vague that I was left to assume the level at which to apply them. I mean is a strike an event or part of being, is everything short of a revolution not an event? Does fascism and the holocaust count as 'an event'? It seems entirely arbitrary to me what constitutes an event and as such what constitutes fidelity to the truth. The example you gave of 'everyone in France counts as french' as being a truth seems to me to being faithful to the everyday 'being' of liberal nationalism and so doesn't seem like fidelity to the truth of an event whatsoever.

 

[kopelgep]

I agree that there are other ways of understanding relations that don't need to use dialectical method or metaphor. Of course not everyone is Hegelian but the fact is that Marx's concept of the proletariat, the antagonism between capital and labour rests on a dialectical approach and to be honest it makes the most sense to understand it on those terms.

From reading Ethics his concept of Event didn't seem to be contingent within 'being' infact he seemed to be at great pains to point out it's externality, infact it didn't seem like a kick in the arse off Foucault's episteme break and likewise it doesn't impress me with it's ability to explain the movement prior to this break. Then again his discussion of 'being' and 'event' is so vague that I was left to assume the level at which to apply them. I mean is a strike an event or part of being, is everything short of a revolution not an event? Does fascism and the holocaust count as 'an event'? It seems entirely arbitrary to me what constitutes an event and as such what constitutes fidelity to the truth. The example you gave of 'everyone in France counts as french' as being a truth seems to me to being faithful to the everyday 'being' of liberal nationalism and so doesn't seem like fidelity to the truth of an event whatsoever.

You would need to read Being and Event to get a grip on exactly how his system works. Ethics IS extemely vague about these things. An event, for Badiou, is a formal description of a breakdown in situational structure/metastructure, which usually operates within situations to hide the nature of being, which is infinite inconsistent manifold multiplicity, to count it as if it were one. This means that not every historical "moment" or "turning point" is an event (in Badiouian terms). His recent book What is the Meaning of Sarkozy? works on thiskind of basis, holding that the election of Sarko is a non-event (in his own deeply peculiar terminology).

 

[revol68]

Well i'm not going to bother reading that cos he hasn't tempted me enough with his wee Ethics number and there are much more interesting things I want to read. If you can give a brief summary of how he actually applies these concepts I'd maybe revise my opinion. Your example of 'all people in France are French' as a truth, I don't see how such a stance equates to fidelity to an event as 'liberal civic nationalism' doesn't constitute a breakdown of a situational structure beyond that of say an ethnic nationalism and if it does constitute an event then it seems to become diluted to the point of meaninglessness. Every political outlook and ideology being an 'event' that one can be faithful to. I mean surely 'all Fench people are white' is as much a statement of truth? Unless of course 'events' are simply things that Badiou arbitrarily decides on the back of his own particular politics.